distinct from the immediate sensations arising from the objects or events themselves. These affections, viz. desire, aversion, joy, and sorrow, we may, after MALBRANCHE," continues Hutcheson, "call spiritual or pure affections; because the purest spirit, were it subject to any evil, might be capable of them. But beside these affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational apprehension of good or evil, there are in our nature violent confused sensations, connected with bodily motions, from which our affections are denominated passions.” *

CHAP. VI.

Locke's notion of matter and substance-controversy between Locke and the Bishop of Worcester-the inference of Locke shewn to be the highest probability and opinion; that of the Bishop of Worcester, the demonstration and certainty, that "the thinking thing in us is immaterial"-argument of modern chemists confuted-the commencement of the study of philosophy and true theoretic science aided by the light of Revelation.

IF there is any truth in these remarks, it is plain, that the notion of Locke respecting passion began and ended in the "instrumentality of the outward organs." But it is presumed, that this should be merely viewed as an oversight; it ought not to be received as a reason for concluding, that the author of "The Essay on Human Understanding" would have agreed with M. Bichat in his conception respecting the "passion of a cabbage!" and for this evident reason; because the arguments of Locke respecting the passions, do not, by any means, correspond with those which he himself has brought for

• The Nature and Conduct of the Passions, pages 62 and 63.—Hutcheson.

ward concerning matter and spiritual substance. But the arguments of Locke on these subjects have been strangely misunderstood. It very commonly happens, that those who have read detached passages only of one side of a controversy, are the very persons who arrogate to themselves the power and right of deciding upon the merits of all that has been said and written upon it. Thus, from a hasty perusal of one or two detached sentences, to be selected from the celebrated controversy of Locke and the Bishop of Worcester, the name even of the great and enlightened author of "The Essay on Human Understanding" has been impugned. But those who, in any tolerable degree, are acquainted with this controversy, will perceive, that when the author of the "Remarks on Scepticism,” says that matter is incapable of thought, he is supported in the most unqualified manner by Locke. "If we suppose nothing to be first, matter can never begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion to be eternal, motion can never begin to be: if matter and motion be supposed eternal, thought can never begin to be; for if matter could produce thought, then thought must be in the power of matter; and if it be in matter as such, it must be the inseparable property of all matter; which is contrary to the sense and experience of mankind." This is the substance of the argument used by Locke, to prove an infinite spiritual being: and was agreeable to the opinions of his antagonist, the Bishop of Worcester; who cited the passage to shew that he was "far from weakening the force of it." And yet there are some men, such individuals as have been mentioned, or individuals but a few gradations removed from them, and most undoubtedly of sceptical opinions, who maintain that a sedulous perusal of the writings of

Locke would tend to make the reader a materialist. The remarks of these persons are most artfully introduced to the minds of the young, with a mention of the well-known conclusion of Locke, that "all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without a demonstration that the thinking thing in us is immaterial.” The meaning of this sentence is no sooner received by artless and unwary young men, than their preceptor quotes a detached sentence from the "Essay on Human Understanding," to shew "that we have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any material being thinks or not; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether omnipotency hath not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive or think." The sceptic (no doubt very charitably) assists his pupil to interpret the passage in perverting the language and argument of the antagonist of Locke to his own purpose. "If this be true then, for all that we can know by our ideas of matter and thinking, matter may have a power of thinking; and if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a spiritual substance in us, from the idea of thinking; for how can we be assured by our ideas, that God hath not given such a power of thinking, to matter so disposed as our bodies are? Especially since it is said, 'that in respect of our notions, it is not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking.'" It is then answered, "whoever asserts this can never prove a spiritual substance in us from a faculty of thinking; because he cannot know from the idea of matter and thinking, that matter so disposed cannot

think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not framed the matter of our bodies so as to be capable of it." If this conclusion from the passage in the Essay on Human Understanding were just, it would then follow that the opinions of Locke were correspondent with those contained in the French philosophy. It is presumed

pas

that the true state of the case is otherwise. In the sage alluded to, Locke meant no more than that "A thinking substance may be combined with a stone, a tree, or an animal body; but that not one of the three can of itself become a thinking being:" and "what is true of one material substance, is true of every other; for all matter, whether organic or inorganic, fluid or solid, is endowed with the same essential properties."* But let the immortal Locke speak for himself. "Your Lordship argues, that upon my principles it cannot be proved that there is a spiritual substance in us. To which give me leave, with submission, to say, that I think it may be proved from my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof in my book stands thus. First, we experiment in ourselves thinking. The idea of this action or mode of thinking, is inconsistent with the idea of self subsistence, and therefore has a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion: the idea of that support is what we call substance; and so from thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking substance in us, which in my sense is a spirit. Against this your Lordship will argue, that by what I have said of the possibility that God may, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that there is a spiritual substance in us, because upon that

• Remarks on Scepticism, page 89.

supposition it is possible it may be a material substance that thinks in us. I grant it; but add, that the general idea of substance being the same every where, the modification of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a spirit, without considering what other modification it has, as, whether it has the modification of solidity or no. As on the other side substance, that has the modification of solidity is matter, whether it has the modification of thinking or no. And, therefore, if your Lordship means by a spiritual, an immaterial substance,

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grant I have not proved, nor, upon my principles, can it be proved, your Lordship meaning (as I think you do) demonstratively proved, that there is an immaterial substance in us that thinks. Though I presume, from what I have said about the supposition of a system of matter, thinking (which there demonstrates that God is immaterial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. But your Lordship thinks probability not enough, and by charging the want of demonstration upon my principles, that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship seems to conclude it demonstrable from principles of philosophy."

This elucidation of the passage is exceedingly satisfactory: the inference of the arguments of Locke, being the highest probability and opinion that the thinking thing in us is immaterial, and the inference of the arguments of the Bishop of Worcester being the demonstration and certainty that the thinking thing in us is immaterial. The fact is, the philosophy of Locke, like that of Bacon, having "God for its author," was derived from the pure fountain of truth. "For this corruptible

must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on im