Replying to your inquiries will advise you that the number of national committeemen to be elected from the state is regulated by each political party at the national convention. One is to be elected this year from this state by the Republican party. The Democratic party is electing two, a man and a woman. The candidates are nominated at the spring election. They are thereafter elected at the national party convention taking office after the convention and holding it for a term of four years.

Very respectfully,

ANDREW B. DOUGHERTY, Attorney General.

*

TAX EXEMPTION: From tax of property of University of Detroit, discussed.

Michigan State Tax Commission, Lansing, Michigan.

April 4, 1924.

Gentlemen: You have requested the opinion of this department relative to the exemption from taxation of certain property owned by the University of Detroit, located in the city of Detroit. It appears from the blue print accompanying your letter, that the property in question consists of the following: Buildings of the University used for school purposes and the grounds on which the same are situated. Grounds used as University campus and an athletic field upon which a stadium has been erected. In addition to the foregoing a number of lots were acquired by the University. The entire property having been platted into lots before it became the property of the University, which plat has since been vacated. This property is being held by the University for school purposes.

Section 4001 of the Compiled Laws of 1915, as amended provides in part: "The following real property shall be exempt from taxation *** Fourth, Such real estate as shall be owned or occupied by *** educational * * * institutions incorporated under the laws of this State, with the buildings and other property thereon, while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which they were incorporated. * * *"

Where the facts are undisputed, whether or not any or all of the real estate belonging to the institution above named is exempt from taxation is a question of law.

It will be noted from the language of the statute that the exemption does not follow from the mere fact of ownership, but is based on ownership combined with occupation for the purpose of its incorporation. There is nothing in the statute which authorizes the assessing officer to limit the amount of real estate belonging to the institution provided it is in good faith solely occupied for the purposes of its incorporation. Webb v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich., 523529.

It follows that if the property heretofore referred to is occupied solely for educational purposes it is exempt from taxation. The word "occupy" means "to hold possession of-to hold or keep for use-to possess." Webster's International Dictionary.

The word "solely" is synonymous with the words "entirely-wholly," from these definitions, it is apparent that all of the property of the University

with the possible exception of the stadium and athletic field is occupied solely for the purposes for which it is incorporated, namely educational purposes.

It is well settled that a college may own grounds used for baseball, football and other athletic sports, which will not be subject to taxation. Emerson v. Milton Academy, 185 Mass., 414.

The fact that some revenue is derived from charging the public admission to witness athletic contests held on these grounds and that the necessary accommodations have been provided for spectators at these contests would not in my opinion render the grounds and structures necessarily used for this purpose, subject to taxation.

Very respectfully,

ANDREW B. DOUGHERTY, Attorney General.

MUNICIPALITIES: Power to compel property owners to con

nect premises with the public sewer, discussed.

Department of Health, Lansing, Michigan.

April 23, 1924.

Gentlemen: We are in receipt of your communication of the 29th ultimo. You enclose with your letter a communication from Dr. E. T. Morris, health officer of the village of Nashville and a copy of a resolution adopted by the board of health of said village, requiring property owners in the village to remove or destroy all outside toilets and connect with the public sewer by a certain date mentioned in said resolution. Dr. Morris wishes to know if the board of health has authority to compel property owners to connect their toilets with the public sewer. This question has never been directly decided by the Supreme Court of this state. The general rule, however, is stated in Volume 19 of Ruling Case Law, page 832, Section 137 as follows:

"Under its general police powers a municipal corporation may require the owners of buildings abutting upon any street along which sewer mains have been laid, to install water closets in their houses and connect the same with the sewer within a specified time from the passage of the ordinance under penalty of fine and imprisonment for non-compliance. It may be that an arbitrary exercise of this power could be restrained but it would have to be palpably so to justify a court in interfering with so salutary a power and one so necessary to the public health."

This question has also been before the United States Supreme Court as well as the court of last resort of many of the states which have uniformly held that municipal authorities had the power to compel property owners to connect their premises with sewers. We refer particularly to the cases of Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138. Allman v. Mobile, 162 Alabama, 226, 50 So., 238; State v. Patterson, 67 N. J. L. 455, 51 Atlantic, 922; Commonwealth v. Abbott, 160 Mass., 282, 35 N. E., 287; Hill v. St. Louis, 159 Mo. 159, 60 S. W.; 116; Mead v. Turner, 119 N. Y. Supp., 526.

It was held in the case of Fristo v. Crowley, 142 La., 393, L. R. A., 1918 C., 254, that upon failure or neglect of a property owner to connect his toilet with the public sewer, that municipal officials might enter upon the premises and

make connections therewith and assess the expenses against the property under the statute in force in that state. It appears therefore, under the police power of the state, the legislature has authority to delegate to municipalities the right to compel owners of property to connect their premises with public sewers abutting thereon and within a reasonable distance thereof and to make it a misdemeanor on the part of the property owners to refuse to comply therewith and it might also empower the municipal authorities to enter upon such premises and make connections with the sewer if the owners refuse or neglect to comply with such orders. The question, therefore, is what power has been given to municipalities over the question under consideration by the legislature of this state.

Sections 5097-5098 inclusive of the Compiled Laws of 1915 gives township and village boards of health power to make such rules and regulations relative to the care and cleansing of toilets within the townships and villages as they may think necessary for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants and may declare any such toilet a nuisance and order and enforce the abatement thereof. A violation of any rule or requirement of the board of health is made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $10. or imprisonment in the county jail not more than ten days or by both such fine and imprisonment. Under sections 5047-5053 inclusive of the Compiled Laws of 1915, township boards of health are given broad powers in abating such nuisances. They may order the nuisance abated within twenty-four hours and if the owner neglects to comply with the order, he is liable to forfeit $100. The board of health may thereafter abate the same the costs and expenses thereof to be assessed against the premises of the owner. These sections do not apply to cities and villages.

Whenever a person is convicted of maintaining a common nuisance, that may be injurious to public health, the court may order it removed or destroyed at the expense of the defendant under the direction of the board of health. The board of health may when they deem it necessary for the preservation of the health and lives of the inhabitants enter any building and abate the nuisance and if entry is refused, it may make a complaint before any justice of the peace and secure a warrant allowing the sheriff or constable to abate the same. Under these provisions, a township board of health would have authority to connect toilets which are a nuisance with a sewer under the order of the board and assess the expenses on the property in addition to the penalty which is provided by the statute.

We must look to the general village incorporation act to discover what the powers of the village are with respect to compelling property owners to connect with the sewer. It is our opinion that under sections 2640, 2668, 2687 and 2689 of the Compiled Laws of 1915, the legislative body of a village, not the board of health, could adopt an ordinance compelling property owners along or near to a public sewer to connect therewith and abandon outside toilets. It could provide a penalty for neglect or refusal to comply with the ordinance and we think could make provisions to connect premises with the sewer for the property owner in case of his refusal to do so and assess the expenses against the property.

The resolution submitted with the letter, adopted by the board of health is not sufficient, however, to compel the relief which it is sought to cover. The action should be taken by way of an ordinance and adopted by the trustees of the village. The ordinance should set up what notice is to be given to property owners to connect with the sewer, provide a penalty for not complying with the notice and if the village desires to make the connections for the property owner in case of his refusal or neglect to do so, of course, it would be necessary to make provision for assessing the expenses against the property. Another objection to the resolution adopted by the board of health is that it endeavors to prohibit all outside toilets in the village of Nashville whether the property abuts or is near a public sewer or not. Sewer connections could not be compelled unless the property were within a reasonable distance of a public sewer. Very respectfully,

ANDREW B. DOUGHERTY, Attorney General.

PARENTS, DEPENDENT: Procedure to compel adult sons and daughters to support, under Act 139 of the Public Acts of 1923, discussed.

April 23, 1924.

Hon. Edmund Ashford, Probate Judge, Manistique, Michigan.

Dear Sir: We are in receipt of your recent communication relative to the court procedure to be followed in the enforcement of the above act and you specifically inquire if process issued out of the probate court under said act may be legally served on adult children outside of the county wherein the proceedings are instituted.

Said Act 139 of the Public Acts of 1923 amends Chapter 97 of Revised Statutes, 1846 relating to "support of poor persons by their relatives." (Section 5191-5205, C. L. 1915) by adding six new sections thereto to stand as Sections sixteen by twenty-one, inclusive.

Prior to the amendment of 1923, said chapter 97 authorized civil proceedings in the circuit court to compel children to support their dependent parents and authorized the enforcement of the court's order for such support by process of attachment from such court, (C. L. 5197) or by action brought by the superintendents of the poor against the designated relatives, "as for moneys paid, laid out and expended." (C. L. 5198).

Section 16 of the amendatory act prescribes a criminal remedy in addition to the civil one against adult residents of the state who, being possessed of or able to earn sufficient means to provide support for their indigent parents, either neglect or refuse so to do, by providing a maximum term of imprisonment of one year upon conviction of such neglect or refusal. The maximum imprisonment being one year, the offense becomes what is commonly termed a circuit court misdemeanor, and in so far as it applies to such proceeding, the procedure would be the same as the general criminal procedure in circuit courts upon complaint, warrant, preliminary examination before the magistrate and the holding for trial in the circuit court. It follows therefore, that the warrant issued by the magistrate and charging the offense prescribed in said Sec

tion 16 could be served anywhere within the state, the same as other criminal process.

Section 17 provides for suspension of sentence after conviction, upon the filing of a bond in the penal sum stated therein and with sureties approved by the court wherein the proceeding is pending, conditioned that the convicted person shall furnish such parent with the necessary and proper shelter, food, care and clothing.

The remainder of the amendatory act, Sections 18 to 21 inclusive, after specifically designating the circumstances under and the extent to which adult children shall be liable for the support of dependent parents, confers concurrent civil jurisdiction on probate courts, prescribes to a certain extent the procedure in such courts and specifically prescribes the procedure for enforcing the court's order for support against the sons or daughter in default who has been brought into such court upon original summons issued upon complaint of the parent or some other person and with the consent of the prosecuting attorney of the county.

The act nowhere authorizes the service of the first or original summons outside of the county of the court's jurisdiction. It follows therefore, that service of such original summons must be made within the county over which the probate court has jurisdiction.

Subdivision (d) of Section 18 of the amendatory act reads as follows: "In case of nonpayment of any sum so ordered together with costs for thirty days after the order has been made or for such less time as the order may provide, and when and so often as the payment so ordered is in arrears, such parent or person acting on his behalf may procure from the judge of probate making the order, a summons against the person in default of payment returnable on the fourteenth day after the service thereof."

Then follows section 19 which provides: "A summons may be served on the person named therein either personally or in such other manner as the judge of probate may in writing direct, and shall require the person so served to attend at the time and place mentioned therein to show cause why the order should not be enforced as may be hereinafter provided."

The summons mentioned in the portions of the act above quoted must be construed as referring to process issued against the relatives in default, and in the nature of an order to appear and show cause why he should not be punished as for contempt of court in not complying with the order of the court determining the liability and fixing the amount and time of payment.

Section 20 of the Act authorizes the court to enforce its order for support "by the like proceedings including imprisonment, as are applicable in the case of a fine or penalty imposed by a justice of the peace." Said Section 20 in our opinion cannot be construed as conferring criminal jurisdiction on probate courts in relation to the act in question, but only as authorizing enforcement of the court's order by proceedings in the nature of contempt and limiting the punishment for such contemptuous conduct to such punishment "including imprisonment" as is legally within the power of a justice of the peace to impose in contempt proceedings cognizable before him. In other words, it is but a declaration of the pre-existing and inherent power of