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fall bim." Blackburn, J., said: "I am of opin Oliver ROOP and Wife, Appts., ion that lunacy is sickness within the meaning of the rules of this society. . . . Insanity depends REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT CO. on the state of mind and body of the person. . . . It certainly seems to me that lunacy is
(-...Pa.....) a sickness affecting the health of the body in A married woman is not empowered to such a way as to prevent a man's ability of earning bis livelibood. If it were not the in
bind herself by a judgment note, by the
provisions of the Married Person's Property Act tention to include it, the rules of the society
of June 3, 1887 (Pub. Laws, 332); at least if it is not should be framed so as expressly to exclude it;"
given in the management, or for the benefit of and Quain, J., said further: "I am also of
her separate estate, or in the prosecution of any opinion that insanity is sickness within the so- business in which she is engaged or for necesciety's rules. "The words entitling the saries. member to relief are, “during any sickness or
(February 24, 1890.) accident,” except certain excluded cases, insanity not being one.
A In Keily v. Ancient Order of Hibernians, 9
Court of Common Pieas, No. 3, of PhilaDaly, 292, Van Brunt, J., says: “Insanity has delphia County discharging a rule to open a always been considered a disease, and comes
judgment entered against them on a judgment
Reversed strictly within the meaning of the term 'sick note, and to let them into a defense.
as to the female defendant. ness.' And in Pullozzino v. St. Joseph's Society, 16
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Cin. L. Bul. 27, it is assumed by Harmon, J.,
Mr. Thomas Diehl, for appellants:
The bond of a married woman is void. apparently without question by either party, that insanity entitles a member of such a so- Heinbaugh, 9 Cent. Rep. 768, 117 Pa. 2:24.
Dorrance v. Scott, 3 Whart. 309; Sellers v. ciety to sick benefits. But even if the extent of the word “sickness"
Those cases which permit married women to
bind their separate property are exceptions were doubtful, the present case is relieved of all difficulty by the additional phrase "other to a general rule of sound policy, and ought disability." The purpose of the Association is to be strictly confined within the limits predefined by article 2 of the Constitution as the
scribed, accumulation of a fund to enable the members
Schlosser's App. 58 Pa. 495. "10 assist each other in cases of accident, sick- June 3, 1887, should be construed in accord
The Married Person's Property 9.1" 3ť dess or other distress, and their families in case of death.” The common class of those who ance with the doctrine anvounced in the above are expected to need the benefits is defined in article 9, as already said, as those who, through Gormley, 24 Pa. 82; Huyler v. Atwood, 26 N.
Endlich, Married Women, § 101; Mahon v. sickness or other disability, are unable to fol. J. Eq. 504: Nero England Nat. Frank v. Smith, low their usual or some other business where
43 Conn. 327, by they may earn a livelihood for themselves and their faunilies. To this class is added an.
The record reveals no contract within the other in article 10, to wit: the families of mem- power of a married woman to make, and be bers who die, and members themselves whose judgment entered in the court below is irreguwives die. The latter are clearly examples of
jar and void, that pecuniary distress which is enumerated in
Ringvalt v. Brindle, 59 Pa. 51; Com, v. Hoff: the Constitution among the ills which it is the man, 74 Pa. 111; Post v. Wallace, 110 Pa. 125. object to relieve. But the main idea through
The record and pleadings must disclose a out is the assistance of those who are incapac in the provisions of the Act, and, if not, the
cause of action against a married woman with: itated for earning their living, and the condition that the incapacity shall be from sickness defect is fatal, and the judgment entered will
be reversed. or other disability” is as comprehensive as language could well make it. If insanity is not
Park v. Kleeber, 37 Pa. 254; Dearie v. Mar. sickness, it is certainly disability and clearly tin, 78 Pa., 58; Hecker v. Haak, 38 Pa. 242; within the prescribed condition for aid. Cet Hof v. Koerper, 103 Pa. 398; Gould v. McFall, tain excepted cases are specified, but not only Cent. Rep. 288, 113 Pa. 268; Needham v.
1 Cent. Rep. 853, 111 Pa. 67; Fenn v. Early, 4 is insanity not one of them, but all of those Woolens, '14 W. N. C. 526; Baker v. Singer which are thus specified, such as want of membership for twelve months, arrearages to Mfg: Co. 122 Pa. 370. the association, or sickness originating from
Mr. John J. Ridgway, for appellees: intemperance, vicious or immoral conduct,
Whenever the consideration goes into the either fail in some necessary requirement, or married woman's actual or constructive posbear some taint of fault which takes them out session the contract is a contract for the benefit of the category of the innocent unfortunate for of her estate. whom the relief is intended. If any of these
Williams v. King, 43 Conn. 6)-572; Battin exceptional facts were charged against the v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 35; Tiern.e jer v. Turnplaintiff, the verdict of the jury has settled guist, 85 N. Y. 521; Endlich, Married Women, them in bis favor, and there is no reason shown $ 131. wby be should not have the relief to wbich, under the rules of the Association, his disabil. See note to Speier v. Opfer (Mich.) 2 L. R. A. 345.
NOTE.-Married women; disability to contract. ity entitles bim.
The power given to her by statute does not exJudgment reversed, and now judgment for tend to a joint contract with her husband. Ibid. plaintiff on the verdict.
Executory contracts of, Cook v. Walling (Iod.) Clark, J., absent.
L. R. A. 769.
Paxson, Ch. I., delivered the opinion of enlarging the powers of married women. The the court:
first section gives them the power of a feme This was an appeal from the order of the sole as to the acquisition, ownership, posses. court below refusing to open a judgment en- sion, control, use or disposition of property of tered by the Real Estate Investment Co. v. any kind in any trade or business in which Oliver Roop and Fanny C. Roop, appellants, in they may engage, or for necessaries, aod for the sum of $680. The said Fanny was the the use, enjoyment and improvemeni of their wife of the said Oliver Roop, but this does not separate estate, and to make contracts of any appear on the face of the note upon which the kind, and to give obligations binding herself judgment was entered. The petition which therefor.” The only restriction upon ihe pow. was filed in the court below is not printed in ers thus conferred is found in the proviso at the paper book, hence we have no certain the end of the section. It is as follows: "Proknowledge of the specific grounds upon which vided, bowever, that a married woman shall the judgment was asked to be opened, and we have no power to mortgage or convey her real might well dismiss the case for this reason estate, unless her busband join in such mortalone. We learn from the docket entries, how- gage or conveyance.” ever, that the application was on bebalf of both The second section declares that a married defendants, and from the agreements of coun- woman may bind herself by contracts relating sel, (a) that the note was usurious; and (b) that to any trade or business in which she may enthe defendant, Fanny C. Roop, was a married gage, or for pecessaries, and for the use and woman, and as such, had no power to bind her. enjoyment of her separate estate, and may sue self by a judgment note.
and be sued, etc., in all respects as if she were As to the first proposition, the depositions a feme sole; “provided, however, that nothing show that only $100 was loaned to the defend in this or the preceding section shall enable a ants; but as the plaintiff concedes this, and also married woman to become indorser, guarantor alleges that it was a loan with the judgment or security for another.” pote as collateral, and that no more than the Then follows the third section, which I have $500 with interest is claimed, there would already quoted. It was contended that this seem no good reason why the court below section gives her the general power to contract, should open the judgment and order an issue which would of course include the power to to try a fact which is not disputed.
confess a judgment. If, however, it was inThe second ground of relief is more serious. tended to confer this broad power, and place On behalf of Fanny C. Roop, it was contended a married woman on the same plane with a “tbat, as the record of the judgment reveals no feme sole it could have been done in a few lines, contract within the power of a married woman declaring that hereafter a feme covert should to make, it is irregular as to Fanny Roop and have the same power to contract debts as a feme cannot stand.” The judgment is entirely reg. sole. For such a purpose it was unnecessary ular upon its face, as the record does not to frame an Act with seven sections. We do show that Fanny C. Roop is a married woman. not think it was intended to confer a power to The depositions do show it, however, and the contract generally. Of wbat use would be the fact is not denied.
restriction, contained in the first section, that The plaintiff contends that under the Act of she shall have no power to mortgage or convey June 3, 1837 (Pub. Laws, 332), known as the her real estate without her husband joining in “Married Person's Property Act," a married such mortgage or conveyance, if she may bind woman bas the power generally of confessing her real estate by confessing a judgment for judgments, and refers us to the third section of general purposes? The third section must be said Act as confirming it. Said section is as read in connection with the other sections and follows: "A married woman may make, exe: the Act considered as a whole. Viewed in this cute and deliver leases of her property, real and light, it unfetters a married woman, subject 10 personal, and assignments, transfers and sales the restrictions before mentioned, for three of ber separate personal property, and notes, purposes, viz., (1) where she engages in trade bills, drafts, bonds or obligations of any kind, or business; (2) in the management of her sepand appoint allorneys to act forber, and it arate estate; and (3) for necessaries. For any sball not be necessary for her husband to be of these purposes she may bind herself and her made a party thereto or joined therein." estate or business by her contract, and I have
This language is certainly very broad, and no doubt may lawfully confess a judgment. is a part of ibe legislation, commencing in 1848, But beyond this we do not tbink the Act conthe object of which evidently is to emancipate fers any power. It is entirely proper that the married women from the restraints of the com- law should clothe her with sufficient power to mon law to a certain extent, and to enable them properly manage her separate estate. And lo act as a feme sole in respect of their prop. when it autborizes her to embark in business erty. It is not necessary for us to express an it is right that she should be held to her con. opinion of the wisdom of this legislation. We tracts, which can only be done by authorizing have followed the Legislature cautiously, and her to make such contracts. So in regard to have, as was our duty, given effect to these necessaries. If she may purchase them she Acts to the extent of their plainly expressed should be authorized to bind berself and her meaning; but it is so radical in its character, estate for them in the usual manner and by the and so wide a departure from the common law, usual forms by which contracts are made by that we have been careful not to extend the persons sui juris. But we are not disposed to force of any of these Acts by judicial construc- say that for every purpose she may make contion.
tracts and bind her estate generally, as may a The Act of 1887 certainly does go very far in 'feme sole. The Legislature must say so in
language two clear th be misunderstood before done so, and at certain seasons of the year the we will subject the estates of married women quantity became so great that it overspread the to such a peril as this.
banks of the litch and deposited earth and siope It was conceded that this judgment was upon plaintiff's land and left the same boggy, given by a married woman. It was not pre- wet aud unfit for cultivation a large part of tended that it was done in the management of, the year. Plaintiff presented bis petition to the or for the benefit of, ber separate estate; or in Court of Common Pleas of Chester County for the prosecution of any business in which she a jury of view to assess the dainages wbich be was engaged, or for necessaries. On the con- claimed by reason of this alleged appropriation trary, if not given as surety for her husband, of bis land and the essential damages to his it was given upon bis importunity, and to aid farm which resulted from this action of the him in bis business, one of the very perils from Railroad Company. Viewers were appointed which the law ought to protect a married wo- who reported adversely to his claim and he then
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. De. The judgment, having been confirmed with fendant admitted the injury, but claimed that out authority, is void as to Fanny C. Roop. no action would lie for the recovery of damages
The order of the court beloo is reversed as to therefor by reason of a release which it bad Fanny C. Roop, and the judgment against her received from plaintiff at the time that it puris stricken from the record.
chased from him its right of way. The court charged the jury in substance that this release would bar a recovery in that action and
directed them to return a verdict for defendant. Levi S. UPDEGROVE, Appt., Plaintiff thereupon took this appeal.
The material portions of the release appear PENNSYLVANIA SCHUYLKILL
in the opinion. VALLEY R. CO.
Messrs. J. Howard Jacobs, William M.
Hayes and R. Jones Monaghan, for ap(....Pa.....)
If the release in this case bad been an absolute A release to a railroad company of a right deed of the land to the Railroad Company, to
of way across certain land, with a further release be used by it for the construction of a railroad, of the company from all claims for damages by it is entirely clear that the action of the Rail. reason of the taking and using of the land for said road Company in diverting the surface water railroad, or by reason of the construction and which accumulated on the appellant's farm maintenance of the said railroad on and over said from its ordinary course, where, by the natural land, will bar the owner of the land from sub- declivity of the land, it was accustomed to flow, sequently recovering damages for the overflow-through artificial ditches constructed for that ing of his land by water by reason of the con purpose, would render it liable to respond in struction of a ditch and culvert by the railroad compauy in the particular manner for drainage damages for their injury to the appellant's purposes long after the original construction
lands. of the read.
Ang. Watercourses, & 108 J; Kauffman v.
Griescmer, 26 Pa. 407; Viller v. Laubach, (February 24, 1890.)
47 Pa. 154; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,
4 Cent. Rep. 475, 113 Pa. 146; Huddleston v. APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of West Bellevue
, 1 Cent. Rep. 861, 111 Pa 1110. County entered upon a verdict directed for de- the case in band where their oply right is that fendant in proceedings arising upon an appeal of a right of way for the construction and by plaintiff from the report of a jury of view maintenance of a railroad. refusing to assess damages against defendant Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co. v. Walsh, 124 Pa. for the alleged taking and occupying of certain 544; Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co. v. Ziemer, Id. of plaintiff's land. Affirmed.
571. Plaintiff was and still is the owner of a farm No such contract as the one in question is in Chester County, Pa. In 1882 the defendant ever understood or could lawfully be made to Company constructed its line of railroad across release one of the contracting parties from its his farm so cutting the same as to leare about acts of negligence or its wrongful injuries to fifteen acres of land between the railroad and the rights or property of the other. An express the Schuylkill Canal. The natural slope of the release to a carrier does not include acts of land was toward tbe capal. In 1888, nearly negligence. six years after the original construction of the 3 Wood, Railway Law, S 425; Am. Erp. Co. railroad. the Company dug a ditch on the v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. upper side of its road-ved by which the natural Butler, 57 Pa. 337; Grogan v. Adams Exp. Co. drainage of the water was diverted from the 5 Cent. Rep. 298, 114 Pa. 528; Pennsylrania R. places where it bad formerly been into other Co. v. Raiordon, 12 Cent. Rep. 177, 119 Pa. 581. and different places. The ditch was com- There bave been an injury and destruction, as menced at the point nearly a half mile distant well as a taking of the appellant's land, by this from a point upon the land wbich the Com- action of the Railroad Company, which renders pany bad obtained from plaintiff at which a it a trespasser subject to ouster, but appellant culvert was constructed under the railroad and may waive the trespass and proceed under the from wbich a ditch was run through plaintiff's Statute. land to the canal. By reason of ibis ditch McClinton v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. large quantities of water were made to run over 66 Pa. 409; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Burson, plaintiff's land which would not otherwise have 61 Pa. 369.
Mr. John J. Pinkerton, for appellee: body of water to accumulate at that particular
The direction of a verdict for defendant was spot than bad been the case before such construcproper.
tion. Upon the trial of that case the court beNorth & West Branch R. Co. v. Suank, 105 low reserved the question whether the release Pa, 555; Hoffeditz v. Southern Pa. R. & Min. was a bar to a recovery by the plaintiff, and subCo. 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. Dig. 593.
sequently entered judgment thereon for the dePlaintiff could not dictate to the Railroad fendant, which was affirmed by this court. It Company bow the road should be constructed. was said in the opinion: “We are unable to
Nero York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. 182. see any ground upon which the plaintiff could
With its discretion, exercised within the lim- rest a claim for damages.". The cases cited rule its of its Act of Incorporation, no court has any the one in hand. The defendant Company obcontrol or right to interfere.
tained from the plaintiff a release for the right Parke's App. 64 Pa. 140; Struthers v. Dun- of way of eighty feet in width across said farm. kirk, W. & P. R. Co. 87 Pa. 282; Cleveland & The agreement further released the said ComP. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 334.
pany from all claims for damages by reason of
the taking and using of the land for said rail. Per Curiam:
road, or by reason of the construction and It was decided in North & West Branch R. maintenance of the said railroad on and over Co. v. Swank, 105 Pa. 555, that “an agreement said tract of land. The plaintiff contended between a land owner and a railroad company that about six acres of his land was repeatedly to sell the latter a right of way across the overflowed and rendered unfit for cultivation, premises of the former covers all damages, of by reason of the construction of a ditch and whatever sort, suffered by the land owner, all culvert by the Railroad Company, which be for which he is legally entitled to compensa- alleged threw water upon bis land which would tion.” The same principle was recognized in not have otherwise flowed there. The learned the later case of Hoffeditz v. Southern Penn- judge below instructed the jury that “these sylcania R. & Min. Co. 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. Dig. ditches and culvert, and this discharge of 593, not yet reported.
water is the result, the necessary result, of the In the latter case the plaintiff had, for the construction of that road.” We see no error in consideration of $1,000, released the company this. It is in direct line with the rulings of from all suits, claims, demands and damages this court in the cases above cited. A release whatever, for, upon or by reason of their entry of the right of way to a railroad company upon and taking and occupying the land on would be a vain thing if the company is to be which the railroad was built, and the location subsequently subjected to litigation for every and construction of said railroad and works injury or damage resulting to the property by connected therewith. The plaintiff brought reason of the construction of the road. All suit to recover damages for the flooding of his these matters are supposed to be in the ronland. His allegation was that the culvert built templation of the parties when the company by the company to carry off the water was too pays its money for the right of way and ob small for that purpose in times of freshets, and tains a release therefor. that the construction of the road caused a larger Judgment affirmed.
NOTE.--Common carriers; liability for loss of goods. The right of the carrier to limit its responsibility A common carrier has two distinct liabilities, United States since its decision in the case of New
has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the one for losses by accident or mistake where his Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U. S. liability is that of insurer; the other for losses by 6 How. 344 (12 L. ed. 465); but to be valid the limitadefault or negligence, where his liability is that of tion must in all cases be reasonable (The Colon, 9 an ordinary bailee. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Benedict, 354; Rintoul v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 363 (21 L. ed. 6351; Dorr Co. 17 Fed. Rep. 905; May v. The Powhatan, 5 Fed. v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co.11 N. Y. 485, 4 Sandf. Rep. 375), and to be reasonable it must not stipulate 136.
for exemptions from liability for the consequences Liability may be restricted by contract.
of its negligence, or that of its servants or agents. It is a well-established rule of law that a carrier Inman v. South Carolina R. Co. 129 U.S. 128 (22 L. ed. may restrict his common-law liability as insurer. 612); Merchants D. Transp. Co.v. Bloch, 86 Tenn, 397; Fibel v. Livingstone, 64 Barb. 179; Christenson v. Coward v. East Tenn. V. & G. R.Co. 16 Lea, 225: DilAm. Exp. Co. 15 Minn, 270; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. lard v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. 2 Lea, 288; Southern Henderson, 51 Pa. 315; Farnham v. Camden & A. R. Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 264 (22 L. ed. Co. 55 Pa. 53; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 131; 556. See note to Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Payne Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362; Illinois Cent. R. Co. (Va.) 6 L. R. A. 819. v. Adams, 42 I. 474.
It is not just and reasonable in the eyes of the
3. A complaint against "Adams Ex- at Champaign, Illinois; the trees were owned
press Company” need not specifically allege by the plaintiffs and were directed to them at that it is a corporation. That fact is imported by Mooresville, Indiana. The United States Exits name.
press Company undertook to carry the trees to 4. A common carrier waives his right Indianapolis, and there deliver them to some
to detain goods for the freight if he puts his other carrier, to be transported to their destiground that they are not in his possession at the nation. A written contract was made between place where a demand is duly made.
the United States Express Company and the
plaintiffs, which contained, among other 5. Where a corporation invests an agent
with general authority to adjust claims things, these provisions: that the person or coragainst it, the declarations of that agent, made poration to whom the trees shall be delivered wbile endeavoring to secure an adjustment of for transportation from the end of that comthe claim, are competent evidence against his pany's line to their destination shall not be principal.
deemed the agent of the company, but shall be 6. A limitation of liability in the bill of deemed the agent of the plaintiffs; that the lading will not control where the damage is an company shall not be liable for injury to the effect of the carrier's negligence, and where it goods unless it “be proved to have occurred does not appear that the limitation was in con- from the fraud or gross negligence of the comsideration of a lower rate of freight
pany or its servants; por shall any demand be (May 9, 1889.)
made upon the company for more than $50, at
which sum said property is hereby valued.” the Circuit Court for Morgan County in benefit of any carrier except the United States favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover dam- Express Company, nor is any other carrier ages for injuries to plaintiffs' property while in named. defendant's possession for purposes of trans- The trees were delivered to the defendant in portation, alleged to have resulted from de good condition at Indianapolis, and it carried fendant's negligence. Affirmed.
them to Mooresville. After they had reached The facts are fully stated in the opinion. there, the plaintiffs went to the office of the de
Messrs. Jordan & Matthews, for appel- fendant, prepared to pay the charges and relant:
ceive the trees, and although they were then in The stipulations and conditions in the bill of the possession of the defendant's agent, he delading inure to the benefit of the intermediate vied that they had been received. On a subsecarrier the same as to the initial carrier,
quent day the plaintiff's went again to the deU. 8. Erp. Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127; Ma- fendant's office, received the trees and paid the ghee v. Camden & A. R. Transp.Co. 45 N.Y.514, freight on them. The trees were so injured and cases cited; 2 Greenl. Ev. $ 210.
through the negligence of the defendant as to The declarations of an agent cannot bind his be utterly valueless. The plaintiff's had sold principal unless they are part of the res gester. the trees to divers persons, and had agreed to
Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Theobald, deliver them ou the 19th day of October, 1885. 61 Ind. 245, and cases cited; La Rose v. Logans. The refusal of the defendant to deliver the port Nat. Bank, 102 Ind. 346; Williamson v. trees when first demanded caused the plaintiffs Cambridge R. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 750, 144 to lose the profits of the sales made by them, for Mass. 148.
the reason that the delay prevented them from Messrs. Adams & Newby for appellees. delivering the trees the purchasers in accord
ance with their contract. Elliott, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the The contention of the appellant is that the count:
contract between the United States Express The material facts pleaded by the appellees Company and the plaintiff's bound both ihem as their cause of action are these: On and and the appellant; that the latter, when it acprior to the 17th day of January, 1885, they cepled the goods for transportation, became were partners engaged in business as nursery. bound to comply with the provisions of the men; on that day a lot of fruit trees was de contract and secured a right to all its stipula. livered to the United States Express Company tions in favor of the first carrier, and that the
law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption St. L. & N. 0. R. Co. v. A bels, 60 Miss. 1017; Kansas from responsibility for the negligence of himself or City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645. his servants; nor can it arbitrarily, or without the The agreement limiting the carrier's liability consent of the shipper, place a value upon articles may be either written or printed. Feige v. Michireceived for carriage and in this manner limit the gan Cent. R. Co. 62 Mich. 1. amount of recovery against it in case of loss. Rosen- A sbipper who signs a contract limiting the carfeld v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 1 West, Rep. 151, 103 rier's liability cannot evade its effect on the ground Ind. 1:21. See note to Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Ivey that he did not know its contents, wbere he had (Tex.) 1 L. R. A. 500: North America Ins. Co. v. East- opportuuity to read it or hear it read. St. Louis, I. on (Tex.) 3 L. R. A. 425.
M. & S. R. Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397; Hutchinson
v. Chicago, St. P, M. & 0. R, Co.:7 Minn. 524; Myers Limit to liability.
v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 6 West. Rep. 685, 90 MO The same reasons do not exist against contracts 98. Uimiting the amount of recovery as exist against Where a contract signed by the shipper is fairly contracts for total exemption from liability; hence made, agreeing on a valuation of the property the rule as expressed in Southern Exp. Co. v. Moon, shipped, with the rate of freight ba ed on the con39 Miss. 892; The City of Norwich, 4 Benedict, 271; dition that the carrier assumes liability only to the United States Exp. Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144; extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss Black v. Goodrich Transp. Co. 55 Wis. 319; Chicago, 'or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the