Opinion of the Court.

222 U. S.

preme Court of Appeals of the State it was contended that the decision should have been judicially noticed by the trial court, but the contention was rejected, and that ruling is now challenged as contravening the provision in § 14 of the act (25 Stat. 855), which reads: "The Commission may provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use, and such authorized publications shall be competent evidence of the reports and decisions of the Commission therein contained, in all courts of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof or authentication thereof."

Undoubtedly, this provision makes the decisions of the Commission, as so published, admissible in evidence without other proof of their genuineness, but it does not require that they be judicially noticed or relieve litigants from offering them in evidence as they would any other competent evidence intended to be relied upon. Its purpose is to relieve litigants from the inconvenience and expense of obtaining certified copies of the decisions by authorizing the use of the published copies. but it does not otherwise change the rules of evidence. The ruling, therefore, was not in contravention of the statute.

The result, however, would have been the same had the decision been properly before the court. An examination of it discloses that it did not contain any finding or direction as to what, if any, reparation should be made because of prior exactions of the rate which it condemned. It did find that the complaining party in that proceeding had been injured by the refusal of the railroad company to furnish cars on certain occasions for the shipment of coal, and did direct that reparation therefor be made, but that is without bearing here.

It follows that the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

222 U.S.

Argument for the United States.

UNITED STATES v. BARNES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.

No. 565. Argued October 24, 1911.-Decided January 9, 1912.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule of construction and not of substantive law, and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent when not otherwise manifest.

The mention in the Oleomargarine Act of August 2, 1886, c. 840, 24 Stat. 209, § 3, of certain specified sections of the Revised Statutes, which relate to special taxes, as applicable to the special taxes imposed by § 3, may exclude other sections relating to special taxes but does not exclude as inapplicable to the collection of the taxes imposed by, and enforcement of, the Oleomargarine Act, § 3177, Rev. Stat., which is general in its terms, and relates to all articles and objects subject to internal revenue tax.

In view of the custom of embodying National legislation in codes and systematic collections of general rules, it is the settled rule of decision of this court that subsequent legislation upon a subject covered by a previous codification carries the implication that general rules are not superseded by such subsequent legislation except where it clearly appears.

Where there is a codification of revenue laws to prevent fraud, the inference is that subsequent legislation is auxiliary to the earlier, and only in case of manifest repugnancy will it be construed as an abrogation thereof Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the Oleomargarine Act of 1886, and the applicability of §3177, Rev. Stat., are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr for the United States:

Oleomargarine is an "article or object subject to tax" to which § 3177 of the Revised Statutes applies, and there is nothing in the Oleomargarine Act to warrant its exclusion.

By conferring special and limited authority upon the internal revenue officers in respect to the manufacture or VOL. CCXXII-33

Argument for the United States.

222 U.S. sale of oleomargarine, Congress cannot be held to have intended to deny them the ordinary powers possessed by them as revenue officers.

Clearly, in the absence of any provision in the Oleomargarine Act expressly or by clear implication negativing the view, these general powers and duties of the revenue officers must be held to apply in the enforcement of that act.

To hold otherwise is to say that the oleomargarine business alone is to be exempted from the necessary and salutary provisions of the law for the enforcement of internal revenue taxes and the prevention of fraud in respect thereto. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386; The Brig Ann, 9 Cranch, 289.

The Oleomargarine Act of 1886, being a revenue act, In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 536, should be construed together with the general statutes relating to collection of and the prevention of frauds upon the revenue, especially as it contains no adequate provisions on that subject and would be practically inoperative otherwise. Saxonville Mills v. Russell, 116 U. S. 13, 21.

The departmental construction is that general internal revenue statutes apply in oleomargarine cases. T. D. Int. Rev., No. 1266; 26 Op. A. G. 282.

The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it will be given great weight by the court if the true construction be doubtful. United States v. Hammers, 221 U. S. 220, 228.

The judicial construction of the statute is that general internal revenue statutes are applicable in oleomargarine cases. United States v. Thomas Fitzsimmons, Dis. C. U. S. for Dist. of Michigan (not reported); Hastings v. Herold, 184 Fed. Rep. 759; Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U. S. 257, 262.

The decisions cited in the opinion below are inapplicable

or erroneous.

222 U. S.

Argument for Defendants in Error.

Mr. Henry M. Johnson for defendants in error:

In analogous cases, provisions of the Revised Statutes have been held inapplicable. In re Archer, 9 Benedict, 428.

As to the applicability of § 3176 to taxes imposed under the Succession Tax Law, see Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U. S. 174.

Congress has always regarded it as necessary, where it considered it desirable for the machinery of § 3177 and the three preceding sections to apply to some new object of taxation, to so state specifically and in unmistakable terms. See the War Revenue Act, 30 Stat. 466, and Income Tax Act, § 34, Act August 28, 1894, 28 Stat. 557, § 36 of same act on p. 559.

The applicability of the part of the act of June 30, 1864, of which § 3177 is a part, to the Oleomargarine Law has been raised in five cases, two of which went to different Circuit Courts of Appeal, sixth and eighth circuits, and in all of those cases the courts held that the act of 1864 did not apply to the Oleomargarine Law. See In re Kearne, 64 Fed. Rep. 481; In re Kinney, 102 Fed. Rep. 468; Schafer v. Craft, 144 Fed. Rep. 908; S. C., on appeal, 153 Fed. Rep. 176; S. C., on reconsideration, 154 Fed. Rep. 1002; Grier v. Tucker, 150 Fed. Rep. 658; S. C., on appeal, 160 Fed. Rep. 611. All of above cases were cited with approval in United States v. Lamson, 165 Fed. Rep. 83.

The provisions in question from their very nature have no application to taxes imposed under the Oleomargarine Law.

Even if departmental construction is in accordance with the contention that general internal revenue statutes apply in oleomargarine cases, the rule of giving weight to the construction given by those whose duty it has been to apply the statute is never applied where the intention of the law-making body is to be gathered from the act itself. The rule urged is not a controlling rule, but a rule which is only applicable where the construction of

the statute is in doubt and some rule is needed to turn the evenly balanced scale.

Here it is evident that it was the clear intention of the law-making body that § 3177 should not apply to taxes imposed under the Oleomargarine Law.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot, by a construction which he places upon an act, extend a penal statute by implication. Penalties are never extended by implication. United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 395; Elliott v. Railroad Co., 95 U. S. 573; Erskine v. Railway Co., 94 U. S. 619; The Ben R., 134 Fed. Rep. 785; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677.

No mere omission or failure to provide for contingencies will justify judicial addition to a statute. United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 103; Glover v. United States, 164 U. S. 295; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287.

The construction of a tariff act by the Treasury Department is not conclusive upon either party, and the collector is not justified by such instructions in imposing duties not warranted by law. Leming v. Marshall, 15 Fed. Cases, 8243; Balfour v. Sullivan, 17 Fed. Rep. 233; and see also United States v. Allen, 14 Fed. Rep. 263; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U. S. 174.

The Oleomargarine Law contains adequate provisions for its enforcement, and the failure of Congress, when it incorporated certain provisions of the so-called general internal revenue laws into the Oleomargarine Act, to incorporate § 3177, clearly evidenced an intention of Congress that said section should not be applicable.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the court.

The sole question presented for decision by this writ of error is, whether Rev. Stat., § 3177, is applicable to the col