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to transfer certain certificates of loan. Affirmed.

A woman acquires her husband's domicil by marriage.

Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 Serg. & R. 84; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 451; Green v. Green, 11

The action was originally brought by one James S. Swartz, who was attorney in fact for S. Josephine Loftus. Pending the suit an agree-Pick. 410. ment of counsel was filed amending the record by making Mrs. Loftus plaintiff in the place of Swartz.

Prior to 1887, a married woman could not give a power of attorney unless her husband joined therein.

Leiper's App. 108 Pa. 377.

The Act of March 18, 1875, gives no power to a married woman to constitute an attorney to make transfers.

That Act is in violation of article 7 of the Constitution forbidding special legislation for any city or county.

The suit was submitted to the court below for its opinion upon a case stated in the nature of a special verdict, from which it appeared in substance that plaintiff was the owner of certain certificates of loan of the City of Philadelphia; that she was a married woman, the wife of Henry J. Loftus, a subject of Great Britain. She was born in Philadelphia, and resided in that city for some years. She was married to her husband in Italy in the year 1880, and has since resided with him in different places, principally abroad. Her husband has acquired no domicil in Pennsylvania. The property repre-icil sented by the certificates in question accrued to plaintiff prior to her marriage.

Plaintiff executed a power of attorney to transfer the said loans, and placed the certificates in the hands of her attorney in-fact, and on December 6, 1888, she sold a part of such certificates.

By an ordinance of the councils of the City of Philadelphia of February 16, 1872, the defendant was made the loan and transfer agent of the said city, and by an ordinance of March 16, 1872, it was required, upon presentation and delivery to it of certificates of loan of the said city for the purpose of transfer, to issue and deliver to the transferee a new certificate. The plaintiff, through her attorney-in-fact, presented to the defendant the said certificates of loan, with the power of attorney, for the purpose of obtaining the transfer of the loans to the purchasers. Thereupon the defendant refused to make the said transfer, assigning as the reason for its refusal that the husband of the plaintiff had not joined in the power of attorney so executed as aforesaid.

It was further agreed that if upon the facts plaintiff was entitled to have the transfer made, judgment was to be entered in her favor; other wise judgment to be entered for defendant.

Judgment was entered for plaintiff upon the ground that during the life of a married woman the law of the situs of her personal property alone controls in the matter of its use, enjoyment and disposition, and hence that the Married Persons' Property Act of June 3, 1887 (Pub. Laws, 332), which enacts that every married woman shall have the same right to dis pose of her property, real and personal, and in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, furnished the rule for making the transfer in this

case.

Also upon the ground that the certificates of loan were contracts to be performed in the City of Philadelphia; that the law of the place of performance should be applied in the enforcement of the contract; and that the enforcement necessarily included the right to transfer the claim and to appoint an attorney for the purpose.

Thereupon the defendant sued out this writ of error.

Messrs. R. L. Ashhurst and Rowland Evans, for plaintiff in error:

Philadelphia v. Pepper, 16 W. N. C. 109; Betz v. Philadelphia, 21 W. N. C. 155.

All questions as to the assignment or transfer by the voluntary act of the owner of choses in action are determinable by the law of the dom

of the owner; hence the Act of 1887 cannot affect the rights or capacities or disabilities of married women domiciled abroad.

Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn. 359; Hanford v. Paine, 9 Am. L. Reg. 553; Mulliken v. Aughin baugh, 1 Penr. & W. 124; Speed v. May, 17 Pa. 91; Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. 186; Steel v. Goodwin, 4 Cent. Rep. 659, 113 Pa. 291; Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 610 (21 L. ed. 430); Kohne's Estate, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 399; Auble v. Ma son, 35 Pa. 261; Story, Conf. L. § 52; Davis v. Zimmerman, 67 Pa. 72; Com's App. 11 W. N. C. 492; Reid v. Gray, 37 Pa. 508.

Messrs. Henry B. Robb and William W. Porter, for defendant in error:

The Act of March 19, 1875, specifically confers the right contended for by the defendant in error.

Contracts respecting public funds or stocks the local nature of which requires them to be carried into execution according to the local law, are an exception to the rule that the law of the domicil applies.

Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406 (23 L. ed. 245); Brooke v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 108 Pa. 529; Tenant v. Tenant, 1 Cent. Rep. 596, 110 Pa. 478; Brown v. Camden & A. R. Co. 83 Pa. 318; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 (27 L. ed. 104); Cail v. Palmer, 116 U. S. 98 (29 L. ed. 559); Mullen v. Morris, 2 Pa. 85; Allshouse v. Ramsay, 6 Whart. 331; Wharton, Conf. L. § 401; Story, Conf. L. § 233.

Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The settled general rule is that the validity of a transfer of personal property is to be determined by the law of the domicil of the owner. And this is especially so in regard to the capac. ity to pass the title in cases of infants, married women or others who may be under legal disabilities varying in different countries. 'A married woman's capacity for the alienation of movables depends in general upon the law of her domicil." Dicey, Domicil, Rule 38, p. 195.

The defendant in error, though by birth a citizen of Pennsylvania, by her marriage lost her domicil here, and acquired the domicil of her husband, which is English. It is entirely clear, therefore, that her general rights, capacities and disabilities as a married woman, in regard to her personal property, are governed

by the laws of Great Britain, and are not affected by the laws of Pennsylvania. No assistance, therefore, in the determination of this case can be got from the Act of June 3, 1887 (Pub. Laws, 332). That Act relates to the rights and powers of married women over the control and disposition of their separate property. But the only married women whose rights and capacities the Legislature of Pennsylvania has any power to regulate are those within the Commonwealth, and it cannot be assumed that the Act was intended to apply to any others.

How far the lex loci contractus might affect the rights of property arising therefrom, it is not necessary to consider, as the marriage in this case took place abroad, and the busband did not even by the place of the contract become subject to the laws of Pennsylvania.

But while the general rule as above stated is entirely settled, not only in this State, but in every jurisprudence founded on the common law, yet it is subject always to the power of the State to declare otherwise as to any property having an actual or legal situs within its borders. The title and mode of transfer of land are always governed by the lex loci rei site, and personal property may be assimilated to land in these respects whenever the law of any State so determines.

Even Dicey, a common-law writer whose clear and accurate pages are refreshing as the blue sky after the foggy disquisitions of Story and Wharton, generalizes the rule as to creditors to which the Pennsylvania cases above cited adhere, in this form: "Where there is a conflict between a title under the law of the country where a movable is situated, and under the law of the owner's domicil, the lex situs will in general prevail." Dicey, Domicil, Rule 57, p. 262.

In accordance with this tendency the Legislature of Pennsylvania, by Act of March 18, 1875 (Pub. Laws, 24), declared that it shall be lawful for any married woman owning any of the loans of this Commonwealth, or of the City of Philadelphia, etc., to sell and transfer the same with like effect as if she were unmarried. This Act rules the present case. Its intention is not so much to enlarge the capacity of a married woman to deal with her property as to regulate the mode of transfer of certain kinds of property owing their existence to Pennsylvania law, and having their legal situs in this Commonwealth. Being a regulation of property, made for the public safety and convenience in the transaction of business, it is applicable to all owners of the classes of property named, though it may thus incidentally enlarge the powers of some foreign or nonresident married women. The direction is peremptory and without exception that the transfer shall have the same eflect as if she were unmarried, and as the purpose of the Act is the public convenience, no construction should be given to it which would operate against that purpose. The authority to transfer, therefore, must be construed to carry with it all the necessary powers to make it effective, and among these is the power to do it by attorney.

In Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn. 353, 351, Chief Justice Tilghman said: "The assignees stand upon this principle, that personal property has no locality, but is transferred according to the law of the country in which the owner is domiciled. This proposition is true in general, but not to its utmost extent, nor without several exceptions. In one sense personal property has locality, that is to say, if tangible, it has a place in which it is situated, and if invisible (consisting of debts), it may be said to be in the place The same considerations dispose of the obwhere the debtor resides, and of these circum-jection to the constitutionality of the Act of stances the most liberal nations have taken ad- 1875, that it relates only to the loans of the City vantage, by making such property subject to of Philadelphia among municipal corporations. regulations which suit their own convenience. The Act is not a regulation of the affairs of the In cases of intestacy, the property is distributed City of Philadelphia, within the meaning of according to the law of the domicil of the in- art. 3, § 7, of the Constitution. As already testate. But yet, so far as concerns creditors, said, it is the regulation of the mode of transit depends on the law of the country where it fer of certain kinds of property for the public is situated. .. Every country has the right business convenience. It includes the loans of of regulating the transfer of all personal prop- the Commonwealth itself, and of all corporaerty within its territory, but when no positive tions chartered by its authority; and the power regulation exists, the owner transfers it at his to include such city loans as the public conpleasure." And see observations of Gibson, venience required is nowhere prohibited to the Ch. J., in Mulliken v. Aughinbaugh, 1 Penr, & Legislature. W. 124, and in Speed v. May, 17 Pa. 94; of King, P. J., in Re Merrick's Estate, 2 Ashm. 485; Smith's App. 104 Pa. 281, and Bacon v. Horne, 123 Pa 452, 2 L. R. A. 355.

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Indeed it may be said that the tendency of modern authorities, under the influence of the European continental jurisprudence, is towards the recognition of the law of the situs to such an extent that what was an exception is tending to become the rule. See note to the late editions of Story, Conf. L. 383; Wharton, Conf. L. SS 346-353, and cases there cited; Westlake, Private Internat. L. § 141.

7 L. R. A.

In the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to consider the power of Mrs. Loftus under the English Statute of 45 and 46 Vict., chap. 75, further than to say that that Act appears to confer upon married women ample authority to make transfers such as the present. But as the construction of foreign statutes is a matter that courts never enter upon unless absolutely necessary, and as the plaintiff's author ity, under the Act of 1875, is clearly suflicient, we rest the case upon that Act. Judgment affirmed.

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

Isaac T. RUPARD and Wife, Appts.,

v.

CHESAPEAKE & OHIO R. CO.

(....Ky.....)

1. An individual, in the exercise of his absolute rights, if it may be reasonably apprehended that their exercise may endanger the safety of others in the exercise of their rights, must exercise them with a due regard for the safety of such others.

2. It is the duty of a railroad company where a train crosses a public highway on a trestle and there is danger of catching a traveler thereunder unawares and frightening the horse that he is riding or driving, to give some timely warning of the approach of the train to the crossing.

3. Whether or not the failure of a railroad company to give warning of the approach of a train to a crossing on a trestle over a public highway is negligence, should be left to the jury.

4. A traveler familiar with the place, who hurries up to a crossing where a railroad passes over the highway on a trestle, and attempts to cross regardless of the fact that the train may come at any moment, without looking to see whether a train is approaching, and without any reasonable excuse for not looking, although the

train could have been easily seen at a distance of several hundred yards, is guilty of negligence which will prevent any recovery for injuries sus

NOTE.-Railroad company not liable when exercising its legal rights in a careful manner.

tained in consequence of the fright of his horse caused by the train.

(February 21, 1889.)

A the Circuit Court of Clark County entered PPEAL by plaintiffs from a judgment of upon a verdict directed for defendant in an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence. Affirmed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. G. B. Nelson, Leland Hathaway and D. W. Lindsey for appellants. Messrs. J. M. Benton and Breckinridge & Shelby for appellee.

Bennett, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The appellant, Patsy E. Rupard, wife of the appellant, Isaac T. Rupard, while riding on horseback on the public road at a point where the appellee's road crosses said road on a trestle high enough from the ground to admit passage thereunder on the public road by persons on horseback or in vehicles, was thrown from her horse by his becoming frightened by the noise of the train as it passed over the trestle above him.

The appellant was seriously injured by the fall. It is contended that the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of appellee in not giving timely notice of its ap

| to expect some warning upon approaching the railroad track. Mynning v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co. 7 West. Rep. 327, 64 Mich. 93.

A railroad company is not liable for damage that accrues to others in the exercise of its legal rights by running its engines, etc., unless the damage is caused by its negligence. Bernard v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. 13 Va. L. J. 184, 8 S. E. Rep. 785. It is not liable, while exercising its rights in a law-man (Ga.) 10 S. E. Rep. 277. ful and reasonable manner, for injuries occasioned by horses, when being driven upon the bighway, taking right at noises incident to the movement and working of engines,-as, in the escape of steam and the noise and rattling of cars. Abbot v. Kalbus, 74 Wis. 504.

The warnings should be given in the usual customary manner, such as ordinary care and diligence require; and if so given the company will be relieved from responsibility. Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Free

The authority to operate a railroad includes the right to make the noises incident to the movement and working of its engines,-as, in the escape of steam and the noise and rattling of cars. Ibid.

No action lies against a railroad company for the inconveniences necessarily caused to premises in the vicinity by noises, smoke, jarring of the ground, etc., arising from properly and prudently operating its railroad upon its own lands, or upon land in which the party complaining has no interest. Carroll v. Wisconsin C. R. Co. 40 Minn. 168.

The failure of a railroad company to give the warning required by law will not justify a recovery by a traveler who is injured while attempting to cross the track in front of a train without looking or listening for the train. Weir v. Canadian P. R. Co. Ont. Ct. App. 1889.

Duty of engineer when person seen crossing railroad track. See note to Parsons v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (N. Y.) 3 L. R. A. 683.

Duty to signal its approach to highway. It is the duty of a railroad company to give the signals prescribed by statute, upon approaching the highway, and a failure renders the company liable where injury is sustained. Authorities cited. Cincinnati H. & I. R. Co. v. Butler, 1 West. Rep. 114, note, 103 Ind. 31; Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Gaines, 2 West. Rep. 262, 104 Ind. 526; Illinois Cent.

Duty to give warning on approaching highway cross- R. Co. v. Slater (Ill.) 21 N. E. Rep. 575.

ing.

. It is the duty of those in charge of a railroad train to give timely and sufficient warning of its approach to the crossing of a public road; and a failure to perform such duty is negligence, the degree of which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, to be determined by the jury. Eskridge v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 557; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Stinger, 78 Pa. 219; but compare Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 265.

Railroad trains have the precedence of passing the crossings of public ways unobstructed; but it is the duty of those directing the trains to give all proper and sufficient signals of their approach, and to take all reasonable precaution to avoid collision. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Hogeland, 5 Cent. Rep. 587, 66 Md. 149; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Owings, 3 Cent. Rep. 847, 65 Md. 502; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Horst, 1 Cent. Rep. 96, 110 Pa. 226.

But a recovery cannot be had for personal injuries caused by a moving railroad train, merely A foot passenger on a public crossing has a right because the engineer in charge of the train failed

See also 11 L. R. A. 674; 12 L. R. A. 830; 32 L. R. A. 149.

proach to the crossing by blowing its alarm, whistle or by ringing its bell, so as to warn the appellant of its approach to the crossing, by which she could and would have kept at a safe distance from the crossing until the train passed it, whereby the injury would have been avoided.

Upon the conclusion of the appellant's evidence, the lower court instructed the jury peremptorily to find for the appellee, which the jury did.

The appellee's contention is that, where its road crosses the public road on a trestle, it does not in common with the traveler have any privilege in, or use of, the public road itself; that its road and the public road, though near and adjacent to each other, are distinct and separate; the former has no rights in the public road, and the traveler has no rights in the track for the purpose of crossing it; therefore the same duties are not imposed upon the appellee that are imposed upon it when it passes over the public road itself in common with the traveler; consequently, it has a right to run its train on a trestle where the trestle crosses a public road at its common, or any, rate of speed, accompanied by the usual noise attendant upon the running of a train, and is not bound, as a matter of law, to give any warning of its approach to the crossing. In support of the foregoing views the case of Favor v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 114 Mass. 350, is relied on.

We cannot agree to this contention. While it is true that the appellee's train does not run

to give the cautionary signals prescribed by the Statute (Code, §§ 1699, 1700), when it appears that the injuries did not result from such failure. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. King, 81 Ala. 177.

Under the Missouri Statutes a prima facie case of negligence is made when the plaintiff shows that the statutory signals were not given. Huckshold v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 7 West. Rep. 764, 90 Mo. 548.

Must ring bell or blow whistle.

The statute imposes the obligation on railroads to ring a bell or sound a whistle when approaching the crossing of a public highway, and imposes a penalty for violation of the rule. State v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 400, 19 Mo. App. 104. The statute requires this to be done at intervals. Alexander v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 440, 19 Mo. App. 312.

If either the bell or the whistle is sounded, the statute is complied with. Terry v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 6 West. Rep. 445, 89 Mo. 586.

The exception as to cities applies only to the sounding of the steam whistle, and it is negligence to omit ringing the bell. Coffin v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 4 West. Rep. 885, 22 Mo. App. 601.

The statutes of Illinois require the bell or whistle to be sounded at a certain distance from the crossings (Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Davis (Ill.) 22 N. E. Rep. 850); in Alabama at least one fourth of a mile before reaching a public-road crossing. Louisville & N. E. R. Co. v. Hall, 4 L. R. A. 710, 87 Ala. 708.

The statute requiring the ringing of a bell or blowing of a whistle on a railroad train eighty rods distant from a crossing, and continuing it until the crossing is passed, is no less obligatory because the train is running upon a side track for the reason that the main track is obstructed by a standing train. Brown v. Griffin, 71 Tex. 654.

on the road itself in common with the traveler, yet it is not true that the public road is not used by the appellee and the traveler in common. It, the public road, supports the appel lee's trestle over which its train passes, and the traveler has a right to pass under the track on the public highway; but for his right of passage on the public highway he would commit a trespass by passing under the track on the trestles. The public road, by being trestled across, is as much in the occupation of the appellee as it would be if its track rested immediately upon it, and for the traveler to cross under the track resting on the trestle, or over the track resting upon the ground would be equally a trespass, but for the protection afforded him by reason of being on the public highway.

So it is incorrect to say that the appellee, although its train crosses the highway on a trestle, and the travelers, do not use the same in common.

But the question as to the relative duties of the appellee and the traveler rests upon broader grounds. It is the duty of the appellee, as it is of natural persons, "to exercise its rights with a considerate and prudent regard for the rights of others."

An individual in the exercise of his absolute rights, if it may be reasonably apprehended that their exercise may endanger the safety of others in the exercise of their rights, must exercise them with a due regard for the safety of such others.

To illustrate, a person who is constructing a

ing cannot assign the violation by the company of the statutory duty in respect to sounding the whistle and ringing the bell at the crossing, as the prox. imate cause of his injury. Pike v. Chicago & A. R Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 754.

The omission of the employés of a railroad company to ring a bell or blow a whistle as required by law is material in estimating the amount of care that one who was struck and killed by a train while attempting to cross the track should have observed before attempting to cross the track. Rodrian v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 28 N. Y. S. R. 625.

And the finding by the jury that the bell was rung would not necessarily establish due care, if the cir cumstances required other and additional precautions. Finklestein v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 41 Hun, 34.

The fact that a street has been discontinued by the commissioners of highways, but not practically closed, will not relieve a railroad from giving warning signals on its approach to a highway. Rodrian v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 28 N. Y. S. R. 625.

Duty to slacken speed.

Where the track crosses a much-traveled highway, without statutory provision it is the duty of the company to give sufficient notice of the train's approach, and to moderate the speed of the train to such a rate as, under the circumstances, is reasonably consistent with the public safety. Lehigh Valley R Co. v. Brandtmaier, 5 Cent. Rep. 144, 113 Pa. 610.

The statute requiring the engineer, where he cannot see at least one fourth of a mile ahead, to reduce the speed of his train before entering a curve crossed by a public road only applies to such crossings as are particularly described, his duty at other crossings being as at common law. East Tennessee,

A party injured a half mile from a railroad cross- V. & G. R. Co. v. Deaver, 79 Ala. 216.

brick wall abutting a public street on which travelers frequently pass may be liable in damages for the falling of a brick on a traveler from the bands of one of his workmen, although the workman was not negligent in letting the brick fall and the immediate cause of the fall of the brick was accidental; but if it was an accident which the person, building the wall, in view of the danger to the life and limb of travelers on the street, should reasonably contemplate, he should provide against | the same by safeguards and barriers, so that travelers might not be exposed to the danger, else he will be responsible in damages for the injury. Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 26.

It is precisely upon the same principle that the appellee is made liable for injuries to travelers at crossings. It is no excuse or justification that the act that caused the injury was in itself lawful or "that it was done in the exercise of a lawful right, if the injury arose from the negligent manner in which it was done."

Injury may occur to the traveler at the crossing in two ways, namely: by a collision with him, or by scaring the horse that he is riding or driving, whereby he is injured. It is the duty of the appellee in approaching a crossing, if danger to the traveler in either of the ways above mentioned may be reasonably apprehended, to give timely notice of its approach, in order that the traveler may not only be warned not to come in collision with the train, but secure himself from injury by his frightened horse. By the trains crossing the highway on a trestle, there is no danger of a collision with a traveler on the highway, but if he

should be under the trestle with his horse while the train is passing over it, the danger is increased, for it is well known that a horse is more likely to scare at a sound made over his head than when the same sound is made on the ground. So where the train crosses the public highway on a trestle, and in view, as above intimated, of the frequency of travel, on horseback or by driving, on the public highway, and the facility of seeing the train, as it ap proaches the crossing, in time to prevent injury by scaring the horse, the danger of catching the traveler unawares and frightening the horse that he is riding or driving may be reasonably apprehended, it is its duty to give some timely warning of its approach to the crossing. And the question as to whether or not the failure to give such warning is negli. gence should be left to the jury.

For an able presentation of the foregoing views, see the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 263.

But it conclusively appears from the appel lant's own testimony that she received the injury in consequence of her own negligence. She was familiar with the crossing and its surroundings; the track, in the direction that the train was coming, was clear of obstruction several hundred yards, and she could have seen the approaching train that distance, had she looked, but she did not look; nor did she give any reasonable excuse for not looking, but hurried up to the crossing and attempted to cross, regardless of the fact that the train might come at any moment. So, as it conclusively appeared that the injury was the result

reasonable as to justify a court in setting it aside, where there is no evidence to show whether the lowas or was not sparsely settled. Weyl v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 40 Minn. 350.

It is the duty of a company to observe due caution and all reasonable efforts to prevent injury to persons who may be on its tracks when approach-cality ing a crowded city. Duffy v. Missouri P. R. Co. 2 West. Rep. 198, 19 Mo. App. 380. See note to Parsons v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (N. Y.) 3 L. R. A. 683.

Running a train in an incorporated town at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour does not impose absolute liability, under Miss. Code, 1047, for the killing of cattle, unless the killing resulted from or was rendered inevitable by the rate of speed. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Caster, (Miss.) 5 So. Rep. 388.

Where a train was run at twelve miles per hour, without its bell being constantly rung, in violation of an ordinance, and deceased was run over and kilied instantaneously with his stepping on the track; and the engine was not reversed till after it passed over him,-it was negligence per se upon the part of the railroad company. Henry, Ch. J., dissents. Keim v. Union R. & T. Co. 7 West. Rep. 144, 90 Mo. 314.

A municipal ordinance regulating the rate of speed of trains, and requiring the display of signals on moving trains at night, applies to the private switch-yards of a railroad company situated within the corporate limits. Grube v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo.) 11 S. W. Rep. 736.

Duty of traveler to stop, look and listen. The rule as to the duty of a person approaching a railroad crossing to stop and look and listen for the approach of trains is not a rule of evidence, but one of absolute and unbending law. Pennsyl vania R. Co. v. Aiken (Pa.) 20 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. 182, 25 W. N. C. 13.

It applies as well to persons walking as to those driving. [bid.

When the track is hidden from one's view for some distance, and the noise made by his own wagon interferes with his hearing the approaching train, it is his absolute duty to stop his team and listen before attempting to cross the track. Abbot v. Dwinnell, 74 Wis. 514.

One who recognized the approach of the train should remain in a place of safety, and should he undertake to cross imprudently he will be guilty of negligence and cannot recover damages. McNeal v. Pittsburgh & W. R. Co. (Pa.) 25 W. N. C. 181. Where he exercised no diligence in listening and looking for the train, and does not pretend igno rance that it was train time, or suggest any mistake or misapprehension, he cannot recover for injuries received from the train. Smith v. Central R. & Bkg. Co. 82 Ga. 801.

A city ordinance limiting the speed of trains in only one part of a city where a railroad runs .s unreasonable and void where there is no material dif- No amount of negligence on the part of a railway ference between the character of such part and of company in failing to close its gates at a crossing another part of the city through which a compet-will absolve a traveler from the duty to stop and ing line runs. Lake View v. Tate (Ill.) 6 L. R. A. 268. An ordinance prohibiting a greater rate of speed than four miles an hour by railroad trains within a city's limits is not so palpably and manifestly un

listen. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Franz, 4 L. R. A. 389, 127 Pa. 297; and see note to Freeman v. Duluth S. S. & A. R. Co. (Mich.) 3 L. R. A. 594; Greenwood v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. (Pa.) 3 L. R. A. 44.

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