tomime of real men through the medium of natural forces, although the machinery is different and more complex. How it would be if the illusion of motion were produced from paintings instead of from photographs of the real thing may be left open until the question shall arise.

It is said that pictures of scenes in a novel may be made and exhibited without infringing the copyright and that they may be copyrighted themselves. Indeed it was conceded by the Circuit Court of Appeals that these films could be copyrighted and, we may assume, could be exhibited as photographs. Whether this concession is correct or not, in view of the fact that they are photographs of an unlawful dramatization of the novel, we need not decide. We will assume that it is. But it does not follow that the use of them in motion does not infringe the author's rights. The most innocent objects, such as the mirror in the other case that we have supposed, may be used for unlawful purposes. And if, as we have tried to show, moving pictures may be used for dramatizing a novel, when the photographs are used in that way they are used to infringe a right which the statute reserves.

But again it is said that the defendant did not produce the representations, but merely sold the films to jobbers, and on that ground ought not to be held. In some cases where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice questions may arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller that the buyer of spirituous liquor is contemplating such unlawful use is not enough to connect him with the possible unlawful consequences, Graves v. Johnson, 179 Massachusetts, 53, but that if the sale was made with a view to the illegal resale the price could not be recovered. Graves v. Johnson, 156 Massachusetts, 211. But no such niceties are involved here. The defendant not only expected but invoked by ad

vertisement the use of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which especially they were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every part of the law. Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131 Fed. Rep. 730, 732. Harper v. Shoppell, 28 Fed. Rep. 613. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 433.

It is argued that the law construed as we have construed it goes beyond the power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution, to secure to authors for a limited time the exclusive right to their writings. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is suggested that to extend the copyright to a case like this is to extend it to the ideas as distinguished from the words in which those ideas are clothed. But there is no attempt to make a monopoly of the ideas expressed. The law confines itself to a particular, cognate and well known form of reproduction. If to that extent a grant of monopoly is thought a proper way to secure the right to the writings this court cannot say that Congress was wrong. Decree affirmed.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

KENTUCKY.

No. 247. Argued October 11, 12, 1911.-Decided November 13, 1911.

An artificial situs for purposes of taxation is not acquired by the en

rollment of a vessel at a port or the marking of that port on the stern, under §§ 4141 and 4178, Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of June 23, 1874, 18 Stat. 252, c. 467.

The taxable situs of a vessel which has no permanent location within

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

222 U.S.

another jurisdiction is the domicile of the owner. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, followed, and Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, distinguished.

A vessel is built to navigate the seas and not to stay in port and it does not acquire a situs in one port rather than another by reason of frequently visiting the former. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596.

Although equality of burdens be the general standard sought to be obtained in taxation, the legality of the tax is not to be measured by the benefit received by the taxpayer, nor are protection and taxation necessarily correlative obligations.

The taxing power can only be interfered with on the grounds of unjustness where the abuse is flagrant and can be remedied by some affirmative principle of constitutional law.

A corporation organized under the law of a State and having its general office and holding its corporate meetings therein, receives such protection from that State as affords a basis for taxing its intangible property which has not acquired a situs for taxation elsewhere. The taxable situs of a vessel not permanently located within another jurisdiction does not depend upon whether the State which is the domicile of the owner possesses a port which such vessel could reach. Such a test would introduce elements of uncertainty dependent upon draft of the vessel and depth of the water.

Vessels engaged in coastwise trade belonging to a Kentucky corporation held to be taxable in Kentucky although enrolled in the port of New York, having the name of New York painted on their sterns and never were at any port in Kentucky.

134 Kentucky, 417, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the power of the State of Kentucky to tax steamships belonging to a corporation of that State but enrolled at the port of New York, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Alexander Pope Humphrey and Mr. Maxwell Evarts for plaintiff in error:

Kentucky is the artificial situs of the ships of the Southern Pacific Company, New York their actual situs. They are therefore not rightfully subject to taxation in Kentucky.

Taxation is imposed by a State in return for protection

222 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

given. Unless a State gives some return for a tax imposed there is no ground for the tax.

To tax personal property where it has no situs is to take property without due process of law, and is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.

It

As to real estate it was never doubted that the taxing laws of a State could have no extraterritorial force. has now come to be settled law that the same is true as to personal property. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385; D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 342; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 195.

Six cases have been decided by this court in reference to the taxation of ships. Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596; St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299; Ayer & Lord Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409.

This court having held that the protection given by the taxing sovereignty to the thing taxed is the true basis of taxation, and that this principle should be applied in the case of personal property, as well as to real estate, it is not plain why ships alone of all personal property should be excepted from the rule.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky declined to hold that the State which furnished protection to the thing taxed alone had the right of taxation, upon the ground that it was prevented from so doing by the decisions of this court in reference to the taxation of ships.

The decisions cited do not so hold. There is no case decided by this court which holds that a ship in the coastwise trade can be taxed by an inland State within whose jurisdiction it is a physical impossibility for it ever to come. Further than that, in its later decisions this court has favored the rule of reason and common sense, viz., that ships should not be taxed in the artificial situs VOL. CCXXII-5

of the domicile of the owner, but in their actual situswhere they receive the protection of the taxing power.

In every case in this court where the principle that the domicile of the owner was to be regarded as the situs of the vessel for the purpose of taxation, it was always a domicile where it was physically possible for that ship to be, and not a domicile where under no circumstances the taxing power could have the ship within its jurisdiction.

The question is: Are these ships to be taxed in a State which does, and can give them, no protection or in a State which can and does do so-in a State where the fiction of the law as to personalty following the owner's domicile must be extended to an extreme, or in one where they have an actual situs, so far as possible for ships engaged in coastwise trade to have a situs, and pay a tax to that State which does something for them in return?

Mr. Matt J. Holt, with whom Mr. Joseph Selligman was on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the court.

The question arising upon this writ of error is, whether certain steamships owned by the Southern Pacific Company, a corporation of the State of Kentucky, are taxable in Kentucky as property having a taxable situs there.

The Southern Pacific Company is a corporation organized under a special act of the General Assembly of Kentucky of March 17, 1884. Acts of 1883-4, p. 725. Very wide and diverse powers are thereby conferred, among them being the right to own, lease, maintain and operate railroads, telegraphs and steamships, though prohibited from owning, leasing or operating "any railroad within the State of Kentucky." By an act of March 21, 1888, the act of March 17, 1884, was amended by adding thereto the following: "Except subject to and in conformity with the provisions of the laws of the State of Kentucky applicable