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But of international comity it was said by Chief Justice Taney in the decision in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 589 [10 L. ed. 308]: "It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interest."

in the following language: "Where the statu- | sovereignty, upon a subject which involves the tory inhibition relates to matters of form or character of its population and citizenship, ceremony, and in some respects to qualifica- and, as we have seen, repeatedly declared by the tion of the parties, it is declared that the courts Supreme Appellate Court of our country, excluwould hold such marriage valid. But if the sively within the precincts of state control. statutory prohibition is expressive of a decided The general rule upon which the petitioners state policy as a matter of morals, the court rely, viz., that a marriage valid where celemust adjudge the marriage void as contra brated is valid everywhere, depends upon inbonos mores." To illustrate the proposition the ternational comity, a jurisprudence "existing court cites the case of State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9, in the sense of mutual interest, mutual benefits where a marriage between a white person and and mutual obligations to cultivate peace and a negro, valid in Mississippi where celebrated, harmony." Story, Conf. L. p. 83. and where the parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage, was held void in Tennessee. There is in Tennessee, as in Georgia, a highly penal statute on this subject, and the court alludes in vigorous language to the "demoralization and debauchery involved in such an alliance." Referring to the criticisms made in Medway v. Needham by the Lord Chancellor That marriages between individuals of Cauin Brook v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 193, and the casian and of African blood are contrary to the criticism of that case in Com. v. Lane, 113 policy of Georgia, we have seen. Whether it Mass. 458, and to the case of Putnam v. Put-is prejudicial to the State is for Georgia to denam, 8 Pick. 433, the court calls attention to termine. We have seen that the National Conthe significant fact that in Putnam v. Putnam stitution is not infringed. It is true that in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts says: "If certain senses the States of the American Union it shall be found inconvenient or repugnant to are not independent nations. "For all national sound principles (the italics are ours) it may be purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution expected that the Legislature will explicitly the States and the citizens thereof, are one, enact that the marriages contracted in another united under the same sovereign authority State, which, if entered into here, would be and governed by the same laws. In all other void, shall have no effect within this Common-respects the States are foreign to and independ wealth." The Legislature did shortly thereafter ent of each other." Buckner v. Finley, 27 U. S. so enact, whether because the doctrine laid 2 Pet. 589 [7 L. ed. 530], opinion, Mr. Justice down in the case was inconvenient or because Washington. See also Dickins v. Beal, 53 U. repugnant to sound principles does not ap- S. 10 Pet. 573 [9 L. ed. 538]; Rhode Island v. pear. Mass. 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 719 [9 L. ed. 1258]; Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 132 [23 L. ed. 649].

Justice Folkes, in his interesting opinion, quotes also from the opinion of the Lord Chancellor in Brook v. Brook, supra, the following observation relative to Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157: "It is entitled to but little weight, and is based upon decisions which relate to the form and ceremony of marriage. If a marriage is absolutely prohibited in any country as being contrary to public policy, and leading to social evils, I thing that the domiciled inhabitants in that country cannot be permitted, by passing the frontier, and entering another State in which the marriage is not prohibited, to celebrate a marriage forbidden int heir own State, and, immediately returning to their own State, to insist on their marriage being recognized as lawful."

We may add, with reference to the law and the policy of Georgia, that whatever may be the difference between courts or countries in the opinion held and enforced upon this vital topic, this State, by its Declaratory Statute, has distinctly withdrawn its jurisprudence from the domain of the debate. The Statute is the rule as to persons domiciled in Georgia. "All marriages solemnized in another State by parties intending at the time to reside in this State shall have the same legal consequences and effect as if solemnized in this State. Parties residing in this State cannot evade any of the provisions of its laws as to marriage by going into another State for the solemnization of the marriage ceremony."

This authoritative and precise announcement of state policy is made in the exercise of its

And the 14th Amendment to the Constitution does not limit the power of the State to protect its citizens. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 [32 L. ed. 585].

The court will not discuss the argument of defendant's counsel to the effect that the intermarriages of whites and blacks do not constitute an evil or an injury against which the State should protect itself. This is a question which has been, as we have seen, the subject of repeated judicial deliverance, but it is more properly in the opinion of this court within the domain of legislative debate.

It is enough, for the purpose of its duty, for the court to ascertain that by a legitimate and settled policy the State of Georgia has declared such marriages unlawful and void; for, while in this country, where the home life of the people, their decency and their morality are the basis of that vast social structure of liberty and obedience to law which excites the patriotic pride of our countrymen and the admiration of the world, and while these attributes of our citizenship should be cherished and protected by all in authority, and the creatures who defy them should be condemned by all, the courts in their judicial functions are rarely concerned with the policy of the laws which are made to protect the community. The policy of the State upon this subject has been declared, as we have seen by its supreme court as well as by its statutes; and it is enough to say that this court is unable to discover anything in that policy with which the federal courts have the right or the

power to interfere. To discuss the topic further might give immediate pain to many who are holly irresponsible for a condition which would make them sensitive to its hearing or knowledge.

It may not be improper to state that the evils comprehended in this general topic are decreasing. This the observation and testimony of Superintendents of public instruction who have the opportunity to observe large numbers of colored children, prove to be true. Upon every possible consideration this must be deemed an important, indeed an absolutely neces sary, step toward the amelioration of their condition and the permanent advancement of the

race; and to disregard the praiseworthy purposes and efforts of the colored people themselves, whether by nullifying the laws made to prevent miscegenation or by ignoring the vicious practices of the licentious, would be as cruel to that race as it would be injurious to society, destructive to social order and ruinous to the future of a large portion of the country, a future with which the prosperity of the whole country is indissolubly connected.

The questions presented are decided adversely to the defendants, and the indictments must be remanded to the state court whence they were removed.

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.

John LAWTON, Libelant to Limit Liability as Owner of The Steamboat "Katie,"

v.

H. M. COMER et al.

"THE KATIE.”

(40 Fed. Rep. 480.)

The Act of June 19, 1886, extending the benefits of limited liability legislation to vessels engaged in inland navigation, having been assailed for alleged unconstitution*Head notes by SPEER, J.

NOTE.-Congress may regulate liability of shipowners.

It is within the power of Congress to regulate the liability of owners of vessels so far as applicable to marine torts, and it is not necessary to aver in the petition, or to prove, that the claims against the vessel are in excess of her value. The Garden City, 26 Fed. Rep. 766; Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 589 (27 L. ed. 1042); Headrick v. Virginia & T. A. L. R. Co. 48 Ga. 545..

Limited Liability Act of Congress construed. Under the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1851, if the loss is caused by the owner's "design or neglect," his common-law liability remains intact, and he is liable for the whole loss. Walker v. Western Transp. Co. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 153 (18 L. ed. 174).

The purpose of the Act was to limit the liability of the vessel owner, and it applies to any damage irrespective of locality of the thing injured, if there be "no fault or privity" on the part of the owner. Re Vessel Owners' Towing Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 169; Re Goodrich Transp. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 713.

To render them liable there must be "privity or knowledge," some personal concurrence, or some fault or neglect on their part or in which they personally participate. Walker v. Western Transp. Co. supra; Hill Mfg. Co. v. Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 113 Mass. 499; Moore v. Am. Transp. Co. 65 U. S. 24 How. 1 (16 L. ed. 674).

The word "privity" (of the owner) means some fault or neglect in which the owner of the vessel personally participates; and “knowledge," as used, means some personal cognizance, or means of knowledge of which he is bound to avail himself, of a contemplated loss, or of a condition of things likely to produce or to contribute to a loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it. Lord v. Goodall, N. & P. Steamship Co. 4 Sawy. 292.

ality,--Held, that the Act is valid, in view of the power of Congress to regulate commerce:

(a) Because the law, amended,excepted from its operation inland navigation only, and not internal commerce, as insisted.

(b) The amendment extended the operation of the law, not to internal commerce, but to inland navigation. So much for the direct purpose of the Act.

(c) If internal commerce is affected, it is incidentally merely. The purpose of the Legislature being legitimate, and warranted by the Constitution, it is wholly immaterial to the consideration of the validity of its action that somewhere it has a casual or contingent effect upon the domain of state legislation.

The "privity or knowledge" of the officers of a corporation is "privity or knowledge" of the cor poration. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U. S. 21 How. 202 (16 L. ed. 73); Hill Mfg. Co. v. Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 113 Mass. 500.

The "knowledge and privity" of the wreckingmaster of an insurance company is not the knowledge and privity of the corporation so far as to charge it with responsibility for his negligence beyond the value of the vessel. Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798.

The Limited Liability Act, Rev. Stat. 88 4282-4289, leaves ship owners liable without limit for their own negligence, and liable to the extent of the ship and freight for the negligence or misconduct of the master and crew. Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 440 (32 L. ed. 788, 791).

It was not intended to exonerate them beyond the value of the ship and freight, for losses from causes for which they were previously liable, including mere negligence of employés. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall 121 (20 L. ed. 591); Allen v. Mackay, 1 Sprague, 219; Place v. The City of Norwich, 1 Ben. 89; Lord v. Goodall, N. & P. Steamship Co. 4 Sawy. 300,

Neither the provision of 16 Stat. at L. 440, for the better protection of the lives of passengers on board steam vessels (Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 126), nor the jurisdiction over marine contracts and torts saved to the state courts by the Judiciary Act, are limited or affected by Stat. March 3, 1851, unless proceedings are taken under the latter Act by a party to limit his liability. Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236.

This Act applies to owners of foreign as well as domestic shipping. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 (26 L. ed. 1001); Re Leonard, 14 Fed. Rep. 53.

"In no case" applies to all cases of loss and dam.

(d) Even though the subjects of this extended limitation of liability, or the territory in which it is effective, are partially within the region of state control, yet, where the subjects are separable, and are partly under the national control, the Act will be sustained by the courts wherever the power of Congress extends,

and as to all those objects to which it attaches;

and this rule is easily applicable in this case.

(e) As to the Savannah River, it is a pub

lic navigable stream. The voyages of The Katie and her cargo are interstate in character, and the jurisdiction of Congress is undoubted.

(f) The Act is warranted also by the admiralty clause of the Constitution, and the power of Congress to modify by statute the application of admiralty doctrines.

(g) The entire purpose of the limited liability enactments was to encourage investments in shipping, and they may be extended wherever the admiralty courts of the United States have jurisdiction.

(November 12, 1889.)

IBEL in admiralty by the owner of the his

losses to her cargo occasioned by fire. On demurrer and motion to dismiss libel. Overruled, The case is fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. Denmark & Adams, for respondents, in support of the demurrer:

The commerce clause of the Constitution not only does not authorize, but it prohibits, legislation by Congress that will affect internal commerce, traffic between citizens of the same State. This clause was intended to place such commerce beyond its control.

age happening during the entire voyage. The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 491 (30 L. ed. 134, 143).

The Statute of June 26, 1884, contains the proviso "that this provision shall not affect the liability of any owner, incurred previous to the passage of this Act, nor prevent any claimant from joining all the owners in one action; nor shall the same apply to wages due to persons employed by said ship owners."

Failure to adopt the provisions of section 4285 does not deprive ship owners of the benefits of Rev. Stat. § 4234. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 (26 L. ed. 1001).

Loss by fire.

Owners are exempted by the Act from liability for loss by fire from negligence of their officers and agents, in which the owners did not participate (Re Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 6 Ben. 124; Walker v. Western Transp. Co. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 150 (18 L. ed. 172); Moore v. Am. Transp. Co. 65 U. S. 24 How. 1 (16 L. ed. 674); Keene v. The Whistler, 2 Sawy. 348; Rev. Stat. 38 4282, 4287); and though the vessel be in a wrecked condition, incapable of self propulsion or of carrying a cargo. Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798.

The protection of this Statute may be invoked notwithstanding the fact that the thing injured is situated on land, if the damage in question be occasioned by the vessel without fault or privity on the part of her owner. Re Vessel Owners' Towing Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 172.

But in Goodrich Transp. Co. v. Gagnon, 36 Fed. Rep. 123, it was held that the words "for any act, matter or thing, loss, damage or forfeiture done, occasioned or incurred," refer only to such acts, things, losses and damages as to which relief can be had in a court of admiralty, and do not include liability for the destruction of buildings and goods

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 194 (6 L. ed. 23); Moore v. Am. Transp. Co. 65 U. S. 24 How. 37 (16 L. ed. 680); The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 564 (19 L. ed. 1001); TradeMark Cases, 100 U. S. 95 (25 L. ed. 552); Lord v. Goodall Steamship Co. 102 U. S. 543 (26 L. ed. 225); Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co. 123 U. S. 295 (31 L. ed. 151).

We fully recognize the familar principle that a law may be constitutional in part and bad in part. But the courts never change, limit or restrict the natural and obvious meaning of words so as to amend the Statute into harmony with the fundamental law.

United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 220 (23 L. ed. 565); Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 304 (29 L. ed. 197); Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90 (30 L. ed. 115); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80 (26 L. ed. 318); Lord v. Goodall Steamship Co. 102 U. S. 543 (26 L. ed. 225).

The cases which sustain the principle that "a legislative Act may be entirely valid as to some classes of cases, and clearly void as to the law has been applied has been covered by unobjectionable and separable words or clauses. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.. S. 123 (26 L. ed. 103).

Unlike the Legislature of a State, Congress has only those powers conferred.

Dwarris, Stat. Const. pp. 367, 368; Martin v. Hunter, 14 U. S. 1 Wheat. 326 (4 L. ed. 37); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 93 (25 L. ed. 551); Cooley, Const. Lim. 10, 11.

The law under review undertakes to regulate

on the land occasioned by fire which has been communicated by a vessel.

The language of this Act limits its operation tofire happening to or on board a vessel, and not to a fire happening on the wharf. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. The Tangier, 6 Am. L. Reg. 504, 11 Law Rep. N. S. 6; The Egypt, 25 Fed. Rep. 323.

Damage caused by collision.

Ship owners are entitled to a limitation of liability where damage is caused to other vessels and their cargo by collision. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 104 (20 L. ed. 585); Wright v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 8 Blatchf. 14, 1 Ben. 156.

In a case of loss by collision the limitation of the owner's liability under the Act is as applicable when the proceeding is in rem, as when it is in personam; if his liability is only the amount of the vessel's value when at the bottom of the sound, his liability after it is raised and repaired is no greater. Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 118 U. S. 468 (30 L. ed. 134).

Where two vessels, both in fault, collide, and one of the vessels is lost, such sum as the surviving vessel is bound to pay to the owners of the sunken vessel must also be applied to the payment of the damages sustained by the owners of the cargo on board said sunken vessel. Duncan v. The C. H. Foster, 1 Fed. Rep. 733; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, supra.

For the mode of applying a limitation of liability where both vessels are in fault and the damages are divided, see The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97 (30 L. ed. 1095).

For the method of offsetting damages, see The Bristol, 29 Fed. Rep. 867.

Where two vessels collided and both were injured, and the vessel in fault subsequently on the

in a material way the rights of the parties who | cases arise must at least be "navigable waters of patronize the vessel-their traffic on the vessel. the United States," the meaning of which desBut as the Act applies and was intended to ap- ignation has already been noticed. ply to the owners of all vessels without exception-whether the vessels were licensed and enrolled or not-including canal-boats and barges, the decisions will show that as a regulation of vessels the Act is unconstitutional.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 197 (6 L. ed. 23); Passenger Cases, 48 U. S. 7 How. 400 (12 L. ed. 702); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U. S. 22 How. 243 (16 L. ed. 247); The Bright Star, 1 Woolworth, 266; The Thomas Swan, 6 Ben. 42; The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 564 (19 L. ed. 1001); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 713 (18 L. ed. 96).

There is an important limitation of the power of Congress over navigation, and that is, it must be navigation on navigable waters of the United States, and which concerns, in some way, interstate or foreign commerce.

Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 682 (27 L. ed. 444); The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 (19 L. ed. 999); Miller v. New York City, 109 U. S. 393 (27 L. ed. 973); Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 631 (27 L. ed. 1057); Hatch v. Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. 6 Fed. Rep. 329; Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. James, 20 Fed. Rep. 903; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co. 123 U. S. 295 (31 L. ed. 151).

If the power to regulate commerce were made in terms as broad as the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the courts, still the law under review cannot be sustained because it is inconsistent with the limitations of even such a jurisdictional principle. The waters in which the

The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443 (13 L. ed. 1058); Allen v. Newberry, 62 U. S. 21 How. 244 (16 L. ed. 110); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 569 (18 L. ed. 455); The Belfast, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 624 (19 L. ed. 266); The St. Lawrence, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 527 (17 L. ed. 183); Re Long Island N. S. P. & F. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 605, 607–618.

If the object of the 4th section of the Act of 1886 was not to regulate internal commerce as well as that carried on by sea-going vessels, to change the law which protected this commerce from the operation of the Act of Congress, then it had no object. If Congress has the power here attempted to be exercised, then the commerce clause is meaningless.

See The Lottawanna, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 558 (22 L. ed. 654); Providence & N. Y. Steamship. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 589 (27 L. ed. 1042); The War Eagle, 6 Biss. 366; The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. 819.

Messrs. Chisholm & Erwin for libelant, contra.

Speer, J., delivered the following opinion: This is a libel brought under the provisions of section 4 of the Act of Congress of June 19, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 80). Its purpose is to limit the liability of the owner of the steamer Katie for losses to her cargo occasioned by fire. The libelant (the owner) alleges that he is not liable at all for the damage which occurred to the cargo, but, if liable, to limit the liability, he

the goods of the owner. Allen v. Mackay, 1 Sprague, 219.

same voyage was wrecked and sunk by negligence | mean the earnings of the vessel in transporting of the master, the liability of the owners was limited to her value after she had sunk. The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468 (30 L. ed. 134); The Great Western. 118 U. S. 520 (30 L. ed. 156); Thomassen v. Whitwell, 9 Ben. 403, 21 Blatchf. 45, 12 Fed. Rep. 891; Re Wright' 10 Ben. 14.

The value is to be ascertained by taking what she is found to be worth after she has been raised, and the expenses of raising her deducted; and the expense of raising and repairing her should not be added to the aforesaid value, nor is the insurance on said vessel to be accounted for by the owners. Re Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 8 Ben. 312; The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468 (30 L. ed. 134).

But in Walker v. Boston Ins. Co., 14 Gray, 288, 309, and Barnes v. Steamship Co., 6 Phila. 479, 25 Leg. Int. 196, it was held that the limitation of liability is to be ascertained by an estimation of the value of the ship at the point of time immediately preceding that when the wrong was done and injury inflicted.

The whole value of the vessel means her value at the close of the voyage, and where she is lost no one shall recover compensation for his whole loss. Re Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 6 Ben. 124; Thomassen v. Whitwell, supra: The Alpena, 10 Biss. 436, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; The City of Norwich, supra. If the vessel is lost the liability of the owner ceases (Wattson v. Marks, 2 Am. L. Reg. 157; contra, | Barnes v. Steamship Co. 6 Phila. 479, 25 Legal Int. 196) and "freight then pending" includes freight earned at the end of the voyage for cargo on board at the time of the collision. Sumner v. Caswell, 20 Fed. Rep. 249.

There can be no apportionment of freight. The Abbie C. Stubbs, 28 Fed. Rep. 719.

Where the same person owns both vessel and cargo, "freight then pending" is to be taken to

Where one of the owners of a vessel commands and sails on shares and exclusively manages the vessel and hires the crew, whereby he in effect becomes charterer thereof, he is responsible for her tortious acts. As to whether the owners also are responsible,--quare. Thorp v. Hammond, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 408 (20 L. ed. 419); Somes v. White, 65 Me. 542.

Freight is only one of the items to be taken into estimation in ascertaining the extent of the liability of the party who is already responsible. Walker v. Boston Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 288.

A claim for unearned freight paid in advance is not within the class of claims protected by the Act. Re Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. 3 Fed. Rep. 168.

The court is not bound to allow interest on the value of the vessel. The Scotland, 118 U. S. 508 (30 L. ed. 155).

Damages for personal injuries.

The limitation of liability extends to personal injuries sustained by passengers, as well as loss of life. The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. Rep. 460; Butler v. Boston & S. Steamship Co. 130 U. S. 527 (32 L. ed. 1017); The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112; The Alpena, 10 Biss. 436, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344; The Epsilon, & Ben. 378; Re Long Island, N. S. P. & F. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599.

Claims for personal injury caused by fire and explosion on board a steamboat prosecuting her voyage on the East River are claims within the Act. Re Long Island N. S. P. & F. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599.

Damages to the person or loss of baggage are not taken out of the operation of the Limited Liability Act by Rev. Stat., § 4493. Re Long Island N. S. P. & F. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599.

prays to be accorded the benefit of the Act referred to. The allegations of the libel are that the Katie was on her trip when the fire occurred. At that time, and for twenty years prior thereto, she had been engaged in transporting freight and passengers from and to the Ports of Savannah and Augusta, and intermediate landings on the Savannah River in the States of South Carolina and Georgia. She belonged to a line of carriers issuing through bills of lading to and from localities in Georgia, and to and from ports and places in the other States of the Union, and to and from foreign ports. The libel contains the usual averments that the damage was done without the privity or knowledge of the owner. It is admitted in the pleadings that a large portion of the cargo was laden at different points on the Georgia side of the river, and was consigned to merchants in Savannah, and that other portions, consigned in like manner, were received from the South Carolina landings.

The various owners of the cargo, as respondents, have interposed a demurrer and motion to dismiss the libel, upon the ground that the fourth section of the Act of Congress of June 19, 1886, is, as they insist, unconstitutional and void; and since the owners of vessels used in rivers or inland navigation were expressly excluded from the right to limit their liability under previous Acts of Congress (§§ 4283-4289, Rev. Stat.) it follows, they contend, that no relief can be granted under the allegations and prayers of the libel. The gist of the contention of proctors for respondents may be stated as follows: (1) They insist that section 4 of

The baggage of passengers is not merchandise, for the loss of which by fire ship owners are exempt. The Marine City, 6 Fed. Rep. 413; contra, Chamberlain v. Western Transp. Co. 44 N. Y. 305.

Surrender and transfer of ship and freight. The privilege of exonerating himself from his individual liability, and of causing all legal proceedings against himself to cease by the surrender and transfer of the ship and freight, is not given to a party who is responsible for damages resulting from collision, but he is strictly confined to cases of loss in consequence of embezzlement or destruction by the master, mariners or passengers on board ship. Walker v. Boston Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 288.

Insurance is not such "an interest in such vessel and freight" as the ship owners are bound to surrender for the benefit of claimants. The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. Rep. 460.

Where property is sold, the insurance does not follow it, but ceases to have any value, unless the insurer consent to the transfer of the policy to the grantee of the property. In other words the contract of insurance does not attach itself to the thing insured, nor go with it when it is transferred. 2 Marshall, Ins. 801; Sadlers Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554; Carroll v. Boston M. Ins. Co. 8 Mass. 515; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 507, 512 (9 L. ed. 512, 514); Carpenter v. Providence W. Ins. Co. 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 495, 503 (10 L. ed. 1044, 1048); Ætna F. Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 386, 397; Wilson v. Hill, 3 Met. 68; Bowles v. Innes, 11 Mees. & W. 13; McDonald v. Black, 20 Ohio, 185; Plimpton v. Farmers Mut. F. Ins. Co. 43 Vt. 497; Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 118 U. s. 495 (30 L. ed. 144).

Apportionment of fund paid into court.

The provisions of the Act authorizing the apportionment of the sum for which the owner is liable

the Act of June 19, 1886, extending the right to liinit liability to the owners of "all vessels used on lakes or rivers, or in inland navigation, including canal-boats, barges and lighters," was intended to affect, and ex vi termini does affect, vessels used in the purely internal commerce of a State; that this purpose of the Act is expressed in unequivocal words. (2) Even though it be conceded, they urge, that Congress might have provided a measure of relief for owners of a vessel whose interstate traffic relations were identical or similar to those of the Katie, without encroaching upon the domain of internal commerce, the court, they insist, may not restrict the application of this Act so as to give it partial effect simply because the facts here are appropriate to national control, the Statute itself, in plain and unambiguous terms, exceeding, they contend, the limitations of the commerce clause of the Constitution. This clause, they maintain, so far from authorizing, actually prohibits, legislation by Congress which will affect the internal commerce between citizens of the same State, and since the terms of the Act in question comprehend alike constitutional and unconstitutional topics, the entire section of the amended Statute must, they argue, be held inoperative and void,-citing U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. Š. 220 [23 L. ed. 565]; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 [25 L. ed. 550]; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. `S. 304 [29 L. ed. 197]; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 647 [32 L. ed. 314]; Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90 [30 L. ed. 115]; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80 [26 L. ed. 318]; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U. S. 12 Wall.

| have reference solely to losses occasioned otherwise than by fire, happening without "the knowledge or privity of the owner." Knowlton v. Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 53 N. Y. 76; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 104 (20 L. ed. 585); Walker v. Boston Ins. Co. 14 Gray, 288.

If the amount paid into court is insufficient to pay all the damages caused, it will be apportioned pro rata amongst the parties claiming damages in proportion to their respective losses. Norwich & N. Y Transp. Co. v. Wright, supra.

The amount recovered, whether before the limitation proceedings or after, and whether in the court of first instance or an appellate court, will stand as the basis for pro rata division when the condemned fund is distributed. The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239 (26 L. ed. 351).

The casualties or losses of different voyages cannot be aggregated or grouped together, and all losers be cited in to share what has been saved from shipwreck or other disasters, together with the pending freight, and have a decree entered exonerating the owners from personal liability. The Alpena, 8 Fed. Rep. 283; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright and Walker v. Boston Ins. Co. supra.

What owners entitled to benefit of Act.

All owners of vessels are not entitled to the privileges of the Act, but only such as fall within the description named therein, to wit, those who had no privity or knowledge of the damage incurred. The Maria and Elizabeth, 11 Fed. Rep. 520.

A vessel must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to entitle her owners to claim a limited liability. Re Vessel Owners Towing Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 169.

A tug engaged in towing into the waters of other States vessels engaged in interstate commerce is as much engaged in such commerce as the vessels

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