refer to each other, and warrant that all the statements made in the application as well as those made by the assured to the medical examiner are true, and stipulate that if any of such statements are in any respect untrue the policy shall be void, any misstatement by the assured in such application or examination, whereby the insurer is misled as to his true condition, will avoid the policy. Galveston Ins. Co. v. Long, 51 Tex. 91; Et na L. Ins. Co. v. France, 91 U. S. 510 (23 L. ed. 401); Jeffries v. Economical Mut. L. Ins. Co. 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 47 (22 L. ed. 833); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 (29 L. ed. 934); Vose v. Eagle Life & H. Ins. Co. 6 Cush. 42; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Melague, 8 Cent. Rep. 611, 49 N. J. L. 587, 60 Am. Rep. 665 Bliss, Life Ins. pp. 46, 48, SS 34, 36, $ 37, 38, 50, p. 72; § 54, p. 79; § 58, p. 85; S 59, 60, 64, 77, p. 109; § 82, p. 122; Bacon, Ben. Societies, § 233, p. 328; § 427, p. 637; May, Ins. § 298, p. 326; SS 186, 187, p. 195; Poicers v. Northeastern Mut. L. Asso. 50 Vt. 630. Where the contract between the parties for assurance is one of warranty, and the facts in evidence show, or tend to show, that the affirmative warranty of the assured, upon which the policy is based, is untrue, the court should so charge the jury as to leave them to find the truth or falsity of such warranted facts; and it is error to allow them to consider outside contemporaneous conversations, or other matters concerning the materiality of the questions, which were not carried into the written contract. Texas Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Davidge, 51 Tex. 244; Galveston Ins. Co. v. Long, 51 Tex. 89; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, supra; Thompson v. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 252 (26 L. ed. 765); Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544 (24 L. ed. 674); Bacon, Ben. Societies, 155, note 1, and authorities cited; McCoy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 133 Mass. 85; Miles v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 580; Draper v. Charter Oak F. Ins. Co. 2 Allen, 569; Kibbe v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co. 11 Gray, 163. shall have a benefit of any kind in a life policy, who is not presumed to be interested in the preservation of the life insured. Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 78. Where all the stipulations of a contract of assurance are set out in writing and by its terms the statements therein are warranted to be true, they cannot be varied upon a material point by contemporaneous verbal statements and conversations between the assured and the soliciting agent of the company. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mowry, New York L. Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, McCoy v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. Miles v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. and Draper v. Charter Oak F. Ins. Co. supra; Bliss, Life Ins. § 82, pp. 122, 123. Messrs. J. A. Templeton, E. B. Perkins and E. H. Bennett, for appellee: Henry Clay Hazlewood had an insurable interest in his own life, and if he himself in good faith applied for and obtained the policy sued on, and paid to defendant all premiums due thereon, and if he in good faith had the same made payable to appellee, said rolicy would not be a speculative or wagering policy, but a valid and birding obligation on defendant. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457 (24 L. ed. 251); Etna L. Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 561 (24 L. ed. 287); Langdon v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 272, and authorities there cited; Bacon, Ben. Societies, §§ 248, 249, 397; Bliss, Life Ins. 3 26; Leomis v. Eagle Life & H. Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 399; Elkhort Mut. Aid B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 1 West. Rep. 284, 103 Ind. 286, and authorities therein cited; Campbell v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 381; Provident L. Ins. & Inv. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236; Morrell v. Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. 10 Cush. 282, 57 Am. Dec. 92 et seq. Henry Clay Hazlewood had an insurable interest in his own life, and could effect such insurance, and appoint anyone to receive the money in case of his death during the existence of such policy. Langdon v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. Elkhart Mut. Aid B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton and Provident L. Ins. & Inv. Co. v. Baum, supra. One brother has an insurable interest in the life of another where there is superadded to that relationship that of debtor and creditor; An insurance contract is void, unless the insured has an interest in the subject matter of the policy. Adams v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co. 1 Rawle, 106; Gilbert v. Moose, 104 Pa. 80; Stoner v. Line, and Keystone Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Norris, supra; Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109, 16 W. N. C. 184; Seigrist v. Schmaltz, 5 Cent. Rep. 230, 113 Pa. 326; Grant v. Kline, 7 Cent. Rep. 626, 115 Pa. 618; Cooper v. Shaeffer (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 601; Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. A party having no insurable interest in the life of another cannot receive an assignment of a policy of insurance upon the life of the latter, on an agreement merely to pay the premiums or assessments. Such an assignment will not vitiate the policy, but will leave the insurance money payable, on the death of the assured, to the party originally desig-643 (21 L. ed. 244); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 nated in the certificate. Price v. Supreme Lodge K. of H. 68 Tex. 361. (26 L. ed. 924); Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 13 Am. Insurable interest in life of another. See note to Rep. 313; Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan. Rittler v. Smith (Md.) 2 L. R. A. 844. That a company is estopped by the fraud of its agent, see note to Kister v. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. (Pa.) 5 L. R. A. 646. Wager policies. It is the absence of this insurable interest which gives to the policy the character of a wager contract; there can arise in such case no question of motive or good faith. Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109. The rule,applicable alike to life and fire insurance, rests in public policy for the protection of human life and property. Stoner v. Line, 16 W. N. C. 187; Keystone Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Norris, 7 Cent. Rep. 204, 115 Pa. 446. 93, 26 Am. Rep. 761; Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Sefton, 53 Ind. 380; Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co. 66 Mo. 63, 27 Am. Rep. 321; Moore v. Small, 19 Pa. 468; DeFrance v. DeFrance, 34 Pa. 390. When the life of a debtor who owes but $100 is insured by his creditor for $3,000, the transaction is within the prohibition against wagering policies. In such a case the court should declare, as a matter of law, that no more can be recovered by a creditor than is sufficient to reimburse him his debt, the premium he has paid and interest. Cooper v. Shaeffer (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 601. An assignment does not help a wagering policy. Stambaugh v. Blake (Pa.) 22 W. N. C. 407. and in such a case the extent of the recovery | The clearest and most unequivocal language is necessary to create a warranty, and all statements and expressions of a doubtful character will be construed as representations merely. Goddard v. East Texas F. Ins. Co. 67 Tex. 69; Moulor v. Am. L. Ins. Co. 111 U. S. 335 (28 L. ed. 447); First Nat. Bank v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673 (24 L. ed. 563): Phania L. Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183 (30 L. ed. 644); Alabama Gold L. Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 467, and authorities cited; Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 8 West. Rep. 88, 119 Ill. 474; Clapp v. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. 6 New Eng. Rep. 103, 146 Mass. 519; Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co. 69 N. Y. 256 et seq.; Stout v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 554; May, Ins. 160-165, 174-178; Bliss, Life Ins. § 404; Bacon, Ben. Societies, § 468. Moulor v. Am. L. Ins. Co. Alabama Gold L. Ins. Co. v. Johnston, Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, and Clapp v. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. supra, Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Booker, 9 Heisk. 606, 24 Am. Rep. 344, 354; May, Ins. § 169, 170; Bacon, Ben. Societies, § 214. Henry, J., delivered the opinion of the court: number and variety of questions and answers, This No statement in the application made by the assured, and which he at that time honestly and in good faith believed to be true, would vitiate the policy, even though it should ulti- The policy sets out on its face that it is issued mately appear that such statement was not in"in consideration of the application, and of all respects literally true. each statement made therein." Among the provisions of the policy is one reading: "If any statement made in the application for this. policy be in any respect untrue, this policy shall be void." The application set out on its face: "I certify that I am temperate in my habits, and am, to the best of my knowledge and belief, in sound physical condition, and a. satisfactory subject for life assurance.' was signed by the insured, and indorsed by the Upon the application of Henry C. Hazle beneficiary. Under the general health record, wood, appellant, in August, 1887, issued its the question was asked in the written and policy upon his life, payable to Robert R. Ha-printed medical examination which was sent zlewood, if living, if not, then to his brother, forward to the company in New York: “(13) Henry C. Hazlewood, for the sum of $15,000, Any history of serious illness, injury or infirm payable at the death of the said Henry C. H. ity, etc.?" to which the insured answered, C. Hazlewood was a younger brother of R. R. "No." "(166) When, and for what, has medHazlewood. He died in March, 1888, aged ical advice been sought within the last three then about twenty-eight years. Appellee, be-years?" to which the insured answered "Nothginning with the year 1881, and between that ing.' The medical examiner of defendant testime and the date of the application for the in-tified that he asked both of the above questions, surance, had advanced to the said Henry C. and the assured answered them as recorded, various sums of money, amounting to about $1,200, for which the said Henry acknowledged an indebtedness. On the back of the application for the insurance, and just above the signatures of both of said Hazlewoods, is a printed agreement in the following words: "It is hereby agreed that all the foregoing statements and answers, as well as those made, or to be made, to the Society's medical exam iner, are warranted to be true, and are offered to the Society as a consideration of the contract." In the body of, and on the back of, the application, and above said signatures, there are a number of questions and answers relating to the risk. Attached to the application is another paper, styled "Medical Examiner's Report," at the beginning of which appears the signature of Henry Clay Hazlewood, and at the end of it the name of the medical examiner. Between the two signatures there appear a great and made no other statements under those heads. He says: "I wrote the answers. Mr. H. C. Hazlewood was sitting at my leit elbow. I asked him each question, and wrote the answer as he gave it. First, had him sign at the top. Asked him questions 1 to 18, inclusive, and then wrote the answers. After the examination, he asked me what sort of a risk he was. I told him he could see for himself, and gave him the report; and he read it over himself. I asked him each question separately, and wrote his answers. He told me he had not sought medical advice in three years. That question is considered material. All are so regarded, as all go to make up the report. Henry Clay Hazlewood gave no history of mental disorder or derangement. Applicant ought to have informed me of any mental derangement. Absent-mindedness, or hallucinations of fear, and the like,-general belief that someone was after applicant, to kill him, or imagining something to exist that did not,-would be a serious question." In the written examination the question was asked: “(6) Any history of mental derangement?" to which the applicant answered, "No." In the medical examination is the printed question to the applicant: "(8a) Ever spat blood, or any history of chronic hoarseness or cough, or of asthma, or shortness of breath?" To which the insured answered, "No." It is contended that the court erred in refusing to give the following charge at the request of defendant: The doctrine contended for by appellant, that a warranty must be strictly complied with, is fully maintained by the authorities quoted in his brief. Mr. Bliss, in his work on Insurance, says: "By introducing them, they stipulate, in effect, that they are so material that if not strictly complied with the whole contract is rendered void. A misstatement in a warranty is therefore fatal to the contract, although arising from the most innocent mistake, or from false information afforded by others, or from mere inadvertence, and as much so as if made with the most willfully fraudulent intent." Section 36. The controverted questions as to breaches of warranty raised by the pleadings, referred to in the evidence and discussed in the brief of ap- In the case of Jeffries v. Economical Mut. L. pellant's counsel, are thus stated in the brief: Ins. Co. 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 53 [22 L. ed. 835], The applicant covenants in writing, and war- the court says: "The proposition at the founrants, that to the best of his knowledge and dation of this point is this: that the statements belief he is in sound physical condition. He and declarations made in the policy shall be warrants that he has not sought medical advice true. This stipulation is not expressed to be for anything within the last three years. He made as to important or material statements warrants that there has been no mental de- only, or to those supposed to be material, but rangement. He warrants that there is no ap- as to all statements. The statements need not plication pending for other insurance. He come up to the degree of warranties. They warrants that there has been no severe illness, need not be representations, even, if this term coughs or other ailments," etc. conveys an idea of an affirmation having any technical character. 'Statements and declarătions' is the expression; what the applicant states, and what the applicant declares. Nothing can be more simple. If he makes any statement in the application, it must be true. If he makes any declaration in the application, it must be true. A faithful performance of this agreement is made an express condition to the existence of a liability on the part of the company." Again, on page 56 [836]: "Many cases may be found which hold that where false answers are made to inquiries which do not relate to the risk the policy is not necessarily avoided, unless they influenced the mind of the company, and that whether they are material is for the determination of the jury. But we know of no respectable authority which so holds, where it is expressly covenanted, as a condition of liability, that the statements and declarations made in the application are true, and when the truth of such statements forms the basis of the contract." "If the jury believe from the evidence that Henry Clay Hazlewood, in the application for the policy of assurance, warranted that all the statements in such application, and all the statements and answers made to the Society's medical examiner, were true, and that such application was made a part of the policy, and it was therein provided that if any statement in such application was in any respect untrue, the said policy should be void, then I charge you that all three of such instruments, taken together, constitute the contract between the parties, and a warranty on the part of the assured that all the statements and answers to the medical examiner were true; and, if you further believe from the evidence that the said Henry Clay Hazlewood, in his medical examination, in answer to the printed questions propounded by the Society, had his answers to said questions put down in writing by the medical examiner opposite said questions, after said Hazlewood had signed said medical examination, and that after said answers were put down he read over and examined the same, and assented thereto, and the same was sent forward with the application, as the basis of the policy, and the same was issued by defendant upon the reliance of the truth of such answers, then, if you find from the evidence that said written answers in said medical examination were in any respect In the case of New York L. Ins. Co. v. untrue, you will find for the defendant;" Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 [29 L. ed. 934], reand also: "In refusing to grant the de- ferred to in the brief of appellant, the insured fendant's motion for a new trial in this, that it made certain statements and representations was clearly proved that the contract was em-respecting himself, his life and his past and braced in the application, the answers of the assured to the medical examiner, and the policy, taken together, and they constitute a warranty that the statements therein made were true, when the facts fully show that they were not true, that at the time of the application the assured was not in sound physical condition, but was in bad health, and misled defendant and its officers by his statements regarding his condition." In the case of Etna L. Ins. Co. v. France, 91 U. S. 512 [23 L. ed. 402], the court adopts the reasoning in the above case, and adds: "It is only necessary to reiterate that all the statements contained in the proposal must be true; that the materiality of such statements is removed from the consideration of the court or jury by the agreement of the parties that such statements are absolutely true, and, if untrue in any respect, the policy shall be void." present health, to which he appended a declaration warranting their truthfulness, and agreeing that they should be the basis of any contract between him and the company, and that if they, or any of them, were in any respect untrue the policy which might be issued thereon should be void; and further agreeing that, inasmuch as only the officers of the home office had authority to determine whether or not a policy should issue on any application, and as they acted only on the written statements and representations referri to, no statements or representations made or information given to the persons soliciting or taking the application for the policy should be binding on the company, or in any manner affect its rights, unless they were reduced to writing, and presented at the home office, in the application. The statements and representations, with this declaration accompanying the application, and forming part of it, were forwarded to the home office. The policy recited that it was in consideration and upon the faith of the statements and representations contained in his application, all of which had been warranted by him to be true. In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Field says: "It was his duty to read the application he signed. He knew that upon it the policy would be issued, if issued at all. It would introduce great uncertainty in all business transactions if a party making written proposals for a contract, with representations to induce its execution, should be allowed to show, after it had been obtained, that he did not know the contents of his proposals, and to enforce it, notwithstanding their falsity as to matters essential to its obligation and validity. Contracts could not be made, or business fairly conducted, if such a rule should prevail. . . . But here the right is asserted to prove, not only that the assured did not make the statements contained in his answers, but that he never read the application, and to recover, upon a contract obtained by representations admitted to be false, just as though they were true. If he had read even the printed lines of his application, he would have seen that it stipulated that the rights of the company could in no respect be affected by his verbal statements, or by those of his agents, unless the same were reduced to writing, and forwarded, with his application, to the home office." any respect" untrue as they should find for the defendant, extended the warranty of the insured so as to bind him for the truth of the answers as written, instead of their truth as given by him. In view of the fact that plaintiff's contention was that the insured gave true answers to the questions, which were incorrectly written down and reported by the medi cal examiner, and that the insured did not read the answers, or sign the paper containing them, which there was evidence tending to support, we think the charge was incorrect in this particular. The signature of the insured, being at the beginning of the examination instead of at its close, seems to us to have been required to be placed there as one means of identifying him as the person who had made the application, rather than for the purpose of binding him, as a party, for the truth of the contents of the paper. The assumption in the charge that the insured "had his answers to said questions put down in writing by the medical examiner" finds nothing in the evidence to support it. The direction to find for the defendant, if the jury should find the written answers were in "any respect" untrue, was, we think, if no other objection to it existed, inapplicable to this case, and tended to mislead the jury. Under it, the jury would have been required to consider every answer of the insured, whether any contention existed over it or not, and however difficult it might have proved for them to separate answers really proceeding from the medical examiner himself from those made by the insured; and, if they believed any one answer was in any particular untrue, they could have found against plaintiff for that reason. No charge on the subject should have been given that was not confined to such questions and answers as were put in issue by the pleadings and evidence, and the one requested should not have been given, because not so limited. We think there is a material difference between the undertaking by the insured in that case and in the one before us. In that case be What we have said about the charge is apagreed that he would be bound by the state-plicable to the assignment of error with regard ments as written down, and that no statements to overruling defendant's motion for new trial, not written down should be binding on the predicated upon the same ground. While the company, or in any manner affect its rights. insured cannot, as is contended for by appelIn the case before us the agreement of the in-lant, be held bound as a warrantor for the sured was that his answers made, or to be made, to the medical examiner were warranted to be true. He did not warrant that his answers would be written down correctly by the medical examiner, or that the answers given by him would be correctly reported to the company. While the doctrine of warranty will be strictly applied, it should be as strictly limited to the precise undertaking of the party making it. If, beyond requiring that the insured should warrant the truth of all answers given by him, the company intended, as it had the right to do, that he should also warrant that his answers should be correctly written down and reported, and that he would warrant them, not only as given by himself, but as written down, the agreement could have been made to so express, and it ought to have been done. The charge as requested by the defendant, as above stated, and refused by the court, reading that if the jury found from the evidence that said "written" answers were "in truth of the answers as written, it does not by any means follow that he was under no obligation about their being correctly written down, in so much as that depended upon him, or was properly within his control. He had undertaken to make true answers; and he must be presumed to have known that the object in having them written down was to furnish information to the absent officers of the corporation of material importance to them in determining whether or not they would execute the contract. Where there were no circumstances to excite his suspicion to the contrary, we see no reason, however, why he may not have trusted to the medical examiner's correct and honest performance of his duty. We do not think his contract, or the exercise of ordinary prudence, demanded of him to assume that there was any want of capacity, care or honesty upon the part of the medical examiner, or make it his duty to assume the exercise of a supervisory power over the work of that officer. As a general rule, no doubt, the subjects of insurance will be but little qualified for such a task. If, however, it did by any means come to the knowledge of the insured that answers given by him had been incorrectly written down, it then became his duty to see that the proper corrections were made; and, if he failed to do so, then, although not bound by a warranty, plaintiff ought now to be held estopped from disputing them as written; and if, under such circumstances, incorrectly written answers materially affected the risk, and the is sue was properly raised by the pleadings, and sustained by the evidence, a recovery ought not to be had. We deem it sufficient to say that we do not think this character of issue was presented by the pleadings or the charge of the court, and the record before us suggests that the evidence upon it would have been thoroughly conflicting, and amply sufficient to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The defendant alleged in its answer that the insurance was taken out by plaintiff as a specu lative and wagering policy. It was proved that plaintiff loaned to the insured the money with which he paid the required premium. The corporation's agent, through whom the in surance was effected, was permitted to testify to the negotiations preceding the application, tending to show that both the plaintiff and the insured were urged by the agent of the corporation to apply for the insurance; that the premium was paid by the insured; and that he first thought of making the minor children of the plaintiff the beneficiaries of the policy, but he finally concluded not to do so, because, in the event of his own marriage and desire to change the beneficiary to one more nearly connected with himself, it would be easier ac complished if his brother was the beneficiary than it would be if his minor children were the beneficiaries. whether it was a wagering policy, the statements made by the witness were pertinent, and have no tendency to control any written evidence or the contract. Nor can we see any impropriety in permitting the agent of the corporation to give the subject of the insurance information about facts proper for him to know. Lodges that furnish insurance to their members may also perform other important functions. and a rejection of an applicant by one of them would not necessarily be predicated upon his unfitness for insurance. It may be a rule of the defendant company not to treat such socie ties as coming within the meaning of the question, and, if it is, we are not able to perceive any sufficient reason why the fact that the statement was made may not be proved. Outside of the evidence objected to, the record fails to show that the insured in fact ever made an application for such membership, or that he was ever rejected. It is contended that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in his brother's life, wherefore the cause of action sued upon was a wagering contract, and void, as against public policy. The rule is stated generally, in Bliss on Life Insurance, § 7, that “no person can procure a valid insurance upon a life, unless he has an interest in such life." The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Connecticut Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 460 [24 L. ed. 253], says: "It is generally agreed that mere wager policies, that is, policies in which the insured party has no interest whatever in the matter insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction, are void, as against public policy. . . . It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life, and in that of his wife and children; a woman, in the life of her husband, and the creditor in the life of his debtor. Indeed, it may be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary The application for insurance contains the benefit or advantage from the continued life of following questions and answers: "Is any another creates an insurable interest in such negotiation for other insurance now pending life; and there is no doubt that a man may or contemplated?" to which the insured an effect an insurance on his own life for the ben swered in writing, "No." "Has a policy ever efit of a relative or friend. The essential been applied for which was not thereafter is thing is that the policy shall be obtained in sued, or which, if issued, was modified in good faith and not for the purpose of specuamount, kind or rates? If yes, for what com-lating upon the hazard of a life in which the pany, and when?" to which the insured an swered in writing, "No." There was conflicting evidence as to whether the insured had not applied for membership in an order known as the Legion of Honor." assured has no interest." In the case of Price v. Knights of Honor, Chief Justice Willie, speaking for the court, said: "It is almost universally conceded that policies procured by persons having no inter Plaintiff, was permitted to prove, by the est in the life of the insured are void at comagent of the corporation by whom the applica-mon law, as against public policy." 68 Tex. tion was secured, that pending negotiations be- 366. tween him and the insured, and before the in sured made answer to said questions, he (the insured) asked him (the agent) "what was meant by that, if it referred to assessment companies or mutual companies." Witness explained that it did not; and the insured then said he had made application to the Legion of Honor for assurance, whereupon witness told him that the Legion of Honor was a mutual company, and was not regarded as a life insur-time the policy was issued Chew was unmarance company, and he was instructed by the general agent of defendant not to consider them as assurance companies. We think the evidence was properly admitted in each instance. On the issue as to In the case of Etna L. Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 561 [24 L. ed. 287], it appears that the insurance was applied for by Chew on his own life, for the benefit of his sister, Lucetta P. France, who was a married woman, and in noway dependant on her brother for her support. The evidence tended to show that Mrs. France had at different times loaned her brother $2,400. The insurance was $10,000. At the ried, but was engaged to be married, and was in fact married the next day. The policy was held "sustainable at law, on account of the nearness of the relationship between the parties, and especially as Mrs. France, at the time |