action does not lie against the Serjeant-at-arms of the House of Commons for excluding a member from the House in obedience to a resolution of the House itself; this being a matter of internal discipline in which the House is supreme (p).

Indian Act, XVIII. of 1850. The principles of English law relating to the protection of judicial officers and persons acting under their orders have in British India been declared by express enactment (Act XVIII. of 1850).

4. Quasi-judicial Acts.

Acts of quasi-judicial discretion. Divers persons and bodies are called upon, in the management of public institutions or government of voluntary associations, to exercise

(p) Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 271, 53 L. J. Q. B. 209. As to the limits of the privilege, see per Stephen J. at p. 283. As to the power of a colonial

legislative assembly over its own members, see Barton v. Taylor (J. C. 1886), 11 App. Ca. 197, 55 L. J. P. C. 1.

Acts of quasi-judicial discretion. In the United States the doctrine of the text has a very general application, being recognized in decisions covering various employments, such as military and naval officers, arbitrators, tax-assessors, grand and petit jurors, collectors of customs, school commissioners, etc. See Jones v. Brown, 54 Ia. 74; Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356; Gould v. Hammond, 1 McAll. 235; Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 42; Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65; Harrington v. Commissioners, 2 McCord, 400; Hoggott v. Bigley, 6 Humph. 236; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117; Freeman v. Cornwall, 10 Johns. 470; Auditor v. Atchison etc. R. Co., 6 Kan. 500; Lilienthal v. Campbell, 22 La. An. 600; McDanil v. Tebbetts, 60 N. H. 497; Gregory v. Brooks, 37 Conn. 365; Edwards v. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686; Billings v. Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318; Donaboe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379; Shoemaker v. Nesbit, 2 Rawle, 201; Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Pa. St. 157; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228; Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Ia. 153; Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 291; Walker v. Halleck, 32 Ind. 293; Downing v. McFadden, 18 Pa. St. 334; State v. Hastings (Neb.), 55 N. W. Rep. 774; Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 118 U. S. 19; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136.

a sort of conventional jurisdiction analogous to that of inferior courts of justice. These quasi-judicial functions are in many cases created or confirmed by Parliament. Such are the powers of the universities over their officers and graduates, and of colleges in the universities over their fellows and scholars, and of the General Council of Medical Education over registered medical practitioners (q). Often the authority of the quasi-judicial body depends on an instrument of foundation, the provisions of which are binding on all persons who accept benefits under it. Such are the cases of endowed schools and religious congregations. And the same principle appears in the constitution of modern incorporated companies, and even of private partnerships. Further, a quasi-judicial authority may exist by the mere convention of a number of persons who have associated themselves for any lawful purpose, and have entrusted powers of management and discipline to select members. The committees of most clubs have by the rules of the club some such authority, or at any rate an initiative in presenting matters of discipline before the whole body. The Inns of Court exhibit a curious and unique example of great power and authority exercised by voluntary unincorporated societies in a legally anomalous manner. Their powers are for some purposes quasijudicial, and yet they are not subject to any ordinary jurisdiction (r).

Rules of natural justice and special rules, if any, must be observed. The general rule as to quasi-judicial powers

(g) See Allbutt v. General Council, &c. (1889), 23 Q. B. Div. 400; Leeson v. General Council, fc. (1889), 43 Ch. Div. 366; Par

tridge v. General Council, &c. (1890), 25 Q. B. Div. 90, 59 L. J. Q. B. 475.

(r) See Neate v. Denman (1874), 18 Eq. 127.

Rules of natural justice and special rules, if any, must be observed. In Farnsworth v. Starrs (5 Cush. 412) it is held that members of a church council who have by the constitution of the church a right to investigate the moral conduct of members are as fully protected, if acting in the

of this class is that persons exercising them are protected from civil liability if they observe the rules of natural justice, and also the particular statutory or conventional rules, if any, which may prescribe their course of action. The rules of natural justice appear to mean, for this purpose, that a man is not to be removed from office or membership, or otherwise dealt with to his disadvantage, without having fair and sufficient notice of what is alleged against him, and an opportunity of making his defence; and that the decision, whatever it is, must be arrived at in good faith with a view to the common interest of the society or institution concerned. If these conditions be satisfied, a court of justice will not interfere, not even if it thinks the decision was in fact wrong (s). If not, the act complained of will be declared void, and the person affected by it maintained in his rights until the matter has been properly and regularly dealt with (). These principles apply to the expulsion of a partner from a private firm where a power of expulsion is conferred by the partnership contract (u).

(8) Inderwick v. Snell (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 216 (removal of a director of a company); Dawkins v. Antrobus (1881), 17 Ch. Div. 615 (expulsion of a member from a club); cf. 13 Ch. D. 352; Partridge v. General Council, &c., note (q) last page, although no notice was given, the council honestly thinking they had no option. In the case of a club an injunction will be granted only in respect of the member's right of property, therefore where the club is proprietary the only remedy is in damages: Baird v. Wells (1890), 44 Ch. D. 661, 59 L. J. Ch. 673.

(t) Fisher v. Keane (1878), 11 Ch. D. 353, 49 L. J. Ch. 11 (a club case, no notice

to the member); Labouchere v. Wharn. cliffe (1879), 13 Ch. D. 346 (the like, no sufficient inquiry or notice to the member, calling and proceedings of general meeting irregular); Dean v. Bennett (1870), 6 Ch. 489, 40 L. J. Ch. 452 (minister of Baptist chapel under deed of settlement, no sufficient notice of specific charges either to the minister or in calling special meeting).

(u) Blisset v. Daniel (1853), 10 Ha. 493; Wood v. Wood (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 190, 43 L. J. Ex. 190. Without an express power in the articles a partner cannot be expelled at all.

scope of that authority and in good faith, as secular judges. See Lucas v. Case, 9 Bush, 297. But in State v. Williams (75 N. C. 134) it is held, that members of a society are liable for subjecting a fellow member to a "ceremony of expulsion" which involves personal violence, though the ceremony was known to the plaintiff at the time of joining. See 24 Am. Law Rev. 537.

Absolute discretionary powers. It may be, however, that by the authority of Parliament (or, it would seem, by the previous agreement of the party to be affected) a governing or administrative body, or the majority of an association, has power to remove a man from office or the like without anything in the nature of judicial proceedings, and without showing any cause at all. Whether a particular authority is judicial or absolute must be determined by the terms of the particular instrument creating it (v).

Questions whether duty judicial or ministerial: Ashby v. White, &c. On the other hand there may be question whether the duties of a particular office be quasi-judicial, or merely ministerial, or judicial for some purposes and ministerial for others. It seems that at common law the returning or presiding officer at a parliamentary or other

(v) E. g. Dean v. Bennett, supra; Fisher v. Jackson, '91, 5 Ch. 84, 60 L. J. Ch. 482 (power judicial); Hayman v. Governors

of Rugby School (1874), 18 Eq. 28, 43 L. J. Ch. 834 (power absolute).

Questions, whether duty judicial or ministerial. In America the law is not settled that officers having charge of elections and the registration of voters are protected like judges from the injurious consequences of their conduct in the performance of their functions. However, the tendency of the late decisions is towards uniformity in exempting such officers from liability where they act in good faith. Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Hannon v. Grizzard, 99 N. C. 161; 6 S. E. Rep. 92; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114; Griffin v. Rising, 11 Metc. 339; Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486; 20 Am. Rep. 431; Goetcheus v. Mathewson, 61 N. Y. 420; Patterson v. D'Auterive, 6 La. An. 467; State v. McDonald, 4 Harr. (Del.) 555; Turnpike Co. v. Champney, 2 N. H. 199; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 Serg. & R. 35; Keenan v. Cook, 12 R. I. 52; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. 693; Caulfield v. Bullock, Id. 495; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Dough. (Mich.) 411; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; Larned v. Wheeler, 140 Mass. 390; Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. 223; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Id. 114. But there are decisions holding such officers to the strict rule of liability for erroneously excluding a person entitled to vote, although they act in good faith. Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 312; Jeffries v. Ankenny, 11 Ohio, 372; Long v. Long, 57 Ia. 497.

election has a judicial discretion, and does not commit a wrong if by an honest error of judgment he refuses to receive a vote (x); but now in most cases it will be found that such officers are under absolute statutory duties (y), which they must perform at their peril.

5.-Parental and quasi-parental Authority.

Authority of parents and persons in loco parentis. Thus much of private quasi-judicial authority. There are also several kinds of authority in the way of summary

(x) Tozer v. Child (1857), Ex. Ch. 7 E. & B. 377, 26 L. J. Q. B. 151, explaining Ashby v. White, Ld. Raym. 938, and in 1 Sm. L. C.; and see the special report of Holt's judgment published in 1837 and referred to in Tozer v. Child. There is some difference of opinion in America, see Cooley on Torts, 413, 414.

(y) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 82. As to presiding officers under The Ballot Act, 1872, Pickering v. James (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 489, 42 L. J. C. P. 217; Ackers v. Howard (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 739, 55 L. J. Q. B. 273.

Authority of parents and persons in loco parentis. A parent has the right to correct his child by corporal punishment in a reasonable and humane manner for the purpose of family discipline. State v. Jones, 95 N. C. 588; Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. 283; State v. Alford, 68 N. C. 322; People v. Cooper, 8 How. Pr. 288. But it is not lawful for the parent to or permanent injury upon the child. Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490; 26 N. E. fey, 121 Mass. 66; Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 281. A step-father is in loco parentis. Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221. See Snowden v. State, 12 Tex. App. 105; 41 Am. Rep. 667.

inflict unreasonable punishment Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395; Rep. 777; Commonwealth v. Cof

School teachers may inflict a reasonable measure of corporal punishment if the right is exercised in good faith for the purpose of enforcing discipline. Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N. H. 297; 9 At. Rep. 722; Dowlen v. State, 16 Tex. App. 61; Anderson v. State, 3 Head, 455; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290; Sheehan v. Sturgis, 53 Conn. 481; State v. Mizner, 45 Ia. 248; 24 Am. Rep. 269; Deskins v. Gore, 85 Mo. 485; 55 Am. Rep. 387; Danenhofer v. State, 69 Ind. 295; 395 Am. Rep. 216; Hathaway v. Rice, 19 Vt. 102; Fertich v. Micherner, 111 Ind. 472.

But the teacher is responsible for any abuse of his authority. State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11; 18 N. E. Rep. 266; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.