ceeding begun within four months of the at- tachment.-Miller v. Kenniston (Me.) 114.
The words "insolvent" and "insolvency" in the insolvent act mean an inability to meet maturing demands in the ordinary course of the business.-Morey v. Milliken (Me.) 102.
A life insurance policy, assigned by an in- solvent debtor as security to one of his credit- ors, becomes the policy of his estate upon the transfer by that creditor of his claim.-Morgan v. Dugan (Md.) 558.
A suit by an assignee in insolvency in Mas- sachusetts will not be enjoined at the suit of a creditor in New Hampshire.-Crippen v. Rogers (N. H.) 346.
The insolvent must make a conveyance of the property to the trustee.-Clark v. Manko (Md.) 621.
Effect of ignorance of a creditor, who was preferred by an insolvent, of the fact of insol- vency and of the preference, as affecting the va- lidity of the preference.-Willison v. First Nat. Bank (Md.) 749.
A trust deed for the benefit of all creditors, without preference, executed by a firm which had previously committed acts of insolvency by preferring certain creditors, is of no effect. Willison v. First Nat. Bank (Md.) 749.
A sale of its stock in trade, with an imme- diate return of part of the price to the pur- chaser to cancel a prior debt, held to be an ille- gal preference, constituting an act of insol- vency.-Willison v. First Nat. Bank (Md.) 749. An agreement between certain creditors and the assignee, with the approval of an insolvent court as to the retaining by the creditors of certain preferences, will not conclude other creditors from contesting the debt, and show- ing illegal preference.-Morey v. Milliken (Me.)
A preference may be surrendered at any time until the debt is fully disallowed.-Mo- rey v. Milliken (Me.) 102.
The replacing securities lost by others to take their place is not an exchange, but is a preference.-Morey v. Milliken (Me.) 102.
Under Rev. St. c. 70, § 29, a person accept ing a preference, knowing that his debtor was insolvent, cannot prove his debt nor receive his dividend until he surrenders to the assignee the benefits of such preference.-Morey v. Mil- liken (Me.) 102.
Where creditors received security, with ex- press notice of their debtor's insolvency, having elected to hold security, they are charged with taking it under notice of insolvency.-Morey v. Milliken (Me.) 102.
Proof and allowance of elaims.
A wife may prove against her husband's es- tate a note against him received by her as heir at law of her grandfather.-Purdy v. Purdy's Estate (Vt.) 695.
Evidence examined in support of a claim by wife against her husband's insolvent estate, and held sufficient.-Purdy v. Purdy's Estate (Vt.) 695.
A claim for attorney's fees is not one for wages or salary, under Code, art. 45, § 15, so as to entitle the attorney to priority.-Lewis v. Fisher (Md.) 608.
An attorney is not entitled to priority of pay- ment for services, under Code, art. 47, § 15.- Lewis v. Fisher (Md.) 608.
A tradesman who has failed to keep books of account is not entitled to a discharge. In re Mooers (Me.) 109.
Whether a tradesman's book gives the com- plete history of his business is a question of fact. In re Mooers (Me.) 109.
Of corporate books, see "Mandamus." Instructions.
See "Criminal Law"; "Trial.
Service of writs on foreign companies, see- "Writs."
The requirements of the act of 1870, that a person or association must be authorized by a charter of incorporation to do insurance busi- ness in order to issue a policy, is reasonable, hence is not unconstitutional.-Commonwealth v. Vrooman (Pa.) 217.
Pub. Laws, c. 673, prohibiting discrimination in premiums on life policies, is not violated be- cause the insured receives the commission from. the agent in consideration of furnishing him the names of others wishing insurance.-Quigg v. Coffy (R. I.) 794.
Where there was evidence of waiver of proofs. of loss, it was proper to charge to find such waiver if defendant was notified of the loss.. and took possession of the property, and offered to pay the award, and denied its liability on oth- er grounds.--Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland v. Traub (Md.) 904. The contract.
Under the standard policy, the insurer is sub- rogated to a judgment recovered by the insured v. Manufacturers' Natural Gas Co. (Pa.) 1001. against the party causing the loss.-Stoughton
tain correct copies of the application when the Act May 11, 1881, requiring policies to con-- policy refers to it, applies only when the ap- plication is in writing.-Lennox v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (Pa.) 940.
Where an attaching creditor fails to procure insurance on his interest, and the debtor takes out a policy, it is on his own interest, not on. that of the creditor.-Donnell v. Donnell (Me.) 67.
An agent carrying on business for his princi- pal, and accounting for the stock and property on hand, holds the property "in trust," within an insurance on goods so held.-Roberts v. Fire- men's Ins. Co. of Chicago (Pa.) 450. Application.
Misstatement by insured as to whether any of her family had died of consumption held to avoid the policy.-Jerrett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (R. I.) 793.
Effect of provision in policy that the loss shall not be paid until 60 days after ascertainment of the amount thereof.-Cooledge v. Continental. Ins. Co. (Vt.) 798.
A condition in a policy avoiding it if foreclo- sure proceedings be commenced does not refer to proceedings pending at the time the policy was written.-Cooledge v. Continental Ins. Co. (Vt.) 798.
Question whether a condition that a policy shall be void if there is any increase in the hazard is not broken by a sale under a judg ment which existed at the time of writing the policy. Collins v. London Assur. Corp. (Pa.) 924.
Construction of condition in a fire policy avoiding it if the hazard be increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the
insured.-Collins v. London Assur. Corp. (Pa.)
A sale on execution issued on the judgment of contract, see "Contracts." entered on a note given for the balance due on a mortgage held not to be a foreclosure of the mortgage, within the meaning of a condition in
a policy rendering it void in case of foreclosure. See "Constitutional Law." -Collins v. London Assur. Corp. (Pa.) 924.
A sale by a sheriff does not pass title, within the meaning of a condition in an insurance pol- icy prohibiting change of title, until after he acknowledges and delivers the deed.-Collins v. London Assur. Corp. (Pa.) 924.
A condition in a fire policy that it shall be void if the interest of the assured be other than the unconditional and sole ownership relates to ownership when the policy is issued.-Collins v. London Assur. Corp. (Pa.) 924.
Evidence considered, and held to show the waiver of a condition of a policy requiring con- sent to additional insurance to be given by directors at a regular meeting.-Stauffer v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n of Lancaster Coun- ty (Pa.) 384.
Under a by-law of an insurance company that the insurance shall be confined within 12 miles of H., removal of the insured property beyond such limit will not forfeit the insurance.-Reck v. Hatboro Mut. Live-Stock & Protective Ins. Co. of Montgomery County (Pa.) 205.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
One may appeal from the granting of a liq- uor license by the county commissioners with- out showing a grievance peculiar to himself.- Appeal of Beard (Conn.) 775.
violation of Gen. Laws, c. 109, § 16.-State v. A delivery of intoxicating liquors is not a Prescott (N. H.) 342.
An indictment charging that defendant kept for sale one pint of cider sufficiently alleges that he kept it with intent to sell.-State v. Pres- cott (N. H.) 342.
On appeal, the action of the court of quarter sessions in granting a tavern license cannot be reviewed on the merits.-In re Branch (Pa.) 296; Appeal of Beck, Id.
Where the bond filed with an applicant for a tavern license is adjudged insufficient, a new bond may be filed, and the license granted.-In re Branch (Pa.) 296; Appeal of Beck, Id.
Where, after default as to assessments, no- tices of other assessments are sent to a mem--Appeal of Kelminski (Pa.) 301. ber, who pays all such assessments to an agent and subsequently annual dues, the association is estopped to deny that he has been reinstated. Commonwealth v. Provident Life Ass'n (Pa.)
A retail license cannot be arbitrarily refused.
Mutual benefit insurance.
A certificate of membership in a mutual as- sociation is not an insurance policy, within Act May 11, 1881, requiring copies of the by-laws to be attached to the policy.-Lithgow v. Su- preme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World (Pa.) 830.
The judges of the court of quarter sessions have no power to allow or make transfers of liquor licenses from one place to another.-Laib v. Hare (Pa.) 163.
Complaint and warrant for seizure of liquors examined, and held sufficient.-State v. Le Clair (Me.) 7.
St. 1870, c. 125, § 2, authorizing officers to seize intoxicating liquors, is constitutional when the seizures can be made without infringing against unreasonable searches. - State v. Le Clair (Me.) 7.
Plaintiff, in an action on a policy, must allege an insurable interest in himself at the time the Of actions, see "Action." policy was issued, and also at the time of the loss.-Dickerman v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (Vt.) 808; Same v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Id.
The declaration on a contract of insurance need not set forth collateral provisions of the policy regarding the rights of the parties, liquidation of damages, and the like.-Cooledge v. Continental Ins. Co. (Vt.) 798.
See, also, "Courts"; "Justices of the Peace."
Neither the president judge alone of the court of common pleas nor the two associate judges acting together can enter judgment on points reserved in vacation and without consultation.
In an action on a policy not payable for 60-Butts v. Armor's Estate (Pa.) 357. days after proof of loss, there is a fatal variance if the declaration alleges a promise to pay with- out limitation as to time.-Cooledge v. Continen- tal Ins. Co. (Vt.) 798.
A contract to insure, "except as hereinafter provided," property "while located as described herein, and not elsewhere," held to be a con- ditional contract, so as to necessitate the state- ment of the condition in an action thereon.- Cooledge v. Continental Ins. Co. (Vt.) 798.
There is no variance between the complaint in an action on the policy, and the policy, where there is no variation as to the parties, the obli- gation to pay, or the time when the payment became due, though the language employed in the complaint might be so general as to be bad on demurrer.-Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland v. Traub (Md.) 904.
In an action against an insurance company, service on one, in an office of his own, who merely solicits insurance and delivers policies, is insufficient.-Eberman v. American Fire Ins. Co. (Pa.) 398.
Arrest of, see "Criminal Law." By default, see "Criminal Law." Satisfaction by joint executor, see "Executors and Administrators."
The certificate of the clerk of a court, in which a foreign judgment was rendered, is defective, if made by a deputy.-Ensign v. Kindred (Pa.)
Where a judgment creditor erroneously enters satisfaction, which is set aside, the judgment is still prior to judgments recovered before the satisfaction; and a subsequent judgment is not entitled to priority where the property of the debtor is insufficient to pay the intermediate ment so satisfied.-McCune v. McCune (Pa.) judgments between him and that of the judg- 577; Appeal of Fullerton, Id.
On scire facias it is not necessary to serve a copy of the claim to entitle plaintiff to judg
ment for want of an affidavit of defense.-Oil | by the rules of court.-Brundred v. Egbert (Pa.) City v. Hartwell (Pa.) 268. 503.
Effect, as against a subsequent judgment, of the entry of various judgments of revival at different times on a scire facias for the sum due each of different use plaintiffs. In re Ernst's Estate (Pa.) 371; Appeal of Hayes, Id. The entry of judgment on a note executed on Sunday under a power of attorney therein granted does not prevent the maker, after the judgment has been set aside, from defending by showing that the note was made on Sunday. -Whitmire v. Montgomery (Pa.) 1016.
A judgment for plaintiff after a verdict in his favor must be entered on the verdict, and not on a point reserved.-Ringle v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.) 492.
A judgment in the small-cause court, enter- ed in figures instead of in words, is reversible. Meirs v. Bussom (N. J. Sup.) 433.
A sheriff's sale under a voidable judgment en- tered in scire facias proceedings on a mortgage is binding on a stranger to the proceedings, as against a bona fide purchaser, when collaterally attacked by the former 30 years afterwards.-- Brundred v. Egbert (Pa.) 503.
An allegation of want of actual notice of a decree of distribution made by the orphans' court will not be considered in a collateral at- tack upon such decree.-Ferguson v. Yard (Pa.) 517.
A judgment rendered against a principal and his surety held to be paid by the sale of the surety's land, so that the assignment thereof to the surety thereafter gave him no rights.- Fulton v. Harrington (Del. Err. & App.) 856. Where a client ratifies the act of his attorney A judgment entered in figures may be amend-in accepting securities and satisfying a judg amendment, and sues on such securities, he cannot ed.-Meirs v. Bussom (N. J. Sup.) 433. have the satisfaction set aside. Whitesell v. Peck (Pa.) 933; Appeal of Stevenson, Id. Scire facias to revive judgment.
Non obstante veredicto.
Propriety of judgment in will contest for the contestee non obstante veredicto, which was rendered on a point reserved as to whether there was any evidence on which contestants were entitled to recover.-Butts v. Armor's Es- tate (Pa.) 357.
Remedy of judgment debtor who failed to de- fend an application for a writ of scire facias to revive the judgment, though he had a good de- fense, he being ignorant of the application for the writ.-Jones v. George (Md.) 635.
Propriety of judgment non obstante veredicto The defense of the statute of limitation to a on a point reserved as to the sufficiency of evi- writ of scire facias must be specially pleaded, dence to justify a recovery, when the jury, un-and cannot be urged on a motion to quash a writ der the instructions of the court, did not find on of fieri facias.-Jones v. George (Md.) 635. all the issues of the case.-Butts v. Armor's Es- tate (Pa.) 357.
Where judgment against a husband and wife for necessaries is reversed as to the wife, it is not a bar to an action against her on the same claim.-Roll v. Davidson (Pa.) 987.
A decision by a common-law court, refusing to set off a judgment, held to be conclusive on an application for the same relief to an equity court.-West New York Silk-Mill Co. v. Laubsch (N. J. Ch.) 814.
A judgment against defendant on a plea to the jurisdiction is not a bar to a subsequent ac- tion between the same parties, involving the same subject-matter.-Town of Jericho v. Town of Underhill (Vt.) 690.
Conclusive effect of judgment as to whether certain waters were navigable, this question be- ing necessarily found before the verdict could be rendered.-Sherman v. Sherman (R. I.) 459.
A conclusion of the orphans' court upon a question necessarily involved in the exercise of its jurisdiction, but otherwise outside of its jurisdiction, is not binding when the question arises in another way.-Dunham v. Marsh (N. J. Prerog.) 47.
The validity of a judgment of a court of com- petent jurisdiction will not be considered on a motion to quash a writ of fieri facias issued thereunder.-Jones v. George (Md.) 635. Opening and vacating.
Right of defendant to have a judgment en- tered against her on a judgment note opened to allow her to set off a note held by her against plaintiff.-Steiner v. Scholl (Pa.) 159.
A rule on plaintiff to show cause why a judg- ment entered against him on a judgment note should not be stricken off held to have been properly discharged, there being a conflict of evidence as to whether the note was given for a gambling transaction. Champlin v. Smith (Pa.) 447.
Propriety of opening a judgment against a married woman, confessed under a power of at- torney, in order that she might show that she signed the power as surety for her husband's debts.-Harris v. Reinhard (Pa.) 510.
A judgment by default cannot be set aside without notice to the judgment creditor. Chapdelaine v. Handy (R. I.) 342.
Where a bill filed to cancel a note as having See, also, "Execution." been given for a gambling debt is dismissed for want of jurisdiction of defendants, the ques-chase price is somewhat less than the value of A sale will not be set aside because the pur- tion of the validity of such note is not res judi- the lands.-Thomson v. Ritchie (Md.) 708. cata.-Champlin v. Smith (Pa.) 447.
An order of distribution is not conclusive as to a nonresident infant legatee not represented, where the auditor is the attorney of the other legatees. In re White's Estate (Pa.) 192.
A decree of, the orphans' court for the sale of the decedent's land, if obtained by fraud on persons not parties to the proceeding, may be attacked by them collaterally.-Sager v. Mead (Pa.) 284.
A judgment by default in a proceeding by scire facias sur mortgage is voidable merely, and not void, when entered by an attorney in- stead of being taken in open court, as required
trust property, to accept a bid offered by the Propriety of refusal by trustees, on a sale of auctioneer on the part of one who wrote to him, asking him to make the bid, but who was unknown to him or to the trustees.-Thomson v. Ritchie (Md.) 708.
A sale under an order of the orphans' court is not subject to collateral attack because made on application of the administrator in behalf of creditors, instead of being made on applica- tion of the creditors themselves.-Simpson v. Bailey (Md.) 622.
A purchaser of land at a sheriff's sale has no right to use force to dispossess the tenant there- of.-Frick v. Fiscus (Pa.) 515.
Right of a purchaser at public sale of an as- signed estate to have the sale set aside on the ground that the title was not wholly in the as- signor.-In re Seard's Estate (Pa.) 298; Appeal of Burford, Id.
Jurisdiction.
See "Courts"; "Equity."
On appeal, see "Appeal."
Taking case from, see "Trial."
Sufficiency of oath by jury commissioners "to faithfully fill the jury wheel in performance of their official duties," no motion being made to quash the array on account thereof until four months after application for continuance. Klemmer v. Mt. Penn Gravity R. Co. (Pa.) 274. The array will not be quashed because one of the jury commissioners, residing some miles from the county seat, by agreement took the jury wheel, and kept it at his home.-Klemmer v. Mt. Penn Gravity R. Co. (Pa.) 274.
The president judge need not take an addi- tional oath in writing before entering on his du- ties, under Act April 10, 186, regulating the drawing of jurors.-Klemmer v. Mt. Penn Grav- ity R. Co. (Pa.) 274.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Rights and liabilities.
Sufliciency of evidence to authorize a find- ing that a lessor agreed to make all necessary and ordinary repairs. Gulliver v. Fowler (Conn.) 852.
Measure of damages for breach of agreement to repair a house let for a boarding house, and for false warranties as to the heating apparatus, is the rental value of the rooms which conse- quently cannot be let. Gulliver v. Fowler (Conn.) 852.
Notice by a tenant, who has the option of a further term for four years, that he will take a further term for one year, is equivalent to a notice that he will not take for four more years. Williams v. Mershon (N. J. Sup.) 619.
A landlord is not liable for injuries by a fall of snow from the roof of a building rented to a tenant, by an ordinance requiring railings on the roofs after 30 days' notice, where no notice was given.-Lee v. McLaughlin (Me.) 65.
A tenant in possession of a building is liable for a fall of snow from the roof on a traveler. Lee v. McLaughlin (Me.) 65.
Construction of a five-year oil lease as to whether the failure of the lessee to make pay- ments as provided therein relieved him of lia- bility for the rent.-Conger v. National Transp. Co. (Pa.) 1038.
A lease will not be forfeited because of fail- ure in the prompt payment of the rent, where time is not the essence of the contract, and full compensation can be had.---Lynch v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co. (Pa.) 984.
The fact that the lessor knew the lessee in- tended to use the premises for the illegal sale of liquor does not avoid the lease.-Miller v. Ma- guire (R. I.) 966.
The fact that a lessee who intended to use the premises for the sale of liquor is unable to pro- cure a license because of subsequent building of a school near the premises does not constitute eviction. Miller v. Maguire (R. I.) 966.
Right of lesser to justify an ejection of his tenant on the ground that a sublease made by the tenant to him provided for use of part of the premises for the illegal sale of liquor.-Al- len v. Keilly (R. I.) 965.
Where, under an oil lease to three persons, the lessees have the right to surrender by parol, the third is bound by the declarations and acts of the other two respecting such surrender.- Hooks v. Forst (Pa.) 846.
be made by parol.-Hooks v. Forst (Pa.) 846. Where a lease provides for a surrender, it can
In an action on a written lease, defendant may show that he did not accept it, but paid rent under a prior verbal agreement.-Johnson v. Smith (Pa.) 675.
Construction of lease, as to whether it in- cluded a vacant strip adjoining the described premises; the lease covering the house and premises," and "all the buildings, outhouses, and premises of such place, with appurtenances." -Morris v. Kettle (N. J. Sup.) 879.
Necessity of assent in writing of the wife to a lease for five years of her land, made by her husband for her.-Williams v. Mershon (N. J. Sup.) 619.
No notice to quit is necessary when, by the terms of the lease, it expires at the end of a year. Williams v. Mershon (N. J. Sup.) 619.
Construction and effect of a provision in a lease that the hay crop should be equally divid- ed between landlord and tenant, but speut on the farm.-Brown v. Ela (N. H.) 412.
Where defendant leased his farm to plain- tiff, who covenanted that, in consideration of the lease and $100, he would care for defend- ant's mother during such term with other cov- enants, the death of the mother does not for- feit plaintiff's right to the $100-Varney v Bradford (Me.) 115.
Right of tenant holding over, in suing for property distrained on for rent which accrued after the end of his term, to prove that he com- plained of the premises, and that repairs were needed, and that negotiations were pending for a new lease.-Patterson v. Park (Pa.) 1041.
When one leasing property for a certain time holds over there is a renewal of the lease.-- l'atterson v. Park (Pa.) 1041.
Action for rent under an oil and gas lease, wherein the fact that the title was partly in the wife of the lessor was no defense, the wife hav- ing made no objection to the lease.-Kunkle v. People's Natural Gas Co. (Pa.) 719.
Waiver of breach of provision in lease, as to the time of paying rent, by an acceptance of the rent after the stipulated time.-Mack v. Dailey (Vt.) 686.
Though, in an action of covenant for rent, an eviction cannot be shown unless specially pleaded, when such defense is admitted with- out objection, the defect in the pleading is waived. Morris v. Kettle (N. J. Sup.) 879.
If the defendant be evicted by the landlord from a part of the premises, the payment of the entire rent is suspended during the contin- uance of the eviction.--Morris v. Kettle (N. J. Sup.) 879.
Gen. St. § 2969, which excuses a tenant from paying rent if the tenement is so injured as to be unfit for occupancy, does not apply to the case of an injury occurring from the want of ordinary repairs.-Gulliver v. Fowler (Conn.) 852.
A lessee of oil land who assigns the lease is A lessee of oil land who assigns the lease is liable for rent, though the lessor fails to de- mand the rent from the assignee when due.- Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal Co. v. Greenlee (Pa.) 489.
One leasing oil land under an agreement to pay a certain sum for each oil well drilled is liable for rent, though he assigns the lease to another, whom the lessor recognizes as his tenant.-Pitts- burgh Consolidated Coal Co. v. Greenlee (Pa.) 489.
Where one, by consent of the lessee, places a third person in possession of the leased prem- ises, he is not liable under the lease, though he may have paid the rent for several months.- Beck v. Eagle Brewery of Newark (N. J. Ch.) 1100.
Liquor license, see "Intoxicating Liquors." Of pilot, see "Pilots."
Act March 28, 1892, does not empower bor- oughs to license the business of a grocer.-Guerin v. Borough of Asbury Park (N. J. Sup.) 472.
Where the purchaser of growing trees cuts all the timber worth taking, and abandons the premises for 11 years, his right to enter is gone. -Patterson v. Graham (Pa.) 247.
See "Mechanics' Liens."
Of attachment, see "Attachment." Of attorney, see "Attorney and Client." Of execution, see "Execution." Of mortgages, see "Mortgages."
In an action for the rent. an allegation that See "Insurance." defendant was enjoined from interfering with the use of the leased premises by the railroad, and that such injunction amounted to eviction, entitles defendant to a hearing.-Friend v. Oil- Well Supply Co. (Pa.) 1134.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
An action against an administrator for a share of an estate is barred after three years from his final accounting.-Buckmaster v. Reed (Del. Super.) 971.
Several distinct conversations as to a debt barred by the statute cannot be considered to- gether.--Patterson v. Neuer (Pa.) 748.
I owe you" is not sufficient to remove the bar.- A statement that "I will pay you everything Patterson v. Neuer (Pa.). 748.
A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute must specify the amount.-Patterson v. Neuer (Pa.) 748.
Effect of finding of true will of testator, aft- er the administration of his estate under a sup- posed will, upon the running of limitations against the rights of legatees under a former will.-Spruance v. Darlington (Del. Ch.) 663.
Where a resident debtor absconds, and after- wards returns, the statute begins then to run in his favor if the creditor takes no steps to ascer- have served process on him.-Dukes v. Collins tain his whereabouts, and could, with diligence, (Del. Super.) 639.
A promise to pay in installments a debt barred by the statutes does not enable the creditor to sue immediately.-Wiley v. Brown (R. I.) 464.
Act March 25, 1881, requiring actions against railroad companies for negligence to be brought within two years, does not apply to horse rail- roads.-North Hudson County Ry. Co. v. Flana- gan (N. J. Sun.) 476.
A by-law of a 'own prohibiting excavations in a street does not make the offense a continuing one, where the hole is left open, so as to pre- vent the running of the statute.-Borough of Wallingford v. Hall (Conn.) 47.
An action for a fine for making an excavation in a street must be brought within one year aft- er the excavation was made.-Borough of Wal- lingford v. Hall (Conn.) 47.
Where the first demand for payment of a de- mand note was made 28 years after its execu- tion, and after the death of all the parties, it is barred by the statute. In re Stevens' Estate (Pa.) 245; Appeal of Wiestling, Id.
Lapse of time will not bar an accounting by an executor when the trust relation has not been terminated.-Davis v. Eastman (Vt.) 1.
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