vegetables and flowers. Guille's descent was in itself plainly a trespass; and he was held liable not only for the damage done by the balloon itself but for that which was done by the crowd. "If his descent under such circumstances would, ordinarily and naturally, draw a crowd of people about him, either from curiosity, or for the purpose of rescuing him from a perilous situation; all this he ought to have foreseen, and must be responsible for " (u). (u). In both these cases the squib case was commented and relied on. Similarly it has many times been said, and it is undoubted law, that if a man lets loose a dangerous animal in an inhabited place he is liable for all the mischief it may do.

Liability for consequences of trespass. The balloon case illustrates what was observed in the first chapter on the place of trespass in the law of torts. The trespass was not in the common sense wilful; Guille certainly did not mean to come down into Swan's garden, which he did, in fact, with some danger to himself. But a man who goes up in a balloon must know that he has to come down somewhere, and that he cannot be sure of coming down in a place which he is entitled to use for that purpose, or where his descent will cause no damage and excite no objection. Guille's liability was accordingly the same as if the balloon had been under

(u) Per Spencer C. J. It appeared that the defendant (plaintiff in error) had called for help; but this was treated as immaterial. The recent Scottish case of Scott's Trustees v. Moss (1889), 17 Ct.

of Sess. C. 4th S. 32, is hardly so strong for there a parachute descent was not only contemplated but advertised as a public entertainment.

Liability for consequences of trespass. If the act of trespass shows a wanton disregard of the rights of others, actual malice need not be shown. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Boone, 45 Md. 344; Drohn v. Brewer 77 Ill. 280; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34; 26 Am. Rep. 493; Cheeney Nebraska, etc., Stone Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 470; Wilson v. Gunning, 80 Ia. 331; 45 N. W. Rep. 920; Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wis. 319; Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258; Cate v. Cate, 44 N. H. 211; Burch v. Carter, 32 N. J. L. 554. See Savage v. Fullar, Brayt. 223.

his control, and he had guided it into Swan's garden. If balloons were as manageable as a vessel at sea, and by some accident which could not be ascribed to any fault of the traveller the steering apparatus got out of order, and so the balloon drifted into a neighbour's garden, the result might be different. So, if a landslip carries away my land and house from a hillside on which the house is built, and myself in the house, and leaves all overlying a neighbour's field in the valley, it cannot be said that I am liable for the damage to my neighbor's land; indeed, there is not even a technical trespass, for there is no voluntary act at all. But where trespass to property is committed by a voluntary act, known or not known to be an infringement of another's right, there the trespasser, as regards liability for consequences, is on the same footing as a wilful wrong-doer.

Consequence too remote: Glover v. L. & S. W. Rail Co. A simple example of a consequence too remote to be ground for liability, though it was part of the incidents following on a wrongful act, is afforded by Glover v. London and South Western Railway Company (v). The plaintiff, being a passenger on the railway, was charged by the company's ticket collector, wrongly as it turned out, with not having a ticket, and was removed from the train' by the company's servants with no more force than was necessary for the purpose. He left a pair of race-glasses in the carriage, which were lost; and he sought to hold the company liable not only for the personal assault committed by taking him out of the train, but for the value of these glasses. The Court held without difficulty that the loss was not the " necessary consequence" or "immediate result" of the wrongful act: for there was nothing to show that the plaintiff was prevented from taking his glasses with him, or that he would not have got them if after leaving the carriage he had asked for them.

(v) (1867) L. R. 3 Q. B. 25, 37 L. J. Q. B. 57.

Question of what is killing in criminal law. In criminal law the question not unfrequently occurs, on a charge of murder or manslaughter, whether a certain act or neglect was the "immediate cause" of the death of the deceased person. We shall not enter here upon the cases on this head; but the comparison of them will be found interesting. They are collected by Sir James Stephen (x).

Liability for negligence depends on probability of consequence, i. e., its capability of being foreseen by a reasonable man. The doctrine of "natural and probable consequence is most clearly illustrated, however, in the

(x) Digest of the Criminal Law, Arts. 219,220.

Liability for negligence depends on probability of consequence. The doctrine of the text has been generally accepted and applied by the courts of the United States. Thus, in a leading case it was said: "The true rule is that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the (defendant's) negligence such a consequence, as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as likely to flow from his act. This is not a limitation of the maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur; it only affects its application." Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; 27 Am. Rep. 653.

In Henry v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (50 Cal. 183), McKinstry, J., said: "A long series of judicial decisions has defined proximate or immediate and direct dar ages to be ordinary and natural results of the negligence, such as are usual, and therefore might have been expected." See Goshen Turnpike Co. v. Sears, 7 Conn. 86; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hope, 80 Pa. St. 373; 21 Am. Rep. 100; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; 1 Am. Rep. 431; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; 28 Am. Rep. 607; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436; Doggett v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78 N. C. 305; Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; 89 Am. Dec. 422; Bellefontaine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; 98 Am. Dec. 181; Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strobh. 525; 47 Am. Dec. 578; McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290; Campbell v. Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308; 50 Am. Rep. 567; McClary v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 3 Neb. 44; Township of West Mahoney v. Wat son, 112 Pa. St. 574; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Guthrie, 10 Lea, 432; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 478; Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; Hill v. Windsor, 118 Mass. 251; Wabash, etc., R. Co Locke, 112 Ind. 404; Atchison v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Muthersbaugh, 71 Ill. 572; Tutein v. Harley, 98 Mass. 211,

Where a railway company, through negligence by the escape of fire

law of negligence. For there the substance of the wrong itself is failure to act with due foresight: it has been

from its locomotive engine, sets fire to a depot, from which a hotel in the vicinity is destroyed, to make the company liable to the owner of the hotel, "It was not at all necessary that the burning of the hotel should be so certain to result from the burning of the depot that a reasonable person could have foreseen that the hotel would burn, or that it would probably burn. It is enough if it be a consequence so natural and direct that a reasonable person might, and naturally would, see that it was liable to result from the burning of the depot, — that is, that it might follow." C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Pennell, 110 Ill. 446.

Where plaintiff was injured, while walking by the side of a railroad track, by a cow which was thrown from the track by the engine, and which fell against plaintiff after striking the ground, the injury is the proximate consequence of the engine striking the cow. "The direct cause was put in operation by the force of the engine, which continued until the injury; and injuries directly produced by instrumentalities thus put in operation and continued, are proximate consequences of the primary act, though they may not have been contemplated or foreseen. The relation of cause and effect between the primary cause and the injury is established by the connection and succession of the intervening circumstances." Ala. G. S. R. Co. v. Chapman, 80 Ala. 615.

Where the horses of a traveler, being frightened by an overturn of their load caused by a defect in the highway, escape from him, run ninety rods, and collide with another traveler, the injury of the latter may be a natural and probable consequence of the defect, for which the town is liable. Merriel v. Claremont, 58 N. H. 468. See Aldrich v. Gorham, 77

Me. 287; Hampson v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 283; 23 At. Rep. 732; Smalley v. City of Appleton, 75 Wis. 18; Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. St. 421; 16 At. Rep. 484; 23 W. N. C. 128.

With regard to the spreading of negligent fires the decisions in the different States upon analogous statements of fact are not uniform; but the weight of the authorities, and the true doctrine is, that proximity of cause has no necessary connection with contiguity of space or nearness of time. Thus, in the case of Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Williams (131 Ind. 30; 30 N. E. Rep. 696), it was held, that where a fire originated on the defendant's right of way, and was carried by the wind to plaintiff's property, though other lands intervened over which the fire burned several days, and was several times partially subdued before reaching his land, defendant is not relieved from the liability on the ground that its negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. See Tyler v. Ricamore, 87 Va. 466; 12 S. E. Rep. 799; Marvin v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 79 Wis. 140; 47 N. W. Rep. 1123; St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. McKinsey, 78 Tex. 298; 14 S. W. Rep. 645; Frace v. New York L. E. & W. R. Co., 68 Hun, 325; 22 N. Y. S. Rep. 958; Adams v. Young, 44 Ohio

defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily

St. 80; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stafford, 12 Kan. 354; Del. L. & W. R. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. L. 300; Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181; Poeppers v. M. K. & P. Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 715; Perley v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 414; Fent v. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ill. 349; 14 Am. Rep. 13; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Stafford, 12 Kan. 354; 15 Am. Rep. 362; Krippner v. Biebl, 28 Minn. 139; Burlington R. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268; Salmon v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 14 Am. Law Reg. 560; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 524; Butcher v. Vaca V. etc., R. Co., 67 Cal. 518; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 644; Poeppers v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 715; Simmonds v. New York, etc. R. Co., 52 Conn. 264; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 369.

Non-liability: examples. Where defendants, knowing a county treasurer to be a defaulter, loaned him money and certificates to enable him to have his accounts audited, and to conceal his embezzlement from the board of county commissioners, after which he embezzled a further sum, and fled from the territory; it was held, that the damage that the county sustained by reason of such act of defendants was too contingent, remote, and indefinite to constitute a cause of action. County of Nelson v. Northcote, 6 Dak. 378; 43 N. W. Rep. 897, citing Morgan v. Bliss, 2 Mass. 111; Randall v. Hazelton, 12 Allen, 412.

The obstruction of a public crossing by a railroad train, thereby preventing plaintiff from driving across for more than half an hour, does not render the company liable for injuries to him caused by the fact that at the end of that time his horse became frightened and ran away at the approach of a second engine and train. "The damages resulting from the fright of the horse were too remote, as a consequence of the obstruction of the public road." Stanton v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 91 Ala. 382; 8 So. Rep. 798.

Another case, involving the connection of defective highways with injury to travellers, is that of Schaeffer v. Township of Jackson (150 Pa. St. 145; 24 At. Rep. 629), in which the facts were that plaintiff had been driven safely past a hole in the road and a pile of stones negligently placed by the town supervisors on a highway. When about 120 feet beyond this obstruction plaintiff's horse became frightened by a donkey, turned short around, breaking a wheel of the buggy, and ran back, one axle dragging on the ground. The dragging axle caused the buggy to be drawn to the side of the road, where it caught in the hole. The buggy was upset and the plaintiff was thrown out upon the stone pile and injured. It was held, that the township was not liable, the occurrence being extraordinary, and not the natural and probable result of the negligence, but of an independent, primary, efficient, proximate cause.

Upon remoteness of cause of injury arising out of negligence, see