from wagons and not from tipples, as the complaint had not
shown that the schedule had been the subject of complaint to the
Interstate Commerce Commission and held by it to be discriin-
inatory. Ib.

15. Sales by agent in State other than that of manufacture not interstate
commerce transactions.

Where the relation of principal and agent exists between one selling
goods in one State which are manufactured in another State and
the manufacturer, sales made by the former within his own State
are not interstate commerce transactions but are subject to the
taxing power of the State. Banker Brothers Co. v. Pennsylvania,
210.

16. Same; effect of payment by purchaser of freight from place of manu-
facture.
Where the transaction of sale of an article manufactured in another

State is wholly intrastate, as between vendor and vendee, it does
not become interstate and immune from state taxation because
the purchaser pays freight from the place of manufacture or be-
cause the purchaser obtains a warranty direct from the manu-
facturer. Ib.

17. State interference; when goods at rest and subject to state laws.
In this case held, that goods manufactured in another State and de-
livered only, in pursuance of contract, after payment of draft
attached to bill of lading, are at rest and subject to the laws of
the State while in the hands of the consignee before delivery by
him to a purchaser from him, notwithstanding the consignee only
ordered them after a contract with the purchaser had been
made. Ib.

18. State interference; when state statute superseded by Federal legislation.
Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, ante, p.: 424, followed to effect that

legislation of Congress in regard to matters of interstate com-
merce need not be inhibitive, but only to occupy the field, in
order to supersede state statutes on the same subject. (Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington, ante, p. 370.) Southern Ry. Co. v.
Reid & Beam, 444.

19. State interference; effect of act of Congress to supersede state legisla-
tion; validity of North Carolina law relative to carriers.

By the specific provisions of the act to regulate commerce, as amended,
Congress has taken control of rate making and charging for in-

terstate shipments, and in that respect such provisions supersede
state statutes on the same subject; and so held that a statute of
North Carolina requiring common carriers to transport freight
as soon as received to interstate points under penalties for failure,
conflicts with the requirement of § 2 of the Hepburn Act of July 29,
1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, forbidding transportation until rates
had been fixed and published, and is therefore unenforceable.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 424.

10. State interference; when middle ground of state authority passed.
Any middle ground on which state authority might still be preserved
after Congress has spoken in regard to interstate commerce is
passed when the state regulation burdens such commerce, and the
imposition of penalties for failure to receive and transport freight
does impose a burden. Ib.
See CATTLE QUARANTINE ACT;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1,
2, 3;

JUDICIAL NOTICE;

SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS;
STATES, 2, 3, 16, 17.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

1. Findings; conclusiveness of.

The Act to Regulate Commerce makes the findings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission as to reasonableness of a rate prima facie
correct. (Cincinnati &c. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
206 U. S. 154.) Interstate Com. Comm. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,
541.

2. Findings; conclusiveness of.

Where, as in this case, there is testimony as to value of the roads,

amounts expended, dividends, ratio of earnings and expenses,
and other matters, there is evidence to support the conclusions
and the findings of the Commission on such facts are conclusive.
Ib.

3. Orders; finality of.

Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are final unless be-

yond the power that the Commission can constitutionally exer-
cise; beyond its statutory power, or based upon a mistake of
law. Ib.

4. Orders may be set aside, when.

An order of the Commission, regular on its face, may be set aside if it
appears that the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in viola-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against taking property

without due process of law; or if the Commission acted so arbi-
trarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence or without
evidence to support its conclusions; or if the authority was ex-
ercised in an absolutely unreasonable manner. Ib.

5. Orders; validity of; power in fixing rates.

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is not to be con-
sidered by itself alone, but must be considered in the light of all
the testimony, and when carriers themselves maintain a ratio of
difference, a rate fixed by the Commission maintaining the same
ratio of difference cannot be said to be beyond its power. Ib.

6. Orders fixing rates; considerations in determining validity.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission within its power can-
not be held invalid because it appears that possibly the Commis-
sion considered other subjects than the reasonableness of the rate;
and in this case, held that an order fixing a rate on lumber was not
invalid because the Commission examined into the effect of the
rate on the lumber business and on the industries of the various
points affected. Ib.

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 4;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3, 6, 12, 13, 14;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 18.

JUDGMENTS AND DECREES.

1. Attacking decisions of Board of Land Commissioners of Hawaii; mode
of.
This court sustains the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Hawaii
that decisions of the Board of Land Commissioners of 1845 could
not be attacked except by direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Hawaii as provided by law. Lewers & Cooke v. Atcherly, 285.

2. Reëxamination of decree sought to be executed.

Where one asks the aid of a court of chancery in executing a former
decree, he takes the risk of opening such decree for reëxamination.
(Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 138 U. S.
532.) Ib.

3. Scope of decree establishing will.

A decree establishing a will may determine who is entitled to testator's
property without determining that a particular property belonged
to the inheritance. Ib.

4. Stay order for rehearing and one for purposes of certiorari differentiated.
There is a difference between a stay order for purposes of rehearing,

which prevents a judgment from becoming final, and one granted to enable an application to be made for certiorari which does not prevent the judgment from becoming final. Title Guaranty Co. v. General Electric Co., 401.

See APPEAL AND ERRORS, 4;
BANKRUPTCY, 14;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMISSION, 3-6;

JURISDICTION, A 1, 13, 22, 23;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 8,
11, 18;
RAILROADS, 4.

JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Of importations and sales of commodity.

This court cannot take judicial knowledge of details of importations and sales of a commodity even if it can take such knowledge of the fact that such commodity is an article of interstate comWilliams v. Walsh, 415.

merce.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 17;
PUBLIC WORKS, 4.

JURISDICTION.

A. OF THIS COURT.

1. Judgments and decrees reviewable under Judiciary Act of 1891. The Judiciary Act of 1891 affords by one method or the other an opportunity for review by this court of every judgment or decree of a lower court which the Judiciary Act contemplated should be reviewed by this court. Brown v. Alton Water Co., 325.

2. Of direct appeal from Circuit Court of judgment on mandate from Circuit Court of Appeals.

This court may not by indirection do that which it cannot do directly; and cannot, therefore, review on direct appeal a judgment of the Circuit Court on the question of jurisdiction based on a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals which it was the imperative duty of the Circuit Court to follow, and which is not, and cannot be, before this court for review by appeal. Ib.

3. Same.

Where the Circuit Court dismisses for want of jurisdiction, and the Circuit Court of Appeals does not deem the question of jurisdiction should be certified to this court but reverses and remands with directions to take jurisdiction, and this court refuses certiorari, a direct appeal will not lie to this court from the judgment of the Circuit Court based on the decision of the Circuit

VOL. CCXXII-40

Court of Appeals which it was the imperative duty of the Circuit
Court to follow.

Ib.

4. Under 5 of Judiciary Act of 1891; when jurisdiction of Circuit Court in issue.

Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is in issue under § 5 of the Judiciary

Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, whenever the power of the court to hear and determine the cause as defined or limited by the Constitution or statutes of the United States is in controversy; and that covers a case where the jurisdiction of the particular Circuit Court is questioned under the statute prescribing the form and place of the action. United States v. Congress Construction Co., 199.

5. Jurisdictional amount; amount in controversy where impairment of contract of exemption from taxation in issue.

The amount in controversy where the question is whether a contract of exemption from taxation has been impaired by subsequent legislation is measured by the value of the right to be protected and not by a mere isolated element, such as the tax for a single year. Berryman v. Whitman College, 334.

6. Same.

In this case the jurisdictional value of amount in controversy held to exceed $2,000, although the actual tax, the collection whereof was sought to be enjoined on the ground that its imposition impaired the obligation of a legislative contract, was less than $2,000. Ib.

7. Same.

Cases, in which the jurisdictional value of amount in controversy is limited to the single tax involved, reviewed and distinguished. Ib.

8. Same; evidence to establish requisite amount. Where the record shows that the jurisdictional value is not made out by a preponderance of evidence, the appeal will be dismissed. (Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U. S. 632.) Enriquez v. Enriquez (No. 2), 127.

9. Same; sufficiency of amount in controversy.

Under § 10 of the act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 695, this court can only review judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands where the value in controversy exceeds $25,000; and in this case it does not appear that the value of real property affected equals that amount. Ib.