with a seizure by the sheriff of the property mentioned in the original petition. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 67. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Massachusetts, 71, 75. So the question put in the way most favorable for the plaintiff in error is whether a statute of limitations that possibly may allow little more than one year, is too short when the property is held in the quasi adverse hand of the receiver for that time, (what the court would do and how it would interpret the statute if other property fell in after the receiver was appointed is not material in this case). We cannot doubt as to the answer. If the legislature thinks that a year is long enough to allow a party to recover his property from a third hand, and establishes that time in cases where he has not been heard of for fourteen years and presumably is dead, it acts within its constitutional discretion. Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, but constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be done. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 67. Shorter time than one year has been upheld. Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 156. Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628. See Soper v. Lawrence Brothers Company, 201 U. S. 359, 369. Decree affirmed. Argument for the United States. 222 U.S. UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE AND OHIO SOUTHWESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY. · ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO. No. 464. Argued October 19, 1911.-Decided October 30, 1911. Courts are not inclined to make constructive crimes, and in this case the general rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed applies. If there be ambiguity, the character of the statute determines for strict or liberal construction, but where there is no ambiguity the words of the statute are the measure of its meaning. A penal statute should not be construed as confounding unwillful with willful acts by uniting in criminality and penalties parties to whom no notice need be given with those to whom notice must be given. The provisions of § 2 of the act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264, c. 1496, forbidding receipt for transportation of live stock from quarantined points in any State or Territory into any other State or Territory, do not apply to the receipt of live stock by a connecting carrier for transportation wholly within the State in which it is received, even though the shipment originated at a quarantined point in another State. THE facts, which involve the construction of the Cattle Quarantine Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264, are stated in the opinion. The Solicitor General for the United States: The statute applies to the shipment of sheep from a quarantined State or Territory into any other State or Territory of the Union and to every carrier participating in such shipment, not alone the initial carrier who takes up the sheep in the quarantined district and carries them without, but as well to every succeeding connecting carrier doing any part of the work of transportation neces 222 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. sary to bring the shipment from its place of beginning to its place of destination. Considering the statute in its entirety and the purposes for which it was enacted, it is applicable to interstate shipments of live stock from place of origin to place of destination. As a part of the statute, too, the regulations made under it, which apply of course only to interstate shipments, must be taken into consideration. Certainly it was competent for Congress to authorize a regulation which was operative from the beginning to the end of the shipment. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1. The intention of the framers of the law was to authorize such a regulation; see the report of House Committee, No. 4200, 58th Cong., 3d Session, February 3, 1905, recommending the law in question as tending to control and eradicate the contagious diseases of animals in the United States; see also Regulations of Secretary of Agriculture of April 15, 1907, and August 16, 1909. The act accomplishes what Congress intended and what its efficiency requires and it should be interpreted and enforced by the light of the fundamental rule for carrying out its purposes. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. The act deals with the shipment always as an entirety. Mr. George Hoadly, with whom Mr. Judson Harmon, Mr. Edward Colston and Mr. A. W. Goldsmith were on the brief, for defendant in error: The statute is penal. United States v. Southern Railway Co., 187 Fed. Rep. 209, holding the statute to be remedial and not penal was error; and see St. L. Terminal Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. Rep. 191. Not only does the statute impose a money penalty in favor of the United States, not of a party aggrieved, but Argument for Defendant in Error. 222 U.S. it declares that the violation of its provisions is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The fact that this defendant being a corporation cannot be imprisoned does not make the statute any the less penal. As to strict construction of penal statutes, see Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S., p. 667; 3 Bl. Comm. 2; United States v. Sheldon, 2 Wheat. 119; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Elliott v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 573, 576; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82; France v. United States, 164 U. S. 676; Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U. S. 262, 265; United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 310; Werckmeister v. Am. Tobacco Co., 207 U. S. 381. The defendant did not transport the live stock from the State of Kentucky to the State of Ohio. Still less did it receive them for such transportation. The transportation from Kentucky to Ohio was complete when it received them and its receipt of them was from, not for, such transportation, as a result, not with the purpose, of such transportation. It may have been within the power of Congress to make what the defendant did an offense, but Congress has not done so. The meaning of the statute is clear and needs no construction. "From," when used in any context resembling this, means "from within"; and the word "into" is of so simple a meaning that, so far as we have been able to discover, no court has ever been compelled to define it. Commonwealth v. Erie & N. E. R. R., 27 Pa. St. 339; West. Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 155; Tenn. & Ala. R. R. v. Adams, 3 Head, 596; McCartney v. Chi. & Evanston R. R. Co., 112 Illinois, 611, 626; and see also B. & O. R. R. Co. v. P., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 701; Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 90 S. W. Rep. 273; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica &c. R. R. Co., 6 Paige, 554. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant in error, called herein defendant, was indicted for violations of the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1264, c. 1496), entitled "An Act To enable the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and maintain quarantine districts, to permit and regulate the movement of cattle and other live stock therefrom, and for other purposes." Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but subsequently the court quashed the indictment, following the ruling in certain other cases, and this writ of error was sued out to determine the validity of the ruling. The efficient words of the statute are in § 2 (presently to be given), and prohibit receiving stock for transportation or to transport it from a quarantined State into any other State or Territory. A summary of the indictment is as follows: The Secretary of Agriculture, in pursuance of the act of Congress, having determined the fact that a contagious and communicable disease, known as scabies, existed among the sheep in the-State of Kentucky, as required by said act, promulgated an order and regulation establishing a quarantine in Kentucky, and gave public notice thereof, as required by the statute. And the indictment charges that he gave notice of the quarantine and of the rules and regulations established by him by sending printed copies of the same to defendant, and that the receipt of notice was acknowledged by the general manager. There were three separate shipments (each of which is made a count in the indictment), of sheep from Kentucky upon different dates, and the cars containing the sheep were delivered to the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, and transported by it over its line of railroad to a point within the city of Cincinnati, |