cisco, California, requiring his arrest as one of the crew of the French ship Jacques, then in that port, on account of his insubordi

L. 992, 996), does not entitle the seaman to his discharge on habeas corpus when brought before a Federal district court, since the objection to the irregularity of the arrest is obviated by the action of that court in ex-nate conduct as one of such crew. (The reamining into the case under the authority conferred upon it by the act of June 11, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 121, chap. 116), carried forward in substance as U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 4079-4081 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2766), enacted to provide for the execution of treaties respecting consular jurisdiction over the crews of foreign vessels in the waters and ports of the United States. 4. The imprisonment of an insubordinate seaman on a French vessel, pursuant to art. 8 of the treaty with France of August 12, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 992, 996), providing that such persons may be arrested on the written requisition of the consul, "supported by an official extract from the register of the ship or the list of the crew, and shall be held, during the whole time of their stay in the port, at the disposal of the consuls," need not end with the departure of the vessel from the port at which the seaman was taken from the vessel, but may last until the expira

tion of the two months, which is the limit prescribed by the act of June 11, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 121, chap. 116), carried forward in substance as U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 40794081 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2766), enacted to provide for the execution of treaties respecting consular jurisdiction over the

crews of foreign vessels in the waters and ports of the United States.

[No. 104.]

1904. Decided

Submitted December 15, 1904.
March 13, 1905.

quisition contained all the averments of fact which would warrant the arrest of the petitioner under the provisions of the treaty of 1853 between the United States and France.) The petitioner also averred that, at the time of the making of his application for the writ, the ship was not in the port of San Francisco, but had departed therefrom some time before. The petitioner was arrested by the chief of police, under such requisition, on the 1st day of May, 1903, and since that time had been confined in the city prison of San Francisco. He asserted that his imprisonment was illegal, because the facts set forth did not confer jurisdiction upon the consul or the chief of police, or either of them, to restrain complainant from his liberty, or to imprison him.

The petition was dated the 26th day of May, 1903, and the writ was issued, returnable before the district court on the 28th day of May, 1903. The chief of police produced the body of the defendant, pursuant to the command of the writ, and justified the imprisonment, under the requisition re

ferred to.

The district court, after hearing counsel, made an order discharging the defendant from arrest, on the ground that it appeared to the court that the bark Jacques, of the crew of which the defendant was a member, had departed from the port of San Francisco, and was no longer in that port. It PPEAL from the District Court of the was further ordered that the execution of United States for the Northern District the order should be stayed for the term of of California, to review a discharge, on one day. Immediately thereon the consul habeas corpus, of an insubordinate seaman general filed with the district court his petion a French vessel, arrested on the requisition for appeal to the Supreme Court of the tion of the French consul. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

A

Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This is an appeal on the part of the consul general of the Republic of France from the judgment of the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, discharging the defendant Moisan from imprisonment.

The proceeding arises on habeas corpus, to inquire into the validity of the detention of defendant in the city prison of San Francisco, in the state of California. His application for the writ was addressed to the district court of the United States for the northern district of California, and it showed that he was a citizen of France, and was imprisoned by virtue of a requisition in writing, signed by the French consul general residing in San Francisco, and addressed to the chief of police of San Fran

United States from the judgment discharging the defendant from imprisonment, which appeal was duly allowed, and thereupon the petitioner was admitted to bail by the district court.

Messrs. Walter V. R. Berry and Benjamin S. Minor for appellant. Mr. William Denman for appellee.

Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the construction of certain language in the 8th article of the consular convention between the United States and France, concluded on the 23d day of February, 1853, and proclaimed by the President of the United States on the 12th day of August, 1853, the whole convention being still in full force and effect. 10 Stat.

at L. 992, 996. The article is reproduced in | member of that crew, has been held not to the margin.t

the treaties it had entered into with foreign | arrest and detention of the persons arrested governments, must be regarded as the only are to be paid by the consul. From the means proper to be adopted for that pur-language of the treaty the departure of pose. Consequently, the requisition of the the ship from the port need have no effect consul general should have been presented whatever upon the imprisonment of the perto the district court or judge, etc., pursuant sons arrested. The statute statute (Rev. Stat. to the act of Congress, and the arrest should § 4081, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2767) have been made by the marshal, as therein provides that the imprisonment shall in no provided for. Therefore the arrest of the case last longer than two months, and at seaman by the chief of police was unau- the end of that time the person arrested is thorized. When, however, the defendant to be set at liberty, and shall not again be was brought before the district court of the arrested for the same cause. The statute United States upon the writ of habeas cor- makes no reference to the stay of the vessel pus, that court being mentioned in the stat-in port, and the legislative construction of ute as one of the authorities to issue warrants for the arrest of the individual complained of, and having power under the statute to examine into the question, and to commit the person thus arrested to prison, according to the provisions of the act, it would have been the duty of the court, under such circumstances, upon the production of the defendant under the writ, and upon the request of the consul, to have made an examination, and to have committed the defendant to prison if he were found to come under the terms of the treaty. It was, therefore, but a formal objection to the regularity of the arrest, which would have been obviated by the action of the court in examining into the case, and the defendant would not have been entitled to discharge merely because the person executing the warrant was not authorized so to do.

The important question remains as to the true construction of the 8th article of the treaty, with reference to the limitation of the imprisonment of the person coming within its terms. The district court has held that the imprisonment must end with the departure of the vessel from the port at which the seaman was taken from the vessel. This we regard as an erroneous construction of the terms of the article.

the treaty is that the imprisonment is not limited by the departure of the ship. Therefore the statute provides that such imprisonment shall not last, in any event, longer than two months. That term might end while the vessel was still in port. This construction not only carries out the plain language of the treaty, but, it seems to us, it is its reasonable interpretation. A vessel may arrive in port with a mutinous sailor, whose arrest is asked for under the treaty. When imprisoned pursuant to the terms of the treaty, he ought not to be discharged without the request of the consul while within the limit of the term of imprisonment provided by the statute, simply because the vessel from which he was taken has left the port. If that were so, the result would be either that the sailor would be discharged as soon as the ship left the port, or, in order to prevent such discharge, he would be taken on board the ship again, and probably be placed in irons. The ship might then continue a voyage which would not bring it back to France for months. During this time the sailor might be kept in irons and in close confinement on board ship, or else the discipline and safety of the ship might be placed in peril. By the other construction, although the ship had left the port without the mutinous sailor, he would not be entitled to his discharge from im

for by the statute, and this would give an opportunity to the consul to send the sailor back to France, at the earliest opportunity, and at the expense of the French government, by a vessel which was going directly to that country.

The provisions of that article seem to us plain, and they refer to the imprisonment | prisonment within the two months provided of the seaman and his detention during the time of his stay in port, and the language does not refer, in that respect, to the stay of the ship in port. The treaty provides that the local authorities shall lend forcible aid to the consuls when they may ask for the arrest and imprisonment of persons composing the crew, whom they may deem it necessary to confine. The language has no reference whatever to the ship, and they (the persons arrested) are held during their stay in the port "at the disposal of the consul." Surely the ship is not held at the disposal of the consul. It is. the persons arrested who are held, and they are to be released at the mere request of the consul, made in writing, and the expenses of the

The district court erred in discharging the defendant before the expiration of the two months provided for in the act of Congress, and against the protest of the French consul. Less than one of the two months of imprisonment permitted by the statute had expired when the defendant was discharged. The order discharging him must be reversed, and the defendant remanded to imprisonment in a prison where prisoners under sentence of a court of the United States

may be lawfully committed (Rev. Stat. | $1.25 per acre, the statutory price for lands 4081), subject to the jurisdiction of the so entered. The frauds charged are that French consular authority of the port of San Francisco; but such imprisonment must not exceed, when taken with the former imprisonment of the defendant, the term of two months in the aggregate.

Reversed, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.

(197 U. S. 200)

UNITED STATES, Appt.,

v.

JAMES STINSON and Henry J. Stinson, and Michael S. Bright, as Receiver of James Stinson.

Appeal-review of finding as to fraud.

the entrymen did not occupy and improve the lands as required by law, and did not enter them for their own benefit, but were employed by James Stinson to make the entries; that he paid the purchase price to the government, and also paid the entrymen for their services, and thus, in defiance of the provisions of the statutes, obtained title to the lands. James Stinson, in his answer, under oath, denied specifically the alleged frauds. Quite a volume of testimony was taken. Upon this the circuit court found that it was not true, as alleged, that James Stinson had been guilty of fraud in obtaining the title to the lands and dismissed the bili. This dismissal was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (60 C. C. A. 615, 125 Fed. 907), from whose decree the United States appealed to this court.

Messrs. Marsden C. Burch, John B. Simmons, and Solicitor General Hoyt for appellant.

Messrs. R. M. Bashford, John C. Spooner, A. L. Sanborn, William E. Church, Robert Mclurdy, and Roger Sherman for appellees.

The concurrent findings of the two lower courts
that a patentee of lands conveyed to him
by the entrymen immediately after entry
under the pre-emption laws was not guilty
of fraud in acquiring the title, so as to per-
mit the United States to maintain an action
to set aside the patents, will not be disturbed
by the Federal Supreme Court, where the
suit was begun forty years after the alleged
fraud, when the property had passed into
the possession of the receiver of the paten-
tee, appointed at the instance of his credi-ion of the court:
tors, and the testimony of those of the still
living pre-emptors who were called to tes-
tify on the question of fraud was conflict-
ing.

[No. 153.]

Argued January 25, 26, 1905. Decided
March 13, 1905.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin

While the government, like an individual, may maintain any appropriate action to set aside its grants and recover property of which it has been defrauded, and while laches or limitation do not of themselves constitute a distinct defense as against it, yet certain propositions in respect to such an action have been fully established. First, the respect due to a patent,-the presumpPPEAL from the United States Circuit tion that all the preceding steps required by Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-law have been observed before its issue. cuit to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, dismissing a bill to set aside patents for certain sections of land, alleged to have been fraudulently acquired. Affirmed.

A

See same case below, 60 C. C. A. 615, 125

Fed. 907.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: This suit was commenced in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Wisconsin, on February 25, 1895, to set aside the patents for fourteen quarter sections of land, charged to have been fraudulently acquired by the defendant James Stinson. The lands were entered under the pre-emption laws, in 1854-55, by different individuals, and immediately thereafter conveyed by them to James Stinson. The government, as admitted, received

The immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles depending upon these official instruments demand that suits to set aside and annul them should be sustained only when the allegations on which this is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof. Maxwell LandGrant Case (United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co.), 121 U. S. 325, 30 L. ed. 949, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1015; Colorado Coal & I. Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, 31 L. ed. 182, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; United States v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. 142 U. S. 510, 35 L. ed. 1099, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154, 36 L. ed. 384, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575; United States v. American Bell Teleph. Co. 167 U. S. 224, 42 L. ed. 144, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809.

Second. The government is subjected to

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