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York Special Term denying a motion to re- | American Opera Company, Limited, a domesvive against such executors an action to entic corporation formed under cbapter 611 of the force the liability of said Wiechers, as a stock-Laws of 1875, for the incorporation of business bolder of the defendant corporation, for cor. corporations with limited liability. The capiporate debts. Affirmed.

tal stock of the company was fixed at $500,000, The facts are sutficiently stated in the opin. only $148.000 of wbich was

ever paid in, and lon.

Do certificate that tbe capital stock bad been Mr. Henry Schmitt, with Messrs. Ab-paid in bas ever been made or recorded, as prebett & Fuller, for appellants:

scribed by the Statute under wbicb the comWiechers' only liability is under $ 37, chap. papy was incorporated. The plaintiffs' action 611, Laws 1875, and an action to enforce it is is in the nature of a creditors' suit to settle the a penal action and does not survive.

affairs of the American Opera Company, LimAn action against the trustces of a corporalited, and to distribute its assets, as well as the tion for failure to file a report, as required by proceeds of the stockholders' individual liabilthe Statute, is penal in ils character and does ity, among the company's creditors. Pfuhl v. not survive against the executors of a deceasca Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137. trustee.

The complaint alleges the incorporation of California Bank v. Collins, 5 Fun, 209: the company; the amount of its capital stock; Easterly v. Barber, 65 N. Y. 252; Reynolds v. the amount paid in, as above stated; and the Mason, 54 How. Pr. 213, allirmed, 6 N. Y. fact that do certificate of the company bad Week. Dig. 531; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. Been made or filed as required by the Siatute. 823.

Numerous persons have been joined as defendIn cases where an action does not survive ants with the opera company, as to whom it is by express statute the survivorsbip of actions alleged that they are either creditors or stock. is contined to actions ex contractu, express or holders of the company, and among these Wilimplied.

liam A. Wiechers was named as a defendant ag People v. Starkideather, 8 Jones & S. 460. to whom it was claimed that he was a suck

So far as the executors of a deceased stock bolder bolling twenty-five shares of the stock bolder who had paid in the full amount of his of the company. It is also alleged in the comsubscription are concerned, the action in any plaint that several of the parties defendant who event is in the nature of a penalty, and does were stockbolders were indebted to the comnot survive.

pany for their stock. This allegation is genIrvine v. McReor, 23 Cal. 472; Erickson v. eral, and the particular persons claimed to be Nesmith, 4 Allen, 233; Halsey v. McLenin, 12 so indebted are not named. Wiechers was Allen, 442; Andrews v. Callender, 13 Pick. served with the complaint, and appeared and 490; Ripley v Sampson, 10 Pick. 372; Dane v. answered. On or about December 14, 1889, he Dane Mfg.Co. 14 Gray, 488; Woonruff & B. died, leaving a last will and testament wherein Iron Work8 v. Chittenden, 4 Bosw. 406; Vin he appointed executors. The will bas been adcent v. Sunds, 42 How. Pr. 235; Gregory v. mitted to probate by the surrogate of New German Bank, 3 Colo. 332; Victory Webb Print-York County, and letters testamentary issued ing & F. Mach. Mfg.Co. v. Beecher, 26 Hun, 52. to the executors, who bave qualified and taken

Mr. Henry D. Hotchkiss,' for respon upon themselves the execution of the will. dents:

After the death of Wiecbers the plaintiffs apThe individual liability of the stockholder is plied to the special term to revive and continue an essential element in the contract by wbich ihe action against the executors, and the special the stockholders become members of the cor. term denied the motion, upon the ground that poration. The liability arises from the fact the cause of action stated in the complaint ibal the individual is a member of the body against the deceased was of a penal character, corporale, and as such is responsible for the and did not survive. Upon appeal to the geperal debt.

term from this order, it was reversed, and the Chase v. Lord, 77 N. Y. 33; Corning v. Mc- court directed that the action be revived and Cullough, 1 N. Y. 47; Story v. Furman, 25 N. continued agninst the executors of Wiechers, Y. 214; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119; Wiles and that the plaintiffs Lave leave to serve a 7. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173.

supplemental summons and complaint on the Everyone who becomes a member of the executors. From the order of reversal the ex. company by subscribing to its stock assumes ecutors have appealed to this court. this liability, wbich continues until the capital The cause of action stated in the complaint stock is all paid up and a certificate of that fact gainst the stockholders is twofold: first, it is is made, published and recorded. The fact alleged tbat many of them are indebted to the that the liability ceases when these events take company for their capital stock; and, second, place does not change its nature and make that that as the capital stock was never fully paid à penalty which would, witbout such limita in, and do certiticate thereof ever made or tiled, tion, be a liability founded on cuntract. tbe defendants who were stock bolders are lia

Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 871 (27 L, ed. 966). ble for its debts to the extent of their stock.

A cause ol action to enforce such liability The question is whether a liability of this cbarburvives the deatb of the stockbolder.

acter on the part of a stockholder to the credBailey v. Hollister, 28 N. Y. 112; Chase v. itors of a corporation survives. If the liability Lord, 77 N. Y. 1,6 Abb. N. C. 258; Richmond is penal in its nature, it is conceded that it does 7. Irons, 121 U. S. 27 (30 L. ed. 864).

not survive; while if the liability is in the pat

ure of a contract obligation it is conceded that O'Brien, J., delivered the opinion of the it does. court:

Tbe provision of the Statute of 1875 (chap The plaintiffs are judgment creditors of the 1 611, 8 37), upon which this action is based, so

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far as the stockholders are concerned, is as fol- holder in any corporation dies, bis estate suclows: "Io limited-liability companies all the cecds him in the iitle to, and the rigbis in, the stockholders shall be severally individually li- stock be held. Of necessity, it must take that able to the creditors of 'the company in which title and those rigbis subject to any liability they are stockholders to an amount equal to then existing upon them; and so long as the the amount of stock beld by tbem, respectively, estate is, by operation of law, the bolder of for all debts and contracts made by such com such stock, the estate must become responsible papy, until the whole amount of capital stock for any obligations accruing duriog that time, fixed and limited by such company has been wbich the law may impose upon any bolder of paid in, and a certificate thereof bas been made the stock, as such. Such liability proceeds, and recorded as bereinafter prescribed." not from any new contract, made by or on be

We think the liability created by this Statute half of the estate, but is inherent in ibe propersurvived tbe death of the stock bolder, and con- ty itself;. . . or, calling it a 'contract liability,' tinues against the executors. It is not like the it arises out of a contract made by the stock. liability of a trustee for neglecting to make a bolder, and binding his personal representareport, or for declaring dividends out of capital lives as it bound bim, as long as the relation of stock, or acts of a kindred character. These stockholder existed." Tbe liability of the esare breaches of duty on the part of the manag. tate of ihe deceased stockholder under the ing agents of the corporation for wbich the Statule is so well established upon principle Statute has made them liable, and this liability and authority that further discussion is unneccannut be said 10 Test upon or grow out of a essary. Chase v. Lord, 77 N. Y. 1; Flash v. contract. The liability of a stock bolder in the Conn. 109 U. S. 371 (27 L. ed. 966); Richmond prestul case is different. Upon becoming the v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27 [30 L. ed. 864). owner of the stock, he voluntarily assumes The order of the Special Term denying the the obligations imposed by the Statute, and the motion to revive and continue the action against creditors of ibe corporation who trust it may the executors was properly reversed by the be said to do so upon the faith of the Statute, General Term, and its order of reversal should be which is part of the contract. The statutory affirmed, with costs. obligation is ioberent in and forms a part of All concur. every contract that the corporation makes with creditors prior to the time that the certificate required by the Statute is filed.

Byron J. STROUGH, Appt., in Loury v. luman, 46 N. Y. 119, Allen, J., stated the principle (pages 125, 126) as follows: George WILDER, Impleaded, etc., Respt. "A persoual liability of stockbolders for the debts of a corporation, in virtue of the charter,

(......N. Y.......) is not in the valure of a penalty or forfeilure, and does not exist solely as a liability imposed 1. The possession of a deed by the by statule. It is not enforced simply as a stat

grantee is prima facie evidence of delivery utory obligation, but is regarded as voluntarily where there is nothing to impeach the bona fides assumed by the acı of becoming a stockholder. of his possession. By such act he assents to be bound, or tbat bis 2. The grantee of the heirs of one who property shall be charged with debts of the

has made an unacknowledged deed is corporation, to the extent and in the manner not a "purchaser" within 1 Rev. Stat., p.738, 8 137. prescribed by the Act of Incorporation." declaring that an unacknowledged and unattest

Io Wiles v. Suyuam, 64 N. Y, 173, it was ed deed "sball not take effect as against a pur. sought to hold the defendant as a stockholder chaser or incumbrancer until so acknowledged." in a manutacturing company on bis liability under g 10 of the Act of 1848, chap. 40,-a sec

(March 11, 1890.) tion wbich, in substance, is almost identical with the ove now under consideration; and also as a trustee on bis liability for all the debts, be- APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of

the General Term of the Supreme Court, cause of a failure to tile a report. A demurrer Fourth Department, affirming a judgment enon the ground of the improper joinder of causes tered in Jefferson County upon the report of a of action was sustained. The court, distin. referee dismissing tbe complaint in an action guishing between the two kinds of liability, brought to secure the partition of certain real said (Church, Ch. J.): "The cause of action

estate. Affirmed. against tbe defendant as a stuck bolder consists

Plaintiff claimed to have acquired from the of the debt, and the liability created by statute beirs at-law of Susandub Wilder, deceased, the against suckbolders when the stock bas pot title to a portion of the real estate of wbich she been paid in, and a certificate of ibat fact re- died seised, sbe baving died intestate. He corded. The first cause of action against brought this action to procure the partition of the defendant as a stockholder is an action on sucboreal estate among those entitled to the contract. The sixyears' Statute of Limita several portions thereof. George Wilder filed tions applies. The defendant is entitled 10 contribution."

a separate answer to the complaint denying

that plaintiff bad any interest in the property, The liability of Wiechers, therefore, being in and denying that Susannab Wilder died seised the nature of a contract obligation, it survived of the portion thereof claimed by plaintiff, but bis death, and the action can be continued against bis personal representatives.

NOTE.-Deed; delivery. See notes to Taylor v To Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 112, the court Street (Ga.) 5 L. R. A. 121; Stokes v. Andersou (Ind.) expressly recognized this principle. Gould, J., 4 L. R. A. 313; Standiford v. Stundiford (Mo.) 8 L. said: “It will be conceded that, when a stock. I A. 299.

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alleging that before her death she had conveyed! Andrews, J., delivered the opinion of the the premises to him, the said defendant, in court:

The finding of the referee that Susannab The case further appears in the opinion. Wilder executed and delivered to the defendMr. Wayland F. Ford, for appellant: ant the deed of June 20, 1855, is supported by

If not duly acknowledged previous to its de evidence and has been confirmed by the genlivery, the execution and delivery of a deed eral term. The execution of the deed by the must be attested by at least one witness; or if grantor was proved by two witnesses wbo were not so attested, it shall not take effect as against present at the time, and no attempt was made a purchaser or incumbrancer until so acknowl on the trial to show that the signature to the edged.

deed was not genuine. The fact of delivery 3 Rev. Stat. 7th ed. p. 2194; Chamberlain v. was not directly proved hy an eye witness. But Spragur, 86 N. Y. 605, 22 Ilun, 437; Roggen v. the defendant produced the deed, and the posĀvery, 63 Barb. 65, affirmed, 65 N. Y. 592. session of a deed by the graplee is prima facie

There is no presumption of delivery in the evidence of delivery, wbere ibere is nothing to case of instruments not acknowledged or at, impeach the bona fides of bis possession. The tested as required by statute.

olber circumstances proved on the part of the Genter v. Morrison, 31 Barb. 158; Elsey v. defendant confirm the presumption of delivery Metcalf, 1 Denio, 323.

arising from possession of the deed. It was The term "purchaser” includes a purchaser shown that it was drawn by a scrivener, purfrom an assignee, heir or anyone in privity suant to the directions of the grantor. The witb the grantor.

sister of the defendant testified to declarations 4 Rev. Stat. 8th ed. p. 2469.

of her mother, the granior, to the effect that The Statute is made to protect the grantor she intended that the son should bave tbe lot in (Chamberlain v. Spragur, 85 N. Y. 608); and question. She also testified that from the time the heirs need the protection as effectually as of the execution of the deed until the mother's the grantor.

death, several years thereafter, the deed was in The evidence will not warrant the finding of the custody of the defendant and was kept by any delivery of the instrument by Susannab bim in a box with his other papers. Wilder to George Wilder. A deed does not The defendant's wife was permitted, without become operative until it is delivered with the objection, to testify 10 the same fact. The deintent that it shall become effective as a con- fendant rented the house, paid taxes and made veyance.

repairs on the premises, and during his mother's Ford v. James, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 159; Best life, after the deed bad been executed, exercised v. Browon, 25 Hun, 224; Brachett v. Barney, 28 such control of the property as usually attends N. Y. 340; Knolls v. Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474; ownership. Stewart v. Steuurt, 50 Wis. 445; Genter v. If the evidence on the part of the plaintiff Morrison, 81 Barb. 158: Elsey V. Metcalf, 1 can be regarded as casting any doubt upon the Denio, 323; Wilscy v. Dennis, 44 Barb. 354; point whether there was an absolute delivery Hilberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547: Jackson v. Rob of the deed, with intent 10 pass the title to the erts. 1 Wend. 478; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. property, we are concluded by the finding in 28; Stillwell v. Hubbard, 20 Wend. 47; Graves frvor of the defendant. The plaintiff claims v. Dudley, 20 N. Y. 76.

title to an undivided part of the premises in Mr. Watson M. Rogers, for respondent: question under deeds from some of the heirs of

The deed, though unacknowledged, was good Susannab Wilder, wbo died intestate July 15, and effectual to pass ille as between the parties 1868, executed after ber death. The deed from

Susannah Wilder to tbe defendant was neither Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509-514.

acknowledged by her nor was its execution atThe deed being good as against he grantor, tested by a subscribing witness. The plaintiff her beir took nothing, and had nothing to con- insists that for this reason the deed was void as vey.

to the plaintiff under the Statute (1 Rev. Stat. Possession by the grantee under the grantor's 738, § 137), which declares that an unacknowlimperfect deed is adverse to the grantor. edged and unattested deed "shall not take ef.

La Fromtois v. Jackson, 8 Cow.589; Briggs fect as against a purchaser or incumbuncer v. Prosser, 14 Wend. 227; Noopes v. Auburn until so acknowledged." Water - Works Co. 37 Hun, 568-573; Abrams v. The conclusive answer to this claim is that Rhoner, 44 Hun, 507–510; Sands v. Hughes, 53 the plaintiff is not a purchaser within the meanN. Y. 287–296; R«formed Church v. Schoolcraft, ing of the Statute. The word purchaser" in 65 N.Y. 134-144; Brudstreet v. Clark, 12 Wend. this Statute means one wbo derives title by pur603-675; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Jobps. 355-362. cbase from the grantor in the unacknowledged

Every grant of land shall be absolutely void, and unattested deed, or from one wbo, himself, If at the time of the delivery thereof such lands is mediately or immediately a purchaser from shall be in the actual possession of a person such graptor. The word "purchase,” as desig. claiming under a title adverse to that of the pating the origin and nature of title to real graptor.

property, bas a technical but well settled mean4 Rev. Stat. 8th ed. p. 2453; Jackson v. Nero-ing. Ii includes every mode of acquisition of ton and Reformed Church v. Schoolcraft, supra; an estate in land known to the law, except that Hilton v. Bender, 4 Thomp. & C. 270; La From- by which an heir on the death of bis ancestor bois v. Jackson, supra; Clapp v. Bromagham, 9 becomes substituted in his place as owner by Cow. 530; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. operation of law. Burrill, Dict. title Purchase. Ch. 739; Sands v. Hughes, supra; Munro v. The beir wbo takes by descent is not a purMerchant, 28 N Y.9. Pearce v. Moore, 114 N. chaser in the eye of the law, and does not hold Y.256.

the estate descended by purchase. He may,

to it.


wben be bas come into the inberitance, origi- an order of the Yates County Court setting date a title by purchase, upon bis conveyance aside an execution levy upon certain property to another, but bis own litle is not such. The alleged 10 be exempt because purchased with St:tute uses the word "purchase" in its legal pension money. Rerersed.

It is well settled that the title under an The facts are fully stated in the opinion. unacknowledged and upattested deed duly de- Messrs. James Č. Smith and Arthur C. livered is good as between the parties. This is Smith for appellant. so both under the Statute and at common law. Mr. William T. Morris, for respondent: Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509; Dole v. Thurlow, The exemption of pensions from levy under 12 Met. 157.

an execution does not apply or extend to prop The grantor cannot reclaim the estate con- erty pot exempt from levy and sale, purchased veyed, in contravention of bis deed, por can with pension money. his heirs. Both are bound by it. The Statute Wyqunt v. Smith, 2 Lans. 185; Youmans v. does not aid the graptor's heirs, for the reason Boomhower, 3 Thomp. & C. 24. that they are not purchasers, and as to them the Statute bas no application.

Ruger, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of tho On the death of Susannab Wilder gbe was court: peither seised por had she any title to the laud In March, 1892, the Yates County National in question, and the heirs took po other estate Bank recovered a judgment in jusiice's court by descent than such as was vested in her at against Zeno T. Carpenter and others, for about her death. Their conveyance to the plaintiff | $111, and caused a iranscript thereof to be filed conveyed nothing, because tbey had no interest in the county clerk's office, July 17, 1884. In to convey. The defendant's deed, wbicb was June 1884, the United States government issued good as against Susannab Wilder, was good and delivered an invalid pension certiticate to also against her beirs or those claiming title Zeno T. Carpenter, as a soldier in the United from them.

States army, which was deposited by him in This disposes of the case. We think it un. the First National Bank of Yates County, for necessary to consider whether the exception collection, in July, 1884. In October, 1884, taken to the question put to the defendant, as Carpenter purcbased and took a conveyance of to the time during wbich be bad possession of a dwelling-bouse and lot in the Village of Penn the deed, was well taken. It would be dillicult Yan, his place of residence, from one Hurford, to sustaip ibe rulipg under our recent decision for $1,300, paying the sum of $700, cash, upon in Clift v. Most8, 112 N. Y. 426.

the purchase price and securing the balance by Excluding, bowever, the defendant's evi- a mortgage 10 tbe grantor upon said lot. The dence on this point, there is left tbe upcontra casb payment was made from moneys received dicted evidence of two unimpeached witnesses by bim fron the First National Bank, as part to the fact that the deed was in his possession of the collection of his pension certificale. Car. after its execution, during bis mother's life. penter was a married man, baving a wife and

We find no error in tbe record prejudicial to live infant children, and the house and lot were the plaintiff, and the judgment should be af purchased for the purpose of securing a home firmed.

for himself and family. Ile bad no otber All concur.

means, or property, liable for the payment of debts. In February, 1885, ibe Yates County

National Bank caused an execution upon such YATES COUNTY NATIONAL BANK, judgment to be issued and levied upon said Respt.,

bouse and lot, and advertised the interest of

said Carpenter therein for sale at public auction Zeno T. CARPENTER, Impleaded, etc.,

, , to satisfy said execution. Appt.

Upon proof of these facts Carpenter moved

the county courl for an order setting aside the (....N. Y.....)

said levy and enjoining the plaintiff from tak.

ing any proceedings to enforce said execution 1. Where the receipts from a pension by the sale of said real esiate, upon the ground can be directly traced to the purchase of that such property was exempt from levy and property necessary or convenient for the support sale upon execution. That court granted the and maintenance of the pensioner and his family, order asked for; but, upon al peal to the general such property is exempt from execution under term this order was reversed and sucb motion

Code Civ. Proc., $ 1303, which exempts a pension. was denied. The defendant, Carpenter, ap2. Where the proceeds of a pension peals to ibis court from the order of reversal.

have been embarked in trade, com- At the time of the levy, the only interest Carmerce or speculation, and become mingled with penter had in such real estate was an equity of other funds so as to be incapable of identification redemption, which we must assume, on the or separation, the pensioner loses the benefit of facts in this case, did not exceed in value the the statutory exemption.

sum paid for it, and it therefore represents, to

the extent of his interest, the proceeds of bis (March 18, 1890.)

pension. Was this interest liable to levy and


from an ord. r of the General Term of the is, and such is the judgment of the court Supreme Court, Fifth Department, reversing below. The question presented involves the

construction of s 1393 of the Code of Civil Note. - Exemption from execution of property Procedure, which, so far as ibe matter here conpurchased with pension money. See Holmes v. Tai- cerned is affected, reads as follows: “A penlada, 3 L. R. A. 219, and note, 125 Pa. 133.

sion heretofore, or bereafter, granted by the 7 L. R. A.

United States ... for military . . . services done. Did the Legislature intend to limit the

. . is also exempt from levy and sale by vir force of their exemption to a pension so long tue of an execution, and from seizure for pon. only as it remained an obligation of the governpayment of taxes, or in any other legal pro- ment,or consisted of cash in the hands of the penceeding.” That statutes of this character are sioner; or did they also intend to protect it after to be liberally construed, with the view of it had been expended in the purchase of articles promoting ibe objects of the legislation, is es. of property designed 10 administer to the comtablished by a uniform course of authority; fort and support of such pensioner and his famand ibat their force and effect are not to be ily. confined to the literal terms of the Act has also If the latter was not intended, we must asbeen held in numerous cases.

cribe to the law-makers the absurd intention of In Hudson v. Plets, 11 Paige, 180, it was beld granting pensions for tbe purpose of satisfying that a creditor's bill would not reach the right claims against pensioners, and not to provide of action of a judgment debtor for the conver- for the care and comfort of invalid or aged sion of exempt property.

soldiers. If the soldier is not proiected in the In Andrews v. Rouan, 28 How. Pr. 126, it act of exchanging bis pension for the necessawas beld that a receiver of the property of a ries of life, its only effect would be to enable debtor, appointed in supplementary proceed. his creditors to take it in satisfaction of their ings, did not take a claim or 3 julgment there- clains. No benefit is conferred if the protecop for damages accruing to such debtor from tion is not extended beyond the possession of one wbo bad wrongfully taken and sold his ex- the money itself, for its only value consists empt property op execution for debt.

in its purchasing power, and if the soluier is. justice Grover, writing the opinion of the deprived of that, the pension might as well, so supreme court in that case, says: "If the judg: far as he is concerned, have remained upgrantment rendered for the injury may be acquired ed. The plain purpose of the Act was to proby a judgment creditor, by proceeding supple- mote the comfort of tbe soldier; to secure to mental to execution, there would be poibing to bim ibe bounty of the government free from prevent seizing exempt property, selling it the claims of creditors, and to insure him and upon execution, and, when the debtor had sued bis family a safe, although modest, mainteand recovered a judgment therefor, compelling dance so long as their needs required it. In the the application of such judgment to the pay- case of an exemption of specitic ariicles from ment of the debt for which the property was levy and sale upon execution, it seems to be seized, thus entirely depriving the debior of well settled thai it extends not only to the prothe exemption, and enabling the creditor in this tection of such articles wbile in use or possesway to collect his debi from property that the sion, but also to any claim arising out of their law bas declared not liable for its payment." | conversion by a wrong-doer, or their destruc

The only case in this court bearing upon the tion by fire or otberwise, when insured. Free. Bubject is that of Tillotson v. Wolcott, 48 N. man, Executions, $ 235. Y. 188, where it was beld that the exemption The rule seems to be just and reasonable and of a team, provided for a householder, should within the spirit of the exemption In the case also apply to a judgment recovered by such of the exemption of money, or its equivalent, householder against one who had tortiously there bas been some controversy in the courts taked and converted it to bis own use. It was with reference to the extent to wbich the exsaid by the court that "the judgment when re- emption shall be carried In such case it is covered by the debtor for the wrongful inva- somewhat difficult to lay down a rule in precise sion of bis privilege of the exemption of bis terms by wbich it may be determined in all property from levy and sale, represents tbe cases what property is liable and what exempt property for the value of wbich it was recov. from levy and seizure upon legal process for ered." W bile the language of the Statute did the payment of debis, but we entertain no pot, in terms, cover a judgment, it was beld doubt that where the receipts from a persion that it came within its spirit and could not be can be directly traced to the purchase of proptaken by creditors. The opinion of Justice erty, necessary or convenieni for the support Grover in Andreuos v. Rorran, 28 How. Pr. 126, and mainienance of tbe pensioner and bis famis referred to and approved in the opinion of ily, such property is exempt under tbe provisJudge Leopard.

ions of this Statute. The General Exemption Laws of the State Where such moneys can be clearly identified provide for the protection of specific articles or and are used in the purchase of necessary arti. classes of property with a view of alleviating cles, or are loaned or invested for purposes of the condition of the poor by securing to them increase or safety, in such form as to secure the use or consumption of the property exempt- their available use for the benefit of the pen. ed; but tbe present law bas dep:ried from the sioner in time of need, we do not doubt but ordinary form of exemption and, wbile seeking that they come within the meauing of the Statto accomplish the same object, provides, in ute; but where they bave been embarked in terms, for the exemption of money or its equiv. trade, commerce or speculation, and become alent. It is quite obvious that such an exemp. mingled with other fun is so as to be incapable tion can produce no beneficial effect, unless it is of identitication or separation, we do not doubt extended beyond the letter of the Act, and but that the pensioner loses the benefit of tbegiven life and force according to its evident statutory exemption. These propositions, we spirit and meaning. Like other statutes, the think, are fully supported by the cases in this. section in question must be construed accor) and oiber States. See Freeman, Executions, ing to the meaning and intent of the law.mak- $ 235, title Proceeds of Eremnt Property. ers and so as to ellectuate their intention, so far In Burgett v. Fancher, 35 llun, 647, and as the language of the Act will permit it to be Stockwell V. Malone Bank, 36 Huo, 583, it was.

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