so that to and from are middle terms, appearing to belong to one ball as much as to the other; yet we can distinctly trace an adjective meaning in both; viz. the to-moving-ball and the from-moving-ball. Let it again be supposed, that the balls are at rest, and that a fourth ball is introduced moving. We now observe the relation of time; the present-moving-ball, and the past-movingball: and here might be developed the various relations of the tenses of a verb.

Novelty is the most natural feeling of the mind; and the faculty by which we discover the objects of novelty is called judgment. The business of the judgment is that of discovering differences. In the very threshold of the philosophy of language, this faculty, though in a state of infancy, exerts its influence: the conceptions of novelty give birth to the expression of ideas, to the various modifications of them, and to all the signs and characteristic marks of the qualities of their differences, whether they be the mode and manner of their being, acting, or suffering.

It is now easy to conceive, that the substantive must have been the original part of speech, and that, according to the nature and proportion of differences in substantives, soon were invented the adjective, the verb, and the adverb: the thing or object being the substantive, and the "mode, accident, or quality," the adjective, verb, or adverb. And this corresponds exactly with Locke's notion of substance, and agrees entirely with the conceptions of the Bishop of Worcester, who opposed some of the passages in "The Essay of Human Understanding," in his discourse in vindication of the Trinity where he says "we find we can have no true conception of any mode or accidents, but we must con

c

ceive a SUBSTRATUM or SUBJECT WHEREIN THEY ARE: since it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves." *

As, therefore, the differences in the appearances of things or objects, in the infancy of language, were designated by the new sign signifying quality, so arose the adjective: and further, as the differences in the qualities of things or objects, at the next step towards the improvement of language, were distinguished by another new sign, signifying being, acting, or suffering, so arose the verb and what the adjective is to the substantive, so the adverb is to the verb: the adjective defines the quality of the substantive, the adverb defines the quality of the verb-that is to say, the state of the substantive.

If we consider the nature of the transpositive idiom, the order of words as they occur in the construction of sentences in the Greek and Latin tongues, the present hypothesis will be furnished with an additional argument in its favour. The nature of language will be then further unfolded to our view: the consideration will, moreover, present to us one of the principal causes which have influenced the alteration of language during the progress of man's civilization, But we must traverse back, as before, to the most uncultivated period of society; and a short extract from the writings of Dr. Blair will not only answer our purpose, but also serve for general corroboration.

"Let us figure to ourselves a savage, beholding some object, such as fruit, which he earnestly desires, and requests another to give him. Suppose him unacquainted with words: he would then strive to make himself un

Bishop of Worcester, quoted in Locke's first Letter, page 41.

6

derstood by pointing eagerly at the object which he desired, and uttering at the same time a passionate cry. Supposing him to have acquired words, the first word which he uttered would, consequently, be the name of that object. He would not express himself according to our order of construction, Give me fruit,' but according to the Latin order, Fruit give me,'-' Fructum da mihi for this evident reason, that his attention was wholly directed towards fruit, the object of his desire, From hence," says Dr. Blair, "we might conclude, à priori, that this would be the order in which words were most commonly arranged in the infancy of language; and accordingly we find, in reality, that in this order words are arranged in most of the ancient tongues, as in the Greek and the Latin; and it is said likewise, in the Russian, the Sclavonic, and Gaelic, and several of the American tongues."*

If the arguments which I have adopted are just, then it undeniably follows, that the noun or adjective is the original or fundamental part of speech; and that the theory which embraces a principle to shew that the verb is the original part of speech, must be false; not only because it sets forward upon the supposition that man, grown in intellect, contemplates the nature of his necessities, and so discovers, or endeavours to select such objects as shall be likely to alleviate and satisfy them; but because the supposition implies in itself an evident contradiction. The promulger of such a theory supposes the want or desire of an individual is really the action of the verb in artificial language. But if this mode of reasoning were accurate, the mere want or desire would not con

* Dr. Blair's Lectures.

that

stitute a part of speech or word! nor a part of thought! Animal wants are occasioned by certain involuntary sensations; and are wholly acts of instinct: words are voluntary articulations; the primary object of which is intellectual communication. A man, who was born dumb, and who has since been taught to articulate, is actuated by feelings of want and desire; the inferior creatures are influenced by wants and desires in common with men; and the inferior creatures are emphatically called dumb animals. But, let it be asked, who has ever accused the dumb man, or the inferior creature, of uttering a part of speech? Such a theorist asserts, also, that in naming a person, we can have no idea of him but in a state of being, acting, or suffering; therefore, he infers that the verb was antecedent to the substantive. Let it be retorted: what idea can I or any man have of the state of the being, acting, or suffering of any thing independently of something? None: because "we can have no true conception of any mode or accidents, but we must conceive a SUBSTRATUM or SUBJECT WHEREIN THEY ARE.' To assert, therefore, that the verb is the original part of speech, i. e. that the verb is antecedent to the substantive, implies a contradiction. It is implying that a thing is before it is; which is a manifest absurdity: "Nam quod non est agere non potest; nec ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset."+

*Bishop of Worcester and Locke.

+ Grotius.

CHAP. IV.

The nature of the verb-its being, action, &c.-time-preliminary elucidations deduced from the action and re-action of balls-metaphysical science recommended-verb the life of language, but not the cause of the existence of the substantive atheistical philosophy-an exposition of its absurdities recommended, as subsidiary to the theory for unfolding the force and application of the verb.

LET us next endeavour to unravel more fully the nature of the verb. The moving ball. Moving is evidently of the nature of an adjective; but it is of a nature different from the adjectives red and hard. The red, hard ball. The moving-red-hard-ball. Red and hard indicate two of the qualities of the ball; but moving points out the quality of its state. Let two of these balls be placed upon the table. Let one of them be gently struck; the relations before explained will be recognized. One is the moving ball, the other is the remaining or resting ball. Suppose the moving ball to be now destroyed; we perceive all its relations, which have been named, to be likewise destroyed. The mind, however, reflects upon its experience; and the memory dwells upon the state of the remaining ball, object, or thing. The mind remembers the expedient of adopting the opposite term, moving, to that of resting. But the mind perceives, that, in this instance, it can discover no opposite term to that of remaining or resting; it wants the substratum by which every mode or accident is said to be or exist: and something can have no relation to nothing. The nomen, or name, moving ball, however, is stored up in the memory. We now strike the remaining ball; and discover the quality or state of moving in this to be the same as that of the ball which is destroyed: we, therefore, reasonably conclude, that what is true of this