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of the appellant's own negligence, the instruction was not improper.

The judgment is affirmed.

ing was obtained in this case, but counsel finally neglected to avail themselves of the extension, and the extended time expired without the filing of such petition, and the decis

An extension of the time for filing a rehear-ion thereby became absolute.

OHIO SUPREME COURT.

STATE of Ohio, ex rel. J. A. KOHLER, Attorney-General,

CINCINNATI, WASHINGTON & BALTIMORE R. CO.

SAME

V.

CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PACIFIC R. CO.

(....Ohio St.....)

1. Where a railway company, incorporated under the laws of this State, misuses a franchise, privilege or right conferred upon it, or claims the right to exercise, or has

exercised "a franchise, privilege or right in con

travention of law," this court has jurisdiction to inquire into and correct the mischief, though the corporation may be engaged in interstate commerce, and the misuser or usurpation to be corrected relate to and concern that traffic.

2. A corporation, created by this State, and engaged in carrying goods for bire as a common carrier, has no franchise, privilege or right to discriminate in its freight rates in favor of one shipper, even when it is necessary to dc so to secure his custom, if the discriminating rate w. tend to create a monopoly by excluding from their proper markets the products of the competitors of the favored shipper. *Head notes by the COURT.

NOTE.-Quo warranto, for illegal exercise of corporate franchise.

A private corporation created by the Legislature may lose its franchises by a misuser or a nonuser of them; and they may be resumed by the government, under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto to ascertain or enforce forfeiture. State Board of Education v. Bakewell, 8 West. Rep. 49, 122 Ill. 339; Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. 9 Cranch, 51 (3 L. ed. 653); State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595; People v. Manhattan Co. 9 Wend. 351.

The writ of quo warranto is the proper remedy for usurpation of a franchise. Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann. 162; State v. Ramos, 10 La. Ann. 420. It may be maintained in the name of the people to restrain a corporation from exercising authority not possessed by it under its charter or by law. People v. New York, 32 Barb. 35, 10 Abb. Pr. 144; Com. v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 43 Pa. 295; People v. Utica Ins. Co. 15 Johns. 358.

An information in the nature of a quo warranto against a private corporation is a public prosecution. People v. Golden Rule, 114 Ill. 34.

It is of legal, not equitable, cognizance, and the issues therein are strictly legal. People v. Albany & S. R. Co. 57 N. Y. 161.

It is a civil suit and must be governed by the rules applicable thereto, and be proceeded with like any other civil action, Central & G. Road Co. v. People, 5 Colo. 39; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. People, Id. 60, State v. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496.

8. Where such corporation fixes a rate of freight per hundred pounds, for carrying petroleum oil in oil-tank cars, substantially lower than its rate for transporting it in barrels in carload lots, it is exercising "a franchise, privilege or right in contravention of law" within the meaning of the fourth clause of § 6761, Rev. Stat.

(March, 4, 1890.)

PETITIONS in quo warrrato to oust defendants from certain franchises alleged to be illegally exercised by them. Judgment of ouster. Statement by Bradbury, J.:

the referee, Hon. Channing Richards, disclose The pleadings, together with the report of that the Cities of Marietta, O., and Parkersburg, West Va., are situated on opposite sides. of the Ohio River, about twelve miles apart; that one of the defendants, the Cincinnati, Washington & Baltimore Railway Company, owns and operates a railway that connects Ma rietta directly, and, by means of a railway bridge across the Ohio River at Parkersburg, the latter place, also with the City of Cincin nati, Ohio, where it has connections with an extensive system of railways operated by the other defendant, the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, both which railway companies are corporations created by and under the laws of this State; and that the entire line of the first-named Company lies within the State, while only about one mile of

Original jurisdiction is conferred on the supreme court by the Constitution. People v. Boughton, 5 Colo. 487; State v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co. 45 Wis. 579.

In New York the remedies may now be obtained by civil action. People v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117. See note to State v. Minnesota T. Mfg. Co. (Minn.) 3 L R. A. 510.

The granting of leave to file the information is within the sound discretion of the court. People v. Waite, 70 Пl. 25; People v. Moore, 73 Ill. 132; State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266.

When the attorney-general ex officio files an information, no leave of court is requisite. Vanatta v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co. 38 N. J. L. 282.

The information is properly filed against the corporate body, not the individual members. State v. Barron, 57 N. H. 498; State v. Taylor, 25 Ohio, 280.

One charged with having usurped powers and franchises and exercising the same without authority of law must either justify or disclaim the alleged acts. Illinois M. R. Co. v. People, 84 Ill. 426.

It is not competent for this court, in a quo warranto proceeding ousting an acting corporation of the franchise to be a body corporate, to consider or determine the rights or liabilities of third parties acquired and incurred in their dealings. Society Perun v. Cleveland, 1 West. Rep. 506, 43 Ohio St. 481. See note to State v. Minnesota T. Mfg. Co. (Minn.) 3 L. R. A. 510.

the extensive system operated by the last-1 named Company is so located, the remainder tl ereof extending through the States south of the Oaio River. That the Camden Consoli dated Oil Company, a branch of the Standard Oil Company, owns and operates an extensive establishment at Parkersburg, West Va., for retining petroleum oil; and that there are a number of smaller establishments at Marietta, O., engaged in the same business, not connect ed, however, with the Standard Oil Company, one of which, owned and operated by George Rice, is of considerable magnitude, though much less extensive than the Camden Consolidated Oil Company. That the several owners of these oil refineries mainly depend for transporting their finished product to its principal market, the towns and cities south of the Ohio River, upon the railways owned and operated by the defendants, both of whom are common carriers of freight and passengers. That there are two methods of transporting oil to market, in use by retiners and wholesale dealers, one in barrels shipped in carload lots, in cars fur nished by the carrier, the other in iron tank cars owned and furnished by shippers; and that defendants furnished no tank cars, and did not hold themselves out as prepared to transport oil in that way; and that the tank cars on the road of the Cincinnati, Washington & Baltimore Railway Company were owned and controlled by the Camden Consolidated Oil Company, while those on the road of the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company were owned and controlled by the Chess Carly Company, a branch of the Standard Oil Company, located in Kentucky, and that the Camden Consolidated Oil Company and the Chess-Carly Company usually adopted the iron-tank car method of shipment, all other refiners using the barrel method only. That for some years prior to the bringing of this action the freight rates established by defendants for transporting oil in tank cars, were made much lower than those for transporting it in barrel packages in carload lots, and that the rates charged George Rice and other refiners and wholesale shippers over these railroads by the barrel method were much higher than the rates charged the Camden Consolidated Oil Company and the ChessCarly Company respectively for similar services by the barrel method; so that, whatever method was adopted, a marked discrimination was made in favor of these two companies.

Any further statement of facts necessary to understand the decision will be found in the opinion.

Messrs. J. A. Kohler, Atty-Gen., W. B. Loomis, A. D. Follett and George K. Nash, for relator:

An Ohio railroad company has no right to give lower rates to a favored shipper. Such a corporation makes an unlawful discrimination in favor of the larger shipper contrary to public policy, when, in consideration of the fact that such shipper furnishes a greater quantity of freights than other shippers during a given time, it agrees to make a rebate on the published tariff on such freights, to the prejudice of other shippers of like freights under the same circumstances.

Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, 43 Ohio St. 571; Talcott v. Pine Grove 1 Flipp. 120; Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co. 14 C. B. 255; Parker v. Great Western R. Co. 7 Scott, N. R. 835.

Messrs. McClintick & Smith and Edward W. Strong, for the C. W. & B. R. Co., defendant:

The petition is based wholly upon the ground that the defendant has misused the franchise, privilege and right conferred upon it by law, or has exercised a franchise, privilege or right in contravention of law.

3 Rev. Stat. § 6761, p. 388.

Acts of misuser must relate to matters which are of the essence of the contract between the State and the corporation, and they must be willful and repeated.

Harris v. Mississippi Valley & S. I. R. Co. 51 Miss. 602; Com. v. Pennsylvania Com. Bank, 28 Pa. 383; State v. New Orleans Gaslight & Bkg. Co. 2 Robt. (La.) 529.

Mere mistake in the mode of exercising a power will not be such a misuser as to constitute a ground of forfeiture.

People v. Kingston & M. Turnp. R. Co. 23 Wend. 193.

If violation of the law has been shown, the same law has provided an extraordinary remedy and punishment, which indicates the intention of the Legislature to limit the party aggrieved to this particular statutory relief.

Com. v. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 1 West. Rep. 812, 43 Ohio St. 571; Peters v. Marietta & C. R. Co. 42 Ohio St. 275.

A judgment of forfeiture will not be ordered if there be any other remedy for the grievance complained of.

High, Extr. Legal Rem. 649; State v. Cincinnati Com. Bank, 10 Obio, 539; State v. Farmers College, 32 Ohio St. 489.

Discrimination in rates of freight, if fair and reasonable, and founded on grounds consistent with public interest, is allowable.

Hersh v. Northern Cent. R. Co. 74 Pa. 181; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Fitchburg R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393; Garton v. Bristol & E. R. Co. 1 Best & S. 112, 154, 165; McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. Co. 52 N. H. 430, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 602; Ransom v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 1 C. B. N. S. 437, 4 C. B. N. S. 135.

Forfeitures are not favored.

High, Extr. Legal Rem.619; State v. Cincinnati Com. Bank, 10 Ohio, 539; People v. Kingston & M. Turnp. R. Co. 23 Wend. 211; Re Franklin Teleg. Co. 119 Mass. 448; State v. Farmers College, 32 Ohio St. 489.

Messrs. Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith & Hoadly, for C., N. O. & T. P. R. Co., defendant:

The States have no jurisdiction whatever over interstate commerce, and a money penalty cannot be imposed by state law for a breach of duty relating to interstate commerce. If such a breach cannot be the basis of a tine, much less can it justify the most severe penalty which by law can ever be inflicted upon a corporation, namely, the forfeiture of its franchise.

See Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (30 L. ed. 244); Com. v. Housatonic R. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 449, 143 Mass. 264.

Bradbury, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

These actions are brought under the fourth clause of 6761, Rev. Stat., which authorizes an action of quo warranto to be brought against a corporation when it has misused a franchise, privilege or right conferred upon it by law, or when it claims or holds by contract or other wise, or has exercised a franchise, privilege or right in contravention of law."

The petitions charge, among other things, that the defendants misused their corporate powers and franchises by discriminating in their rates of freight in favor of certain refiners of petroleum oil connected with the Standard Oil Company, by charging other shippers of like products unreasonable rates, by arbitrarily and suddenly changing the same, and, finally, by confederating with the favored shippers to create and foster a monopoly in refined oil, to the injury of other refiners and the public; and, further, that the defendants claimed and exercised, in contravention of law, the right to charge for shipping oil in tank cars a lower rate of freight per hundred pounds than they charged for shipping the same in barrels, in carload lots The defendants by answer, among other matters, denied charging any shippers unreasonable rates of freight, or that they arbitrarily or suddenly changed such rates and denied any confederacy with anyone to establish a monopoly.

ments of oil over their roads which would otherwise have been lost to them.

It is contended, in this connection, that as the evidence shows, and the referee in another part of his report found, that this action of the Railroad Companies tended to create a monopoly and to injure the business of George Rice in all the markets reached by their lines, and in some instances did in fact create a monopoly, they (especially as their officers were men of large capacity and wide experience in the affairs of the commercial world) must be held to have contemplated and intended these natural results.

It is true that in relation to many matters, both civil and criminal, one must be held to intend the natural and probable consequences of an act and carnot be heard to deny it. We think the principle hardly applicable here, and that the charge of an actual conspiracy by the defendants with others, to misuse the franchises conferred on them by the State, to injure the public, is not necessarily sustained by proof that a course was pursued beneficial to their interests, though it tended to and in fact did produce that result. The inference thus arising is to be given due force, but is not conclusive; and the fact of conspiracy is to be established, if at all, from a consideration of ali the circumstances in the case, and we cannot say, in view of all those circumstances, that the finding of the referee in this respect is not supportThe actions were referred to a referee to take ed by the evidence. The exceptions to the the evidence and to report to this court his find-report are therefore overruled. ings of fact and conclusious of law therefrom; all which has been done and the cases are before us upon this report.

All of the oil of the Camden Consolidated Oil Company that was transported over the Cincinnati, Washington & Baltimore Railroad Company, all of that which was refined by George Rice and other refiners operating at Marietta, Ohio, which was carried south of the Ohio River, and all of that belonging to any of those parties which was transported over the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway, was commerce between the States, the regulation of which, by the Constitution of the United States, is denied to the several States; and as the discrimination, of which complaint is made in this action, relates to this traffic, defendant's counsel contend that this court has

To the report of the referce exceptions were filed by all parties. The defendants, however, do not now insist upon their exceptions to the finding of the referee in so far as it relates to the facts; indeed, it is difficult to conceive any grounds for their doing so, for these findings are mainly based upon the testimony of the officers and agents of the Railroad Companies, On the other hand, however, counsel for the relators urge upon us with much force their exceptions to the facts as they were found by the referce; four of which findings at least the eighth, ninth, twenty-second and twenty-no jurisdiction of the subject. No doubt the third deserve consideration.

The eighth regulation of interstate commerce belongs exwas, that the open rate of freight made for the clusively to the national government; but does public for oil was not excessive, and the ninth, the controversy now before us, in any proper that those open rates were not frequently or sense of the term, relate to a regulation of comarbitrarily changed. Without absolutely commerce between the States? Does this exclusive mitting ourselves to the correctness of these findings, we think they are made immaterial by other findings that require the rendition of the same judgment that should have been rendered had these two findings been the reverse of what they are.

The twenty second and twenty-third findings of fact should be considered together. The first of the two negatives the existence of a conspiracy or confederation between either of the defendants and the Camden Consolidated Oil Company on the one hand, or the Chess Carly Company on the other, to foster er create a monopoly in the traffic in petroleum il, while the other one rests the action of the Railroad Companies, in giving rebates and special rates to these favored shippers, upon the necessity they were under of doing so to secure large ship

right in Congress to regulate interstate commerce preclude any action by a State upon any subject that may incidentally affect such commerce? Certainly a State cannot be compelled to create corporations in aid of, or to facilitate, commerce between the States; but if it does create one capable of engaging in such commerce, and the corporation in fact so engages, is that an emancipation of the corporation from the control of the State? That the power to regulate commerce between the States cannot safely be pressed to such extreme consequences is, we think, recognized by the supreme court in Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taring Dist. 120 U. S. 4-9 [30 L. ed. 694]. The corporation has received vitality from the State; it continues during its existence to be the creature of the State; must live subservient to its laws, and has such

powers and franchises as those laws have bestowed upon it, and none others. As the State was not bound to create it in the first place, it is not bound to maintain it, after having done so, if it violates the laws or public policy of the State, or misuses its franchises to oppress the citizens thereof.

For such offenses the State, acting through its Legislature and courts, and in the exercise of a sound discretion, may either destroy the corporation entirely, by forfeiting its charter, or oust it from the wrongful exercise of its powers; and if, instead of, or in addition to, misusing the franchises actually conferred, it usurps others, the circumstance that the usurped franchises relate to and concern commerce between the States ought not to deprive the State of its visitorial power. If the State creating the corporation is deprived of this power, none exists elsewhere. "The government creating the corporation can alone institute such a pro ceeding [quo warranto to adjudge forfeiture of a corporate franchise], since it may waive a broken condition of a compact made with it." Angel & A. Corp. § 777, and cases cited. See note 6.

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found in the opinion of Judge Atherton, in the case of Scofield v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 43 Ohio St. 571, 1 West. Rep. 812, to which nothing need be now added.

It appears that of the two methods of shipping oil, that by the barrel in carload lots and that in tank cars, the first only was available to George Rice and the other refiners of petroleum oil at Marietta, Ohio, as they owned no tank cars, nor did the defendants own or undertake to provide any; but that both methods were open to the Camden Consolidated Oil Company and the Chess-Carly Company, by reason of their ownership of tank cars; and that the rate per barrel in tank cars was very much lower than in barrel packages in box cars; that in fact the Cincinnati, Washington & Baltimore Railway Company, after allowing the Camden Consolidated Oil Company a rebate, and allowing the Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company for switching cars, received from the Camden Consolidated Oil Company only about one half the open rates it charged the Marietta refiners, and that both Railroad Companies claimed the right to make different rates, based upon the different methods of shipping oil, and the fact of the ownership by shippers of the tank cars used by them. It was the duty of the defendants to furnish suitable vehicles for transporting freight offered to them for that purpose, and to offer equal terms to all shippers.

That the Cincinnati, .Washington & Balti more Railway Company did discriminate in its rates for freight on petroleum oil in favor of the Camden Consolidated Oil Company, and that the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Failway Company did the same in favor of the Chess-Carly Company, is shown by the A railroad is an improved highway; the pubfinding of the referee, which is clearly sus-lic are equally entitled to its use; it must protained by the evidence. That these discrimi- vide equal accommodation for all upon the nating rates were in some instances strikingly same terms. The fact that one shipper may be excessive, tended to foster a monopoly, tended provided with vehicles of his own entitles him to injure the competitors of the favored ship- to no advantage over his competitor not so propers and were in many instances prohibitory, vided. The true rule is announced by the Inactually excluding these competitors from ex- terstate Commerce Commission in the report of tensive and valuable markets for their oil, giv the case of George Rice v. Louisville & N. R. ing to the favored shippers absolute control Co. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 722: "The fact that thereof, is established beyond any serious con- the owner supplies the rolling stock when his troversy. The justification interposed is that oil is shipped in tanks, in our opinion, is entitled this was not done pursuant to any confederacy to little weight when rates are under considerwith the favored shippers or with any purpose ation. It is properly the business of railroad to inflict injury on their competitors, but in companies to supply to their customers suitable order that the Railroad Companies might secure vehicles of transportation (Ogdensburg & L. C. freight that would otherwise have been loss to R. Co. v. Pratt, 89 U. S. 32 Wall. 123 [22 L. them. This we do not think sufficient. We ed. 827]), and then offer their use to everybody are not unmindful of the difliculties that stand impartially." Page 50 of the report of the in the way of prescribing a line of duty to a case. railway company, nor do we undertake to say they may not pursue their legitimate objects, and shape their policy to secure benefits to themselves, though it may press severely upon the interests of others; but we do hold that they cannot be permitted to foster or create a monopoly, by giving to a favored shipper a discriminating rate of freight. As common carriers, their duty is to carry indifferently for all who may apply, and in the order in which the application is made and upon the same terms; and the assumption of a right to make discriminations in rates for freight, such as was claimed and exercised by the defendants in this case, on the ground that it thereby secured freight that it would otherwise lose, is a misuse of the rights and privileges conferred upon it by law. A full and complete discussion of the principles and a thorough collection of the authorities bearing upon the duties of railroad companies towards their customers is to be

No doubt a shipper who owns cars may be paid a reasonable compensation for their use, so that the compensation is not made a cover for discriminating rates or other advantages to such owner as a shipper. Nor is there any valid objection to such owner using them exclusively as long as the carrier provides equal accommodations to its other customers. It may be claimed that if a railroad company permit all shippers indifferently and upon equal terms to provide cars suitable for their business, and to use them exclusively, no discrimi nation is made. This may be theoretically true, but is not so in its application to the actual state of the business of the country, for a very large proportion of the customers of a railroad have not a volume of business large enough to warrant equipping themselves with cars, and might be put at a ruinous disadvantage in the attempt to compete with more extensive establishments. Aside from this, how

ever, a shipper is not bound to provide a car; the duty of providing suitable facilities for its customers rests upon the railroad company, and if instead of providing sufficient and suitable cars itself, this is done by certain of its customers, even for their own convenience, yet the cars thus provided are to be regarded as part of the equipment of the road. It being the duty of a railroad company to transport freight for all persons indifferently and in the order in which its transportation is applied for, it cannot be permitted to suffer freight cars to be placed upon its track by any customer for his private use, except upon the condition that, if it does not provide other cars sufficient to transport the freight of other customers in the order that application is made, they may be used for that purpose. Were this not so, a mode of discrimination fatal to all successful competition by small establishments and operators with larger and more opulent ones could be successfully adopted and practiced at the will

of the railroad company and the favored shipper. The advantages, if any, to the carrier, presented by the tank car method of transporting oil over that by barrels in box cars in carload lots, are not sufficient to justify any substantial difference in the rate of freight for oil transported in that way; but if there were any such advantages, as it is the duty of the carrier to furnish proper vehicles for transporting it, if it failed in this duty it could not in justice avail itself of its own neglect as a ground of discrimination; it must either provide tank cars for all of its customers alike, or give such rates of freight in barrel packages, by the carload, as will place its customers using that method on an equal footing with its customers adopting the other method.

Judgment ousting defendants from the right to make or charge a rate of freight per hundred pounds for transporting oil in iron tank-cars, substantially lower than for transporting it in barrels, in carload lols.

ALABAMA SUPREME COURT.

Robert T. SMITH, Appt.,

v.

GEORGIA PACIFIC R. CO.

(....Ala.....)

Calling the name of a station and stop ping the train soon after to take a side track while another train passes will not make the car rier liable for injuries to a passenger who at tempts to get off at that place, where all the surroundings indicate that it is not the proper place for alighting.

(January 15, 1890.)

inference may be reasonably drawn that his injury was caused by the negliget ce of the defendant. We shall therefore direct our consideration to the question whether, on the facts clearly proved, and having regard to the liberty to draw inferences therefrom, the court would have been justified in taking the question of negligence from the jury; for if on the facts, which admit of no dispute, and allowing all adverse inferences, it would have been the duty of the court to set aside the verdict bad one been rendered in favor of plaintiff. and the affirmative charge in favor of the defendant was authorized, we need not consider the various rulings of the court. Bently v. Georgia

APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of Puc. R. Co. 86 Ala. 484.

the Circuit Court for Cleburne County in
favor of defendant in an action to recover dam-gers,
ages for personal injuries alleged to have re-
sulted from the Legligence of defendant's serv-
ants. Affirmed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Kelly & Smith for appellant.
Messrs. Knox & Bowie for appellee.

Clopton, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

Appellant's injuries, for which he sucs, were received while alighting from a train at Heflin, a regular station on defendant's road. His right of recovery is founded on the allegation that his injury was caused by the negligence of defendant's servants. The specific negligence complained of is alleged to consist in calling out the name of the station, bringing the train to a stand-still immediately thereafter, thereby inducing plaintiff to believe, and to act upon the belief, that the train had reached the usual place for landing passengers, and suddenly starting it without giving him notice. Plaintiff's act in leaving the train being voluntary, it is incumbent on him, in order to entitle him to a recovery, or before the opinion of a jury is required to be taken as to the question of negligence, to produce evidence from which the

A railroad company, being a carrier of passenis under obligation to use reasonable care to transport them safely. This general duty includes the specific duty not to expose them to unnecessary danger, and not intentionally or negligently to mislead them by causing them to reasonably suppose that their point of destination has been reached, and that they may safely alight, when the train is in an improper place. Calling out the name of the station is customary and proper, so that passengers may be informed that the train is approaching the station of their destination, and prepare to get off when it arrives at the platform. The mere announcement of the name of the station is not an invitation to alight, but, when followed by a full stoppage of the train soon thereafter, is ordinarily notification that it has arrived at the usual place of landing passengers. Whether the stoppage of the train, after such announcement and before it arrives at the platform, is negligence, depends upon the attendant circumstances. The rule is aptly expressed in Bridges v. North London R. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 377, by Willes, J.: "It is au announcement by the railway officers that the train is approaching, or has arrived at, the platform, and that the passengers may get out when the train stops at the platform, or under circumstances induced

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