safe in paying the same to him. But the possession of these papers alone gives him no authority to receive a part of the principal sum secured by the mortgage before it was due. (Crane agt. Evans, ante, 310.)

2. A mortgagor who pays interest or principal upon a mortgage to any one other than the mortgagee himself, when the person receiving the moneys has not in his possession the obligation, does so at his peril. In order to hold the principal to such payment he must be prepared to prove express authority. (Id.)

3. Persons employed as attorneys and counselors to perform services for others must be reasonably well informed of the legal principles applicable to and governing the disposition of the business committed to their charge; and when they fail to inform themselves of statutory provisions or well settled principles of law readily accessible by means of ordinary care and attention, and in consequence thereof the business committed to them is mismanaged, and the persons employing them are deprived of their legal rights, they will not only forfeit all legal claim for compensation, but in addition be justly held responsible for any loss or injury sustained by means of such misconduct by the person or persons for whom they may be employed. (Carter agt. Tallcott, ante, 352.)

4. An attorney who is employed to defend two actions arising out of the same contract, and sets up the same counter-claim, consisting of an indivisible demand as a defense in both actions, and upon the trial of the first action withdraws the counter-claim, except so much thereof as is necessary to extinguish plaintiff's demand, and thereby deprives defendant of the benefits of the remainder of the counter-claim upon the

1. The taxable costs in an action are not subject to set-off. (Turno agt. Parks et al., ante, 35.)

2. An attorney has a lien for his services in a particular case, as a mechanic would upon the product of his labor, and equity intervenes to save it for him, but this lien would ordinarily be measured by his taxable costs, but might embrace a further fee, and will not always be limited to such costs if a special contract had been made in good faith between the client and his attorney, but, it seems, it must refer to his services in the particular action. (Id.)

3. Where prior to the recovery of the judgment the plaintiff assigned to his attorney herein all his interest in the cause of action in payment for services in the suit of Parks agt. Turno, and also for money loaned, and the attorney held this assignment prior to the recovery of judgment, and due notice was given the defendants:

Held, that the equity of the attorney is superior to that of the plaintiff, and no right of set-off exists. (Id.)

4. The lien of an attorney attaches to the cause of action; but if the client has no cause of action at the time of suit brought, there is nothing to which the lien attaches unless it be the papers in the case. (Kipp agt. Rapp et al., ante, 169.)

5. If a judgment be recovered wholly for costs, it belongs to the attorney, who is regarded as the equitable assignee thereof, and he may prosecute in his own name the undertaking given to secure its payment. (Id.)

6. When the plaintiff in an action, after recovering judgment therein, assigned his cause of action, &c., to one "P.," and the action was thereafter continued in the name of the original plaintiff, and a judgment for costs in his favor recovered in the court of appeals, which he also assigned to said "P.," and thereafter an action was brought in the name and with the consent of the original plaintiff by his attorney, who was the attorney of record for the respondent on said appeal, to recover from the sureties on appeal the amount of said judgment:

Held, that the action could not be maintained; that the attorney, being the equitable owner of the judgment, should have brought the action in his own name. (Id.)

7. In such a case, the fact that the attorney obtained an order, after issue joined, permitting him to

2. Such proceedings to compel the delivery of books, &c., are not to be used to try the title to an office; and when, the result of an election is declared by the official canvassers, a county judge has no power, upon such an application, to take evidence and determine the result of an election. (Id.)

3. It is only in a clear case, or in one free from reasonable doubt, that the authority conferred upon the court by the Revised Statutes to compel the delivery of books and papers in the possession of one officer to the custody of another will be exercised. The remedy is only given where the case is so clear that the conduct of the party, in refusing to deliver, could be called willful or obstinate, and not in a case in which a person in good faith holds possession of an office supposing himself to be its lawful incumbent, and with that possession the custody of books and papers essential to the proper discharge of its duties. (Bridg man agt. Hall, ante, 173.)

the true facts. (Bannerman agt. Quackenbush et al., ante, 293.)

2. The distinction between brokers and factors and their rights and liabilities, considered. (Ïd.)

3. Perhaps, in the case put, the true owner might reclaim his goods from the vendee, if the right to do so is exercised within a reasonable time. But the right may be lost by delay or by bringing an action to recover the price. (Id.)

1.

CEMETERY LOTS.

Where it appeared that a certain lot in Greenwood cemetery was purchased by the husband of the plaintiff as a burial lot for herself, her husband and their family, and that it had been greatly improved, not only at his but at her expense, and their family dead had been placed in the lot as their final resting place:

Held, that these facts were sufficient to disable the husband from afterwards conveying it away to another person, and thereby devoting it to a distinct and different purpose. The plaintiff had become so far interested in the property by its improvement, and the interment of her parents as to prevent her husband from making a legal or valid sale of it. (Schroeder agt. Wanzor, ante, 13.)

2. The case of Thompson agt. Hickey (8 Abb. N. C., 159; opinion by VAN VORST, J.) cited with approval. (Id.)

CITY COURT OF NEW YORK.

1. In examinations in supplementary proceedings in the city court, where it appears that the judg ment debtor has made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors, the examination need not be limited to property acquired

since the assignment. (Schneider et al agt. Altman, ante, 448.)

Was

2. Where a judgment was recovered and entered in the city court of New York and execution issued thereon for more than $2,000, and the excess was remitted and the judgment and execution amended nunc pro tune. On motion by a subsequent execution creditor to vacate the judgment and execution for want of jurisdiction and other alleged defects and irregularities:

Held, that the jurisdiction of this court extends to any action wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only, whatever may be the amount claimed. The amount claimed does not affect the jurisdiction of this court. If jurisdiction vests at the commencement of the action, it cannot be ousted by any subsequent act, although entry of judginent for the excess of its jurisdiction may have been an irregularity which the defendant might have objected to, a third party cannot. (Roof agt. Meyer, ante, 20.)

3. There being no want of jurisdiction, if there are any defects or irregularities in the judgment, or proceedings or execution, they can be taken advantage of only by the defendant. (Id)

CITY MARSHAL.

1. The sureties on the official bond of a city marshal are not liable until after a valid judgment has been recovered against their principal. (In re Mary Braiser, ante, 154.)

CIVIL SERVICE.

1. By section 2 of chapter 410 of the Laws of 1881, it is the duty of the mayor of each city to pre

2.

scribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service of such city; and to carry out the design and intention of the law it was provided that the mayor shall, from time to time, employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries and make examinations; and the power to employ includes the obligation to provide for their compensation. (The People ex rel. Wrig't agt. Common Council of Buffalo, ante, 61.)

Where, under the charter of the city of Buffalo, the mayor made the estimate for what he considered would be the necessary expenses of carrying these provisions of the laws of the state into execution, and communicated and presented such estimate to the common council:

Held, that the common council had no power to wholly reject such estimate. Although it may alter or amend the estimate, it has no authority to arbitrarily reject it. Its duty is to consider it in good faith, with sound judgment and discretion; and if any misapprehension has intervened in its amount, to correct it and apportion it to the probable necessities of the service. (Id.)

2. Section 8, sub. 5- Contempt the refusal of a witness to answer questions may be punished either criminally or civilly-Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 8, sub. 5; sec. 14, sub. 5; sec. 2285-length of the confinement form of the commitment. (See People ex rel. Jones agt. Davidson, 35 Hun, 471.)

3. Section 14, sub. 5- Contempt the refusal of a witness to answer questions may be punished either criminally or civilly - Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 8, sub. 5; sec. 2285-length of the confinement- form of the commitment. (See People ex rel. Jones agt. Davidson, 35 Hun, 471.)

4. Section 22- The practice of referring in an answer to parts of the complaint which the pleader intends to admit or deny, as "at" or "between" certain folios, does not conform to the spirit of the provision of this section of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires pleadings to be made out "in words at length and not abbreviated," and serves no useful purpose on appeal where original folios do not appear in the case. (Caulkins agt. Bolton et al., 98 N. Y., 511.)

5. Section 66- Where orders were granted for the examination of a judgment debtor on proceedings supplementary to execution, upon affidavits in the usual form made by one of the attorneys who recovered the judgments for the plaintiff. On motion by the judg ment debtor to vacate such orders upon the ground that prior to the granting of the orders the title to the judgments had passed to a receiver:

Held, that the judgment debtor had the right to make such motion.

Held, further, that an attorney must obtain leave of the court before he can institute supplementary proceedings upon a judg ment in favor of his own client after the title to that judgment has passed from the client to the receiver, and especially where the proceedings are instituted by an affidavit that says nothing about the lien of the attorney. (Moore agt. Taylor, ante, 343.)

6. Sections 66, 449- The lien of

7.

8.

an attorney attaches to the cause of action; but if the client had no cause of action at the time of suit brought, there is nothing to which the lien attaches unless it be the papers in the case.

If a judgment be recovered wholly for costs, it belongs to the attorney, who is regarded as the equitable assignee thereof, and be may prosecute in his own name the undertaking given to secure its payment. (Kipp agt. Rapp et al., ante, 169.)

Section 191 In an action not founded upon contract, the sum for which the complaint demands judgment is deemed to be the amount of the matter in controversy within the meaning of this section. (Zoeller agt. Riley, 98 N. Y., 668.)

Section 315-Where a judgment was recovered and entered in the city court of New York and execution issued thereon for more