Matter of Caamano.

out in the opinion of the general term. In the latter case the petitioner had disposed of his own property with intent to defraud the creditors who opposed his discharge, and the affidavit required by the statute that he he had not done so was therefore untrue, and his proceedings were held not to be just and fair. It may well be, as was held in In the Matter of Roberts (59 How., 136), that it is worse for the debtor to dispose of the creditor's property than for him to dispose of his own, and that the former act as well as the latter ought to prevent his discharge. It is not, however, so provided in the statute, and the views of the learned judge who decided the Roberts case were expressly disapproved by the general term of the court of common pleas (In re Fowler, 8 Daly, 85). Counsel for the plaintiff also calls attention to the fact that portions of the fund with which the $40,000 was mingled were given by Caamano to his wife, his brother and brotherin-law, and claims that his conduct "does not make it a violent supposition that he purposely turned over a large part of Mrs. Roderiguez's property for the future benefit of himself and various members of his family.

Of course, if he had disposed of Mrs. Roderiguez's property in this manner, he could not be discharged. The burden of proof, however, to show such disposition of her property is on the plaintiff (In the Matter of Benson, 10 Daly, 166). Not only is such disposition not shown by the plaintiff, but the examination of the debtor, which stands uncontradicted, establishes the contrary. The testimony is that the real estate conveyed to his wife was inherited by her from her mother, and a satisfactory explanation is given why the title was taken. in Caamano's name and of the subsequent conveyance. The testimony is also to the effect that the payments to his relatives were for full consideration out of moneys that belonged to them. There is no evidence that Caamano disposed of his own property or that of Mrs. Roderiguez for the future benefit of himself or members of his family, or with intent to defraud his creditors, and an order must be granted directing him to

Jenkins agt. City of Hudson.

execute an assignment to a trustee, and that he be discharged upon complying with the provisions of the Code relating to the assignment and delivery of his property.

SUPREME COURT.

MARY C. JENKINS, as administratrix, &c., of DANIEL JENKINS, deceased, agt. THE CITY OF HUDSON.

Jury-Effect upon a verdict when the entire jury is unsworn and no objection made-Code of Civil Procedure, sections 721, 1016, 1166.

If a trial proceeds, and a verdict be rendered without a jury being sworn, such a verdict is not irregular and void, when neither party asked that the oath should be administered.

That which the law requires to be done for the protection of a party, may be waived, and the failure to object is a waiver. Nor can failure to object be excused by alleged ignorance.

Ulster Special Term, May, 1885.

MOTION to set aside the verdict of a jury for irregularity.

C. A. Baurhyte and C. P. Collier, for defendant and motion.

Andrews & Edwards, for plaintiff and opposed.

WESTBROOK, J. In this case the plaintiff, whose husband was killed by the upsetting of a load of hay in the city of Hudson, recovered a verdict for $2,500 against the city in an action tried at the Columbia circuit, in April, 1885, for negligently causing such death by permitting one of its streets, upon which the deceased was traveling at the time of the accident, to be out of repair.

In

The defendant now moves, at special term, to set aside the verdict upon the ground that the jurors were not sworn. the county of Columbia, as in all the counties of this (the

Jenkins agt. City of Hudson.

third) judicial district, the practice has been to swear the trial jurors in a body at the commencement of court for the trial of all the civil causes at that circuit. It seems that the clerk neglected this duty at the circuit at which this cause was tried and after the selection of the jury, the trial proceeded without anything being done or said as to the swearing of the jury. The trial was begun April 13, 1885, the cause submitted to the jury on the twenty-second, and the verdict rendered on the twenty-third. The counsel for the defendant did not learn that the jury was not sworn until the said twenty-third day of April, about an hour previous to the verdict.

The question which this motion then presents is: If a trial proceeds, and a verdict be rendered without a jury being sworn, is such a verdict irregular and void if neither party asked that the oath should be administered? In other words, is the swearing of the jury essential to the validity of the verdict? The question, though novel in the form in which it is presented the omission to swear an entire jury involves no new principle but one well settled. That which the law requires to be done for the protection of a party may be waived, and the failure to object is a waiver. Neither can the failure to object be excused by alleged ignorance, for a party is presumed to know what he could easily have ascertained; and if a party wishes for his protection that to be done which the law directs, ordinary diligence requires him to make inquiry whether or not the statute has been complied with, and not to sit with folded arms and assume that others will care for his rights, or to watch, with closed lips, to see if some omission does not occur which will render all that is done of no effect.

The Code of Civil Procedure (sec. 1166) declares "the first twelve persons who appear, as their names are drawn and called, and are approved as indifferent between the parties, and not discharged or excused, must be sworn, and constitute the jury to try the issue."

This portion of the section quoted (it was added to by

Jenkins agt. City of Hudson.

chapter 234 of the Laws of 1883 by disqualifying jurors related by consanguinity or affinity in the same cases in which judges are disqualified; but requiring the objection to be made before opening the case) is almost a literal transcript of the Revised Statutes (2d ed., 438, sec. 61), as indeed the most of the provisions of the Code in regard to jurors are.

The statute and the Code undoubtedly prescribe a rule to be followed, both as to who the twelve jurors are to be, and the administration of the oath, but it was never supposed that, in regard to either the requirements could not be waived. If for example the first twelve found indifferent were not sworn, but some others were without objection taken, would the verdict be set aside as irregular because the statute requirement, that such first twelve must be the jury, is jurisdictional? That portion of the section is as mandatory as the other, and if the objection fails in the one instance it must in the other. And what is true of the provisions of this section is equally true of others in regard to the drawing, summoning, selection and qualifications of jurors; and various other provisions regulating the practice of the courts. They all speak of certain things to be done, and yet when those have been omitted in every instance, when such omission has been made the ground of a motion, it has been held to be waived by want of the interposition of an objection at the proper time.

*

*

In Bennett agt. Matthews (40 How., 428), the alienage of one of the jurors was made the ground of a motion to set aside the verdict, and as an excuse for not making the objec tion upon the trial, ignorance of the fact was urged. The statutes of the state declared an alien "incapable * of serving on any jury" (3 R. S. [5th ed.], 8, sec. 42), but the court nevertheless denied the motion, holding that the failure to make the objection was a waiver, even though the fact of the alienage of the juror did not "come to their knowledge until after the trial.

So, too, when motions have been made to set aside verdicts upon the ground that one or more of the jurors was related

Jenkins agt. City of Hudson.

to one of the parties within the degree which rendered jurors incompetent, though the fact was unknown at the time of the trial, it has been held that the failure to object waived the objection (Schuyler agt. Thompson, 15 Abb. [N. S.], 220; Salisbury agt. McClaskey, 26 Hun, 262).

So, too, it has been held that express statutes as to the mode of selecting a referee and as to his being sworn, can be waived by not making the objection (Whalen agt. Supervisors, 6 How., 278; Keator agt. The Ulster and Delaware Plank Road, 7 How., 41; Nason agt. Luddington, 56 How., 172).

In Howard agt. Setxon (1 Den., 440) it was decided that though a statute of the state required arbitrators to be sworn, yet a procedure with the trial without demanding it to be done was a waiver. The opinion of the court, per BRONSON, J., bears directly upon the present motion because he likens the provisions of the statute requiring arbitrators to be sworn to those requiring judges and jurors also to be sworn, and argues that because the necessity of an oath can be waived in regard to the latter (judges and jurors), it can be in the case of arbitrators.

The exact question involved in this matter was, however, presented in Hardenburgh agt. Crarey (15 How., 307). One of the jurors in that case had not been sworn and that fact was unknown to the parties. A motion was made to set aside the verdict on that ground, and the court (HARRIS, J.) held, writing an opinion to sustain it, that the failure to object was a waiver, and that ignorance did not excuse the want of an objection. The fact is, and so judge HARRIS held, that the language of the statute then in force, which is identical with that of our present Code, required a juror to be sworn in each case; and the practice of swearing jurors in a body for all the issues of a circuit can only be upheld by the absence of an objection to the non-swearing in the case which is tried. When, therefore, the counsel for the defendants undertake to excuse the want of an objection by the plea cf ignorance, in addition to the answer hereinbefore given, that