Houston neglected to respond to the order to appear at a place specified in the order, it was competent for the State authorities to enforce the statute of the State.

§ 225. In the more recent case of Martin against Mott, (12 Whea., 19), the Court went so far as to decide that the judgment of the President was conclusive as to the existence of the exigency, and that it was not necessary to aver the fact of the existence of the constitutional reason for calling forth the militia; for, said Mr. Justice Story, "when the President exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumption is that it is exercised in pursuance of law. Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to his duty until the contrary is shown; and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favorably applied, to the chief magistrate of the Union.

§ 226. During the rebellion a more comprehensive statute was passed, entitled "an act for enrolling and calling out the national forces and for other purposes," dated March 3, 1863. (12 Stat. 731.)

By that statute all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and all persons of foreign birth who had declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, were enrolled, and declared to be the national forces, and made subject to the orders of the President as commander-in-chief.

The constitutionality of that statute was not controverted before the Supreme Court, but its validity was recognized in two important cases. (United States v. Scott, 3 Wall. 642, and Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509.)

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

ART. 1, SEC. 8, Par. 17.

"The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings."

§ 227. Under the seventeenth clause of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, which gives to Congress jurisdiction over the seat of government, and over forts, arsenals, and other needful public buildings, there have been many decisions by the Supreme Court, and the conclusions in the more important of them may be thus stated:

§ 228. In the case of Hepburn and Ellzey (2 Cr. 445), it was decided that the District of Columbia was not a State, and consequently that a citizen of the District was incapable of maintaining a suit against a citizen of Virginia under the statute giving to Circuit Courts jurisdiction of cases between citizens of one State and citizens of another State.

§ 229. It was also held that the word "State," as used in the Constitution, had not the meaning given to it by writers upon public law, but was limited to the organizations composing the Federal Union, each one of which is entitled to be represented by two senators in the Senate of the United States.

§ 230. In the case of Loughborough v. Blake (5 Whea. 317), the Court held that Congress had power to levy a

direct tax on the District of Columbia for the general purposes of the government as distinguished from a tax to meet local expenditures.

§ 231. The authority of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to issue the writ of mandamus to an executive officer of the government compelling him to do an act, merely ministerial, required by law, and concerning which he has no discretion, is fully recognized in the case of Kendall v. The United States (12 Pet. 524).

§ 232. The power of the general government to acquire lands within the limits of a State, may be exercised upon such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the States and assented to by the United States, provided that the terms are not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the purposes intended. (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525.)

CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL POWERS.

ART. 1, SEC. 8, PAR. 18.

"The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

§ 233. The first, second and eighteenth clauses of section eight, article one, are kindred to each other.

The first clause authorizes Congress to levy and collect taxes "for the common defence and general welfare," the second authorizes Congress to borrow money, and by the eighteenth clause Congress is empowered "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

§ 234. The gravest political and judicial questions have arisen as to the extent and limits of the powers so granted. In dealing with the first and second clauses, I have referred to some of the decisions of the Court which are pertinent to questions that have been raised under the eighteenth clause.

§ 235. In the opinion of the Court in the case of M'Culloch against Maryland (4 Whea. 316), there are some observations bearing upon the eighteenth clause which were not considered under the first two clauses of this section.

The main questions raised in that controversy were these, viz.:

(1.) Had Congress power to charter the Bank of the United States, so called, and

(2.) If it had the power, had it also power to exempt it

from taxation by the authorities of the State in which such bank was located?

Reference is made to paragraph 90 for a synopsis of the reasoning of the Court by which the power of Congress is sustained in both particulars.

§ 236. More important even were the declarations by the Court as to the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare. The doctrine seems to be this, viz.: Wherever there is a grant of a specific power, as the power to borrow money, for example, there is then also granted, under the clause in question, ample power, in the discretion of Congress and not contrary to any other specific provision of the Constitution, to provide the means for the execution of the specific power granted.

§ 237. This doctrine was sustained by Chief Justice Marshall, not only from the text of the Constitution, but also by a process of general reasoning. He asserted that the Constitution was made by the people of the States, and not by the States in their corporate capacity, and that “in form and in substance" it emanated from the people; "that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, was supreme within its sphere of action."

§ 238. Again he says, "although among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word 'bank' or ‘incorporation,' we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies." He then proceeds: "It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depend, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution."