Mr. John J. Pinkerton, for appellee: The direction of a verdict for defendant was proper. North & West Branch R. Co. v. Swank, 105 Pa. 555; Hoffeditz v. Southern Pa. R. & Min. Co. 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. Dig. 593. Plaintiff could not dictate to the Railroad Company how the road should be constructed. New York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. 182. With its discretion, exercised within the limits of its Act of Incorporation, no court has any control or right to interfere. Parke's App. 64 Pa. 140; Struthers v. Dunkirk, W. & P. R. Co. 87 Pa. 282; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 334. Per Curiam: It was decided in North & West Branch R. Co. v. Swank, 105 Pa. 555, that “an agreement between a land owner and a railroad company to sell the latter a right of way across the premises of the former covers all damages, of whatever sort, suffered by the land owner, all for which he is legally entitled to compensation." The same principle was recognized in the later case of Hoffeditz v. Southern Pennsylvania R. & Min. Co. 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. Dig. 593, not yet reported. In the latter case the plaintiff had, for the consideration of $1,000, released the company from all suits, claims, demands and damages whatever, for, upon or by reason of their entry upon and taking and occupying the land on which the railroad was built, and the location and construction of said railroad and works connected therewith. The plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for the flooding of his land. His allegation was that the culvert built by the company to carry off the water was too small for that purpose in times of freshets, and that the construction of the road caused a larger body of water to accumulate at that particular spot than had been the case before such construction. Upon the trial of that case the court below reserved the question whether the release was a bar to a recovery by the plaintiff, and subsequently entered judgment thereon for the defendant, which was affirmed by this court. It was said in the opinion: "We are unable to see any ground upon which the plaintiff could rest a claim for damages." The cases cited rule the one in hand. The defendant Company obtained from the plaintiff a release for the right of way of eighty feet in width across said farm. The agreement further released the said Company from all claims for damages by reason of the taking and using of the land for said railroad, or by reason of the construction and maintenance of the said railroad on and over said tract of land. The plaintiff contended that about six acres of his land was repeatedly overflowed and rendered unfit for cultivation, by reason of the construction of a ditch and culvert by the Railroad Company, which he alleged threw water upon his land which would not have otherwise flowed there. The learned judge below instructed the jury that "these ditches and culvert, and this discharge of water is the result, the necessary result, of the construction of that road.” We see no error in this. It is in direct line with the rulings of this court in the cases above cited. A release of the right of way to a railroad company would be a vain thing if the company is to be subsequently subjected to litigation for every injury or damage resulting to the property by reason of the construction of the road. All these matters are supposed to be in the contemplation of the parties when the company pays its money for the right of way and obtains a release therefor. Judgment affirmed. INDIANA SUPREME COURT. ADAMS EXPRESS CO., Appt., v. John B. HARRIS et al. (....Ind.....) 1. An intermediate carrier can derive no benefit from a contract between the NOTE.-Common carriers; liability for loss of goods. A common carrier has two distinct liabilities, one for losses by accident or mistake where his liability is that of insurer; the other for losses by default or negligence, where his liability is that of an ordinary bailee. New York Cent. R. Co. V. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 363 (21 L. ed. 635); Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. 11 N. Y. 485, 4 Sandf. 136. Liability may be restricted by contract. It is a well-established rule of law that a carrier may restrict his common-law liability as insurer. Fibel v. Livingstone, 64 Barb. 179; Christenson v. Am. Exp. Co. 15 Minn. 270; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315; Farnham v. Camden & A. R. Co. 55 Pa. 53; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 131; Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams, 42 Ill. 474. first carrier and the shipper, limiting the carrier's liability, where such contract neither provides that its stipulations shall inure to the benefit of any other than the first carrier nor designates any other carrier along the line as an intermediate carrier. 2. Where the title of the cause gives the full names of the plaintiffs, they need not be repeated in alleging that plaintiffs are partners. The right of the carrier to limit its responsibility has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States since its decision in the case of New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 344 (12 L. ed. 465); but to be valid the limitation must in all cases be reasonable (The Colon, 9 Benedict, 354; Rintoul v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 17 Fed. Rep. 905; May v. The Powhatan, 5 Fed. Rep. 375), and to be reasonable it must not stipulate for exemptions from liability for the consequences of its negligence, or that of its servants or agents. Inman v. South Carolina R. Co. 129 U. S. 128 (32 L. ed. 612); Merchants D. Transp. Co.v. Bloch, 86 Tenn. 397; Coward v. East Tenn. V. & G. R.Co. 16 Lea, 225; Dillard v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. 2 Lea, 288: Southern Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 264 (22 L. ed. 556. See note to Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Payne (Va.) 6 L. R. A. 849. It is not just and reasonable in the eyes of the 1889. ADAMS EXPRESS Co. v. HARRIS, 3. A complaint against "Adams Express Company" need not specifically allege that it is a corporation. That fact is imported by its name. the 4. A common carrier waives his right 6. A limitation of liability in the bill of (May 9, 1889.) APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of The facts are fully stated in the opinion. lant: The stipulations and conditions in the bill of lading inure to the benefit of the intermediate carrier the same as to the initial carrier. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127; Maghee v. Camden & A. R. Transp. Co. 45 N. Y. 514, and cases cited; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 210. The declarations of an agent cannot bind his principal unless they are part of the res geste. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Theobald, 51 Ind. 249, and cases cited; La Rose v. Logansport Nat. Bank, 102 Ind. 346; Williamson v. Cambridge R. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 750, 144 Mass. 148. Messrs. Adams & Newby for appellees. Elliott, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: 215 at Champaign, Illinois; the trees were owned There is no provision in the contract for the The trees were delivered to the defendant in good condition at Indianapolis, and it carried them to Mooresville. After they had reached there, the plaintiffs went to the office of the defendant, prepared to pay the charges and receive the trees, and although they were then in the possession of the defendant's agent, he denied that they had been received. On a subsequent day the plaintiffs went again to the defendant's office, received the trees and paid the freight on them. The trees were so injured through the negligence of the defendant as to be utterly valueless. The plaintiffs had sold the trees to divers persons, and had agreed to deliver them ou the 19th day of October, 1885. The refusal of the defendant to deliver the trees when first demanded caused the plaintiffs to lose the profits of the sales made by them, for the reason that the delay prevented them from delivering the trees to the purchasers in accordance with their contract. The contention of the appellant is that the contract between the United States Express The material facts pleaded by the appellees Company and the plaintiffs bound both them as their cause of action are these: On and and the appellant; that the latter, when it acprior to the 17th day of January, 1885, they cepted the goods for transportation, became were partners engaged in business as nursery- bound to comply with the provisions of the men; on that day a lot of fruit trees was de- contract and secured a right to all its stipulalivered to the United States Express Company | tions in favor of the first carrier, and that the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants; nor can it arbitrarily, or without the consent of the shipper, place a value upon articles received for carriage and in this manner limit the amount of recovery against it in case of loss. Rosenfeld v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 151, 103 Ind. 121. See note to Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Ivey (Tex.) 1 L. R. A. 500; North America Ins. Co. v. Easton (Tex.) 3 L. R. A. 425. Limit to liability. The same reasons do not exist against contracts Umiting the amount of recovery as exist against contracts for total exemption from liability; hence the rule as expressed in Southern Exp. Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822; The City of Norwich, 4 Benedict, 271; United States Exp. Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144; Black v. Goodrich Transp. Co. 55 Wis. 319; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017; Kansas The agreement limiting the carrier's liability may be either written or printed. Feige v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 62 Mich. 1. A shipper who signs a contract limiting the carrier's liability cannot evade its effect on the ground that he did not know its contents, where he had opportunity to read it or hear it read. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397; Hutchinson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 37 Minn. 524; Myers v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 6 West. Rep. 685, 90 Mo 98. Where a contract signed by the shipper is fairly made, agreeing on a valuation of the property shipped, with the rate of freight ba ed on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract continued in force for the benefit of all the parties until the goods were delivered at their destination. The opposing contention is, that the contract between the United States Express Company and the plaintiffs did not inure to the benefit of the appellant, and that, when it accepted the goods for transportation, it received them under the law and became bound by the ordinary rules which prevail in cases where there is no special contract. stantially agreed that in such a case the intermediate carrier cannot successfully claim the benefit of the provisions of the original contract. Martin v. Am. Exp. Co. 19 Wis. 336; Bancroft v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co. 47 Iowa, 262, 29 Am. Rep. 482; Merchants Despatch Transp. Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473: Cam. den & A. R. Co. v. Forsythe, 61 Pa. 81; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616. The rule declared by the decisions we have referred to is the only one that can be defended on principle; for, where the contract designates only one carrier, there is no privity between the owners and the designated carriers; but, where the contract is a through one, by desig is justly inferable that the contract was intended for the benefit of all who perform services under it. So, too, where the contract declares that it is for the benefit of intermediate carriers it may be enforced, since it is a contract for the benefit of a third person, and, as it is beneficial to him, it is natural to presume that its terms were assented to and formed the contract under which the goods were transported. Where, however, the contract is solely for the benefit of the original parties it is not possible to apply this rule to it. If the appellant had been designated in the contract with the first carrier as one of the intermediate carriers, or if the contract had provided that its stipulations should inure to the benefit of all the carriers, then the conten-nated carriers there is a privity of contract, for it tion of the appellant would find strong support from the authorities. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Weally, 50 Ark. 397; Halliday v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. 74 Mo. 159, 41 Am. Rep. 309: Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 594 [22 L. ed. 724]; Maghee v. Camden & A. R. Transp. Co. 45 N. Y. 514; Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. 54 N. Y. 197. But the contract does not provide that its stipulations shall inure to the benefit of any other carrier than the one with whom it was made, nor does it designate any other carrier along the line. Its provisions apply only to the carrier with whom the contract was directly made, and they leave it to that carrier to select the carrier from the termination of its line to the end of the route. The authorities are sub contract will be upheld; the valuation and limitation of liability in the bill of lading, being just and reasonable, is binding on the shipper. Newburger v. Howard & Co's Express, 6 Phila. 174; Squire v. New York Cent. R. Co. 98 Mass, 239; Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Exp. Co. 69 Ill. 62; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 163, 62 N. Y. 35, 70 N. Y. 410; Earnest v. Southern Exp. Co. 1 Woods, 573; Elkins v. Empire Transp. Co. 81* Pa, 315; South and North Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606, 56 Ala. 368; Muser v. Holland, 17 Blatchf. 412; Harvey v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 74 Mo. 538; Graves v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 137 Mass. 33, approved in Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 112 U. S. 333 (28 L. ed. 719; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sherrod, 84 Ala. 178; St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397. A bill of lading is the written contract of the parties, and by its terms their rights and liabilities must be measured (Fry v. Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 280, 103 Ind. 265), and one accepting it without examining its contents will be bound thereby. Snow v. Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. 7 West, Rep. 264, 109 Ind. 422. The effect of acceptance by the shipper of a bill of lading is regulated by the Civil Code of Dakota. See Hartwell v. Northern Pac. Exp. Co. 3 L. R. A. 342, 5 Dak. 463. The rule that a shipper must examine a bill of lading, or if he does not he is bound by its terms, does not apply where, before delivery of the bill, the goods have been shipped so far that he could not have reclaimed them had he objected to the bill; nor does it apply where the parties have acted upon a previous parol agreement. Guillaume v. General Transatlantic Co. 1 Cent. Rep. 723, 100 N. Y. 491; Snow v. Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. 7 West. Rep. 264, 109 Ind. 422; Hamilton v. Western N. C. R. Co. 96 N. C. 398. Where, as here, the names of the plaintiffs are given in full in the title of the cause, it is unnecessary to repeat them in alleging that the plaintiffs were partners. It is sufficient to allege that the plaintiffs were partners, without again giving their names. The name of the defendant imports that it is | shipper should put a value on the articles, he cannot recover beyond that value. Rosenfeld v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 150, 103 Ind. 121. A stipulation, in a bill of lading, that the carrier's responsibility as a common carrier shall terminate when the goods are transported and safely stored in the depot of the carrier, is not opposed to public policy, and operates to limit the liability thereafter to that of a warehouseman. Western R. Co. v. Little, 86 Ala. 159. In case of connecting carriers. The rights of a connecting carrier receiving goods from another carrier are not affected by any limitations put upon the latter's authority by the shipper, of which the connecting carrier has no notice. Price v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 12 Colo. 402. When several carriers unite to complete a line of transportation, and receive goods for one freight, they are each liable for damages during transportation, subject to reclamation against the party by whose act the damage occurred. Richardson v. The Charles P. Chouteau, 37 Fed. Rep. 532. A carrier receiving freight from another carrier under an agreement between the latter and the shipper is entitled to the benefit of any valid limitation of the first carrier's liability, just as it is liable for any failure to perform its part of the contract. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397. A railroad company whose line is one of several connecting roads, in the absence of a special contract or of an association or copartnership by which each connecting line is liable for the contracts of the others, is not responsible for damages for negligence occurring beyond its terminus. In such case its liability is confined to that of a forwarding agent. Knott v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 98 N.. If for the purpose of getting reduced rates the C. 73. a corporation, and it was therefore not necessary to specifically aver that it was a corporation. Adams Exp. Co. v. Hil, 43 Ind. 157; Indianapolis Sun Co. v. Horrell, 53 Ind. 527; Sayers v. Crawfordsville First Nat. Bank, 89 Ind. 230. In deciding, as we have, that the provisions of the contract with the United States Express Company cannot be taken advantage of by the appellant, we have disposed of the point that the damages are limited to $50; but if we were wrong in this, still, the limitation will not control, since there is evidence of negligence and no evidence that a lower rate of freight was given on account of the limitation placed upon the value of the property. Rosenfeld v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. 103 Ind. 121, 1 West. Rep. 150; Bartlett v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. 94Ind. 281; United States Exp. Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144. The defendant's denial of the possession of the goods at Mooresville excused the plaintiffs from making a tender of the carrier's charges. | A common carrier waives his right to detain goods for the freight if he puts his refusal to deliver them to the owner upon the ground that they are not in his possession at the place where a demand is duly made. Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind. 433, and cases cited; Mathis v. Thomas, 101 Ind. 119; Platter v. Elkhart County, 103 Ind. 360, 1 West. Rep. 235; House ▼. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109, 3 West. Rep. 316. Where a corporation invests an agent with general authority to adjust claims against it, the declarations of that agent, made while en-lified. deavoring to secure an adjustment of the claim, are competent evidence against his principal. This general rule has often been applied in insurance cases, and must necessarily apply in such cases as this, for, otherwise, the corporation would be entirely without a representative. As there was evidence of negligence, and noevidence that there was any special consideration inducing the owners to place a less value on their property than its actual worth, the limitation, even conceding it to be available to the appellant as a part of the contract, is nul The instructions of the court are quite as favorable to the appellant as the law warrants, and the evidence fully supports the verdict. Judgment affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied September 25, 1889. TEXAS SUPREME COURT. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SO- D. Robert R. HAZLEWOOD. (....Tex.....) 1. A warranty by an applicant for a life insurance that his answers to the society's medical examiner are true, does not make NOTE.-Life policy; construction of. A policy of insurance is a single entire contract and continues during the life of the insured subject to discontinuance by nonpayment of the premiums. Fearn v. Ward, 80 Ala. 555. The provisions of a policy are construed and applied like other contracts, and may render it void ab initio, by its terms and failure of warranty. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Pyle, 2 West. Rep. 380, 44 Ohio St. 19. Questions and answers will be reasonably construed although the policy is conditioned on the truth of the answers. Home Mut. L. Asso. v. Gillespie, 1 Cent. Rep. 134, 110 Pa. 84. Mistakes in policies may be disregarded or corrected. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Pyle, supra. . Application for insurance on life. Where the application was signed before being filled out, the fact that the answers were incorrectly written in by the agent may be established by paroi evidence; otherwise if the applicant had signed afterwards. Brown v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 8 West. Rep. 775, 65 Mich. 306. Where an agent of a life insurance company assumed the whole preparation of an application, and asked or told the applicant to sign it, without ber reading it or hearing it read, the company cannot defend on the ground of false statements in the application. Temmink v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 72 Mich. -. 40 N. W. Rep. 469. A copy of an application attached to an insurance policy, which does not have the name of the applicant appended thereto, is not a copy of such application within the Statute of Wisconsin, requiring a copy to be attached to the policy in order to permit the insurance company to prove the falsity of any statement therein. Dunbar v. Phenix Ins. Co. 72 Wis. 492. Whether the signature to an application for insurance, which was by mark only, is genuine or not is immaterial, where the policy has been accepted, the premiums paid for several years, and received and retained by the company, with no offer to return them. Home Mut. L. Asso. v. Riel (Pa.) 17 Atl. Rep. 36. Where an insurance contract is ambiguous, the doubt should be resolved against the company. See note to Kratzenstein v. Western Assur. Co. (N. Y.) 5 L. R. A. 799. Company responsible for acts of its agents. The insurance company, and not the insured, isresponsible for the falsity of answers inserted in the See also 12 L. R. A. 315; 20 L. R. A. 761; 21 L. R. A. 746; 35 L. R. A. 692. than for the purpose of binding him for the truth of the contents of the paper. 3. Where payment of a policy of life insurance is contested because of the falsity of certain answers made by the applicant to questions propounded to him, and which he warranted to be true, the charge to the jury upon the question of falsity must be confined to such questions and answers as were put in issue by the pleadings and evidence, and not extended to all the answers made by the applicant. 4. While an applicant for life insurance is not bound to exercise supervision over the writing down of his answers by the medical examiner, yet, if he knows that his answers have been incorrectly written down, it becomes his duty to see that proper corrections are made, and if he fails to do so he will be estopped from disputing them as written even although recovery upon the policy is thereby defeated. 5. Where a life insurance company contests payment of a policy upon the ground that it was taken out by the beneficiary as a wagering policy, and proves that the beneficiary loaned the insured the money with which he paid the premium, testimony of the agent of the corporation is admissible as to negotiations preceding the application, tending to show that both the beneficiary and the insured were urged by the agent to apply for the insurance; that the premium was paid by insured; and that he thought of taking the policy for the benefit of the mincr children of the beneficiary, but did not do so because the beneficiaries could not then be so easily changed in case such change became desirable. 6. Where the applicant stated that no application by him for insurance was ever rejected, and it is shown that his application for membership in a mutual benefit society was rejected, plaintiff may show that the company's agent informed the insured that such societies were not regarded as life insurance companies and need not be considered as such by him. 7. The designation of a person as beneficiary in a life insurance policy, who has no insurable interest in the life of the person taking application by an authorized agent of the company, where the insured had given true answers. O'Brien v. Home Ben. Society, 27 N. Y. S. R. 326. Where the law of a State provides that a person who solicits or procures an application for insurance shall be held to be the agent of the insurance company, and such agent fills up the application, his act in doing so is the act of the company. Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304 (33 L. ed. 341). If the applicant for insurance fully states the facts to the agent, and the agent writes the answers to the questions contrary to the facts stated by the applicant, the insurance company is estopped from making a defense in an action on the policy, by reason of the falsity of such answers. Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304 (33 L. ed. 341). Where the agent writes in the application that the applicant has no other insurance, although the applicant told him that he had certificates of membership in co-operative companies, which the agent said were not considered insurance by him, the company is bound by the agent's interpretation, and estopped from asserting the contrary. lbid. The act of an agent authorized to solicit and take applications for insurance, in inserting false answers to interrogatories, without the knowledge or fault of the applicant, is binding upon the company. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stark, 120 Ind. 444. ion. Messrs. Maxey, Lightfoot & Denton and Hodges & Lane, for appellant: Where a policy of life insurance was taken out for speculation-at the instance of the beneficiary, who furnished the money to pay the premium-upon the life of a brother, twentyeight years of age, the beneficiary being a man in no way dependent upon the assured, even though there might have been a small indebtedness greatly disproportionate to the policy, such policy cannot be sustained, but is a wagering contract and void, as against public policy. authorities there cited; Levy v. Taylor, 66 Tex. Price v. Knights of Honor, 68 Tex. 366, and 652; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 782 (26 L. ed. (21 L. ed. 244); Lewis v. Phonix Mut. L. Ins. 927; Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 643 Ins. Co. 66 Mo. 63, 27 Am. Rep. 321; Guardian Co. 39 Conn. 100; Sing'eton v. St. Louis Mut. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35, 22 Am. Rep. 180; Keystone Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Norris, 7 Cent. Rep. 204, 115 Pa. 446; Bacon, Ben. Societies, § 250, pp. 368, 370, 595, 363, § 249; Bliss, Ins. pp. 27, 40, 42, 43; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564. Where both the application and the policy To create an insurable interest in the life of another, there must be a reasonable ground, founded in the relations of the parties,-either pecuniary, or of blood, or affinity,-to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of his life. United Brethren Mut. Aid Society v. McDonald, 1 L. R. A. 238, 122 Pa. 324. A stepson has no insurable interest in the life of his stepfather. Ibid. In the absence of any insurable interest of the beneficiary, the law will presume that a policy was taken out for the purpose of a wager or speculation. 1bid. A son-in-law has no insurable interest in the life of his mother-in-law, who has no visible means of support and whom he keeps and maintains. Stambaugh v. Blake (Pa.) 22 W. N. C. 407. A wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of the husband and father. Washington Cent. Nat. Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (32 L. ed. 370). The foundation of the doctrine is that no one |