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WRIGHT, J.-Defendants appeal from an order refusing to retax certain costs. Whether the facts were as claimed by them in their motion, we have no means of knowing. It only appears that they moved, for certain causes, to exclude the fees of several witnesses from the taxation of costs. There is no bill of exceptions, or anything else to show that these causes had any foundation in fact.

G. R. Struble for the appellant-J. L. Allen for the appellee.

PHELPS et al. v. HART.

Appeal from Johnson District Court Saturday, June 6, 1863.

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ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL.

THE opinion of the court was announced by

WRIGHT, J.-Verdict for plaintiffs which was on defendant's motion set aside and a new trial ordered. It seems that the motion was sustained upon the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. And this ruling we shall not disturb. The record simply presents a case, where we would not have felt justified in interfering whether the motion had been overruled or sustained. There was most clearly no abuse of the discretion lodged with the court below, and the order granting a new trial is, therefore,

Affirmed.

Fairall & Boal for the appellants - Clarke & Davis for the appellee.

15 596 Case 2 115 565

THE STATE OF Iowa v. WAY.

Appeal from Tama District Court — Tuesday, June 9, 1863.

REVENUE STAMP.

MOTION to affirm the judgment below. The defendant objected to the transcript on the ground that no stamp was affixed to the Clerk's certificate as required by the National Revenue law. The AttorneyGeneral affixed a stamp.

BALDWIN, Ch. J.-The party producing the transcript in this case having complied with the provisions of the National Tax law by affixing a revenue stamp to the Clerk's certificate, the objections of the defendant to a judgment against him are obviated thereby.

Affirmed.

BENNETT V. HEYLAND.

Appeal from Jones District Court — Friday, June 12, 1863.

RECORD OF EVIDENCE.

THE decision of the court was announced by

WRIGHT, J.-Motion to set aside a sale under execution of certain real estate. The ruling below overruling the motion is affirmed, ou the ground that it does not affirmatively appear that all the testimony upon which it was made is contained in the record.

Affirmed.

Preston & Son for the appellant - G. W. Field for the appellee.

DUDLEY V. REID et al.

Appeal from Lee District Court - Tuesday October 6, 1863.

OVERRULING DEMURRER: EXCEPTIONS.

THE decision of the court was announced by —

WRIGHT, J.-Defendants appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to their answer. To this ruling no exception was in any way taken at that time, but defendant's "had leave to answer further." In this condition the record presents no question for our review. §§ 3106, 3108, Revision of 1860.

Affirmed.

LOWE, J., being interested took no part in the determination of this

case.

Rankin & McCrary for the appellant—J. P. Hornish for the appellee.

Joy V. ROBINSON.

Appeal from Fayette District Court-Wednesday, October 7, 1863.

RECORD ENTRY: TRIAL BY COURT: FINDING OF FACTS.

THE questions presented and the conclusions of the court thereon, were announced by —

LowE, J.-Three errors are assigned: First. In overruling the demurrer to defendant's answer. There is no order or judgment entry of record showing this fact. Second. In overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial. There is no order or judgment entry of record showing any such ruling. Third. In rendering judgment for defendant and against plaintiff. The cause was tried by the Court upon an issue made and evidence offered, without finding the facts and entering them of record. In this imperfect condition of the record there is nothing that we can legitimately pass upon, and the judgment is affirmed.

McClintock and Ainsworth for the appellant- Mc Glathery for the appellee.

DICKERSON & Co. v. DANIELS et al.

Appeal from Clayton District Court-Wednesday, October 7, 1863.

EVIDENCE OF AGENCY: RATIFICATION.

THE facts and the conclusions of the court thereon were stated by—

WRIGHT, J.-In 1852 one Rolf entered, in the name of Michael Sanford, with a military land warrant, the land in controversy. The warrant was issued to Sanford, but was owned by the respondent, Daniels. Daniels lived in Vermont and sent the warrant to his agent, Evans, who employed Rolf to enter the land. Rolf sold the land in August of the same year to complainants, giving them a bond for a deed, reciting the sale for $60, which was to be paid in July, 1853; that a note was taken for the said sum, and that a deed was to be made upon the payment of said note, with all interest and taxes, &c. Before the maturity of the note, which was payable to Rolf, it was indorsed and sent by him to Daniels. After this, complainant paid the

purchase-money and interest to Rolf and took his deed for the land. This was in May, 1854. In August, 1853, Sanford conveyed the land to Daniels, whose deed was filed for record in October of the same year. In 1861 respondent sold the land to respondent Pastch, and received $200 of the purchase-money, but made no deed. This bill is filed against Daniels and Pastch to compel a specific performance of the contract with Rolf, claiming that Rolf was the agent of Daniels, or if not, that his contract and agency was ratified; that Daniels took the title from Sanford in trust for complainants, and that Pastch purchased with notice, &c. The cause was referaed to a referee, who, after hearing all the testimony, found in favor of complainants, and this finding being adopted by the Court, respondent Daniels appeals.

We do not think the evidence justifies this decree. As to the law of the case there is no room for controversy. The bill is not sustained by the evidence (its material averments being denied in the answer), and should have been dismissed.

There is no testimony tending to show that Daniels ever employed Rolf to enter land for him, or that he knew anything of his transacting such business until in 1855. Evans had no authority from Daniels to thus employ him. Then, again, Rolf did not disclose his agency, nor pretend to complainants that he was acting in the entry and sale as the agent of respondent. Complainant had no actual knowledge until years afterwards, that the land warrant belonged to Daniels. But conceding the authority of Rolf to make the entry, by virtue of his employment by Evans, the case is barren of all proof, as to his authority to make the sale. Indeed, his authority to do so is expressly negatived by the testimony of two witnesses, and is not sustained by any. And the authority to make the sale would not include the right to receive the money. The note was not in his hands, nor surrendered. Nor does it even appear that the money was paid to or received by Rolf as the agent of Daniels. At this time complainant knew nothing of the connection of respondent with the land. Daniels held the note, but what it was given for, or that it had any connection with this land, he did not know, so far as disclosed by the evidence. The taking of the note, therefore, could not amount to a ratification, for respondent had no knowledge much less a full knowledge of the facts, at the time of such supposed ratification.

Several letters are introduced in evidence, and a ratification is claimed from them; taking them altogether, they are certainly far from establishing any such proposition. In substance they show a repudiation by respondent of Rolf's act-a willingness on his part to let complainants have the land upon certain terms, and an anxiety on the part of complainants to comply with these propositions and per

fect their title. But these letters amount to nothing more than propositions to settle or arrange the controversy, unless it may be an implied admission, of the independent fact in one of them, by complainants that they were dependent for their title upon the favor of respondent, and had no right, by virtue of the contract with Rolf, to exact the same.

Without reaching the question, therefore, whether Pastch was or was not an innocent purchaser (and the testimony is certainly very slight), we conclude that for the reasons stated, the bill should have been dismissed.

Reversed.

Murdock and Stoneman for the appellant — Noble and Beckwith for the appellee.

GRAHAM V. Wood.

Appeal from Tama District Court - Thursday, October 8, 1863.

EXCEPTIONS TO FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

THE announcement of the conclusion of the court was made by —

Lowe, J.-It is unnecessary to state the facts of this case, as the record shows that the cause was tried by the court, who gave his opinion in writing upon the law of the case together with the facts as found by it, and no objection or exception was made or taken whatever to its decision. The cause comes up upon no point or exceptions taken below, and should be affirmed without further opinion.

Struble for the appellant - Allen for the appellee.

CAMERON V. HOPKINS et al.

Appeal from Lucas District Court - Thursday, October 8, 1863.

TRANSCRIPT: CERTIFICATE BY THE CLERK.

THE disposition of this case was announced by

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