The People ex rel. Ray agt. Davenport. the relator has ever been removed from her position as teacher, under the provisions of the statutes providing for the organization of the board of education and prescribing the powers and duties of said board, and of the board of trustees of the several wards. The provisions in respect to such removals are contained in seccions 1038 and 1042 of the consolidation act (See Manual of the Board of Education, pp. 20, 34). Neither is it alleged that the license of the relator has been revoked for any cause by the written certificate of the city superintendent and the written concurrence of two of the inspectors for the district for which the teacher is employed, as prescribed by section 1042 of the consolidation act (See Manual of 1884, p. 32). It is however alleged that, by the provisions of the act of 1884, the school to which the relator was attached became a ward school, under the provisions of the by-laws of the board of education relating to ward schools, and that by those by-laws but one teacher could be allowed for every thirty-five pupils of a grammar grade, and one for every fifty scholars of a primary grade, and that additional teachers could only be employed by the ward trustees, when authorized by the committee on teachers of the board of education. The respondents further aver, in their return, that the number of pupils returned by the principal of the school in question for the year 1883 was eigthy of the grammar grade, and that the number of teachers allowed by the by-laws aforesaid was, therefore, two only, and that two teachers, in said return named being senior in rank to the relator, were assigned to the two positions of first and second assistants, as prescribed by section 35 of the by-laws of the board of education. After examining the act of 1884, I am of the opinion that the teachers in the colored schools, when said act was passed, were continued as such teachers in the word schools and primaries until removed in the manner provided by law. I am also of the opinion that the words "removed in the manner provided by law," mean the manner provided by the statutes relating to such removals. As already shown, those The People ex rel. Ray agt. Davenport. statutes, provide for a removal by the board of trustees, and by the board of education, and that a license of a teacher may also be revoked for any cause affecting the morality or competency of the teacher (See secs. 1038, 1040 and 1042 of the Consolidation Act). In this case the relator was dropped under a provision of a by-law of the board of education, and not removed in the manner prescribed by the statute above referred to. This procedure I do not think was warranted by the act of I think that the clear intention of the legislature was to continue the teachers in the colored schools until they were removed for some misconduct. If there is any inconsistency between the act of 1884 and the by-laws of the board of education, the former must control, particularly in view of the fact that the act of 1884 provides that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of said act are hereby repealed. If the by-law of the board of education, upon which the learned counsel for the respondent relies, has the force and effect which he attributes to it, it is to my mind entirely inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1884, respecting the "present teachers" in the colored schools. Indeed, the effect of the by-law in question seems to me, upon the facts stated in the return, to have been rather to increase the salaries of the two teachers who were the seniors in rank to the relator, than to "remove" the relator "in the manner provided by law." The learned counsel for the respondents has not furnished the court with a brief in this case, and I have considered it solely upon the points necessarily presented by the return to the alternative writ. No objection was taken on the oral argument to the form of remedy, and I have, therefore, assumed that no such objection is intended to be urged. Let an order be entered that a peremptory mandamus issue to the effect prayed for by the relator. Roof agt. Meyer. CITY COURT OF NEW YORK. CLARENCE M. ROOF agt. PHILIP MEYER. Jurisdiction-City court of New York-Code of Civil Procedure, seotions 815, 723, 724. Where a judgment was recovered and entered in the city court of New York and execution issued thereon for more than $2,000, and the excess was remitted and the judgment and execution was amended nunc pro tune. On motion by a subsequent execution creditor to vacate the judgment and execution for want of jurisdiction and other alleged defects and irregularities : Held, that the jurisdiction of this court extends to any action wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only, whatever may be the amount claimed. The amount claimed does not affect the jurisdiction of this court. If jurisdiction vests at the commencement of the action, it cannot be ousted by any subsequent act, although entry of judgment for the excess of its jurisdiction may have been an irregularity which the defendant might have objected to, a third party cannot. There being no want of jurisdiction, if there are any defects or irregularities in the judgment, or proceedings or execution, they can be taken advantage of only by the defendant. The alleged irregularities and informalities, may be amended or corrected by an order to be entered herein. Special Term, February, 1885. MOTION by Charles Doll, a subsequent execution creditor to vacate the plaintiff's judgment and execution. was HYATT, J.-It appears from the moving papers that the plaintiff had a claim against the defendant and that he brought suit thereon by serving & summons and notice on the defendant on January 23, 1885, three days prior to the commencement of the Doll action; the judgment which was entered thereon was for more than $2,000, but the excess remitted and the judgment and execution amended nunc pro tunc. The defendant does not object to the validity of the judgment, execution and sale thereunder, nor does the moving party herein attack the same upon the ground of fraud or collusion. A subsequent judgment creditor is the only objecting party. He alleges several grounds for setting aside the pro Roof agt. Meyer. ceedings in this action; one as to the jurisdiction of the court, and the others relating to alleged defects and irregularities in the proceedings. Section 315, Code Civil Procedure, provides that the jurisdiction of this court extends to any action wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. The language of this section is intended, as its terms show, to include any money judgment action whatever may be the amount claimed. This court has jurisdiction over all such actions. That the amount claimed does not affect the jurisdiction of this court was held in In re Barbour (52 How., 94); People agt. Marine Court (23 How., 447). If jurisdiction vests at the commencement of the action, it cannot be ousted by any subsequent act (Koppel agt. Heindricks, 1 Barb., 449; McAdam's Marine Ct. Pr. [2d ed.], 36). Jurisdiction having been thus acquired in this action regularly, all subsequent proceedings can be, at most merely irregular, and errors and irregularities may be disregarded or amended. The court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction. The court having jurisdiction, its judgment is not void, as between the parties, and a fortiori as to third parties. Entry of judgment for the excess of its jurisdiction may have been an irregularity, which the defendant might have objected to, a third party cannot. Section 1245 of the New York Consolidation Act, provides that any portion of a claim may be remitted in this court. There being no want of jurisdiction in the case at bar, if there are any defects or irregularities in the judgment or proceedings or execution, they can be taken advantage of only by the defendant. In the conceded absence of fraud, there being no want of jurisdiction, a subsequent execution creditor has no standing in court for the purposes of this motion (Gere agt. Gundlach, 57 Barb., 13). The alleged irregularities and informalities may be ainended or corrected by an order to be entered herein (Code Civil Pro, secs. 723, 724). The motion to vacate the judgment is denied, with ten dollars costs, and the stay of proceedings vacated. NOTE. - Affirmed March General Term.-[ED. Briggs agt. "The Titan." U. S. CIRCUIT. FREALON BRIGGS agt. "THE TITAN" and JOHN H. STARRIN and "THE HILLS." Negligence Obscured lights — Look-out-Speed - Fellow servant · a fellow-servant of a deck hand. The pilot and the deck hand were not fellow-servants. Pilot not The "Hills" is liable also for excess in speed and for not having a look-out. Both parties being to blame, neither may claim to be excused by the others and the decree of the district court giving $3,000 damages, one-half against the "Hills" and one-half against "The Titan" to the libelant, Briggs, is affirmed. Southern District of New York, February, 1885. THE district court waived the point as to whether the deck "The hand was a fellow-servant on "The Titan," but held as Titan was in fault and "The Hills" was also in fault, "The Titan" had a right to claim an apportionment of the damages on "The Hills." Peckham & Tyler, for the libelant Briggs. E. D. McCarty and P. C. Cantine, for "The Titan." Owen & Gray, for "The Hills." WALLACE, J.-Upon the proofs it seems perfectly clear that both the Titan and the Hills were in fault for the collision, by reason of which the libelant was injured. The collision took place about seven o'clock in the evening of September 22, 1882, in the Hudson river, about 1,000 feet out from the Jersey shore, somewhat above the Pavonia ferry slip. The tide was ebb, running about three miles an hour. The wind was light and the night was gray, but fairly clear. The Titan was proceeding up the river bound for |