by his authority. And the authority need not be to publish a particular form of words. A general request, or words intended and acted on as such, to take public notice of a matter, may make the speaker answerable for what is published in conformity to the general" sense and substance of his request (r).

(r) Parkes v. Prescott (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 169, 38 L. J. Ex. 105, Ex. Ch. Whether the particular publication is within the authority is a question of fact. All the

Court decide is that verbal dictation or approval by the principal need not be shown.

Andrews v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260; 5 Am. Dec. 267; Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 260; Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344; Perret v. Times Newspaper, 25 La. An. 170; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199. Contra, Wheaton v. Beecher, 79 Mich. 443; 44 N. W. Rep. 927; Smith v. Ashley, 11 Metc. 367. A journalist cannot protect himself from the consequences of publishing a libellous article by assurances of its truthfulness, and by a contract of indemnity from the writer. The parties being joint wrong-doers, the law will not interfere in aid of either. "The freedom of the press does not consist in lawlessness, or in freedom from wholesome legal restraint. The publisher of a newspaper has no more right to publish a libel upon an individual, than he or any other man has to make a slanderous proclamation by word of mouth." Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 82. See Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 176.

One to whom a printing press and a newspaper establishment were assigned has not such a property as will render him liable as proprietor for a libellous publication. McCabe v. Jones, 10 Daly, 222; Andres v. Wells, 7 Johus. 260. But a receiver appointed to take charge of a newspaper was held liable for libellous publications in Martin v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479. See Dayton v. Wilkes, 17 How. Pr. 510.

The proprietor of a newspaper as well as the advertiser is responsible for the publication of a libellous advertisement. Boynton v. Remington, 3 Allen, 397. See Robertson v. Bennett, 44 N. Y. Superior Ct. 66; Tier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66; 58 Am. Rep. 9.

He who by words causes another to write or print the thing conveying the libellous matter, may be guilty, as if his own hand traced the lines. But the speaker of words out of which another, of his own motion, composes and publishes a libel cannot be charged as the author of the libel. Cochran v. Butterfield, 18 N. H. 117.

But "one who adopts or recognizes the publication of a libelous article purporting to emanate from him may be liable therefor, though the publication was made by another without his authority." Crousdale v. Bright, 6 Houst. 52. See Allen v. Wortham, 89 Ky. 485; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn. 259.

A person who is generally responsible for publication (such as an editor), and who has admitted publication, is not as a rule bound to disclose the name of the actual author (s).

Construction of words: innuendo. Supposing the authorship of the words complained of to be proved or admitted, many questions may remain.

The construction of words alleged to be libellous (we

(8) Gibson v. Evans (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 384, 58 L. J. Q. B. 612.

Construction of words. It is now well settled, "that words are to be understood in their plain and natural import, according to the ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are addressed. In ascertaining the meaning of the speaker, reference must be had to the words used and the circumstances under which they were uttered, and the author is presumed to have used them in the sense which their use is calculated to convey to the minds of the hearers." Roe v. Chitwood, 36 Ark. 215; citing Harrison v. Findley, 23 Ind. 265; Rogers v. Lacey, Id. 507; O'Conner v. O'Conner, 24 Id. 218. See Castleberry v. Kelly, 26 Ga. 606; Wagaman v. Ryers, 17 Md. 187; Stieber v. Wensell, 19 Mo. 513; Hudson v. Garner, 22 Mo. 423; Worth v. Butler, 7 Id. 251; Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156; Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blackf. 453; Blickenstaff v. Perrin, 27 Ind. 527; Edwards v. San Jose P. & P. Co. (Cal.) 34 Pac. Rep. 128; Buckstaff v. Vial (Wis.), 54 N. W. Rep. 111; Campbell v. Campbell, 54 Wis. 94.

“Where words are susceptible of a twofold meaning, it is the province of the jury to determine, from the circumstances, in what sense they were uttered and understood. This is the rational and legal rule as now well established by authority." Deday v. Powell, 4 Bush, 78. See Van Vactor v. Walkup, 46 Cal. 133; Rankine v. Elliott, 16 N. Y. 376; Thompson v. Powning, 15 Nev. 212; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398; Clarke v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 480; Mosier v. Stoll, 119 Ind. 244; 20 N. E. Rep. 752; Ex parte Bailey, 2 Cow. 479; Patch v. The Tribune Assoc., 38 Hun, 368; McKinly v. Rob, 20 Johns. 356; Boyle v. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 163; Barnard v. Press Pub. Co., 63 Hun, 626; 17 N. Y. S. Rep. 573; Simmons v. Morse, 6 Jones L. 6; Powers v. Price, 12 Wend. 500; Bullock v. Koon, 9 Cow. 33; Green v. Telfair, 20 Barb. 20; Gregory v. Atkins, 42 Vt. 250; Davies v. Johnston, 2 Bailey, 579; Reeves v. Bowden, 97 N. C. 29; Turrill v. Dolloway, 17 Wend. 428, 429; Dorland v. Patterson, 23 Wend. 422; State v. Jeandell, 5 Harr. (Del.) 475; Hays v. Hays, 1 Humph. 402; McLaughlin v. Bascom, 38 Ia. 660; Hess v. Fockler, 25 Ia. 252; Garrett v. Dickerson, 19 Md. 418.

Words or signs will, after verdict for plaintiff be construed by the

shall now use this term as equivalent to "defamatory," unless the context requires us to advert to any distinction

court to have been used in the worst sense. Bloom v. Bloom, 5 Serg. & R. 391; Walton v. Singleton, 7 Id. 451; Butterfield v. Buffum, 9 N. H. 156; Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Canton Co., 24 Md. 492; Brown v. Lamberton, 2 Binn. 35; Wilson v. Cottman, 65 Md. 190; Hancock v. Stephens, 11 Humph. 509; Goodrich v. Woolcott, 3 Cow. 231; Tuttle v. Bishop, 30 Conn. 80; Kennedy v. Gifford, 19 Wend. 296.

It is the duty of the court to define what is libel in point of law, and leave it to the jury to say whether the publication in question falls within that definition. State v. Goold, 62 Me. 511; Shattuck v. Allen, 4 Gray, 540; In re Noyes' Will, 61 Vt. 14; 17 At. Rep. 743; Dunnell v. Fiske, 11 Metc. 553; Jackson v. Wood, 12 Johns. 242; Bourreslau v. Detroit Evening Journal, 63 Mich. 435; 30 N. W. Rep. 379; Filber v. Dautermann, 28 Wis. 134; Gottehuet v. Hubachek, 36 Wis. 518; Haight v. Cornell, 15 Conn. 74; Thompson v. Grimes, 5 Ind. 385; Calkins v. Wheaton, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 226; Pittock v. O'Neill, 63 Pa. St. 253; Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Waugh v. Waugh, 47 Ind. 580; Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43; Pugh v. McCarty, 44 Ga. 383; 40 Id. 444; Gabe v. McGinnis, 68 Ind. 538; Estahan v. Card, 15 B. Mon. 102.

It is the duty of the jury to construe words and phrases, and as long as the words are not absolutely unintelligible the jury will judge of the meaning as other readers or hearers. Mix v. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262; Gibson v. Cincinnati Inquirer, 2 Flip. (U. S.) 121; Laughlin v. Bascom, 38 Iowa, 660; Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186; Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21; Arnott v. Standard Assn., 57 Conn. 86; True v. Plumley, 36 Me. 466; Dorland v. Patterson, 33 Wend. 422; Andrews v. Woodmansee,

15 Id. 232; Foval v. Hellett, 10 Bradw. (Ill.) 265; Aldrich v. Brown, 11 Wend. 596; Emery v. Miller, 1 Denio, 208; Perry v. Mann, 1 R. I. 263; Trabue v. Mays, 3 Dana, 133; Haines v. Campbell, 74 Md. 58; 21 At. Rep. 703.

As where the phrase is grammatically incorrect; and where cant or slang terms or ironical, figurative or allegorical language is employed. Cornelius v. Van Slyke, 21 Wend. 70; Goodrich v. Woolcott, 3 Cow. 231; Hickley v. Grosjean, 6 Blackf. 351; Mielenz v. Quasdorf, 68 Ia. 726; Saunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill. 498; Vanderlip v. Roe, 23 Pa. St. 82.

If words are spoken in jest or of a doubtful meaning defamatory of another the speaker is responsible to that other for the hearing of the bystanders. Maybee v. Fisk, 42 Barb. 336; Maynard v. Firemans' Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48; 47 Cal. 207; Binford v. Young, 115 Ind. 174; Foval v. Hallett, 10 Ill. App. 265; Weed v. Bibbins, 32 Barb. 315; Jacksonville Journal Co. v. Beymer, 42 Ill. App. 443. See Shecut v. McDowell, 3 Brev. 38.

Foreign language. In cases of alleged defamation in a foreign language, the impression upon the minds of the hearers goes to the gist of the

In

between libel and slander) is often a matter of doubt. the first place the Court has to be satisfied that they are capable of the defamatory meaning ascribed to them. Whether they are so is a question of law (t). If they are, and if there is some other meaning which they are also capable of, it is a question of fact which meaning they did convey under all the circumstances of the publication in question. An averment by the plaintiff that words not libellous in their ordinary meaning or without a special

(t) Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882), 7 App. Ca. 741, 52 L. J. Q. B. 232, where the law is elaborately discussed. For a shorter example of words held, upon consideration, not to be capable of

such a meaning, see Mulligan v. Cole (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 549, 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; for one on the other side of the line, Hart v. Wall (1877), 2 C. P. D. 146, 46 L. J. C. P. 227.

action, and a slander not understood by the bystander is not actionable. Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 239. See Delaney v. Kaetel, 81 Wis. 353; 51 N. W. Rep. 559; Blakeman v. Blakeman, 31 Minn. 396; 18 N. W. Rep. 103; Schild v. Legler, 82 Wis. 73; 51 N. W. Rep. 1098.

Innuendo. The office of innuendo is to explain doubtful words and phrases, and annex to them their proper meaning. "It is, however, well settled that an innuendo cannot extend the sense of the words used beyond their natural meaning, unless something is put upon the record by way of introducing matter, with which they can be connected; in which case, words which are equivocal, or ambiguous, or fall short in their natural sense of stating a slanderous charge, may fix to them a meaning extending beyond their ordinary import, which renders them certain or defamatory by means of a proper innuendo." Vickers v. Stoneman, 73 Mich. 421. See Boyce v. Aubuchon, 34 Mo. App. 323; Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts, 393; Black's Law Dic., p. 626; Crystal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 367; Weis v. Hoss, 6 Ala. 886; Dicken v. Shepherd, 22 Md. 418.

"Words that are not actionable ex vi termini cannot be made so by innuendo but must be aided by a proper averment and colloquium, which will warrant the explanatory meaning given them by innuendo." Peterson v. Seutman, 39 Md. 155.

But if the words are capable of the meaning attributed to them in the innuendo as explanatory of the previous part of the declaration it must be left to the jury to find whether they were in fact so understood by the persons who heard them. Haines v. Campbell, 74 Md. 58; 21 At. Rep. 703.

Where the meaning is plain no innuendo is required. Randall v. Evening News Assoc. 79 Mich. 266; 44 N. W. Rep. 783. See Boyce v. Aubuchon, 34 Mo. App. 315; Bain v. Myrick, 88 Ind. 137.

application were used with a specified libellous meaning or application is called an innuendo, from the old form of pleading. The old cases contain much minute, not to say frivolous, technicality; but the substance of the doctrine is now reduced to something like what is expressed above. The requirement of an innuendo, where the words are not on the face of them libellous, is not affected by the abolition of forms of pleading. It is a matter of substance, for a plaintiff who sues on words not in themselves libellous, and does not allege in his claim that they conveyed a libellous meaning, and show what that meaning was, has failed to show any cause of action (u). Again, explanation is required if the words have not, for judicial purposes, any received ordinary meaning at all, as being foreign, provincial or the like (v). This however is not quite the same thing as an innuendo. A libel in a foreign language might need both a translation to show the ordinary meaning of the words, and a distinct further innuendo to show that they bore a special injurious meaning.

Libellous tendency must be probable in law and proved in fact. The actionable or innocent character of words depends not on the intention with which they were published, but on their actual meaning and tendency when published (w). A man is bound to know the natural effect of the language he uses. But where the plaintiff secks to put an actionable meaning on words by which it is not obviously conveyed, he must make out that the words are capable of that meaning (which is matter of law) and that they did convey it (which is matter of fact): so that he has to convince both the Court and the jury, and will lose his cause if he fail with either (x). Words are not deemed capable of a particular meaning merely because it might by possibility

(u) See 7 App. C. 748 (Lord Selborne).

(v) Blake Odgers 109-112.

(w) 7 App. Ca. 768, 782, 790, cf. p. 787. (x) Lord Blackburn, 7 App. Ca. 776.