Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: its own force, such liens may be enforced in | from an initial carrier for the damages to the state court against and to the extent of an interstate freight shipment. Reversed the property affected by the lien, notwith- and remanded for further proceedings. standing the order setting it apart as ex- See same case below, 116 Ga. 863, 60 L. empt, and the discharge of the debt in bank- R. A. 817, 43 S. E. 265. ruptcy. In cases of liens which can exist independent of the question whether or not the property is exempt, undoubtedly the rule here invoked would be applicable; but the lien of a general judgment is not such a lien. It is a lien upon real property, only, which is not exempt. Hence, if this prop-in error, for the damages sustained by them erty was exempt at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the judgment under which it was sold was not a lien thereon, and to assume that the judgment was a lien is to assume that it was not exempt,the very question at issue." We are not able to perceive that the state supreme court denied in any way a right of plaintiffs in error specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States. All that was determined, and all that the state court was called on to determine, was the question of exemption under the state statutes. Its acceptance of the judgment of the Federal court in that regard does not bring the case within § 709. Writ of error dismissed. (196 U. S. 194) The plaintiff in error brings this case here to review the judgment of the supreme court of Georgia, affirming a judgment of the trial court, in favor of the defendants on the shipment of certain grapes, as hereinafter more particularly stated. First reported, 113 Ga. 514, 53 L. R. A. 720, 38 S. E. 970, and again, on appeal from judgment on second trial, 116 Ga. 863, 60 L. R. A. 817, 43 S. E. 265. The trial court gave judgment for the shippers of the grapes, who were plaintiffs below, for the amount of the difference between the market price of the grapes as shipped in good order and the amount they actually received for the same in their damaged condition, being the the sum of $434.55. The action was commenced in the Pike county court, in the state of Georgia, and the petition averred that on July 31, 1897, the petitioner shipped a carload of grapes from Barnesville, Georgia, consigned to Rocco Brothers, Omaha, Nebraska, by way of the Central of Georgia Railway CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY COM- Company. The freight was to be conveyed PANY, Plff. in Err., v. A. O. MURPHEY and J. L. Hunt, Partners, by more than two common carriers, the initial carrier being the Central of Georgia Railway Company, and the freight was shipped under a contract of shipment in which it was provided that the responsibility of each carrier should cease upon deinterstate livery to the next "in good order." The grapes were greatly damaged on the route between Barnesville and Omaha, and the damage resulted from the negligence of the common carriers on the route. The petitioners applied to the plaintiff in error, the initial carrier on the route, and served it with an application in writing August 20, 1897, in which they requested that the railway company should trace the freight, and inform the petitioners, in writing, when, how, and by which carrier the freight was damaged, and also that the company should furnish the petitioners the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set forth in the information could be established. The The imposition upon the initial or any connecting carrier by Ga. Code 1895, §§ 2317, 2318, as a condition of availing itself of a valid contract of exemption from liability beyond its own line, of the duty of tracing the freight, and informing the shipper, in writing, when, where, and how, and by which carrier, the freight was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the information can be established, is, when applied to an interstate shipment, a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. [No. 111.] Argued December 16, 1904. Decided Janu- railroad company failed to trace the freight and give the information in writing within the thirty days required by law, wherefore the petitioners averred that the railroad company became indebted to the petitioners to the amount of the damage to the grapes as stated. The plaintiff in error demurred to the petition, the demurrer was overruled, and it | the grapes were damaged, and the names of then put in an answer denying many of the the parties and their official position, if any, allegations of the petition. Upon the trial by whom the truth of the facts set out in it appeared that the grapes were shipped the information could be established. They from Barnesville, Georgia, to Omaha, Ne- also demanded that the information should braska, and they were "routed" by the ship- be furnished within thirty days from the pers over the Central of Georgia, then the date of the application. The plaintiff in Western & Atlantic, then the Nashville, error, although it endeavored so to do, Chattanooga, & St. Louis, then the Louis- failed to furnish the information within the ville & Nashville, and then the Wabash time mentioned in the statute. It offered Railroads. The initial carrier, the plain- to prove on the trial that the car in which tiff in error, issued to the shippers, A. O. the grapes were originally shipped at Murphey and Hunt, a bill of lading for the Barnesville, on the road of the plaintiff in carload of grapes, which showed the routing error, reached Atlanta, Georgia, the end of as above stated, and the bill was signed by the line of the plaintiff in error, in due Murphey and Hunt, as the contract between time, and that the grapes were then in good the plaintiff in error and themselves. It order, and the car was promptly delivered contained a promise "to carry (the grapes) to the next connecting line, that is, the Westto said destination, if on its road, or to de- ern & Atlantic Railroad, and by that road liver to another carrier on the route to said it was delivered to the Nashville, Chattadestination, subject, in either instance, to nooga, & St. Louis Railroad Company, at the conditions named below, which are Nashville, are Nashville, Tennessee, with the grapes in agreed to in consideration of the rate like good order and condition. The evidence named." Omaha, Nebraska, is not on the was rejected, the court holding that the road of the plaintiff in error. Paragraph 5 plaintiff in error had failed to comply with of the bill of lading, under which the ship- the conditions of the statute, and that it ment of grapes was made, reads as follows: was therefore liable for the amount of the "5. That the responsibility, either as damage sustained by the petitioners on common carrier or warehouseman, of each whatsoever road the damage actually occarrier over whose line the property curred. shipped hereunder shall be transported, shall cease as soon as delivery is made to the next carrier or to the consignee; and the liability of the said lines contracted with is several, and not joint; neither of the said carriers shall be responsible or liable for any act, omission, or negligence of the other carriers over whose lines said property is or is to be transported." The grapes were carried under the contract contained in the bill of lading, and arrived at Omaha, in the state of Nebraska, in a damaged condition. The law under which the action was brought is found in §§ 2317 and 2318 of the Code of Georgia of 1895. Those sections are set forth in full in the margin.† On the 20th day of August, 1897, the shippers availed themselves of these provisions of the statute, and duly demanded of the plaintiff in error that it should trace the grapes, and inform the shippers, in writing, when, how, and by which carrier †Sec. 2317. When any freight that has been shipped, to be conveyed by two or more common carriers to its destination, where, under the contract of shipment or by law, the responsibility of each or either shall cease upon the delivery to the next "in good order," has been lost, damaged, or destroyed, it shall be the duty of the initial or any connecting carrier, upon application by the shipper, consignee, or their assigns, within thirty days after application, to trace said freight, and inform said applicant, in writing, when, where, and how, and by which carrier said freight was lost, damaged, or de | Messrs. John I. Hall, Henry C. Cunningham, Lloyd Cleveland, and Robert L. Berner for plaintiff in error. Messrs. William Wallace Lambdin and Hoke Smith for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court: The supreme court of Georgia has held in this case that the statute applies to shipments of freight destined to points outside, as well as to those inside, the state, and we must accept that construction of the state statute. The question for us to decide is whether the statute, when applied to an interstate shipment of freight, is an interference with, or a regulation of, interstate commerce, and therefore void. We think the imposition upon the initial or any connecting carrier, of the duty of tracing the freight, and informing the shipstroyed, and the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in said information can be established. Sec. 2318. If the carrier to which application is made shall fall to trace said freight and give said information, in writing, within the time prescribed, then said carrier shall be liable for the value of the freight lost, damaged, or destroyed, in the same manner and to the same amount as if said loss, damage, or destruction occurred on its line. per, in writing, when, where, how, and by | provision making the initial or any conwhich carrier the freight was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out in the information can be established, is, when applied to interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The supreme court of Georgia has held that a carrier has, in that state, the right to make a contract with the shipper to limit its liability, as a carrier, to damage or loss occurring on its own line. Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Avant, 80 Ga. 195, 5 S. E. 78; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Shomo, 90 Ga. 500, 16 S. E. 220. necting carrier liable in any event for any loss or damage sustained by the shipper, on account of the negligence of any one of the connecting lines, would also be convenient for the shippers; but it would hardly be maintained, when applied to the interstate shipment of freight, that a state statute to that effect would not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. The provision of this statute, while not quite so onerous, is yet a very plain burden upon interstate commerce. It is also said that it is so much easier for the initial or other connecting carrier to obtain the information provided for in the statute than it is for the shipper, that a statute requiring such information to be obtained, under the penalty of such carrier being liable for the damage sustained, ought to be upheld for that very reason. Whether the state would have the right to prohibit such a contract with regard to interstate commerce need not therefore be considered. It has not done so, but, on the contrary, its highest court has recognized the validity of such a contract. Without Assuming the fact that the carrier might the provisions of the statute in question, more readily obtain the information than the plaintiff in error would not be liable to the shipper, we do not think it is material the shippers in this case, if, without negli- upon the question under consideration. We gence, they delivered the consignment in are not, however, at all clear in regard to good condition to the succeeding carrier. the fact. The loss or damage might occur This they offered to prove was the case. on the line of a connecting carrier, outside But if this statute be valid, this limitation the state where the shipment was made (as of liability can only be availed of by the was the case here), and we do not perceive railroad company by complying with its that the initial carrier has any means of obprovisions. In other words, before it can taining the information desired, not open avail itself of the exemption from liability to the shipper. The railroad company rebeyond its own line, provided for by its ceiving the freight from the shipper has no valid contract, the initial or any connecting means of compelling the servants of any carrier must comply with the terms of the connecting carrier to answer any question. statute, and must, within thirty days after in regard to the shipment, or to acknowlnotification, obtain and give to the ship-edge its receipt by such carrier, or to state per the information provided for therein. its condition when received. And when it This is certainly a direct burden upon interstate commerce, for it affects most vitally the law in relation to that commerce, and prevents the exemption provided by a legal contract between the parties from taking effect except upon terms which we hold to be a regulation of interstate commerce. It is said that the reason for the passage of such an act lies in the fact that, as a general rule, shippers under such a contract as the one in question are very much inconvenienced in obtaining evidence of the loss or damage, where it occurred on another road than that of the initial carrier. It is contended that, under such contracts, there being great difficulty in identifying the particular carrier upon whose road the loss occurred, it is reasonable to make the initial or other connecting carrier liable therefor, unless such carrier furnish the information provided for in the statute. We can readily see that a provision, such as is contained in the statute in question, would be a very convenient one to shippers of freight through different states. And a is known by the servants of the connecting company that the object of such questions is to place in the hands of the shipper information upon which its liability for the loss or damage to the freight is to be based, it would seem plain that the information would not be very readily given, and the initial or other carrier could not compel it. The effect of such a statute is direct and immediate upon interstate commerce. If directly affects the liability of the carrier of freight destined to points outside the state, with regard to the transportation of articles of commerce; it prevents a valid contract of exemption from taking effect except upon a very onerous condition, and it is not of that class of state legislation which has been held to be rather an aid to than a burden upon such commerce. The statute in question prevents the carrier from availing itself of a valid contract unless such carrier comply with the provisions of the statute by obtaining information which it has no means of compelling another carrier to give, and yet, if the information is not obtained, The power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within the limits of the state cannot extend so far as to thereby regulate interstate commerce. The police power of the state does not give it the right to violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. Being of the opinion that the statute in question, when applied to an interstate shipment, is a regulation of interstate commerce, we must hold the statute, so far as it affects such shipments, to be void on that account. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed and the case remanded for such further proceedings as may be consistent with this opinion. Reversed. the carrier is to be held liable for the negli- | ly imposes a burden upon the carrier of gence of another carrier over whose conduct interstate commerce, and is not an aid to it, it has no control. This is not a reasonable but, in its direct and immediate effect, it is regulation in aid of interstate commerce, quite the contrary. but a direct and immediate burden upon it. The case of Richmond & A. R. Co. v. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 42 L. ed. 759, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335, is not an authority against these views, but, on the contrary, it supports and exemplifies them. The section of the Virginia Code (1295 of 1887) was held not to be a regulation of interstate commerce, because it simply established a rule of evidence ordaining the character of proof by which a carrier might show that, although it received goods for transportation beyond its own line, nevertheless, by agreement, its liability was limited to its own line. The statute left the carrier free to make any limitation as to its liability on an interstate shipment, beyond its own line as it might deem proper, provided, only, the evidence of the contract was in writing and signed by the shipper. The provision of the Virginia statute that, although the contract in writing provided for therein was made in fact, yet "if such thing be lost or injured, such common carrier shall himself be liable therefor, unless, within a reasonable time after demand made, he shall give satisfactory proof to the consignor that the loss or injury did not occur while the thing was in his charge," is a materially different provision from the one under consideration. A provision in a statute may be deemed a reasonable one, and not a regulation of interstate commerce, where the statute simply imposes a duty upon the carrier, when the loss has not happened on the carrier's own line, to inform the shipper of that fact within a reasonable time, and this court has said in the above case that such a provision is manifestly within the power of the state to adopt. This is very different (196 U. S. 192) HARVEY FULLERTON, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF TEXAS. Error to state court-Federal question. A certificate of the presiding judge of a state court that a Federal question which was first raised by a petition for rehearing was duly considered and decided cannot confer jurisdiction on the Federal Supreme Court of a writ of error to the state court, where, from the face of the record proper and from the opinions, the reasonable inference is that the court may have denied the application in the mere exercise of its discretion, or may have declined to pass upon the Federal question in terms because it was suggested too late. [No. 112.] Argued December 16, 1904. Decided January 9, 1905. IN ERROR to the Court of Criminal Apjudgment which affirmed a conviction in the County Court of Hunt County, in that state, of unlawfully dealing in futures. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. peals of the State of Texas to review a See same case below, (Tex. Crim. App.) The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. William W. Griffin and A. D. Englesman for plaintiff in error. from the duty imposed upon the carrier by No brief was filed for defendant in error. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: Fullerton was charged by information with unlawfully conducting, carrying on, and transacting the business of dealing in futures in cotton, grain, etc.; and unlawfully keeping a bucket shop, shop, so-called, "where future contracts were then and there bought and sold with no intention of an actual bona fide delivery of the articles and things so bought and sold." He was found guilty as charged, and sentenced to a fine of $200 and imprisonment for thirty days. The case was carried to the court of criminal appeals of Texas, and judgment affirmed. The court, in its opinion, stated the contention to be that the evidence did not show a violation of the statute, namely, art. 377 of the Penal Code; and held, on a consideration of the facts, that Fullerton had clearly brought himself within and violated the statute. 75 S. W. 534. Fullerton thereupon moved for a rehearing, which motion was overruled. This application for rehearing assigned, among other grounds, that the statute, as construed by the court, was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. In overruling the motion, the court delivered a second opinion on the question of the sufficiency of the indictment, which was attacked, not in the motion for rehearing, but in an additional brief, presented after the submission of that motion. The court, however, held the indictment good, and, after stating that "the motion for rehearing was mainly devoted to an attack on the original opinion, wherein the evidence was held sufficient," adhered to that opinion. 75 S. W. 535. No reference to the Constitution of the United States was made by the court, nor does the record disclose any such reference except in the petition for rehearing, as before stated. that to do so would violate said constitutional provision." And further, "that said contention was duly considered by us and decided adversely to plaintiff in error." But, on the face of the record proper, and from the opinions, the reasonable inference is that the court may have denied the application in the mere exercise of its discretion, or declined to pass on the alleged constitutional question, in terms, because it was suggested too late; and nothing is more firmly established than that such a certificate cannot, in itself, confer jurisdiction on this court. Henkel v. Cincinnati, 177 U. S. 170, 44 L. ed. 720, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U. S. 63, 41 L. ed. 72, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 939. Writ of error dismissed. (196 U. S. 207) UNITED STATES, Appt., v. UNITED VERDE COPPER COMPANY. The use of timber taken from unsurveyed min- We have repeatedly ruled that it is too late to raise a Federal question by a petition for rehearing in the supreme court of a state after that court has pronounced its final decision, although, if the state court entertains the petition, and disposes of the Federal question, that will be sufficient. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730. In that case it was observed: "Had that court declined to pass upon the Federal questions, and dismissed the petition without con- Argued December 2, 1904. Decided January sidering them, we certainly would not undertake to revise their action." Some weeks after the denial of the motion 9, 1905. PPEAL from the Supreme Court of the for a rehearing, this writ of error was al-A Territory of Arizona to review a judg lowed by the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals, who certified that on that motion it was contended "that, under the evidence in the cause, plaintiff in error was engaged in interstate commerce and commerce between different states within the meaning of article 1, § 8 of the Constitution of the United States, and that the statutes of the state of Texas could not make such matters and transactions an offense, and ment which affirmed the judgment of the See same case below, (Ariz.) 71 Pac. 954. |