« AnteriorContinuar »
ern Judicial Circuit, who is the counsel repre. bibited, and such marriages shall be null and sedling the State of Georgia in its criminal void.' prosecutions, would move to remand the causes Section 4572, Code, presents the penalty for in the court whence the transcript was taken, adultery or fornication between individuals of regularly assigned the hearing of the said mo- the races, and under this section the indicttion for trial. The motion to remand, which ments against the defendants were found. the court required to be in writing, presents Section 1710 of the Code provides as follows: several grounds:
"All marriages solemnized in another State 1. It is insisted the case should be remanded by parties intending at the time to reside in because the defendants made no appearance in this State shall bave the same legal consethe state court, and that their bonds were es- quence as if solemnized in this State. Parties treated; that their counsel, James Atkins, Esq., residing in this State cannot evade any part of admits that he advised his clients to remain the provisions of its laws as to marriage by goaway from said state court as it was not neces- ing into another State for the solemnization of sary that they should be there in person when the marriage ceremony." said motion for removal was made.
It will thus be seen how clearly recognized 2. Because it appears that the indictments and distinctly fixed is the purpose of the State against the defendants charged the offense to of Georgia to probibit within its borders mishave been committed on the 1st day of April, cegenation as the result of marriages between 1989, whereas it is not pretended that the al. the wbite and black races. leged marriage took place until the 15th day of These Statutes have received judicial conthe sine month.
struction by the Supreme Court of the State at 3. Erenuse the defendants have been citizens a period when its judges were widely known, and domiciled in the County of Liberty for not alone for their conservatism, their devotion many years; that the defendant Rose Ward was to the Constitution of the common country, born a slave; that they removed to Chatham their broad and tolerant liberalty of opinion, County after the finding of the indictment, but but also for their profound learning and conthat, while domiciled in the County of Liberty spicuous intellectual power. and citizens of the State, they went to the Dis. In Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, this decision trict of Columbia, and were married there in will be found: Leopold Daniels, a Frenchman, order to evade the laws of tbe State of Georgia, had married Charlotte Scott, a negro woman. probibiting marriages between wbites and They were indicted for cobabiting, and thus blacks, and that immediately after said mar the question arose. riage they returned to the County of Liberty. Chief Justice Joseph E. Brown pronounced
The defendants filed affidavits to the effect the unanimous opinion of the court, of which that their lives would have been in danger had the other members were the Hon. H. F. McCay, they attended court in Liberty County, as they more lately the United States Judge for the were bound to do by their bond, but they do Northern District of Georgia, and the Hon. Dot indicate any satisfactory, or, indeed, credi- Hiram Warner, afterwards himself the illusble, reason for that statement.
trious chief justice of the State. Without bestowing very great attention on Of the law Chief Justice Brown makes these the technical reasons urged for remanding these observations: Cases, it is, in the opinion of the court, the "I do not hesitate to say that it was dictated wisest and most serviceable course to consider by wise statesmanship, and has a broad and and decide the motion upon the grave and im- solid foundation in enlightened policy, susportant question which it presents.
tained by sound reason and common sense. Does the law of the State which prohibits The amalgamation of the races is not only unand makes void a marriage between individuals natural, but is always productive of deplorable of the Caucasian and of ihe African races de results. Our daily observations show us that prive the parties in this case of their rights. the offspring of these unnatural connections are guaranteed to them by the Constitution and generally sickly and effeminate, and that they laws of the United States, or, to state the ques. are inferior in physical development and tion as it is more narrowly presented by the strength to the full blood of the other races. petition of the defendants, do the statutes of It is sometimes urged that such marriages the Siate have the effect to violate the obliga- should be encouraged for the purpose of eletion of the marriage contract in the sense in vating the inferior race. The reply is, that which the Constitution of the United States in such connections never elevate the inferior race bibits state action which violates the obligation to the position of the superior, but they bring of a contract? It would, perhaps, be impossi- down the snperior to that of the inferior. ble to overstate the importance of this question They are productive of evil, and evil only, under the grave and unsettled relations which without any corresponding good.”. exist between the distinct races now inhabiting The court was unanimous that the law was a large portion of these United States, and it constitutional, and the conviction of the parwill not be wise nor patriotic for the court to ties was affirmed. evade tbe vital point of decision as might per- An identical conclusion was reached by this baps be done in this case.
court. Judge Erskine pronouncing the decision, By a settled policy of this State, a policy in the case of Hobbs and Johnson, 1 Woods, 537. adopted with the purpose to preserve, as far as The section of the Code above quoted is in. tbe laws may accomplish that result, the purity terpreted, and is held not to be an infraction of and integrity of the races inbabiting the State, the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the it is declared, (Code, section 1768):
United States, or of the laws Congress has "Marriage relations between white persons made for its enforcement. and persons of African desceut are forever pro- In the course of his opinion, page 540, Judge
52 UNITED STATES Circuit Court, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGLA.
He quotes the declaration of Chief Justice subject to the control of the Legislature.
In another part of the opinion, the same tionable and contrary to public policy? great magistrate said: “The framers of the Upon the main point on which the deConstitution did not intend to restrain the fendants here rely, the learned justice says: States in the regulation of civil institutions The only inconsistency suggested is, that it adopted for interval government.”.
impairs the obligation of the contract of marJuuge Erskine concludes that it is plain that riage. Assuming that the probibition of the the institution of marriage is not technically a Federal Constitution against the impairment of contract, nor can it be said to be related to contracts by state legislation applies equally, as property. He quotes the declaration of Mr. would seem to be the opinion of the Supreme Bishop: “All our marriage and divorce laws Court of the Territory, to legislation by terri. are state laws and state statutes, the national torial legislatures, we are clear that marriage courts with us not having cognizance of the is not a contract within the meaning of the matter within our localities.” 1 Bishop, Mar. probibition." and Div. § 87.
He quotes the language of Chief Justice MarCalling attention to the fact that the state shall, quoted supra. With reference to marmarriage regulations did not deny to a citizen riage, be says: “It is an institution in the the equal protection of the laws, for the pun, maintenance of which in its purity the public ishment or penalty adjudged to the colored is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of citizen found guilty of fornication is like that, the family and of society, without which there and none other, which is inflicted on the white would be neither civilization nor progress. citizen, he holds that the sections of the Code This view is well expressed by the Supreme of Georgia which inhibit marriage between Court of Maine in Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. white persons and persons of African descent, 481, 483.” and which provide for the punishment of the It will be interesting and important to concolored and white persons who are found guilty sider the language of this case, to which Justice of the crime of fornication, are not in violation Field quotes with approval. of the Constitution of the United States, and 2 Chief Justice Appleton declares that the relators were remanded to the state courts, the contracting parties have entered into the
The conclusion of Judge Erskine, that the married state, they have entered into a new relamarriage contract is not contemplated the tion, the rights and obligations of which rest, prohibition of the Constitution of the United not upon their agreement, but upon the law of States against the impairment of contracts by the State, statutory or common, which defines state legislation, has been, subsequently to the and prescribes those rights, duties and obliga. rendition of the decision above quoted, fully tions. They are of law, not of contract. Their sustained by two decisions of the Supreme rights under it are determined by the will of Court of the United States. In the case of the sovereign, as evidenced by law. It is not, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (31 L. ed. 654), then, a contract within the meaning of the it was held that marriage is something more clause of the Constitution which prohibits the than a mere contract, though founded upon an impairing of the obligation of contracts. It is, agreement by the parties. When once formed, rather, a social relation, a creation of the law a relation is created between the parties which itself; a relation of the utmost importance as they cannot change, and the rights and obliga- affecting the bappiness of individuals, the first tions of each depend, not upon their agreement, step from barbarism to incipient civilization, but upon the law, statutory or common. It is the purest tie of social life, and the true basis an institution of society, regulated and con of human progress. trolled by public authority. Legislation, there- And the Chief Justice cites, in support of fore, affecting this institution, or annulling a this opinion, the case of Maguire v. Maguire, relation between parties, is not within the pro: 7 Dana, 181, 183, and Ditsori v. Ditson, 4 R. I. bibition of the Constitution of the United 87, 101. In the first of these, the Supreme States against the impairment of a contract by Court of Kentucky said that marriage was such legislation. It may be observed that this more than a contract; that it was the most eledecision was rendered upon the effect of terri-mentary and useful of all the social relations torial legislation annulling a marriage. A for- regulated and controlled by the sovereign power tiori, this announcement will control with ref- of the State and might be abrogated by the sof: erence to the legislation of a State.
ereign will whenever the public good would The language of Mr. Justice Fields is pecu- thereby be subserved; that being more than a liarly apposite and instructive with reference contract, and depending especially upon the to the important controversy before the court. sovereign will, it was not embraced by the con
stitutional inhibition of legislative Acts impair- | sat Mr. Justice Creswell, Jield that the marriage ing tbe obligation of contracts.
in Denmark was, by the well-known law of The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the England upon the subject, wholly in valid. case above quoted, declares it is not a contract The case was appealed to the House of Lords, in the sepse in which the obligation may not and was there considered with great carefulbe impaired, but one of the domestic relations. ness. Opinions were rendered by the Lord
In Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282, it is Chancellor Campbell, Lord Cranworth, Lord declared to be more than a contract, its rela- St. Leonards and Lord Wensleydale. tions always regulated by the government. It Tbe Lord Chancellor declared: “Wbile the partakes more of the character of an instiru forms of entering into the contracts of marriage tion, regulated and controlled by public au are to be regulated by the lex loci contractus the thority, upon principles of public policy for essentials of the contract depend upon the ler the benefit of the community.
domicilii. If the contract of marriage is such In Noel v. Ering, 9 Ind. 37, it is declared to in essentials as to be contrary to the law of the be in every enlightened government, pre emi. country of domicil, and it is declared void by Dently the basis of civil institutious and thus that law, it is to be regarded as void in the an object of the deepest public concern." country of domicil though not contrary to the
The illustrious Story, in his great work on law of the country in which it was celebrated." the Conflict of Laws, paragraph 108, note, All tbe law Lords concurred with the opinion fully sustains this view: “It follows within of the Lord Chancellor. The same doctrine is the full precincts of absolute and paramount affirmed in this country, in North Carolina administration by the controlling authority, (Williams v. Outes, 5 Ired. L. 535; State v. that the marriage contract is not within the Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251; State v. Ross, 76 N. C. provision of the inhibitory clause of the Cop- 242), and in Louisiana (Dupre v. Boulard, 10 stitution denying to the State the power to im- La. Ann. 411); and the Circuit Court of the pair contracts.”
United States for the District of Virginia seems This doctrine bas been repeated by the Su- to have concurred in the opinion of the state preme Court of the United States in the case of court, in Kinney v. Com. above quoted. Et Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. Appendix clxv. (S. parte Kinney, 3 Hughes, 1. C. in its place chronologically 24 L. ed. 1109]: The principle, as we have seen, is made the “The contract of marriage is not a contract law of ihe State of Georgia by the express Statwithin the meaning of the provision in the ute quoted above. By statute and by unbroken Constitution prohibiting States from impairing authority then, except by the case of Medway the obligation of contracts.”
v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, such marriages, beIn the case of Kinney v. Com. 30 Gratt. 858, tween parties domiciled at the time in the State, 32 Am. Rep. 690, the precise question in this as are declared void by the laws of the State, case was decided adversely to the defendants will be beld invalid, no matter where they were here. There a negro man and a white woman contracted. domiciled in Virginia, went, as in this case, to The case of Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. the District of Columbia, and were regularly 157–161, was the occasion of an interesting and married, and after remaining there ten days re- learned discussion of the conflict of laws relaturned to their home in Virginia and continued tive to marriage, and especially of the validity to reside there as husband and wife. The law of marriages between persons domiciled in a of Virginia, like the law of Georgia, prohibits State, wbo temporarily left it to evade its marmarriages between white persons and negroes. riage laws (Story, Conf. L. 5th ed. p. 230, note), It was held that the parties were liable to in- in which the distinguished author, with much dictment in Virginia for lewd and lascivious of warrant in the renown of its ccuits and the cohabitation; that the marriage in the District learning of its judges, favors, not unpaturally, of Columbia was a mere evasion of the laws of the ruling in Massachusetts. An attentive Virginia, and could not be pleaded in bar of consideration of the reasoning of the text and the prosecution. The case is therefore pre- the note will make it appear, however, tbat the cisely in point. There the argument was made author did not have in mind a case like that that the laws of a State, with reference to mar- under consideration here. The true rule is riage, could not operate extra territorium. Con- stated with satisfactory clearness in the recent ceding the general rule, the learned court pro- case of Pennegar v. Štate, decided by the Suceeded to point out the exceptions, citing Mr. preme Court of Tennessee on 29th of January, Justice Story, in his work on the Conflict of 1889, and reported in that useful and valuable Laws, section 113a: “The most prominent, if periodical, the Lawyers Reports, Annotated, Vol. not the only known, exceptions to the rule are 2, p. 703 [87 Teon. 244). Stating the general those marriages involving polygamy and incest, rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is ibose positively prohibited by the laws of a valid everywhere, the court calls attention to country upon motives of policy.” The case at the exceptions. Of these the most important bar would seem clearly within the latter classic is a marriage which the local law-making fication.
power bas declared shall not be allowed any Reference is made in the opinion from wbich validity either in express terms or by necessary we quote to the case of Brook v. Brook, 9 H. implication. L. Cas. 193. In that case William Leigh Brook Marriages of this class are divided by the married in Denmark Mrs. Emily Armitage, his court into two subdivisions: (1) where the first wife's sister. The parties were lawfully statutory prohibition relates to form, ceremony domiciled in England and bad gone to Den- and qualifications; (2) marriages which are promark on a temporary visit. The marriage was bibited by positive state policy as affecting the lawful in Denmark. In a suit among the lieirs morals or good order of society. Justice of Brook, Vice-Chancellor Stuart, with whom i Folkes, for the court, presented the distinction
in the following language: "Where the statu- 1 sovereignty, upon a subject which involves tho tory inhibition relates to matters of form or character of its population and citizenship, ceremony, and in some respects to qualifica and, as we have seen, repeatedly declared by the tion of the parties, it is declared that the courts Supreme Appellate Court of our country, exclu. would hold such marriage valid. But if the sively within the precincts of state control. statutory probibition is expressive of a decided The geperal rule upon which the petitioners state policy as a matter of morals, the court rely, viz., that a marriage valid where celemust adjudge the marriage void as contra brated is valid everywhere, depends upon inbonos mores. To illustrate the proposition the ternational comity, a jurisprudence "existing court cites the case of State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9, in the sense of mutual interest, mutual benefits where a marriage between a white person and and mutual obligations to cultivate peace and a negro, valid in Mississippi where celebrated, barmony.” Story, Conf. L. p. 83. and where the parties were domiciled at the But of international comity it was said by time of the marriage, was held void in Ten-Chief Justice Taney in the decision in Bank of
There is in Tennessee, as in Georgia, Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 589 [10 L. a bigbly penal statute on this subject, and the ed. 308): "It is the voluntary act of the nation court alludes in vigorous language to the “de- by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when moralization and debauchery involved in such contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interad alliance.
Referring to the criticisms made est. in Medway v. Needham by the Lord Chancellor That marriages between individuals of Cau. in Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 193, and the casian and of African blood are contrary to the criticism of that case in Com. v. Lane, 113 policy of Georgia, we have seen. Whether it Mass. 458, and to the case of Putnam v. Put- is prejudicial to the State is for Georgia to denam, 8 Pick. 433, the court calls attention to termine. We have seen that the National Conthe significant fact that in Putnam v. Putnam stitution is not infringed. It is true that in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts says: “If certain senses the States of the American Union it shall be found inconvenient or repugnant to are not independent pations. "For all national -sound principles (the italics are ours) it may be purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution expected that the Legislature will explicitly the States and the citizens thereof, are one, enact that the marriages contracted in another united under the same sovereign authority State, which, if entered into here, would be and governed by the same laws. In all otber void, shall have no effect within this Common respects the States are foreign to and independ. wealth.” The Legislature did shortly thereafter ent of each other.” Buckner v. Finley, 27 U. S. so enact, whether because the doctrine laid 2 Pet. 589 [7 L. ed. 530), opinion, Mr. Justice down in the case was inconvenient or because Washington. See also Dickins v. Beal, 53 U. repugnant to sound principles does not ap- S. 10 Pet. 573 [9 L. ed. 538]; Rhode Island v. pear.
Ma88. 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 719 [9 L. ed. 1258); Justice Folkes, in his interesting opinion, Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 132 [23 L. ed. 649). quotes also from the opinion of the Lord And the 14ih Amendment to the ConstituChancellor in Brook v. Brook, supra, the tion does not limit the power of the State to following observation relative to Medway v. protect its citizens. Minneapolis & St. L. Needham, 16 Mass. 157: “It is entitled to R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 [32 L. ed. but little weight, and is based upon decisions 585). which relate to the form and ceremony of
The court will not discuss the argument of marriage. If a marriage is absolutely pro defendant's counsel to the effect that the interhibited in any country as being contrary to marriages of wbites and blacks do not constitute public policy, and leading to social evils, I an evil or an injury against which the State thing that the domiciled inhabitants in that should protect itself. This is a question which country cannot be permitted, by passing the bas been, as we bave seen, the subject of refrontier, and entering another State in which peated judicial deliverance, but it is more the marriage is not prohibited, to celebrate a properly in the opinion of this court within the marriage forbidden int heir own State, and, domain of legislative debate. immediately returning to their own State, to It is enough, for the purpose of its duty, for insist on their marriage being recognized as the court to ascertain that by a legitimate and lawful.”
settled policy the State of Georgia has declared We may add, with reference to the law and such marriages unlawful ard void; for, while the policy of Georgia, that whatever may be in this country, where the home life of the the difference between courts or countries in people, their decency and their morality are the opinion held and enforced upon this vital | the basis of that vast social structure of liberty topic, this State, by its Declaratory Statute, bas and obedience to law which excites the patriotic distinctly withdrawn its jurisprudence from pride of our countrymen and the admiration of the domain of the debate. The Statute is the the world, and wbile these attributes of our rule as to persons domiciled in Georgia. “All citizenship should be cherished and protected marriages solemnized in another State by par- by all in authority, and ibe creatures who defy ties intending at the time to reside in this state them should be condemned by all, the courts shall have the same legal consequences and in their judicial functions are rarely concerned effect as if solemnized in this State. Parties with the policy of the laws which are made to residing in this state cannot evade any of the protect the community. The policy of the State provisions of its laws as to marriage by going upon this subject has been declared, as we have inio another State for the solemnization of the seen by its supreme court as well as by its statmarriage ceremony."
utes; and it is enough to say that this court is unThis authoritative and precise announcement able to discover anything in that policy with of state policy is made in the exercise of its which the federal courts have the right or the power to interfere. To discuss the topic further race; and to disregard the praiseworthy purmight give immediate pain to many who are poses and efforts of the colored people themwholly irresponsible for a condition which selves, whether by nullifying the laws made to would make them sensitive to its hearing or prevent miscegenation or by ignoring the knowledge.
vicious practices of the licentious, would be as It may not be improper to state that the evils cruel to that race as it would be injurious to comprehended in this general topic are decreas. society, destructive to social order and ruinous ing. This the observation and testimony of to the future of a large portion of the country, superintendents of public instruction who bave a future with which ibe prosperity of the the opportunity to observe large numbers of whole country is indissolubly connected. colored children, prove to be true. Upon every The questions presented are decided adpossible consideration this must be deemed versely to the defendants, and the indictments an important, indeed an absolutely neces. must be remanded to the state court whence they sary, step toward the amelioration of their con- were removed. dition and the permanent advancement of the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.
John LAWTON, Libelant to Limit Liabil
ity as Owner of The Steamboat “Katie,"
H. M. COMER et al.
ality,--Held, that the Act is valid, in view of the power of Congress to regulate commerce:
(a) Because the law,amended, excepted from its operation inland navigation only, and not internal commerce, as insisted.
(b) The amendment extended the operation of the law, not to internal commerce, but to inland navigation. So much for the direct purpose of the Act.
(C) If internal commerce is affected, it is incidentally merely. The purpose of the Legislature being legitimate, and warranted by the Constitution, it is wholly immaterial to the con. sideration of the validity of its action that somewhere it has a casual or contingent effect upon the domain of state legislation,
(40 Fed. Rep. 480.)
The Act of June 19, 1886, extending
the benefits of limited liability legisla.
NOTE.-Congress may requate liability of ship- The "privity or knowledge" of the officers of a
corporation is "privity or knowledge" of the corIt is within the power of Congress to regulate the poration. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, liability of owners of vessels so far as applicable to 62 U. 8. 21 How. 202 (16 L. ed. 73); Hill Mfg. Co. v. marine torts, and it is not necessary to aver in the Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 113 Mass. 500. petition, or to prove, that the claims against the
The "knowledge and privity" of the wreckingvessel are in excess of her value. The Garden City, master of an insurance company is not the knowl26 Fed. Rep. 766 ; Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. edge and privity of the corporation so far as to v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 589 (27 L. ed. 1042; Head- charge it with responsibility for his negligence rick v. Virginia & T. A. L. R. Co. 48 Ga. 545.
beyond the value of the vessel. Craig v. Continen
tal Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798. Limited Liability Act of Congress construed.
The Limited Liability Act, Rev. Stat. 88 4282-4289, Under the provisions of the Act of Congress of leaves ship owners liable without limit for their 1851, if the loss is caused by the owner's "design or own negligence, and liable to the extent of the neglect," his common-law liability remains intact, ship and freight for the negligence or misconduct and he is liable for the whole loss. Walker v. West- of the master and crew. Liverpool & G. W. Steam erp Transp. Co. 70 U.S. 3 Wall. 153 (18 L. ed. 174). Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 440 (32 L ed. 788,
The purpose of the Act was to limit the liability 791). of the vessel owner, and it applies to any damage It was not intended to exonerate them beyond irrespective of locality of the thing injured, if there the value of the ship and freight, for losses from be "no fault or privity" on the part of the owner. causes for which they were previously liable, inRe Vessel Owners' Towing Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 169; Recluding mere negligence of employés. Norwich & Goodrich Transp. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 713.
N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall 121 (20 To render them liable there must be "privity or L. ed. 591); Allen v. Mackay, 1 Sprague, 219; Place knowledge,” some personal concurrence, or some v. The City of Norwich, 1 Ben. 89; Lord v. Goodall, fault or neglect on their part or in which they per- N. & P. Steamship Co. 4 Sawy. 300. sonally participate. Walker v. Western Transp. Neither the provision of 16 Stat. at L. 440, for the Co. supra; Hill Mfg. Co. v. Providence & N. Y. better protection of the lives of passengers on Steamship Co. 113 Mase. 499; Moore v. Am. Transp. board steam vessels (Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. Co. 65 U. S. 24 How. 1 (16 4. ed. 674).
58 N. Y. 1:26), nor the jurisdiction over marine conThe word "privity" (of the owner) means some tracts and torts saved to the state courts by the fault or neglect in which the owner of the vessel Judiciary Act, are limited or affected by Stat. personally participates; and “knowledge," as used, March 3, 1851, unless proceedings are taken under means some personal cognizance, or means of the latter Act by a party to limit his liability. knowledge of which he is bound to avail himself, of Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236. a contemplated loss, or of a condition of things This Act applies to owners of foreign as well as likely to produce or to contribute to a logs, without domestic shipping. The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (26 L. adopting appropriate means to prevent it. Lord v. ed. 1001); Re Leonard, 14 Fed. Rep. 53. Goodall, N. & P. Steamship Co. 4 Sawy. 292.
"In no case" applies to all cases of loss and dam.