simply relieving the court of the work of settling minor matters, such as method of use, compensation therefor, and matter of control. Indeed, the alleged invalidity of the contracts was rested largely on the scope of the statutes, and the duties to the Government and the public imposed thereby on the railroad company."

To the contention that the statutes had been misconstrued, the court replied (p. 166) that, "We see no reason to question the conclusion announced in the former opinion." The other contentions were also held untenable. The decree against the Union Pacific was affirmed, with some minor reservations which it is unnecessary to notice.

It was this decree that the Union Pacific Company was, in the present case, adjudged guilty of contempt for violating. The decree we have already set out.

The parties are in sharp controversy as to its meaning, but, necessarily, whatever ambiguity arises from some of its parts, its extent must be determined by what preceded it and what it was intended to execute-in other words, that the bridge act of 1871 is the measure of the rights given by decree in connection with the act of 1866 providing for a bridge across the Mississippi River at Quincy, Illinois, and other bridges. 14 Stat. 244.. The latter act, as we have seen, provided that "all trains of all roads terminating at said river at or opposite said point shall be allowed to cross said bridge for reasonable compensation." And, as we have also seen, the act of 1871 was passed "for the more perfect connection of any railroads that are or shall be constructed to the Missouri River at or near Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska." And the powers conferred and the use and protection of the bridge that should be erected were "governed and limited" by the provisions of the act of 1866. The two acts, therefore, express the powers conferred and the obligations imposed on the Union Pacific Company. And this court so construed them, saying, as we have seen, that

"the common object of both these acts was the more perfect connection of roads running to the bridges on either side of the river." A right to the "approaches and appurtenances" was given as necessary to the connection and to make it effective. It did not otherwise subject the property of the Union Pacific Company to the use of other companies. It bridged the river "the transportation gap"-between Council Bluffs and Omaha, the country east of the river and the country west of it. It did no more. It did not intend to give to other roads a right in the terminal of the Union Pacific Company beyond what was necessary for a right of passage over the "gap," giving the same continuity to other roads which the Union Pacific Company had. That the act of Congress had this object the Circuit Court of Appeals did not deny. The court said (165 Fed. Rep. 850):

"It is true that the object of the requirement of the acts of congress was to bridge the transportation gap and to facilitate the transfer of cars passing between railroads east and railroads west of the Missouri river, but this fact did not deprive the court which was called upon to enforce this legislation of its jurisdiction to prescribe the limits and the terms of the use which the Pacific Company should allow, nor of its power and duty to exercise a wide and wise judicial discretion in fixing those limits and terms."

Of course the court had power to pass on the issues presented to it, and we might have to yield to its decision as res judicata if its decree was as broad as asserted, but we do not so understand its decree. It gave only what the Chief Justice, in 163 U. S., called "running rights." As we have already pointed out, the original charter of the Pacific road only impliedly authorized the building of a bridge across the river. The act of 1864 expressly authorized it, but the bridge contemplated was for the use of the Pacific Company only. No provision was made for other roads. The act of 1871 enlarged the powers of the

222 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

company, giving it means to construct the bridge, but at the same time put the obligation on the company of permitting its use by other roads, as we have seen, "indicating [we quote from 163 U. S. 587] a settled policy that all structures of this character should allow connecting roads to cross them with their cars, trains and engines." And this was the right which was given over the tracks, such right over the tracks being necessary to the right over the bridge. Id. 587, 588. The right to cross them, bridge and tracks, it will be observed, and thereby provide "for the more perfect connection of the roads east of the river with those west of it." That this was the purpose is expressed in many places in the opinion. The bridge was decided to be the principal and dominating thing, to which the rights in the tracks were accessory and only given as appurtenant and necessary as a means to avail of its use.

The Mason City Company would upset this order and make paramount the use of the tracks; indeed, make the use of the tracks independent of any use of the bridge, though the only rights it possesses are given by the act authorizing the construction of the bridge. It was because its railroad connected with the Union Pacific at Council Bluffs that it was enabled to invoke the provisions of that act. It now claims a right on the west side of the river to the use of tracks in connection with what it terms "a grain terminal" in Omaha, for which purpose it has purchased certain real estate. And it represents "that, in order to provide the necessary elevators and other special facilities, it has purchased other real estate, the title to which it has caused to be conveyed to the Omaha Grain Terminals, a corporation of the State of Nebraska, every share of the capital stock of said corporation being owned by" it. It sets forth, in detail, length of tracks and their connection with those of the Union Pacific, and the number and capacity of the elevators which are necessary to accommodate "the grain business naturally tributary

to the city of Omaha." It also sets forth that, as a carrier of live stock and live stock products, it must have facilities "in close proximity to the South Omaha stock yards." We quote these averments to illustrate the extent of the rights claimed. It is to accommodate the business thus described and its business as a common carrier that the Mason City Company asserts the right to use the tracks of the Union Pacific Company which connect with the tracks of other companies-specifically, in this case, with the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. It was a prevention of the use of the latter tracks in order to deliver a car of stucco hauled by an engine of the Mason City Company to the Rock Island Company that was held to contemn the decree. If the Mason City Company had the right to deliver that car it had the right to deliver all cars, and the court so decreed, finding that there was a physical connection between the tracks of the Rock Island and the main tracks of the Union Pacific at South Omaha, and that by the terms of the decree the Mason City Company had "the right to run its engines, cars or trains" over such tracks, and from them "over and through the said connection on to the tracks of the Union Pacific Company at South Omaha."

As

The court, therefore, decided that the decree authorized the use of the Union Pacific track for local switching purposes and enjoined the prevention of such use. we have pointed out, we do not think the decree justified the conclusion of the court. The rights asserted transcend anything given by the bridge act. The tracks of the Union Pacific Company, as urged by its counsel, are its property, and the supervision and control thereof cannot be taken from it and given to its connections except to the extent expressed in the bridge act, which gave, as we have seen, the use of the bridge and of the main and passing tracks as necessary approaches to the bridge. And it is of special significance that none of the "tenant companies" (parties

in 163 U. S.) ever claimed such right except in one attempt by the Rock Island, after these proceedings to punish the Union Pacific officers for contempt.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the decree admitted appellee to the use of the "main and passing tracks" of the Union Pacific Company from their eastern terminus at Council Bluffs, only to a physical connection with the roads and at the places mentioned therein, including the bridge over which the tracks extend across the Missouri river between Council Bluffs and Omaha. And that such use was all that was necessary to constitute the road's continuous lines from east to west or from west to east. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the order of the Circuit Court adjudging the appellants guilty of contempt of the decree entered August 12, 1903, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA v. RAMSEY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.

No. 56. Submitted November 8, 1911.-Decided December 11, 1911. Although a statute increasing the liability of corporations may, as to corporations of the State, be an exercise of the reserved power to alter, amend and repeal, the application of that principle as to foreign corporations depends on many considerations and involves Federal questions.

Whether or not a classification merely between all corporations and partnerships and individuals offends the equal protection clause, a classification of corporations operating railroads and individuals does not offend that provision of the Constitution.

One within a distinct class which is properly subject to classification canrot question the constitutionality of the classification on the