Mellen v. Moline Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, followed in Lewers &
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612, followed in
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 424.
Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, followed in Acme Harvester Co. v.
Beekman Lumber Co., 300.
New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S.
38, followed in Interurban Ry. Co. v. Olathe, 187.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, followed in
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid & Beam, 444.
Origet v. United States, 125 U. S. 243, followed in Kinney v. United
States Fidelity Co., 283.
Rector v. Bank, 200 U. S. 405, followed in Acme Harvester Co. v. Beek-
man Lumber Co., 300.
Redfield v. Windom, 137 U. S. 636, followed in Turner v. Fisher, 204.
Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U. S. 632, followed in Enriquez v.
Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 399, followed in Turner v. Fisher, 204.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, followed in Southern Ry. Co. v.
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, followed in Chicago
Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222; Northern Pacific Ry Co. v. Wash-
ington, 370.
Sperry & Hutchinson v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, followed in Williams v.
Walsh, 415.
Tefft, Weller & Co. v. Munsuri, 222 U. S. 114, followed in Munsuri v.
Fricker, 121.
The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354, followed in Martin v. West, 191.
United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, followed in United States v.
Munday, 175.
Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, followed in United States v. Barnes,
513.
CASES QUALIFIED AND LIMITED.
Armstrong v. Fernandez, 208 U. S. 324, qualified and limited in Tefft,
Weller & Co. v. Munsuri, 114.
CATTLE GRAZING.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 7, 8.
CATTLE QUARANTINE ACT.
Carriers affected. Section 2 of act of March 3, 1905, construed.
The provisions of § 2 of the act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264, c. 1496,
forbidding receipt for transportation of live stock from quarantined
points in any State or Territory into any other State or Territory,
do not apply to the receipt of live stock by a connecting carrier
for transportation wholly within the State in which it is received,
even though the shipment originated at a quarantined point in
another State. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R.
COMMERCE COURT.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4.
COMMON LAW.
See LOCAL LAW;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
See SALES, 3.
CONDITIONAL SALES.
See BANKRUPTCY, 14.
CONFISCATION.
What amounts to taking of property.
To take away an essential use of property is to take the property itself.
Curtin v. Benson, 78.
1. Commerce clause; power of Congress under; dangers which may be
obviated.
The power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion is plenary and competent to protect persons and property
moving in interstate commerce from all danger, no matter what
the source may be; to that end, Congress may require all vehicles
moving on highways of interstate commerce to be so equipped as
to avoid danger to persons and property moving in interstate
commerce. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 20.
2. Commerce clause; state statute not invalid as interference with inter-
state commerce.
When the interruption of interstate commerce by reason of the en-
forcement of a state statute otherwise constitutional is incidental
only, it will not render the statute unconstitutional under the
commerce clause of the Constitution. Martin v. West, 191.
3. Commerce clause; state statute incidentally affecting use of vessel en-
gaged in interstate commerce, not invalid.
A state statute which gives a lien upon all vessels, whether domestic
or foreign and whether engaged in interstate or intrastate com- ·
merce, for injuries committed to persons and property within the
State and providing that the lien for non-maritime torts be en-
forced in the state courts and which is not in conflict with any act
of Congress, does not offend the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution because it incidentally affects the use of a vessel engaged
in interstate commerce; and so held as to §§ 5953 and 5954 of the
Code of the State of Washington. Ib.
Contracts. See STATES, 5.
4. Due process of law; validity of statute of limitations.
A state statute of limitations allowing only a little more than a year
for the institution of a suit to recover his personal property by a
party who has not been heard from for fourteen years and for
whose property a receiver has been appointed is not unconstitu-
tional as depriving him of his property without due process of
law; and so held as to the provisions to that effect of the Revised
Laws of Massachusetts, c. 144, for distribution of estates of per-
sons not heard of for fourteen years and presumably dead. Blinn
v. Nelson, 1.
5. Due process of law; legislation for maintenance of social order; what
constitutes.
Legislation reasonably adapted to the maintenance of social order,
affording hearing before judgment, and not affirmatively for-
bidden by any constitutional provision, does not deny due process
of law. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 313.
6. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of the mob and
riot indemnity law of Illinois.
The act of Illinois of 1887 indemnifying owners of property for dam-
ages by mobs and riots is not unconstitutional as depriving cities
of their property without due process of law because liability is
imposed irrespective of the power of the city to have prevented
the violence; nor is it unconstitutional as denying equal protec-
tion of the law because it discriminates between cities and unin-
corporated subdivisions of a county. Ib.
7. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of New York
transfer tax law of 1896.
The statute of New York of 1896, providing for a transfer tax on prop-
erty passing by deed of a resident intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor, is not
unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law
nor does it deny the equal protection of the law by arbitrary classi-
fication of the subject-matter or by different rates of taxation de-
pending on the relationship of the beneficiaries to the grantor.
Keeney v. New York, 525.
8. Due process of law; equal protection of the laws; validity of Massachu
setts statute regulating assignments of future wages.
The statute of Massachusetts making invalid assignments for security
for debts of less than $200 of wages to be earned unless accepted
in writing by the employer, consented to by the wife of the as-
signor, and filed in a public office, is not unconstitutional as de-
priving the borrower or the lender of his property without due
process of law, nor is it unconstitutional, as denying equal pro-
tection of the law, because certain classes of financial institutions
are exempted from its provisions. It is a legitimate exercise of the
police power and there is a basis for the classification. Mutual
Loan Co. v. Martell, 225.
9. Equal protection of the law; recognition of degrees of evil.
Legislation may recognize degrees of evil without denying equal pro-
tection of the laws. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 225.
10. Equal protection of the laws; classification within.
Whether a state statute denies equal protection of the laws by reason
of classification depends upon whether there is a basis for the
classification. Finley v. California, 28.
11. Equal protection of the laws; classification of punishment for crimes
within.
There is a proper basis for classification of punishment for crimes be-
tween convicts serving life terms in the state prison and convicts
serving lesser terms. Ib.
12. Equal protection of the laws; classification of punishment for crime;
validity of § 246 of California Penal Code.
Section 246 of the Penal Code of California inflicting the death penalty
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