« AnteriorContinuar »
creditor, and consequently had no insurable Schonfield died without otherwise disposing of interest in bis life. It is contrary to public it. The rule and the practice that permitted policy to allow anyone pot owning such insur. the member, and him alone, to dispose of the able interest to become the owner, by assign- insurance at bis own pleasure, without regard ment or otherwise, of insurance upon the life to any right or claim of any person to whoin it of a human being. A creditor of the assured had been issued or transferred, is utterly inconmay lawfully become the owner of such insur-sistent with the idea of a beneficial interest in ance to an extent requisite to protect bim from any person other than the member himself. ultimate loss of bis demand; and a purchaser That mode of dealing with it is consistent only or assignee of it will be recognized as having with the proposition that the party in whose an interest in it sufficient to repay him the pur- name it was, whether originally or by transfer, chase or other money invested in it by bim, in- beld it merely as a trustee, for the use and cluding advancements, in the nature of dues, benefit of the member. Upon the death of the assessments and premiums, to preserve and member the beneficial interest vested in his keep the insurance in force, with lawful inter- beirs. When the person designated to receive est ibereon. What amount a creditor, as such, the insurance is held by the law incapable of may procure insurance for, and the rules regu- taking it for his own use, on grounds of public lating his collection of it, depend upon coniid- policy, it will be entirely consistent with the gencies not necessary to discuss in this case. manifest purposes of tbe order to make the What the policy of the law forbids to be done same disposition of the money that would bave must be treated by courts, when administering been made if he had been dead. As we bave the law, as never having been done. The un- seen, the laws of the order direct it to be paid, disputed evidence is that Turner's first claim in that contingency, to the beirs of the memni owoerslıip of the insurance was through an ber; not to the heirs of the holder or transferee assignment to him of the Friedlander benefit of the benefit ceriiticate. Such holder of the certificate. The case, in this respect, comes certificate may, no doubt, collect the money directly within the decision of this court in the for the use of the heirs, and enforce such proper case of Price v. Knights of Honor, 68 Tex. 361, claims of bis own against the fund as the law in which it is held that such a transfer is pro recognizes. bibited by law. The fact that subsequently After allowing to appellee the $50 originally Schonfield surrendered the transferred certiti- paid, and amount subsequently paid by bim cate to the lodge, and procured another one, for dues and assessments, with interest thereon pavable directly to Turner, does not change the at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, the reprinciple, or affect the result. Tbe public pol- mainder of the money belongs to the heirs of icy that forbids such transactions is entirely David Schopfield, as they existed at the date independent of the consent or control of the in- of his death. If his wife bad then been disurer or the insured.
vorced, she was not one or them, and is not in We ibink it clear that the laws of the order any capacity entitled to a share of the money. at the dates of the transactions in question rec On another irial the exception to the pleading ognized David Schonfield as the only beneficial of plaintiff charging tbat she was divorced, inowner of the insurance, and that the person stead of being sustained, onght to be overruled. named in the certificale, whether it was Fried- The judgment is reversed, and the cause is relander or Turner, was only an appoivtee to col. manded. lect and receive the money, in the event that
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT.
STANDARD OIL CO., Appl.,
Statutes giving mechanics’ liens are remedial,
and must be liberally construed. James M. LANE et al., Respts.
White Lake Lumber Co. v. Russell, 22 Neb.
126; Montandon v. Dens, 14 Ala. 33; Brown v. (.... Wis......)
Pendergast, 7 Allen, 427.
The court should not narrow the meaning of A len for the price of lubricating oil fur- the term protection.” Even if the expression nished for use on machinery in a mill is not given is special, but the reason general, the expression by a statute giving a liep for any materials fur- will be deemed general. Dished for the protection of any building or any
Brown v. Pendergast, supra. machinery which becomes a part of tbe freehold. Courts universally give a broad and liberal
construction to the language of lien statutes. (January 28, 1890.)
llazard Powder Co. v. Byrnes, 12 Abb. Pr. 469; Diron v. La Farge, 1 E. D. Smith, 722; Keystone Min. Co. v. Gallagher, 5 Colo. 23.
Messrs. Miles & Shea, for respondents: Circuit Court for Bayfield County denying In determining the question wbether a lien its claim to a lien upon certain premises for the attaches, the Massachusetts court construes a price of lubricating oil furnished for use upon lien statute strictly because it is in derogation machinery situated thereon. Affirmed.
of the common law. The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. Trask v. Searle, 121 Mass. 229.
Messrs. Lamoreux & Gleason, for appel- In this respect Illinois is in harmony with lant:
Stephens v. Holmes, 64 ml. 336; Canisius v., friction, and thus preserve it from injury. But Merrill, 65 III. 67, 2 Jones, Liens, $ 1554. is it the in:ent of the Statute to give a lien for
The materialman's lien always goes on the everything used on machinery which may pro. theory that the material has become a fixture, lect it, and preserve it or keep it from wearing part and parcel of the realty, or that it was out? The Statute seems to go on the principle purchased with that intention and understand that materials used and labor performed on ing.
machinery wbich epbance its value, and beSpruhen v. Stout, 52 Wis. 517; Dimmick v. come a part of such machinery, should be entiCook, 7 Cent. Rep. 191, 115 Pa. 573; Pond tled 10 a lien. This appears to be the object of Mach. Tool Co. v. Robinson, 38 Minn, 272. the Statute. It is clear ibat it is not everything
used in operating machinery, and which tends Cole, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the lo preserve it, ihat is embraced within the court:
meaning of the Statute. Many things may We think the decision of the court below, serve to preserve machinery, and make it opbolding that the plaintitf was not entitled to a erate more efficiently and easily, which do not lien for its debt, was correct and must be af- protect it in the sense of the Statute. Illustrafirmed. Its claim was for lubricating oil sold, tions of this view were given on the argument, to be used, and actually used, on the machinery and others might be suggested. It will be noin the mill situated on the premises described ticed that the word “protection” is used in in the complaint. There is no dispute about connection with “erection, construction and the facts of the case. The only question is, repairs,” as well as “ removal.” And wbile the Does the Statute give a lien for the claim for word “protect” often means to cover, shield oil furnished for such purpose? It is con- or defend from injury, barm or danger of any tended on the part of the plaictiff that it does, kind, the word imports in the Statule some. because, it is said, the oil was necessary to pro- thing used or furnished for the machinery tect the machinery against the effects of fric- which not only preserves it from injury, but tion while it was in motion, and to prevent it becomes a part of the machinery itself. The from wearing out. The solution of the ques. statutes of the different States giving mechan. tion involved depends entirely upon the con- ics' liens are so dissimilar that we derive but struction of the Statute giving mechanics' liens. little aid from tbe decisions under them. The The Statute provides, in effect, that every per question is new in this State, and we are not son who, as principal contractor, architect, etc., prepared to say that lubricating oils used upon performs any work or furnishes any materials the machinery of a mill, though they may prein or about the erection, construction, protec- serve and keep it from wearing out, are ma. tion or removal of any dwelling-bouse or other terial,” within the meaning of the Statute. building, or any machinery erected or con. While this court has been disposed to give the structed so as to be or become a part of a free- Statute a liberal construction, so as to include bold upon a bicb it is to be situated, shall bave all claims coming fairly within its provisions, a lien for such labor and materials. $3314, as yet it seems to us that the conteniion of the amended. See 2 Sapb. & B. Ann. Stat, 1841. plain iff can only be sustained by a forced and
Lubricating oil sold to be used, aud actually unnatural interpretation of the language used used, in operating, the mill machinery, may by the Legislature. protect such machinery against the effects of The judgment of tho Circuit Court is affirmech 7L. R. A.
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT.
Re Change of Grade of WASHINGTON 1887, which attempt to provide a peculiar code of STREET.
procedure in road cases for the City of Philadel.
phia unlike that in the rest of the State, are un. J. Addison CAMPBELL'S APPEAL.
constitutional and void.
4. Sections 1 and 2 of that Act, although Re Opening of RUAN STREET.
in form local, since they in fact repeal provisions of the Road Law peculiar to Philadelphia and
make such law conformable to that in force in (....Pa.....)
the rest of the State, may be upheld. 1. The classification of cities for the pur. (Clark and McCollum, JJ., dissent from the last pose of facilitating the convenient ex
proposition.) ercise of corporate powers necessary for the proper regulation of municipal affairs is not (Paxson, Ch. J., and Mitchell, J., dissent from the prohibited by the Constitution; and as the several
judgment.) cities have different needs growing out of the differences in their size and situation, it may be
(February 17, 1890.) upheld as a necessary means for enabling the Legislature to make provisions adapted to secure
NERTIORARI to the Court of Quarter Ses. to each class of cities the corporate powers and
sious for Philadelphia County to review a the number, character, powers and duties of otti- judgment quashing proceedings to ascertain cers best adapted to its needs, without an infrac- and award the damages caused to abutting tion of the constitutional prohibition against lo- property owners by the change of grade of cal legislation.
Washington Street, in the 21st Ward of the 2. The legislation for the several class- City of Philadelphia. Affirmed.
es into which cities are divided, which is author- In 1873 an ordinance of councils of the City ized by the power of classification, must relate to of Philadelphia changed the grade of Wasbing. the exercise of the corporate powers possessed ton Street. "On March 29, 1887, an ordinance by cities of the particular class to which the legis- directed the paving of a portion of this Sireet. lation relates or to the number, character, pow. The work was done in the latter part of the ers or duties of the officers employed in their management; all other legislation is unauthor- year 1887, and in laying the pavement the conized.
tractor filled up the Street to the grade line es3. Local or special laws relating to tablished in 1873, to the injury of certain prop proceedings in road cases are prohibited erty owners. They thereupon filed a petition by the Constitution and cannot be upbeld under under the Act of May 6, 1887 (Pub. Laws 1987) the power to classify cities for purposes of legis in the court of quarter sessions to recover damlation; hence, sections 3-17 of the Act of Muy 6, ages for the injuries thus occasioned. In pur
NOTE.-Statute, classification of cities by, constitu- A statute dividing cities into classes cannot go tional.
into effect until the terms of all the members of a Under the Constitution it is intended that the council in office at the time of its approval have Legislature should by general laws provide for the expired. lbid. incorporation of cities, towns and villages, or for The Missouri Constitution, providing for four change or amendment of their charters; and it was classes only of cities, does not prevent the applicanot designed to repeal or change charters in force tion of general laws to cities having special charat the adoption of the Constitution. Guild v. Chi-ters. Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 513. cago, 82 111. 472.
Population may be made the basis of classificaSo, under the Territorial Organic Law, the Legis- tion in statutes relating to municipal bodies and lature bas power to establish municipal corpora- their police powers, but such a classification cannot tions. Deitz v. Central City, 1 Colo. 323.
be made the means of evading the constitutional The Pennsylvania Statute, designed to establish interdict of local or special laws, where the classifia uniform and general system of government for cation is plainly illusory. State v. Hoagland, 51 N. all the cities of the Commonwealth, does not apply J. L. 62. to cities then organized under existing charters The office of the Classification Act, dividing cities until they have accepted its provisions or suffered into classes on the basis of population, is to provide a repeal of their charters. Re Henry Street, 123 Pa. a classification as a rule of construction for the 346.
convenience of municipal legislation. Ibid. The Legislature may classify cities according to In order to observe the uniformity required by their population. Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401; Nev. Const., art. 4, 8 25, classification of counties Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338.
must be based upon reasonable and actual differBut designating counties as a class according to ences: the legislation must be appropriate to the a minimum population which makes it certain that classification, and embrace all within the class. but one county can avail of the benefits of the luw State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43. is an evasion of the constitutional provision. De- The requirement that the system of county gov. vine v. Cook Co. 84 III, 590.
ernment shall be uniform is not considered to imIt may delegate authority incident to municipal port universality in the operation of the law. Such governments to cities, but only by general law; and construction would defeat much useful legislation. ordinances adopted in different municipalities may Ibid. be variant in their terms as public policy may re- A statute giving towns containing one or more quire. Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 I11. 518. unincorporated villages of 1,000 inbabitants each
Under the constitutional provision against local certain enlarged powers does not violate the conand special legislation, the classification of cities stitutional provision that “the Legislature shall with a view of legislating for each class separately establish but one system of town and county govis unconstitutional unless necessity therefor exists. ernment." Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Brown 8 Ayars' App. 2 L. R. A. 577, 12. Pa. 266.
L. R, A. 472, 73 Wis. 294. 7 L. R. A.
suance thereof a jury, master and stenographer opening of the Street. To this report one Alwere appointed. They entered upon their du bert Foulds, against whose properly benefits ties and filed a report on January 18, 1889, had been assessed, filed exceptions, one of which awarding damages to several claimants. The was on the ground that ibe Act of May 6, city solicitor obiained a rule to quash the pro: 1887, under which the jury was appointed, ceedings on the ground that the Act of 1887was unconstitutional. The court dismissed the was unconstitutional because it is confined in exceptions and Foulds sued out this writ. its operation to cities of the first class. On January 31, 1889, the court made absolute the The two cases were argued together in the rule to quash, and J. Addison Campbell took supreme court April 8, 1889. Subsequenily this appeal.
an application for a reargument was presented
and the court granted the same and they were CERT
ERTIORARI to the Court of Quarter Ses- reargued together January 6, 1890.
sions for Philadelphia County to review a Messrs. John Douglass Brown, Jr., and judgment dismissing exceptions to the report William C. Hannis, for appellant in Re of a jury appointed to open Ruan Street in the Washington Street: 23d Ward of the City of Philadelpbia. Re- The regulation of the streets of cities is not versed.
such a subject that legislation concerning it On October 19, 1897, a petition was filed in cannot properly be based upon a classification the court of quarter sessions representing that of the cities. public necessity demanded that Ruan Street See Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 333; IValkshould be opened from Edward Street to er v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14. Frankfort Avenue; that the said Ruan Street Later decisions have not impaired the force is a street laid down on the city plan wbich bas of what was said in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 been duly confirmed. The petitioners prayed Pa. 339. for the appointment of persons as a jury to See Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401; Com. y. view and review the same, and to assess dam- Patton, 88 Pa. 258; Scouden's App. 96 Pa. 422; ages which might arise from the opening, and Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377; McCarthy v. Com. fix benefits if any there might be, and report 1 Cent. Rep. 111, 110 Pa. 243; Morrison v. the same to the court. Under the provisions Bachert, 3 Cent. Rep. 117, 112 Pà. 322; Scranof the Act of May 6, 1887, a jury, a master and ton School District's App. 4 Cent. Rep. 311, 113 a stenographer were appointed and they pro. Pa. 176; Scranton v. Silkman, 4 Cent. Rep. 317, ceeded toward the opening of the Street. On 113 Pa. 191; Philadelphia v. Haddington M. E. June 22, 1888, they filed a report in which Church, 6 Cent. Rep. 419, 115 Pa. 291; E ans they fixed the damages which would result v. Phillipi, 9 Cent. Rep. 691, 117 Pa. 226, Veinfroin the opening of said Street and also pre- man v. Wilkinsburg & E. L. P. R. Co. 11 Cept. pared a schedule of benefits which should be Rep. 54, 118 Pa. 192; Reading v. Savage, 13 assessed against property by reason of the Cent. Rep. 458, 120 Pa. 198, 124 Pa. 328; Ayars'
Local and special legislation prohibited. a curative Act validating the establishment of
local improvement is framed so as to be both local The Constitutions of several of the States pro- and special is evidence of the legislative belief that vide that the Legislature shall not paes local or a general law could not be made applicable; and special laws, in all other cases than those speci- such statute will not be declared unconstitutional fied, where a general law can be made applicable. except where it clearly appears that the Legislature Ala. Const. art. 4, $ 2:3; Cal. Const. art. 4, § 25; III. was mistaken in such belief. Richman v. MuscaConst. art. 4, $ 22; Ind. Const. art. 4, 8 22; Iowa Const. | tine Co. 4 L. R. A. 45, 77 lowa, 513. art. 3, $ 30; Mo. Const. art. 4, 8 53; Neb. Const, art. 3, The New Jersey Code, giving the control of $ 15; Nev, Const, art. 4, 8 20; Or. Const. art. 4, $ 23; streets, etc., exclusively to the common council or Pa. Const. art. 3, 87; Tex. Const. art. 3, 8 50; W. Va. | board of aldermen of all the cities in the State, exConst. art. 4, 8 59.
cept those of the first class having a population exThis clause recognizes the necessity for special ceeding 100,000, does not violate the Constitution; legislation, and seeks merely to limit, not to pro- for the purpose of euch legislation the classification hibit. State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178.
is legitimate. State v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62. A statute that cannot be reduced to a general The Act to Dissolve Municipal Corporations and rule to operate in all parts of the State alike is not to Provide Provisional Governments for the Same, & general law. King v. State, 3 L. R. A. 210, 87 is not a special law within the probibition of the Tenn. 304.
Constitution. Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280. As to whether a general law can be made appli- The California Acts for the improvement of cable, or whether a special Act is necessary, in a streets, etc., and the construction of sewers within given case, the Legislature is the exclusive judge. municipalities, are general laws, affecting all muSt. Louis v. Shields, 02 Mo. 247.
picipal corporations in the State. Thomason v. The object of the constitutional regulation against Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73. special and local legislation as to municipal corpo- Although the Legislature has no power to change rations was to substitute general law in every in the charter of a municipality by the passage of a stance in which such substitution could be effected. special or local law without the consent of the muState v. Bloomfield, 1 Cent. Rep. 443, 47 N. J. L. 442. nicipality, yet it may do so by a general law affect
The California Act for the classification of mu- ing all municipal corporations within the State. nicipal corporations according to their population Ibid. is a general law and constitutional. Pritchett v. A statute declaring that it shall apply to all cities Stanislaus Co. 73 Cal. 310.
and towns in the State, "anything in their charters A statute relating to unorganized counties, as to the contrary notwithstanding," is operative in distinguished from those wbich are organized, is every city in the State. Re House Resolution not local or special. Ferris v. Vannier (Dak.) 3 L. (Colo.) 21 Pac. Rep. 484. R. A. 713.
A law is not made local or special by a provision Under this constitutional provision the fact that that it shall not take effect in any city until acApp. 2 L. R. A. 577, 122 Pa. 266; Shoemaker Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 318, and bilv. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. 285; Berghaus v. Harris- gore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, both relate to statutes buro, 122 Pa. 289.
which relate to the government of cities, in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338, has been other words to cities as municipalities, baving followed in
“affairs." llammer v. State, 44 N. J. L. 667; Re Church, Cla sification of cities and laws confined 92 N. Y. 1; State v. Butts, 3! Kan. 537: Ewing thereto are permissible only in matters relating v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 to their municipal government; but the rights Kan. 156; Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512; Dar of persons and property must be secured by rou v. People, 8 Colo. 417; Pritchett v. Stanis- general laws, which must be uniform and in laus Co. 73 Cal. 310; Re Commissioners of force everywhere throughout the State. Elizabeth, 8 Cent. Rep. 318, 49 N. J. L. 488; Philadelphia v. Haddington M. E. Church, 6 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iorda, 94 U. S. 155 Cent. Rep. 419, 115 Pa. 291; il'einman v. Wil. (24 L. ed. 94); Little Rock & Ft. 8. R. Co. v. kinsburg i E. L. P. R. Co. 11 Cent. Rep. 54, Hanniford, 49 Ark. 291.
118 Pa. 192; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377; Beta A constitution is not to receive a technical v. Philadelphia, 21 W. N. C. 155; Scranton v. construction, like a common-law instrument or Silkman, 4 Cent. Rep. 317, 113 Pa. 191; Com. & statute.
v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258; Scowden's App. 96 Pa. Com. v. Clark, 7 Watts & S. 127; Morrison v. 422; McCarthy v. Com. 1 Cent. Pep. 111, 110 Bachert, supra; Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 243; Scranton School Districi': App. 4 Cent. Pa. 147; Speer v. School Directors of Blairsville, Rep. 311, 113 Pa. 176; Strine v, l'ultz, + Cent. 50 Pa. 150.
Rep. 283, 115 Pa. 349; Evans v. Phellipi, 9 An Act of Assembly can be declared void Cent. Rep. 691, 117 Pa. 226. only when it violates the Constitution clearly, Messrs. Charles F. Warwick, City Solicpalpably, plainly, and in such manner as to itor, and E. Spencer Miller and Abraleave no doubt or hesitation on the mind. ham M. Beitler, Asst. City Solicitors, for
Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147; Speer appellee: v. Blairsville School Directors, supra.
Messrs. Benjamin Daniels and J. How. Williams, J., delivered the opinion of the ard Grendell, for appellant in Re Ruan court: Street:
These cases arise under the Act of May , The Act in question uses the words "cities of 1887, and depend on the constitutionality of iis the first class," merely as a designation of local provisions. It is entitled “An Act Relating to ity, and nowhere refers to them as municipali- the Opening and Widening and Assessment and ties, or to their municipal functions. In no re- Payment of Damages and Benefits for the ported case has this been permitted.
Opening, Widening and Change of Grade of
cepted by vote of electors therein. State v. Hoag- An Act giving, in cities of the first class, to a scire land, 51 N. J. L. 62.
facias to recover a municipal claim the subject of The proviso of the Pennsylvania Act that no city a lien, the force and effect of a scire facias to conof the third class, nor one of less than 10,000 inhabi- tinue such lien, is unconstitutional and void betants, shall become subject to the Act until its pro- cause local in its operation. Philadelphia v. Hadvisions are accepted by an ordinance, is not uncon- dington M. E. Church, 6 Cent. Rep. 419, 115 Pa. 291. stitutional, as all cities of the class or size mentioned So much of the Act to re-organize and consolidate have the privilege of accepting the Act, and if they cities of the first grade of the second class, etc., as do not, to remain as they were before. Reading v. grants authority to such city to appoint through Savage, 124 Pa. 3:28.
its council a board of control, confers corporate The Minnesota law declaring valid the incorpora- powers by a special Act, and is unconstitutional. tion of villages attempted to be incorporated under State y. Pugh, 1 West. Rep. 36, 43 Ohio St. 98. Ming. Laws 1883, chap. 73, is not unconstitutional as A law to establish an excise department in cities being a special law and not uniform throughout of over 15,000 inhabitants, where the power to grant the State. State v. Spaude, 37 Minp. 322.
licenses is not vested in a board of excise or court An Act is not unconstitutional as a local or spe- of common plens, is local and special. State v. cial law because of a provision which leaves intact Trenton License Board, 4 Ceut. Rep. 88, 48 N. J. L. special prohibitory lawe enacted prior to the Con- 438. stitution. Com, v. Sellers (Pa.) 25 W. N. C. 154. An Act providing additional powers for the gov.
An Act authorizing the trustees of a sinking fund ernment of seaside resorts by commissioners is unto re-district a city into wards does not confer upon constitutional as local legislation. State v. Winsor, them corporate powers, within the meaning of 2 Cent. Rep. 259, 18 N. J. L. 95; State v. Somers Point Const., art. 13, & 1, prohibiting the General Assem- (N. J.) 6 L. R. A. 57. bly from passing a special Act conferring corporate An Act providing for the appointment and prepowers. State v. Pugh, 1 West. Rep. 38, 43 Ohio scribing the duties of a master in road cases in cities St. 99.
of the first class is violative of Pa. Const., art. 3, $ 4, Legislation which is applicable to one class of prohibiting local or special legislation regulating municipal corporations as classified by the Legis- the practice or jurisdiction in any judicial proceedlature is general, although there may be at that | ing. Re Ruan Street (Pa.) 24 W. N. C. 460. time but one city in that class. Fellows y, Walker, Act 1879, No. 337, providing for lighting streets, * Fed. Rep. 651.
etc., is special and local and unconstitutional so far
as it relates to townships. State v. Bloomfield, 1 Acts held unconstitutional.
Cent. Rep. 442, 47 N. J. L. 442. The fact that local and special laws are in force A statute changing the policy of the State by In some cities at the time of the adoption of the transferring the burden of repairing turnpikes to Constitution prohibiting such laws, and are not separate townships, but excepting therefrom any affected thereby, will not justify the substitution county having a county public-road board, is a loof other local or special laws in their stead. Ayars' cal and special law and unconstitutional. Lodi App. 1-22 Pa. :66.
Township v. State (N. J.) 6 L. R. A. 56.