course this proposition is essentially the resultant of the first, since unless it be well founded the first also must be wanting in foundation. This must be the result, as it cannot be conceived that there is power to compel the giving of testimony where no right exists to require that the testimony shall be given under such circumstances and safeguards as to compel it to be truthful. In other words, this is but to say that an authority which can only extend to the licensing of perjury is not a power to compel the giving of testimony. Of course, these propositions being true, it is also true that the immunity afforded by the constitutional guarantee relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury. That this is hot disputable is shown by the fact that it has been accepted as self-evident in providing for immunity for one compelled to testify, as shown by the reservation in Rev. Stat., § 860, declaring that the immunity shall not extend to "exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in discovering or testifying as aforesaid," and by a like provision, contained in the act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443, c. 83. The first of these. provisions was considered in Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, and the second in Brown v. Walker, supra, where it was expressly decided that the statute containing it complied with the constitutional guarantee.

With these propositions in hand it follows that the precise question for decision is, Did the guarantee of immunity contained in the ninth subdivision of § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act bar a prosecution for perjury for false swearing in giving testimony under the, command of the section? In other words, the sole question is, Does the statute, in compelling the giving of testimony, confer an immunity wider than that guaranteed by the Constitution? The argument to maintain that it does is, that as the statute provides for immunity and does not contain the

reservation found in either § 860, Rev. Stat., or that embodied in the act of 1893, therefore, under the rule that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other, such reservation cannot be implied. Or, to state the proposition in another form, it is that as the statute in the immunity clause says, "But no testimony given by him (the witness who is compelled to be examined) shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding," and as these words are unambiguous, there is no room for limiting the language so as to cause the immunity provision not to prohibit the offer of the testimony in a criminal prosecution for perjury. But the contention assumes the question for decision, since it excludes the possibility. of construction when on the face of the statute the meaning attributed to the immunity clause cannot be given to it without destroying the words of the statute and frustrating its obvious object and intent. This may not be denied, since the statute expressly commands the giving of testimony, and its manifest purpose is to secure truthful testimony, while the limited and exclusive meaning which the contention attributes to the immunity clause would cause the section to be a mere license to commit perjury, and hence not to command the giving of testimony in the true sense of the word.

The argument that because the section does not contain an expression of the reservation of a right to prosecute for perjury in harmony with the reservations in Rev. Stat., § 860, and the act of 1893, therefore it is to be presumed that it was intended that no such right should exist, we think, simply begs the question for decision, since it is impossible in reason to conceive that Congress commanded the giving of testimony, and at the same time intended that false testimony might be given with impunity in the absence of the most express and specific command to that effect.

Bearing in mind the subject dealt with we think the reservation of the right to prosecute for perjury made in the

statutes to which we have referred was but the manifestation of abundant caution, and hence the absence of such reservation in the statute under consideration may not be taken as indicative of an intention on the part of Congress that perjury might be committed at pleasure.

Some of the considerations which we have pointed out were accurately expounded in Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. Rep. 636, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and in Wechsler v. United States, 158 Fed. Rep. 579, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. And this leads us to observe that the necessary result of the conclusion now reached is to disapprove the opinions in In re Marx et al., 102 Fed. Rep. 676, and In re Logan, 102 Fed. Rep. 876.

It follows that the question propounded must receive a negative answer, and our order will be,

Question certified answered No.

RIPLEY v. UNITED STATES.

UNITED STATES v. RIPLEY.

APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS

ON RETURN TO MANDATE DIRECTING ADDITIONAL FINDINGS.

Nos. 498, 499. Submitted May 29, 1911.-Decided December 4, 1911.

Where the right of one claiming under a contract with the United States depends on whether the government inspector acted in good or in bad faith in refusing to allow the work to proceed, the findings of the Court of Claims should be specific in this respect; and if not, the case will be remanded with directions to make specific findings. Findings, which simply state that the inspector in immediate charge of the work acted with knowledge, other inspectors being also referred to in the findings, and which do not make a direct and unequivocal finding as to the good or bad faith of the inspector in giv

ing the orders, do not conform to the order of this court heretofore made in this case, 220 U. S. 491, and the case is remanded for further compliance therewith.

THE facts, which involve the sufficiency of findings of the Court of Claims, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Wm. H. Robeson, with whom Mr. Benj. Carter and Mr. F. Carter Pope were on the brief, for appellant in No. 498, and appellee in No. 499.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson, with whom Mr. Philip M. Ashford was on the brief, for the United States.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

Ripley recovered the sum of alleged losses occasioned by the delay consequent on the refusal of the inspector in charge of certain jetty work, being performed under contract with the United States in Aransas Pass, Texas, to permit the placing of certain crest blocks on the foundation intended to receive them. Both the United States and Ripley appealed. At the last term, when the case was before us, it became necessary to ascertain how far the findings of fact established the good or bad faith of the inspector in refusing to permit the crest blocks to be placed in position, and even upon the hypothesis of bad faith, to determine whether Ripley had been so negligent in notifying the engineer officer who was in charge of the work of the refusal of the inspector as to bar a right to recover for loss occasioned by such refusal. Concluding that the findings of fact on these subjects were so inadequate and possibly so misleading as to render it impossible for us to decide the cause on the merits, our action was stayed and the court below was directed to make and transmit as VOL. CCXXII-10

speedily as possible additional findings on the subjects referred to, as follows:

"First. Whether, when the claimant was laying the slope stones and during the months of December, 1903, and January, February, March and April, 1904, as recited in Finding VII, the inspector in charge knew 'that large parts of the work done by the claimant had fully settled and consolidated.'

"Second. Whether in the various refusals to permit the laying of crest blocks stated in Finding VII the inspector in charge acted in good faith.

"Third. Whether at any time the claimant notified the engineer officer in charge or the chief of engineers that the inspector in charge wrongfully refused to permit the laying of the crest blocks, and if such notice was given, whether it was oral or written, when the notice or notices were given, and what action, if any, was taken by such superior officer."

[See 220 U. S. 491.]

The case is now before us upon additional findings made by the court below in assumed compliance with our previous order. These findings are as follows:

"(1) When denying permission to the claimant to lay crest blocks, as stated in Finding VII, the inspector in charge knew from the time which had elapsed that large parts of the core theretofore completed by the claimant had fully settled and consolidated and were ready for the crest blocks to be laid thereon.

"(2) The refusal of said inspector to allow crest blocks to be laid at the time requested in said Finding VII thereby unreasonably delayed the work and was, on his part, a gross mistake. There is no other evidence of bad faith on the part of the assistant engineer in immediate charge.

"(3) There is no evidence to show that any protest or notice was ever made to the engineer in charge (whose of