« AnteriorContinuar »
Act shall apply only to such railroad companies as & Obio Railroad Company, having, as they ra owned the landing for such water craft.
port, wholly failed, after repeated efforts, to 2. A statute giving to any railroad com. purchase from the receivers ibe land for Ibeir pany that owns landing places the right incline, asked that the constitutionality of the to own water craft for transportation across a nav: Act of the Legislature before referred to, and igable river at its terminus, but which declares that popularly known as the “Water-Craft Act," be no right shall exist under the Act to condemnany set down for argument. There being no sereal estate, and that the Act sball apply only to ruch companies us own the landings for such rious conteution that any other difficulty to the water craft, is in violation of the constitutional condemnation than this Water-Craft Act exprovision against locul or special laws for grant- isted, and its constitutionality being challenged ing any special or exclusive privilege, immunity by attorneys for intervening peti:joners, the or franchise.
court set down the question for argument, and 8. If constitutional and unconstitu. it was ably and elaborately argued, by eminent tional provisions of an Act are per. counsel, representing the receivers, as well as fectly distinct and separable, the former may the St. Louis & Cairo Railroad Company and stand though the latter fall.
its lessees, tbe Mobile & Obio, before the dis(October 15, 1889.)
trict judge. So much of the Act in question as is here necessary to be considered is as follows:
“ An Act to Facilitate the Carriage and TransINTERVENING petition by the St. Louis &
Cairo and tbe Mobile & Ovio Railroad Com fer of Passengers and Property by Railroad panies for the condemnation of certaiu land in Companies. the possession of plaintiffs as receivers of the
* Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railroad Com the State of Minois, represented in the General pany, to be used for an incline and transfer boat Assembly, that all railroad compuvies incorpo landing. Judgment for petitioners.
rated under the laws of this state, baving a terThe case sufficiently appears in the opinion. minus upon any pavigable river bordering on
Messrs. Lansden & Leek. E. L. Russell this State, shall bave power to own for their and H. S. Greene for petitioners.
own use any water-craft necessary ip carrying Messi's. John M. Butler and S. P. across surb river any cars, property or passenWheeler for the receivers.
gers transported over their lines or transported
over any railroad terminating on the opposite Allen, J., delivered the following opinion: side of such river to be transported over their
This case bas been before the court, in one lines; providel, that no right shall exist under form and another, for nearly two years. The this Act to condemn any real estate for landing intervening petitioners instituted proceedings in for such water-craft, or for any other purpose. the Circuit Court of Alexander County, Ill., 1o And this Act shall only apply to sucb railroad condemo one acre and a fraction of land, sit-companies as own the landing for such wateruated between the bank of the Obio River and crafi." the water for the purpose of building thereon The validity of this Act is denied, and the an incline, to be used for the transportation of counsel questioning its constitutionality concars down to the river, and thus, by means of tend: transfer boats, form an unbroken connection First, that it is in conflict with the 13th section with railroads on the other side, for the benefit of the 4th article of the Constitution of Illinois, of their through freight and passengers. The which is in the following language: Every strip of land sought to be condemned being in bill shall be read at large on tbree different days the possession of Thomas & Tracy, receivers, in each House; and the bill and all amend. appointed by the court, of the Cairo & Vinments ibereto shall be printed before the vote cenues Railroad, and claimed by them as the is taken on its final passage, and every bill barproperty of tbat corporation, the case was ing passed both Houses shall be signed by the transferred to this court, and afterwards a speakers thereof. No Act bereafter passed bearing was bad before the district judge and shall embrace more than oue subject, and that & jury, resulting in a holding by the court that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subthe sirip of land was subject to condemnation ject sball be embraced in an Act wbich shall for the purposes set forth in the intervening not be expressed in the title, such Art shall be petition, and the assessment by the jury of void only as to so much thereof as shall not be damages, to be paid by the St. Louis & Cairo so expressed; and no law shall be revived or and tbe Mobile & Ohio Railroad Companies, id amended by reference to its title only, but the the sum of $5,000. Subsqpuently, upon argu-law revived or the section amended shall be inment before the circuit and district judges, a serted at length in the new Act." rehearing was granted in the case, upon the And, second, tbat it is in conflict with section distinct ground that the Act of_ihe Illinois 22 of the same article, wbich provides: “The Legislature, entitled “ An Act to Facilitate the General Assembly shall not pass local or special Carriage and Transfer of Passengers and Prop- laws in any of the following enumerated cases, erty by Railroad Companies," approved May that is to say ... for granting to any corpo 24, 1877, presented an insuperable barrier to ration, association or individual any special or Buch condemnation. 34 Fed. Rep. 774. exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
Afterwards, upon further argument, the wbatever." matter was postponed, pending the suggestion Thiid, that it is in conflict with article 11, of the court that the receivers sell to ibe inter- $ 14, of the State Constitution of 1870, wbicb vening petitioners for a fair price, to be agreed reads as follows: "The exercise of ibe power upon, so much of the ground as might be nec. and the right of eminent domain sball dever be essary for the purposes of their incline. The so construed or abridged as to prevent tbe tak. St. Louis & Cairo and their lessees, the Mobile ling by the General Assembly of the property
and francbises of incorporated companies, al. I of such river, to be transported over their lives, ready organized, and subjecting them to the with a proviso that do rigbt shall exist under public necessity, the same as of individuals." the Act to condemn any real estate for a land.
In addition to these objections, it is contend- ing for such water-craft, or for any other pured that the Act is also repugnant to the spirit pose, and that the Act itself shall only apply and import of the State and Federal Constitu- to slich railroad companies as own the landing tions, intended 10 secure equality of rights to for such water craft. It is assumed that this every citizen, patural and corporate. Grave Act confers a new power on railroad compaand important constitutional questions are thus pies,—that of using and owning water-craft to brought before the court, and its decision upon transfer freighi and passengers across the river; them demanded.
and it may be assumed that it also takes away It is with extreme up willingness that a fed- from certain railroad corporations rights with eral court wiil assume to hold as void the Acts which they bad become vested under the Genof the Legislature of a State, e-pecially when eral Incorporation Law of the State, particu. such Acts bave not been passed upon by the larly the power to make such terminal enlargestate court. And if aoy well-grounded doubt ments, and variations of their terminal privi. exists as 10 their constitutionality, whenever by leges, not constituting a new enterprise, as the any system of fair reasoning any possible con- commerce of the country and the traffic of their struction tbat is coosistent with reason can be roads require. It cannot be well questioned given by which the couris can hold them con- | that railroads, whose lines terminated on the stitutioval, and give such interpretation to the bank of one of the navigable rivers bordering statutes as to make them valid, they will als on this State, wbere their business required it, ways do so. But courts, however unpleasant bad the power, prior to the Water-Craft Act of the duty, will always, when properly called 1877, to extend their tracks, or build side upon, considerately review the acts of a co- tracks, to the edge of the water, and condemn orjinate branch, and, wbile besilating to hold land subject to condemnation for tbat purpose. them void for unconstitutionality, vet, wben Under this Act railroad companies cannot conthey find them in bold defiance of the Consti- demo lavd at all, however necessary it may be, tution, seeking to override some valuable right to reach the water. or privilege of tbe citizen or of the public, will After such examination and reflection as I not shrink from the performance of the high have been enabled to bestow on tbe question, I duty imposed upon them by the law.
am unable to reach tbe conclusion tbat the title Tibe tirst objection argued to the validity of of this Act fairly or sufficiently gives notice or a portion of the Water-Craft Act, namely, that information of the scope and substance in the it embraced subjects not expressed in the title, body, or indicates with reasonable certainty the must be tested and disposed of by the decisions purposes intended to be effected; but, on the conand their analogies of the Supreme Court of irary, I am clearly of opinion that the title is Illinois, this 13th section of the 4th article of misleading, and not as broad as the Act. This the State Constillition having repeatedly been view is supported by the following authorities: before that tribunal for exposition and inter- People v. Mellen, 32 III. 182; Lockport v. Gaypretation. The object of the constitutional lord, 61 Ill. 276; People v. Wright, 70 III. 388; provision was praise worthy. Its evident pur- People v. Institution of Protestant Deaconesses, pose was to prevent fraudulent and vicious leg- 71 III. 229; Middleport v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. 82 islation, by requiring the title to give a fair in. III, 565; People v. Hazelwood, 116 III. 327, 3 dication of the substance of the Act,—such a West. Ren. 538; Leach v. People, 122 sl. 421, certain indication as would potify members of 10 West. Rep. 617; Dolese v. Pierce, 124 III. 140, the Legislature, the public at large, and more 13 West. Rep. 866; Cooley, Const. Lim. 147-151. particularly all persons having an interest in the The second point argued in connection with maller, of the contents of the Act, so as to put the alleged invalidity of the Legislative Act prethem on their guard. Wbenever the title of sents a most important question: Docs the the Act bas a scope so clear as to indicate its Water-Craft Act grant, and was it intended to general purpose, then its more specific purposes grant, any special or exclusive privilege, immay be left to the body of the Act itself. The mupily or franchise wbatever to any corporatitle of this Act is: “To Facilitate the Carriage tiop? If it does, it is special legislation, proand Traosser of Passengers and Property by bibited by the Constitution. The fundamental Railroad Companies.” This title, it must be idea of the authors of the Constitution, exconfessed, is at once captivating and delusive. pressed in a declaration clear and explicit, was The entire public would most likely unite, and doubtless secure some reasonable degree of the desire become a common one, to facilitate equality and uniformity of right and privilege the carriage and transfer of passengers and between the different railroads in the State, property by railroad companies, but not the which are required to perform important serv. slightest iniimation is giveo as to the means to ices to the public. In the first part of the Act be employed whereby this transfer is to be fa- under considera'ion po principle of uniformity cilitated. Indeed, it would seem dificult, by of right or privilege is violated. All railroad any combination of words, to make a title to companies incorporated under the laws of the any Act more general. The body of the Act State, having a terminus on any of the navigaauthorizes all railroad companies, having a ter- ble rivers on its borders, are given power to mious upon any navigable river bordering on own for their own use water-craft necessary in the State of Illinois, to own for their own use carrying across such river cars, property or any water-craft necessary in carrying across passengers transported over their lines, or transsuch river any cars, property or passengers ported over any railroad terininating on the optransported over their lines, or transported over posite side of such river, to be transported over any railroad terminating on the opposite side their lines. It bas already been mentioned that the concession seems to have been made, on the, on the bank of the Ohio River at Cairo. They argument, of the grant of a new power to the owe a common duty to the public, and this class of Illinois railroads terminating on bor- duty grows correspondingly with the demands dering navigable waters. Up to the approval of commerce, and public necessity and conof the Act in question, these railroads, by the venience. The Cairo & Vincennes answers the General Incorporation Act, with the view of demand of the public for boats transferring merely enlarging their terminal facilities, bad across the river cars, freight and passengers the undoubted right of going to the water,- to connecting on the opposite side with other rail. transports or ferry boals. It was because they road lines, and thus securing unbioken transdid not possess the power to own and use such portation. The St. Louis & Cairo, wben called transports or ferry-boats back and forwarii be on for a similar service, is unable to respond. tween terminal points on opposite sides of these It avows its willingness to do so, and its adx. rivers that the Legislature was appealed to, and iety to discharge its duty to the public, but it the new power given. The Legislature, in an does not own the land for a landing for trang. swering this appeal, did a wise thing, in the fer-boats. The owner of this land, the Cairo first clause of the Act, by granting to these rail. & Vincennes, will not sell it, and this Waterroad corporations the privilege of ferrying, -Craft Act prohibits its condemnation. Is it not carrying goods and passengers through, on perfectly manifest that the Cairo & Vincennes, through cars, putting them on boats and trans- under this Act, enjoys a special privilege or ferring them across the river, and expediting immunity over the St. Louis & (airo? Or, to railroad business and accommodating the pub- put it differently, are not all the railroads not lic by simplifying the number of intervening owning land for a landing, and vuable to purageucies.
chase the same, discriminated against, and a The Act, however, seems to have gone much special privilege granted to such, and such further thac the interests of commerce or of only, as own the landing? If in this controthe public demanded. The parties seeking this versy only these iwo Railroad Companies were legislative aid,-a ferry franchise, in addition interested,-if it were a contest of mere private to a railroad franchise, -were not satisfied with right between them,-different considerations a general grant of power to all railroads baving might arise. But they are both “railroad comthe same terminus, but sougbt to accomplish panies, incorporated under the Laws of this the double purpose of getting this new power State," enjoying franchises to be used in the for themselves, and keeping every body else interests of the public. The one owning the from getting it, as far as they could. By pro- landing would in all probability promise the viding that no railroad company should be giv- public to serve it efficiently, faithfully and en power to condemn land for a landing for cheaply; but the public, unwilling to accept such water-craft, and that the Act should only such assurances, very properly demand that all apply to such companies as own the landing the avenues for the transaction of the commerce for such water-craft, the objectionable and vi. of the country be kept open, and that no agencious features of this legislation clearly appear. cy be crippled which has for its object the proThe new power enabled railroad companies motion of the public interests. owning land for a landing to own and use In the discussion of this question, counsel water-craft necessary in ferryir.. passengers for the receivers emphasized the argument that and properiy across a river, but disabled comtbe Legislative Act could be upheld upon the papies not owning such land from exercising ground that railroad companies terminating this most important franchise or privilege. I on a river bordering op a State, and owning a bave bad occasion before to state that, under landing for water craft, constitute a class: that the General Incorporation Act, railroad corpo. the Legislature intended to classify railroads rations, whose lives terminated on a bordering terminating on navigable bordering streams navigable stream, bad the power to go to fer-livto such as owned land for a landing for ries, when they did so by merely enlarging | water-craft and such as did not, and thut a rail. their terminal facilities; but the portion of the road corporation not owning a landing for Act now being considered takes away an exist. water-craft can only claim such privilege, im. ing power, by declaring that they shall not ex- munity or franchise as belongs to any other ercise the power of eminent domain to the company or corporation in that class. A numextent of getting down to a ferry-boat; that ber of autborities were ciied to sustain this they can neither use a transfer boat nor get to view; among others Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. a landing. The additional power, or enlarged lova, 94 U. 8. 155 [24 L. ed. 94). franchise, to own and use boats to carry freight This position cannot be sustained, nor do the and passengers across the river is limited “to authorities referred to support it. There is but such railroad companies as own the landing for one classification of railroad companies under such water craft. Corporations not fortunate the Act, and that is such as buve “a terminus enough to own the land, it may be in conse- upon any navigable river bordering on this quence of a refusal by rival corporations to sell State.” what they do not need for their own purposes, The supreme court, in 94 U. S. supra, are denied alike the privilege of owning water- quotes approvingly, an Iowa case being under craft and of condemning land to reach a ferry- consideration, from McAunich v. Mississippi & boat which may be used or owned by others. M. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 343, wherein it is said: It cannot be denied that the operation of this “These laws are general and uniform, not bepart of the Act is partial and unequal. cause they operate upon every person in the
Here are two railroad companies,—the Cairo State, for they do not, but because every per& Vincennes, represented by_the receivers, son who is brought within the relations and Thomas & Tracy, and the St. Louis & Cairo, circumstances provided for is affected by the by intervening petitioners,—both terminating law. They are general and uniform in their operation upon all persons in the like situation, the same rights. The following authorities are and tbe faci of their being general and uniform referred to in support of this view, that the is not allected by the pumber of persons within Act is in conflict with the 22d section of the tbe scope of tbeir operation," "The Statute” 4th article of the Constitution of Illinois. (of lowa), says Chief Justice Waite, "divides Frye v. Partridge, 82 II. 273; People v. Cooper, the railroads of the Siate into classes, according 83 Ill. 586; People v. Meech, 101 III. 200; Millto business, and establisbes a maximum of ett v. l'euple, 117 Ill. 305, 5 West. Rep. 155; rates for each of the classes. It operates uni- Cooley, Const. Lim. 389–396. formly on each class, and this is all the Consti- The views already expressed and the conclutution requires."
siops reached render it unnecessary to consider It seems probable that the authors of the the 14th section of article 11 of the ConstituAct under consideration prepared it with ref-liod of 1870. or the 2d section of the 41h article erence to this doctrine of classification. But it of the Constitution of the United States, both gives them no support. Every privilege, im- of which bave been referred to as authority munity or franchise enjoyed or used by one against the validity of the Act in question. railroad con pany terminating on the Ohio They were cited to sustain the position that a River at Cairo should be extended to every statute is unconstitutional which selects particot ber railroad terminating there. It is impos- ular persons, datural or corporate, from a class sible, by any fair reasoning, or upon any prin- or locality, and subjects them to peculiar rules, ciple of justice 10 lhe public, to sustain the or imposes upon them special obligations or contention that one of these railroad corpora- burdens, from which others in the same localtions loses an almost invaluable privilege of ity or class are exempt. This position is so serving the public because only of not beiug nearly self evident as not to require authority able to purchase land for a travsfer or ferry to support it. In my view, the prorisions of landing. All the incorporated railroad com- the Water-Craft Act, limiting the right to ouon panies terminating at Cairo exercise their fran and use boats and water-craft to such railroad cbises by virtue of grants from the sovereign companies 18 own the real estate for a landing, power. The State, in granting tbe charters, and withbolding the right from companies not necessarily in every instance reserved the right owning the land for a landing, are obnoxious to riguale ard control the corporations in the to both objections urged against its constitupublic interest. No one or more of these com- tionality, and cannot be upheld as valid or bind. panies can be permired, under the semblance ing. Of course this conclusion in no manner of a state grani or authority, to exercise rigbts affects provisions of the Act which are constiard privileges in connection with facilitating tutional. The constitutional and unconstituthe commerce of the country which are denied tional provisions of this Act are perfectly disto others. And if the exercise of such power linct and separable, so that the first may stand, and authority by the one or more is rightful, though the latter fall. the denial of the same immunities and priv. The salutary and useful provision permitting ileges to others is illegal and oppressive; and all Ilinois railroad companies terminating on any Act pretending to confer authority for any pavigable river borderivg on the State to such discrimination is void. The Water-Craft own and use water craft as a means of increasArt, therefore, Las not only a false and deceil- ing their capacity to serve the public is unex. ful title, but its purpose was to confer special ceptiopable; but the proviso restricting the use privilege upon certain corporations, and to de- of this additional franchise to companies owony to others of the same class the exercise of ling laud for a ling is void.
(January 29, 1890.) Robert ALLISON et al., Respts.,
PPEAL by defendant, The St. Paul City 0.
Railway Company, from orders of the DisSAME, Appt.
trict Court for Ramsey County denying its mo
tions for new trial in actions to enforce certain (....Minn.....)
alleged mecbanics' liens in wbich judgments
bad been entered for plaintiffs. Affirined. '1. Whether the authority of notaries The cases sufficiently appear in the opinion. public to administer oaths be of statutory
Mr. H. J. Horn, for appellant: origin, or founded on customary law, it is now Such a liep is tbe creature of statute and can universal, and should be judicially recognized as only exist by virtue of a compliauce with its one of their general powers, and afidavits, au- provisions. thenticated by the ofhcial seals of notaries of Rugg v. Uoorer, 28 Minn. 404. *Head notes by MITCHELL, J.
The oath of the claimant or his agent verify. ing the account or claim is an indispensable reclaimant shall make his statement in writing, quisite of the Statute.
make oath thereto and tile in the ollice of the $ 7, chap. 90, formula in § 18, Id.; Colman v. Secretary of State. Good now, 35 Minn, 9.
An onih is a pledge given by a person makThe oath required implies an oath admin. ing is, ibat his attestation or promise is made istered by an officer authorized so to do, by the und'r an iomeaiate sense of his responsibility laws of Minnesota, and administered within to God. his jurisdiction.
2 Bouvier, L. Dict. p. 248. Tbe Statutes of this State bave in several in- This pledge may be given, and this oath may stances given foreign notaries power to act. be made, in any country, and before any officer But not in a case such as the present.
authorized to administer an oatb. See Gen. Stat. 1878, chap. 26, 87; chap. 73, In the case at bar the officer before whom SS 35, 36; chap. 40, § 7, subu. 2.
these oaths were taken was authorized to adExpressio unius esi exclusio alterius.
minister an oath by the laws of the Slale of The State obviously, to prevent inconvenience Pennsylvania. to nonresident claimants, authorizes an agent Purdon's Dig. pp. 1270-1272. to make the oath.
His certificate, signature and seal prove that See $ 7, chap. 90; Clark v. Schatz, 24 Minn. the oaib was administered, and this establishes 300; 2 Jones, Liens, $ 1451; Benedict v. llall, 76 these liens. N, C. 113; Kirksey v. Bates, 7 Port. (Ala.) 529; Browne v. Philadelphia Bank, 6 Serg. & R. Chandler v. Hanna, 73 Ala. 390.
485. Messrs. Rogers, Hadley & Selmes, for In England, as far back as the memory of Wood and Roberts et al., respondents:
man extends, nolaries public were autborized A potary public is not merely an officer of to administer oaths, and by the statutes of Engthe country by which he is appointed and in land, and the statutes of every State in the which be is authorized to act, but he is an of. Uniied States, tbey are now so authorized. ficer recognized by all countiies; and especial Brooke, Notaries, pp. 19, 20. importance has always been attached to the Under the common law and the practice of oflice for the reason that certain official acts the courts of England, oaths and affidavits performed by bim within the territory for taken before notaries, public in foreign counwhich he is appointed are recognized as au- tries, accompanied with evidence that, by the thoritative the world over; and among the acts laws of such countries, they were authorized wbich he is thus recognized as having the au. to administer oaths, bave been received and thority to perform is that of administering an used in England as far back as the bistory of oath.
jurisprudence runs. Brooke, Notaries, p. 19; Cole v. Sherard, 11 Omealy v. Newell, 8 East, 364, 368, citing Exch. 432; (mealy v. Newell, 8 East, 364; Hag. v. Broron, decided by Lord Mansfield, gitt v. Iniff. 5 DeG. M. & G. 910; E.r parti and Voght v. Eigin, Hil. 58 G 3, decided by Worsley, 2 H. Bl. 275; Walrond v. Van Moses, 8 Lord Kenyon; Cole v. Scrard, 11 Exch. 482; Mod. 321.
Ilangitt v. Inif, 5 DeG. M. & G. $10. It is generally recognized in the courts of The courts will take judicial notice of the this country that affidavits may be taken be official seal of a foreign nolary public attached fore dolaries public in the other States, and to an allida vit, and oaths and allidavits required that they have the same effect and authen by the laws can be lawfully taken before noticity as if taken in the State where they are tävies public of foreign Slates baving authority used,
to administer onths. Conolly v. Riley, 25 Md. 402; Stephens v. Wil. Conolly v. Riley, 25 Md. 402, 419, 4:0; Felloros liam8, 46 lowa, 540, Denmead v. Naack, 2 Mc. v. Menaxha, 11 Wis. 562, 563; Denmead v. Artb. 477, Fellows v. Menasha, 11 Wis. 562: Maack, 2 McArth. 477; Stephens v. Williams, Marshall v, Mott, 13 Jobos. 423; Tucker v. 48 Iowa, 540; United Stutes v. Libby, 1 Woodb. Ladd, 4 Cow. 47; United States v. Libby, 1 & M. 225, 226. Woodb. & M. 221.
The potary public being an officer recognized Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the the world over, bis sal proves itself, and it is court: not necessary tbat it should be authenticated. Gen. Stat. 1878, chap. 90, SS 6,7 (relating to
Conoily v kiley, Stephens v. Williams and mechanics' liens), provides that the stutement Fellows v. Menasla, 8ura.
of the account, required to be filed and reIn the absence of any evidence upon the mat. corded, shall be verified by the oath of the party ter, the presumption would be that the laws of or his agent, but is entirely silent as to wbere Peppsylvania, like the laws of our own Siate, or before wbom such affidavits sball be made authorize potaries public to administer 0:11hs. To hold that the Statute requires them to be
Cooper v. Keaney, 4 Minn. 528; Brimhall v. I made within the State, or, if without the State, Van Campen, 8 Minn. 13; Conolly v. Riley, suoi that the oath must be administered by a commispra; Rape v. Íleaton, 9 Wis. 328; Walsh v. Dart, sioner for the State of Minnesota, would be to 12 Wis. 635: Shumway v. Leakey, 67 Cal. 458; put a construction upon the Act at once upauMarsters v. Lash, 61 Cal. 622; Ilickman v. Al- thorized by its language, and unsuited to the paugh, 21 Cal. 226; Allen v. liatson, 2 Hill, L. business babits and nece-sities of the country. 319; Crafts v. Clark, 38 lowa, 237; Wright v. Noibing short of express legislation would Delafielu, 23 Barb. 498 513; llall v. Pillow, 31 justify any such rule. We think these affiArk. 32; Wharton, Ev. $ 314.
davits may be made in another State, before Messi's
. John B. & W. H. Sanborn, for any officer authorized by the laws of sucb State Allison et al., respondents:
to administer oaths. Of course, if taken in All that the Statute requires is, that the another State, they must be duly authenti