Thereupon the Crescent City Company commenced a suit against the Butchers' Union in the Circuit Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which came by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, and is reported in vol. 111 U. S. page 746. The Court held that the grant in 1869 to the Crescent City Company was in its form and conditions a contract which would have been recognized and operative against subsequent legislation under the provision of the Constitution which declares that States shall not pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, except for the fact that the grant operated as a restriction upon the police power of the State and city. It was held in substance by the Court that so far as the act of 1869 partook of the nature of an irrepealable contract, the Legislature exceeded its authority, as it had no power to tie the hands of a Legislature of the future and restrain it from legislating on that subject.

§ 349. The decision contains a denial of the power of the Legislature to so establish the right as that no future legislation could repeal or modify the law or grant similar privileges to others. "The denial of the power," says the Court, "in the present instance rests upon the ground that the power of the Legislature intended to be suspended, is so indispensable to the public welfare that it cannot be bargained by contract; it is that well-known but undefined power called the police power. "While we are not prepared to say that the Legislature can make valid contracts on any subject embraced in the largest definitions of the police power, we think that in regard to two subjects there embraced it cannot by any contract limit the exercise of those powers to the prejudice of the general welfare. These are the Public Health and Public Morals."

§ 350. In several cases the Court has held that a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States in the particulars now under consideration. (The cases referred to are Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129;

Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449; and Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201.)

§ 351. In the case of Wilson against the Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (2 Pet. 245) the Court sustained the statute of the State of Delaware by which authority was given for the construction of a dam across a navigable creek, upon the ground that the public health would be protected thereby, there being no act of Congress controlling the policy of the State.

§ 352. Contracts made in the insurgent States during the late Civil War between residents of those States, and not designed to aid the insurrectionary governments, have been enforced in the national courts. In such cases the value of the contracts has been determined by the value of the Confederate notes in the lawful money of the United States at the time when, and the place where, such contracts were made.

§ 353. In regard to the contract which was the subject of controversy between Effinger and Kenney (115 U. S. 566), the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the land, which was the subject matter of the contract, and at the time the sale was made. The Supreme Court of the United States held, on the contrary, that recovery was to be based upon the value of Confederate notes in the lawful money of the United States at the time when, and the place where, the contract was made. Consequently an act of the Legislature authorizing a recovery based on the value of the property was unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of the contract.

§ 354. A legislative grant of the exclusive right to supply gas or water to a municipality and its inhabitants, upon condition of the performance of the service by the grantee, is a grant of a franchise in consideration of the performance of a public service, and after performance by the grantee it becomes a contract, protected by the Constitution of the United States, against State legislation calculated to impair

the contract. (New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company, 115 U. S. 650, and New Orleans Water Works Company v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, and Louisiana Gas Company v. Citizens' Gas Company, 115 U. S. 683.)

§ 355. In the case of Fisk against Jefferson Police Jury (116 U. S. 131) it was decided that where a law attached a fixed compensation to a public office, during the whole term of service of a person legally filling the office and performing the duties thereof, a perfect implied obligation arose to pay for the services at the fixed rate, to be enforced by the remedies which the law then gave; and that a change in the Constitution, which took away existing powers of taxation, so as to deprive the officer of the means of collecting his compensation, was within the prohibitory clause of the Constitution forbidding the passage of State laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

§ 356. Again, where a law of the State imposes taxes for the purpose of revenue upon persons pursuing lawful occupations and professions, such persons are entitled to a license upon the tender of the license fee, if, in all respects, they have such qualifications as by law or usage may be required. Upon the refusal of a license they may enter upon the practice of the profession, and any law of the State subjecting such persons to criminal proceedings therefor is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

§ 357. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, by writ of error to the highest Court of the State, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired, unless some legislative act of the State is upheld by the judgment suit to be reviewed. The provision of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts is aimed at the legislative power of the States and not at decisions of its Courts, nor acts of executive or administrative boards of officers, or doings of corporations or individuals. (New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18.)

CHAPTER XXIX.

AS TO IMPOSTS AND DUTIES LEVIED BY STATES.

ART. 1, SEC. 10, PAR. 2.

"No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress."

§ 358. A small number of decisions only have been made under the second clause of this section, which denies to States the power to levy duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary, for executing its inspection laws subject to the condition that all such laws may be revised and controlled by Congress. In the case of Cooley against the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (12 How. 299) already referred to, the Court held that State laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage are not laws laying imposts or duties on imports or exports or on tonnage, -if such laws do not pass the appropriate line which limits laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage.

§ 359. The State of California having imposed a stamp tax on bills of lading for the transportation from any point or place in that State to any point or place without the State, of gold or silver coin or gold dust, or gold or silver bars, the Court held that it was a tax upon a specified class of exports, and forbidden by the clause of the Constitution under consideration, and that the law therefore was void. (Almy v. State of California, 24 How. 169.)

§ 360. A State tax levied upon imported goods after the same had passed into the hands of a purchaser, is not in conflict with the clause under consideration, although the goods

at the time of the levy of the tax should be contained in the original packages. (Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 110.)

§ 361. The terms imports and exports do not refer to articles imported from one State to another, but only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States, or exported from the United States to foreign countries. (Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, and Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622.)

§ 362. The statute of a State imposing a tax upon the gross receipts of a railroad company is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, although the gross receipts are made up in part from freights received on transportation of merchandise from the State to another State, or into the State from another State, nor is it a tax on imports or exports. (State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284.)