John Evans, which were held by the defendants, and which they, acting in combination, procured, in co-operation with James Evans, to be allowed as claims against the estate of Hiram Evans. By reason of that combination, resulting in the allowance of all those claims in the probate court, as expenses of administering the estate of Hiram Evans, the defendants have so tied their respective claims together as to make them, so far as the plaintiffs and the relief sought by them are concerned, one claim. The validity of all the claims depends upon the same facts. The lien on the lands which is asserted by each defendant has its origin as well in the combination to which all were parties as in the orders of the probate court, which, in furtherance of that combination, were procured by their joint action. Those orders were conclusive against the plaintiffs, as to all the claims, if the claims could be allowed at all against the estate of Hiram Evans. A comprehensive decree by which the plaintiffs can be protected against those orders will avoid a multiplicity of suits, save great expense, and do justice. If the plaintiffs do not prove such a combination and conspiracy, in respect, at least, of so many of the specified claims as in the aggregate will be of the required amount, then their suit must fail for want of jurisdiction in the circuit court; for, in the absence of the alleged combination, the claim of each defendant must, according to our decisions, be regarded, for purposes of jurisdiction, as separate from all the others.

It is contended that the jurisdiction of the | upon that estate a liability for debts of circuit court must fail, because no one defendant has a claim of the required jurisdictional amount. In support of this contention, several cases are cited of the class to which Walter v. Northeastern R. Co. 147 U. S. 370, 373, 37 L. ed. 206, 208, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348, 349, belongs. That was a suit by a railroad company against the treasurers and sheriffs of several counties through which its road passed, to enjoin them-separately, of course-from issuing executions against, or seizing the property of, the company for the purpose of collecting a tax based upon an assessment alleged to be unconstitutional and void. The court said: "It is entirely clear that, had these taxes been paid under protest, and the plaintiff had sought to recover them back, it would have been obliged to bring separate actions in each county. As the amount recoverable from each county would be different, no joint judgment could possibly be rendered. So, had a bill for injunction been filed in a state court, and the practice had permitted, as in some states, a chancery subpoena to be served in any county of the state, these defendants could not have been joined in one bill, but a separate bill would have had to be filed in each county. . . . It is well It is well settled in this court that when two or more plaintiffs, having several interests, unite, for the convenience of litigation, in a single suit, it can only be sustained in the court of original jurisdiction, or on an appeal in this court, as to those whose claims exceed the jurisdictional amount; and that, when two or more defendants are sued by the same plaintiff in one suit, the test of jurisdiction is the joint or several character of the lia-93. bility to the plaintiff."

The case before us, however, is presented by the bill in an entirely different aspect. The case may be regarded as exceptional in its facts, and may be disposed of without affecting former decisions. There is no dispute as to the amount of any particular claim. So far as the bill is concerned, if any one of the specified claims is good against the estate of Hiram Evans, then all are good; if the lands in question, or any interest in them, can be sold to pay one claim, they must be sold to pay all. The court could not, under the bill, enjoin the prosecution of one claim and leave the others untouched. The matter in dispute is whether the lands in which the plaintiffs have a joint, undivided interest of one half can be sold to pay all the claims, in the aggregate, which the defendants, by combination and conspiracy, procured the probate court to allow against the estate of Hiram Evans. The essence of the suit is the alleged fraudulent combination and conspiracy to fasten

An instructive case on the general subject is Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 15 L. ed. That was a suit in equity in a Kentucky state court in which the plaintiffs, as the legal representatives of an intestate, sought a decree for certain proportionate amounts alleged to be due them respectively from the defendant, who had married the widow and thereby obtained possession of the property of the deceased. The defendant was charged with having converted to his own use a large amount of the intestate's property to which the legal representatives of the intestate, plaintiffs in the suit, were entitled. In that suit a decree was rendered against the defendant for a large sum of money, "the shares of the respective complainants being apportioned to them in the decree," and the defendant being required by the decree to pay to each of the plaintiffs the specific sum to which he was entitled as his portion of the property misappropriated by him. Subsequently a suit was brought in a circuit court of the United States (jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship) to enforce the decree rendered in the Kentucky state court, and to compel the

cision in that case, said: "It was held that, where the representatives of a deceased intestate recovered a judgment against an administrator for an amount in excess of the

defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, respective- | Rep. 603, 605, the court, interpreting the dely, the several sums which had been decreed in their favor. A decree to that effect was rendered. The whole amount which the defendant was required by the decree to pay was large enough to give this court jurisdic-sum necessary to confer jurisdiction to retion on appeal, although the specific sum awarded to each plaintiff was less than the jurisdictional sum. The defendant appealed to this court, and a motion was made to dismiss the appeal on the ground "that the sum due to each complainant is severally and specifically decreed to him; and that the amount thus decreed is the sum in controversy between each representative and the appellant, and not the whole amount for which he has been held liable."

view, and such recovery was had under the same title and for a common and undivided interest, this court had jurisdiction, although the amount decreed to be distributed to each representative was less than the jurisdictional sum." See also The Connemara (Sinclair v. Cooper), 103 U. S. 756, 26 L. ed. 322; Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 369, 34 L. ed. 708, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; New Orleans P. R. Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S. 51, 36 L. ed. 68, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 361, 41 L. ed. 191, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 647, 39 L. ed. 289, 296, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237.

It is said that as to any single one of the claims in question the plaintiffs in the pres

After observing that, if that view of the matter in controversy was correct, this court was without jurisdiction, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the court, said: "But the court think the matter in controversy, in the Kentucky court, was the sum due to the representatives of the deceased collective-ent case could have released the lands in ly, and not the particular sum to which each was entitled, when the amount due was distributed among them, according to the laws of the state. They all claimed under one and the same title. They had a common and undivided interest in the claim; and it was perfectly immaterial to the appellant how it was to be shared among them. He had no controversy with either of them on that point; and, if there was any difficulty as to the proportions in which they were to share, the dispute was among themselves, and not with him. It is like a contract with several to pay a sum of money. It may be that the money when recovered is to be divided between them in equal or unequal proportions. Yet, if a controversy arises on the contract, and the sum in dispute upon it exceeds $2,000, an appeal would clearly lie to this court, although the interest of each individual was less than that sum. This being the controversy in Kentucky, the decree of that court, apportioning the sum recovered among the several representatives, does not alter its character when renewed in Iowa. So far as the appellant is concerned, the entire sum found due by the Kentucky court is in dispute. He disputes the validity of that decree, and denies his obligation to pay any part of the money. And if the appellees maintain their bill, he will be made liable to pay the whole amount decreed to them. This is the controversy on his part; and the amount exceeds $2,000. We think the court, therefore, has jurisdiction on the appeal."

The doctrines of Shields v. Thomas have been frequently recognized by this court. In the recent case of Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 218, 44 L. ed. 741, 743, 20 Sup. Ct.

which they had an undivided interest by paying that particular claim; therefore, it is argued, the value of the matter in dispute, as between the plaintiffs and such defendant, was the amount of the latter's claim. And so as to each separate claim. But that same thing could have been said as to the respective claims involved in Shields v. Thomas. The defendant there could have paid off any of the respective claims involved. This court, however, held that fact to be immaterial because the defendant disputed the validity of the original decree holding him liable for all the claims, and had no concern as to how the whole amount decreed against him was to be distributed. So here, the plaintiffs, suing to protect their common undivided interest in lands put in peril by fraudulent orders obtained by the defendants acting in combination to obtain such orders for their benefit, are only concerned in preventing the defendants from proceeding under the orders of the probate court, which they procured for their benefit equally, and under which they all now equally claim. The plaintiffs made no contest as to particular claims. They dispute all of them as claims against Hiram Evans's estate. If the orders of the probate court stand for the benefit of the respective defendants, then the plaintiff's interests in the lands are liable for all the claims asserted by the defendants; for there is no dispute here as to the amount of any particular claim. Hence, as we have said, the value of the matter in dispute is the aggregate amount of the claims fraudulently procured by the defendants acting in combination to be allowed in the probate court as claims against the estate of Hiram Evans.

Árgued January 27, 1905. Decided Febru- any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is

*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 83, Cent. Dig. Mandamus, § 52.

found, without respect to the amount in con- | tory and judge of the district court of the troversy, and shall recover threefold the second judicial district, quashed the return damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3202.

The return of the judge also stated that the actions in ejectment brought by the railroad company against trespasses upon its property were instituted prior to the sale of its railroad property and franchises to the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fé Railroad ComAll of those lands, with the rights, priv- pany; and that the refusal of the judge to ileges, and franchises appertaining thereto, assume jurisdiction in the case referred to were acquired by the Santa Fé Pacific Rail- was upon the ground that the service upon road Company as the successor of the At-Ripley as president of the company was not, lantic & Pacific Railroad Company, to which last-named company they were granted by the act of Congress of July 27th, 1866. 14 Stat. at L. 292, chap. 278.

moved that such order be made in the prem- | retirement from office of the original defendises as would be conformable to the rules ant, the writ must abate in the absence of and practice of this court. Judge Abbott any statutory provision to the contrary. consents that the action may be revived When the personal duty exists only so long against him as the successor of Judge Baker, as the office is held, the court cannot compel and proceed to a hearing, without further the defendant to perform it after his power summons or notice, upon the record as now to perform has ceased. And, if a successor presented to the court. in office may be substituted, he may be mulcted in costs for the fault of his predecessor, without any delinquency of his own. Besides, were a demand made upon him, he might discharge the duty and render the interposition of the court unnecessary. At all events, he is not in privity with his prede

In United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604, 607, 21 L. ed. 721, 722, which was a man-cessor; much less is he his predecessor's perdamus against Mr. Boutwell as Secretary of the Treasury, it appeared that after the case was brought to this court the defendant resigned his office. Thereupon a motion was made to substitute the name of his successor, Mr. Richardson. It did not appear that any previous application was made to the latter for leave to substitute his name, and he opposed the motion, which was denied.