property to which it relates, merely prevents the acts for which consent is given from being wrongful, is called a licence. There may be licences not affecting the use of property at all, and on the other hand a licence may be so connected with the transfer of property as to be in fact inseparable from it.

"A dispensation or licence properly passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful. As a licence to go beyond the seas, to hunt in a man's park, to come into his house, are only actions which without licence had been unlawful. But a licence to hunt in a man's park and carry away the deer killed to his own use, to cut down a tree in a man's ground, and to carry it away the next day after to his own use, are licences as to the acts of hunting and cutting down the tree, but as to the carrying away of the deer killed and tree cut down they are grants. So to licence a man to eat my meat, or to fire the wood in my chimney to warm him by; as to the actions of eating, firing my wood and warming him, they are licences but it is consequent necessarily to those actions that my property be destroyed in the meat eaten, and in the wood burnt. So as in some cases by consequent and not directly, and as its effect, a dispensation or licence may destroy and alter property” (u).

License.

(u) Vaughan C J., Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan, 351.

License is permission or authority. It is a defense to trespass. With reference to real estate "A license is an authority or power to make use of land in some specific way, or to do certain acts or series of acts upon the land of another." Tiedeman's Real Property, § 651, citing Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 380; Blaisdell v. Railroad, 51 N. H. 485. See Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289; 24 At. Rep. 933; Cahoon v. Bayard, 123 N. Y. 298; 25 N. E. Rep. 376; Silby v. Trotter, 29 N. J. Eq. 228; Pursell v. Stover, 100 Pa. St. 43; 20 At. Rep. 403; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Driscoll v. Marshall, 15 Gray, 62; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9; Chynoweth v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 397.

Revocation of licence: distinction when coupled with interest. Generally speaking, a licence is a mere voluntary suspension of the licensor's right to treat certain acts as wrongful, comes to an end by any transfer of the property with respect to which the licence is given (v), and is revoked by signifying to the licensee that it is no longer the licensor's will to allow the acts permitted by the licence. The revocation of a licence is in itself no less effectual though it may be a breach of contract. If the owner of land or a building admits people thereto on payment, as spectators of an entertainment or the like, it may be a breach of contract to require a person who has duly paid his money and entered to go out, but a person so required has no title to stay, and if he persists in staying

(v) Wallis v. Harrison (1838), 4 M. & W. 538, 8 L. J. Ex. 44.

Revocation of license: distinction when coupled with interest. Ordinarily a license is revokable at will. Houston v. Laffe, 46 N. H. 505; Carleton v. Redington, 21 N. H. 291; Hetfield v. Central R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 571; Kimble v. Yates, 14 Ill. 464; Jameson v. Milliman, 3 Duer, 255; Duineen v. Rich, 22 Wis. 550; White v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 63 Hun, 634; 18 N. Y. S. Rep. 396; Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray, 441; Burton v. Scherff, 1 Allen, 133; Allen v. Fiske, 42 Vt. 462; Eckerson v. Crippen 110 N. Y. 585; 18 N. E. Rep. 443; Owen v. Field, 12 Allen, 457; Kremer v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 51 Minn. 15; 52 N. W. Rep. 977; Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 323; Fargis v. Walton, 107 N. Y. 399; 14 N. E. Rep. 303; Totel v. Bonnefoy, 123 Ill. 653; 14 N. E. Rep. 687; How v. Searing, 6 Bosw. 354; Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 132 Ind. 274; 31 N. E. Rep. 943; Rayner v. Nugent, 60 Md.515; Parish v. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586.

But if the license amounts to a legal grant it is irrevocable. Bracken v. Rushville, etc., R. Co., 27 Ind. 346; Collins Co. v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 239; Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157; Bingham v. Salene, 15 Oreg. 208; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Metc. 34; Claflin v. Carpenter, 4 Metc. 580; Hetfield v. Central R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 571; Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. C. 63; White v. Elwell, 48 Me. 360; Goff v. Obertenffer, 3 Phila. Rep. 71; Douglas v. Shumway, 13 Gray, 498. Thus, in Johnson v. Skillman (29 Minn. 97; 12 N. W. Rep. 149), the court said: "In some cases where the license is connected with a valid grant, as of chattels or fixtures, upon the land of the licensor, susceptible of being removed, it is subsidiary to the right of the property, and irrevocable to the extent necessary to protect the licensee, and saves to him the right of entrythe right of possession following the right of property."

he is a trespasser. His only right is to sue on the contract (x): when, indeed, he may get an injunction, and so be indirectly restored to the enjoyment of the licence (y). But if a license is part of a transaction whereby a lawful interest in some property, besides that which is the immediate subject of the licence, is conferred on the licensee, and the licence is necessary to his enjoyment of that interest, the licence is said to be "coupled with an interest" and cannot be revoked until its purpose is fulfilled: nay more, where the grant obviously cannot be enjoyed without an incidental licence, the law will annex the necessary licence to the grant. "A mere licence is revocable; but that which is called a licence is often something more than a licence; it often comprises or is connected with a grant, and then the party who has given it cannot in general revoke it so as to defeat his grant to which it was incident" (z). Thus the sale of a standing crop or of growing trees imports a licence to the buyer to enter on the land so far and so often as reasonably necessary for cutting and carrying off the crop or the trees, and the licence cannot be revoked until the agreed time, if any, or otherwise a reasonable time for that purpose has elapsed (a). The diversity to be noted between licence and grant is of respectable antiquity. In 1460 the defendant in an action of trespass set up a right of common; the plaintiff said an excessive number of beasts were put in; the defendant said this was by licence of the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff said the licence was revoked before the trespass complained of: Billing, then king's

(x) Wood v. Leadbitter (1845), 13 M. & W. 838, 14 L. J. Ex. 161; Hyde v. Graham (1862), 1 H. & C. 593, 32 L. J. Ex. 27. A contract to carry passengers does not constitute or include a licence so as to let in this doctrine, though part or the whole of the journey may be on land belonging to the railway company or other carrier: Butler v. M. S. & L. R. Co. (1888), 21 Q. B. Div. 207, 57 L. J. Q. B.

564. The reasoning is perhaps open to criticism: see L. Q. R. v. 99.

(y) See Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace (1859), Joh. 333, where, however, the agreement was treated as an agreement to execute a legal grant.

(2) Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 844, 14 L. J. Ex. 161.

(a) See further 2 Wms. Saund. 363-365, or Cooley on Torts, 51.

serjeant, afterwards Chief Justice of the King's Bench under Edward IV., argued that a licence may be revoked at will even if expressed to be for a term, and this seems to have so much impressed the Court that the defendant, rather than take the risk of demurring, alleged a grant: the reporter's note shows that he thought the point new and interesting (b). But a licensee who has entered or placed goods on land under a revocable licence is entitled to have notice of revocation and a reasonable time to quit or remove his goods (c).

Executed licences. Again, if the acts licensed be such as have permanent results, as in altering the condition of land belonging to the licensee in a manner which, but for the licence, would be a nuisance to adjacent land of the licensor; there the licensor cannot, by merely revoking the licence, cast upon the licensee the burden of restoring the former state of things. A licence is in its nature revocable (d), but the revocation will not make it a trespass to leave things as the execution of the licence has made them. In this sense it is said that "a licence executed is not countermandable" (e). When a licence to do a particular thing once for all has been executed, there is nothing left to revoke.

(b) 39 Hen. VI. 7 pl. 12.

(c) Cornish v. Stubbs (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 334, 39 L. J. C. P. 202; Mellor v. Watkins (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 400.

(d) Wood v. Leadbitter, note (x), last page.

(e) Winter v. Brockwell (1807), 8 East, 308. This class of cases is expressly recognized and distinguished in Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. at p. 855.

Executed licenses. In the United States the authorities are not uniform upon the question as to the right of a licensor to exercise the power of revocation where the licensee in pursuance of the license has expended money and incurred binding obligations.

Each case necessarily depends upon its own circumstances. It is established that for a sufficient cause a revocation may be enjoined by a court of equity. See School District v. Lindsay, 47 Mo. App. 134; Harlan v. Logansport Nat. Gas Co., 133 Ind. 323; 32 N. E. Rep. 930; White v.

Whether and how far the licensor can get rid of the consequences if he mislikes them afterwards is another and distinct inquiry, which can be dealt with only by considering what those consequences are. He may doubtless get rid of them at his own charges if he lawfully can; but he cannot call on the licensee to take any active steps unless under some right expressly created or reserved.

For this purpose, therefore, there is a material difference between "a licence to do acts which consist in repetition, as to walk in a park, to use a carriage-way, to fish in the waters of another, or the like," which may be countermanded without putting the licensee in any worse position than before the licence was granted, and "a licence to construct a work which is attended with expense to the party using the licence, so that, after the same is countermanded, the party to whom it was granted may sustain a

Manhattan Ry. Co., 139 N. Y. 19; 34 N. E. Rep. 887; Brauns v. Glesige, 130 Ind. 167; 29 N. E. Rep. 1061; Saucer v. Keller, 129 Ind. 475; 28 N. E. Rep. 1117; Crousdale v. Lanigan, 59 Hun, 620; 13 N. Y. S. Rep. 31; Grimshaw v. Belcher, 88 Cal. 217; 26 Pac. Rep. 84; Flickinger v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 126; 25 Pac. Rep. 268; Barnes v. Barnes, 6 Vt. 388; Ashman v. Williams, 8 Pick. 402; Williams v. Flood, 63 Mich. 487; Nowlin v. Whipple, 79 Ind. 481; Campbell v. Indianapolis etc. R. Co., 110 Ind. 490; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray, 302; Baker v. Chicago etc, R. Co., 57 Mo. 265; Southwestern R. Co. v. Mitchell, 69 Ga. 114; Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray, 302; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St. 206; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116.

Equity will enforce the future enjoyment of a license executed in part where money has been expended and fixtures erected on its faith. Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; Stephen v. Brown, 19 Ind. 367; Cook v. Pridgen, 45 Ga. 331; Lee v. McLead, 17 Nev. 280; Gibson v. St. Louis A. & M. Assoc., 33 Mo. App. 165; Grimshaw v. Belcher, 88 Cal. 217; 26 Pac. Rep. 84; Wilson v. Chalfant, 15 Ohio, 248; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135; Lane v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534.

But in other well-considered cases the power of revocation is held to be absolute. Jackson & Sharp Co. v. Philadelphia etc. R. Co., 4 Del. Ch. 180; Lake Erie & W. Co. v. Michener, 117 Ind. 465; 20 N. E. Rep. 254; Kevitt v. McKeithan, 90 N. C. 106; St. Louis Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 Ill. 384; Williams v. Morrison, 32 Fed. Rep. 177; Ketchum v. Newman, 4 Daly, 57; 22 N. E. Rep. 1052. See cases cited, ante, p. 459.