« AnteriorContinuar »
the vessels or the water routes were utilized. | Legislature to encroach upon the conceded This is plainly apparent from the language of rights of the States as to internal commerce. the proviso before the amendment was adopted: It may be, and is, no doubt, true that much of "This Act sball not apply to the owner or own this legislation does incidentally affect rights ers of any caval-boat, barge or lighter, or to growing out of internal commerce. That, any vessels of any description whatsoever, used however, is a necessary result, flowing from in rivers or inland navigation."
the variety and extent of the influence, exerted It should not be difficult to understand that by every Act of Congress of general operation, this is widely variant from the proposition of howsoever undoubted its constitutionality. An respondents. The excepting clause, if their illustration of this may be found in the laws construction bad been adopted, would probably relating to internal taxation. Who may say bave read: “This Act sball not apply to the these do not affect internal commerce? And yet owners of any vessel, etc., used in purely in the power of Congress is conceded. In ihe ternal commerce."
amplitude and variety of the occupations and Tbere is, or may be, a vast distinction in the enterprises of our countrymen many results lading or contracts of a vessel used in inland flow from congressional action, which, if denavigation, and one used for internal com- signed as a result of direct legislation, would merce. A vessel may be used for internal com- be held unwarranted. It is enough to say of merce and never traverse inland waters, or a law that its purpose, object and main remay ply the waters of a lake embosomed in sults are legitimate, and the law of limited rethe central territory of a State, and be wholly sponsibility has been often so adjudged. Norengaged in interstate commerce. Then it is wich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 poi irue that the law, before the Amendment, Wall. 109–128 [20 L. ed. 585-593). excepted from its operation the owners of ves- The Act of March 3, 1851, was entitled “An sels engaged in internal commerce, but simply Act to Limit the Liability of Ship Owners, and those whose vessels were used in rivers or in- for Other Purposes.” Its provisions applicaland navigation. Again, does the Amendment ble to the questions at bar, embodied in s 4283to the Limited Responsibility Law, assailed by 4289, Rev. Stat., are as follows: "The liability the respondents, apply to the owners of ves of the owner of any vessel for any embezzle. sels engaged in internal commerce?" In the ment, loss or destruction, by any person, of opinion of the court, very clearly not. It has any property, goods or merchandise shipped po syllable with reference to internal commerce. or put on board of such vessel; or for any loss, It “sball apply also to all vessels used on lakes damage or injury by collision, or for any act, or rivers, or in inland navigation, including matter or thing lost
, damage or forfeiture done, canal-boats, barges and lighters.” Congress, occasioved or incurred without the privity or in the Amendment as in the excepting clause of knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in the Act of 1851, supra, dealt entirely with no case exceed the amount or value of the inclasses of vessels navigating inland waters and terest of such owner in such vessel, and her lakes, and gave no attention to cargoes or ship- freight tben pending." S 4283, Rev. Stat: ping contracts. It did not deal with com- "The provisions of this title] [the seven premerce, but with shipping. As we have before ceding sections), relating to the limitation of seed, i here is no essential identity of topic in a tbe liability of the owners of vessels, shall not vessel and the character of the commerce in apply to tħe owners of any canal-boat, barge which it is engaged. By a parity of reasoning or lighter, or to any vessel of any description it follows that Congress has pot, by this exten- whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigasion of the limited-responsibility privilege, ex- tion." $ 4289, Rev. Stat. pressed the purpose to take control of internal The legislation upon this subject, next succommerce, nor, so far as it has been made to ceeding the Act of 1851, is found in the Act of appear, was it its purpose to do an unconstitu- June 26, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 53). This, it is tional thing. These conclusions seem to be important to observe, is entitled “An Act to clearly inferable from the plain and unambigu- Remove Certain Burdens on the American ous words of the clauses which constituted the Merchant Marine, and Encourage the Ameriold law and the remedial statute, wbich, as we can Foreign Carrying Trade, and for other will presently see, is but an encouragement to Purposes.' The eighteenth section of this important classes of shipping in which the Act'is as follows: "That the individual liawealth of the country is largely invested. But bility of a ship owner shall be limited to the if the language of the sections quoted was proportion of any or all debts and liabilities equivocal, there would even then be no diffi- ibat bis individual share of the vessel bears to cally in tracing to its constitutional source the the whole, and the aggregate liabilities of all current of this legislation, which has revived the owners of a vessel, on account of the same, ibe drooping but vital growth of the country's shall not exceed the value of such vessel and maritime interests. It is well to remember freight pending: provided, that this provision that it is an elementary principle of construc- shall not affect the liability of any owner in. tion, not only that the scope of a legislative en-curred previous to the passage of this Act, por actment may be moditied by the purpose prevent any claimant from joining all the expressed in the title, but that the intention of owners in one action, nor shall the same apply the Legislature is often gathered from a view to wages due to persons employed by said ship of the whole, and every part, of continuous owners." legislation on the same general topic. 1 Kent, We thus perceive that the title indicates Com. 461, 462. Upon consideration of the sev- what the body of the Act makes clear, viz., eral enactments on the subject of limiting re- that it was intended to encourage, and theresponsibility of the owners of shipping, it is not fore to foster, the American mercbant marine possible to discover any purpose of the national and the American foreign carrying trade. Its chief modification of the existing law was an the conclusion was reached that it was a navenlargement of the privileges of exemption. igable stream, and the court adds: “And by It will be readily observed that it was the con its junction with the lake it forms a continued sistent legislative purpose to broaden the priv- bigbway for commerce, both with other States ileges of the owners of American craft upon and with foreign countries, and is thus brought the bigh seas. The enactments, it seems. were under the direct control of Congress.” found advantageous also, as they were followed The court continues: “That power [i. e. very soon afterwards by the Act of June 19, the power to regulate commerce) authorizes all 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 79), which is entitled “An appropriate legislation for the protection or Act to Abolish Certain Fees for Official Serv- advancement of either interstate or foreign ices to American Vessels, and to Amend the commerce, and, for that purpose, such legislaLaws Relating to Shipping Commissioners, tion as will insure the convenient and safe nay. Seamen and Owners of Vessels, and for Other igation of all the navigable waters of the United Purposes.” The fourth section of this Act ex- States, whether that legislation consists in retends previous enactments relating to limita- quiring the removal of obstructions to their tions of liability to "all sea-going vessels,” and use, in prescribing the form and size of the here the respondents insist the National Legis- vessels employed upon them, or in subjecting lature exhausted its jurisdiction.
the vessels to inspection and license, in order But it was not deemed enougb to accord to insure their proper construction and equipthese privileges to sea-going vessels. A vast ment. "The power to regulate commerce,' and rapidly augmenting fleet of American this court said in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 shipping, embracing every type of vessel, from U. S. 3 Wall. 724 [18 L. ed. 99J 'comprebends the clumsy sailing craft of the last century to the control for thai purpose, and to the extent the latest achievements in naval architecture, necessary, of ail navigable waters of the United whose twin screws and triple expansiov engines States which are accessible from a State other drive them with incredible swiftness over the than those in which they lie. For this purpose teeming waters of the Great Lakes, were wisely they are the public property of the nation, and esteemed by Congress to merit the aid and en subject to all the requisite legislation of Concouragement of the legislation which bad been gress.' But it is contended that the steamer so effective with sea-going shipping. Nor was Daniel Ball was only engaged in the internal tbis all. It had been found that the vital ne- commerce of the State of Michigan, and was cessily for cheap transportation for the natural not, therefore, required to be inspected or and manufactured productions of the country, licensed, even if is be conceded that Grand ofien denied in greater or less measure by rail. River is a navigable water of the United States; way combinations, had been accomplished by and this brings us to the consideration of the a return to the slower but cheaper methods of second question presented. There is undoubt. water carriage. Rivers, canals and inland edly an internal commerce wbich is subject to Jakes, by themselves or their connections, in the control of the States. The power delegated many instances afford the most important chan to Congress is limited to commerce 'among nels for the ebbing, and flowing tide of inter- the several States,' with foreign nations and state and foreign commerce.
with the Indian tribes. This limitation necesIn the case of The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 sarily excludes from federal control all comWall. 557 [19 L. ed. 999], where the recovery merce not thus designated, and of course that of a penalty under the Act of Congress for commerce wbich is carried on entirely within failure to obtain a license to transport mer- the limits of a State, and does not extend to or chandise and passengers upon the bays, lakes, affect other States. In this case it is admitted rivers or other navigable waters of the United that the steamer was engaged in shipping and States was resisted upon the ground that the transporting down Grand River goods destined steamer navigating the Grand River, in the and marked for other States than Michigan, State of Michigan, was not engaged in inter- and in receiving and transporting up the river state commerce, and for this reason it was in goods brought within the State from without sisted Congress bad no control over her, the its limits; but inasmuch as her agency in the supreme court make very pertinent declara- transportation was entirely within the limits tions. They decided that the Grand River of the State, and she did not run in connection was a navigable stream. They hold that rivers with, or in continuation of, any line of vessels “are navigable in fact when they are used, or or railway leading to other States, it is conare susceptible of being used, in their ordinary tended that she was engaged entirely in domescondition, as high ways for commerce, over tic commerce. But this conclusion does not which trade and travel are, or may be, con- follow. So far as she was employed in transducted in the customary modes of trade and porting goods destined for other States, or travel on water, and they constitute navigable goods brought from without the limits of waters of the United States, within the mean Michigan, and destined to places within that ing of the Acts of Congress, in contradistinc-State, she was engaged in commerce between tion from the navigable waters of the States, the States; and, however limited that comwhen they form, in their ordinary condition, merce may have been, she was, so far as it by themselves, or by uniting with other wa went, subject to the legislation of Congress. ters, a continuous bighway, over wbich com- She was employed as an instrument of that merce is, or may be, carried on with other commerce; for, whenever a commodity has States or foreign countries, in the customary begun to move as an article of trade from one modes in wbich such commerce is conducted State to another, commerce in that commodity by water.” 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 563 (19 L. ed. between the States bas commenced. The la 1001].
that several different and independent agencie This test was applied to Grand River, and are employed in transporting the commoclity. 1889,
LAWTON V. COMER.
some acting entirely in one State, and some foreign country, and po opinion is intended to actiog through two or more States, does in no be intimated as to jurisdiction in such a case. respect affect the character of the transaction. The case was decided in January, 1884. ID To the extent in which each agency acts in December, 1870, in the case of The Montello, + that transportation, it is subject to the regula- a proceeding to recover a penalty under a stattion of Congress. It is said that, if the posi- ute operative upon the "bays, lakes, rivers or tion here asserted be sustaiped, there is no such other navigable waters of the United States," thing as the domestic trade of a State; tbat - Mr. Justice Field, for the court, declares that Congress may take the entire control of the the stream " can only be deemed a pavigable commerce of the country, and extend its regu. water of the United States when it forms by lations to the railroads within a State on which itself, or by its connection with other waters, grain or fruit is transported to a distant market. such a bighway.' “If, bowever," the learned We answer that the present case relates to justice continues, “ the river is not of itself a transportation on the navigable waters of the highway for commerce with other States or Luited States, and we are not called upon to foreign countries, or does not form such a highexpress an opinion upon the power of Congress way by its connection with other waters, and is over interstate commerce when carried on by only navigable between different places witbin land transportation. And we answer, further, the State, then it is not a navigable water of tbat we are unable to draw any clear and dis- the United States, but only a navigable water tinct line between the authority of Congress to of the State, and the Acts of Congress . . . for regulate an agency employed in commerce be the enrollment and license of vessels have no aptween the States when that agency extends plication. Those Acts only require sich en. through two or more States, and when it is rollment and license for vessels employed upon confined in its action entirely within the limits the navigable waters of the United States. of a single State. If its authority does not ex- It will be observed that this was the con. teod to an agency in such commerce when that struction of a penal statute, and its application agency is confined within the limits of a State, under the admiralty power. But, for the regu. its entire authority over interstate commerce Jation of interstate commerce, as we shall may be defeated. Several agencies combining, presently see, Congress has enacted legislation each taking up the commodity transported at with reserence to the commerce upon water the boundary line at one end of a State, and routes, whether they form, by connection with leaving it at the boundary line at the other other waters or with railways, a high way for end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely continuous carriage or shipment of passengers ousted, and the constitutional provision would or property. The power of Congress for this become a dead letter." See also The Montello, purpose is, we believe, generally conceded. If, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 411 [20 L. ed. 191], 87 U. S. therefore, the navigable waters of a State 20 Wall. 430 (22 L. ed. 391]: Ex parte Boyer, wholly within the State, and with no exterior 109 C. S. 629 [27 L. ed. 1056].
water connection, are yet utilized under “com. In the case last cited the waterway upon mon control, management or arrangement," in Bhich the collision occurred was actually the connection with railroads, for “continuous property of the State of Illinois, and was wholly carriage,"—in other words, for interstate coinartificial, and was wholly within its territorial merce,- for the purposes of such commerce, boundaries. The court says, through Mr. they would become public waters of the United Justice Blatchford: “Within the principles States, and subject to congressional control unlaid down by this court in the cases of The der the commerce clause (par. 3, § 8, art. 1) of Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 (19 L. ed. the Constitution, if not under the admiralty 939), and The Montello, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 430 clause. See Act of February 4, 1887, entitled (22 L. ed. 391), which extended the salutary “ An Act to Regulate Commerce,” 24 Stat. at views of admiralty jurisdiction applied in The L. 379; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. Rep. 9. 413 [13 L. ed. 1058); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 But if it be true, as contended, that the terms V. S. 4 Wall. 555 (18 L. ed. 451]; and The of the Act of June 19, 1886, are so broad that Eagle, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 15 (19 L. ed. 365], we they affect the navigable waters of a State upbare no doubt of the jurisdiction of the dis- on which there are vessels wholly engaged in trict court in this case. “Navigable water, internal commerce, must the Act be held a situated as this canal is, used for the purposes nullity for that reason? From the fact that the for which it is used, a highway for commerce indefatigable proctors for respo lents have between ports and places in different States, referred to the Kissimee, in Florida, and the carried on by vessels such as those in question Jordan, in Utah, to illustrate their argument, bere, is public water of the United States.' it is perhaps fairly inferable that such streams
It is true that this case considers and decides and lakes are very rare. It is probable, also, a question of admiralty jurisdiction; but the that the commerce which they convey is comcanal, although wholly artificial, and wholly paratively unimportant. Now, is it not the within the body of the State, is declared public duty of the court to sustain the Act under conwater, for the reason that it is a conduit for id. sideration if it appears that its application to terstate commerce. In concluding the opin- the vavigable icland waters of the United ion, Mr. Justice Blatchford observes: “ This States, and to the great body of commerce, is. case does not raise the question whether the valid and appropriate, even though it may afadmiralty jurisdiction of the district court ex- fect, upon occasion, commerce wholly within tends to waters wholly within the body of a a State? Concede that its language is suscenState, and from which vessels cannot so pass tible of the meaning suggested by the respondas to carry on commerce between places in ents, it is nevertheless clearly warranted, and such State and places in another State or in a operative as to all the important inland navi
gation of the country and the Great Lakes, and. How apposite is this language to the facts as to a mighty volume of commercial transac- before the court! Here the books and bills of tions. It has long been settled tbat statutes, lading of the steamer would show every fact constitutional in part only, will be upheld so essential to the apportionment of the cargo infar as they are not in contlict with the Consti- to classes of internal and interstate traflic and tution, provided the allowed and prohibited freight. But even more pertinent is the next parts are separable. Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. succeeding remark of the learned justice: v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 [24 L. ed. 377).
* This precise question was adjudged in the A case of controlling authority upon the Case of State Freight Tax, 82 Ü. S. 15 Wall. proposition that the Statute may be valid as to 232 [21 L. ed. 146).” There a statutory tax of one class of commerce, even though invalid as Pennsylvania of two cents for one class, three to another, is Ratterman v. W. U. Teieg. Co. cents for another, and tive cents for another, 127 U. S. 411-428 (32 L. ed. 229-234). There imposed upon every ton of freight transported a single tax was assessed by the State of Ohio by any railroad or canal of that State was reupon the receipts of the telegraph company. sisted by the Reading Railroad Company on These were derived as well from interstate as the ground that it was levied on interstate from internal commerce. The items of the commerce. The returns of the railroad comincome account were of course capable of sep. pany to the accounting officers stated separaration, but they were returned and assessed ately the amount of freight carried wholly in gross, and without separation or appor- within the State, and the amount brought into tionment. A bill was presented to the judge or carried out of the State. The court beld of the circuit court of the United States, sit. “ that the tax upon the former class ting in chancery, by the telegraph company, valid under the law of Pennsylvania, by wbich with averments that the tax was illegal and it was imposed; but that the latter classes, bevoid, and in conflict with the Constitution of ing commerce among the States, were not subthe United Siates, for the aileged reason that ject to such taxation.” These cases are very the State was seeking by the Act to impose a satisfactory. tax upon gross receipts principally accumu- It is also true that the apportionment and lated from interstate telegraphic messages. separation of subjects under control of the The prayers were that the defendant, to wit, State, and exempt therefrom, will apply to the the treasurer, may be compelled to accept that transportation routes, as well as to the freight portion of the tax lawfully due the State and transported or messages forwarded. In the country, and that he may be enjoined from case of W. U. Teleg.Co. v. Atty-Gen. of Mass.,125 levying or collecting the balance of the assess. U. S. 530 [31 L. ed 790), where a iax by that ment. To the bill a general demurrer was State was estimated against the company upon filed. The circuit court, after argument, upon the length of its lines within the State, as proan agreed submission of facts, which was in the portioned to their length elsewhere, it was held main but a statement of the separate amounts that since lines along post routes and across received from business within the State, and navigable waters of the United States were not from business between points in Ohio and in subject to taxation, and since, in the State, other States, beld that the tax by the State, so 233,455 miles of the defendant's lines were tbus far as apportioned to receipts derived from in-exempted, there remained only 49,850 miles not terstate communication, was unconstitutional exempt; and upon this the company offered to and void, but, as apportioned to messages with pay the proportion of the tax assessed against in ibe Staie, was valid. The case reached it according to mileage by the state authorities. the supreme court by a certificate of difference The remaiving assessment was enjoined. “We of opinion between ihe circuit and the district refer to this now,"continues this valuable opinjudge; and Mr. Justice Miller, for the court, ion, “only for the purpose of showing how presenting the unanimous opinion with the easily the question of taxation which is forbidcharacteristic vigor and clearness of his judicial den by the Constitution may be separated from deliverances, has with precision, and we think that which is permissible in this class of cases.' with conclusiveness, defined the rule for our If the subjects of taxation are so readily classiguidance. After stating the question certified, tied to mark the separate domain of federal and and observing thai the agreement of parties had state taxing power, how entirely justifiable will avoided the point that the tax was not separa- be the same process when necessary to maintain ble, the learned justice decisively states: "Nor the validity of national legislation! This, as do we believe, if there were allegations, either we bave seen, is the unquestionable duty of the in the bill or answer, setting up that part of court. Vide also Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. the tax was from interstate commerce, and 123 [26 L. ed. 103]; Philadelphia & S. M. Steampart from commerce wholly within the State, ship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 [30 L. that there would have been any difficulty in ed. 1200), 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 311; W. U. securing the evidence of the amount of receipts | Teleg. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 128 U. S. 39 (32 L. chargeable to these separate classes of tele. ed. 345). grams by means of the appointment of a referee
A case very interesting and very instructive or master to inquire into that fact and make as to this important topic is Philadelphia & S. report to the court. Neither are we of opin. M. Steamship Co v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. ion that there is any real question, under the 326–345 [30 L. ed. 1200-1204). The opinion decisions of this court, in regard to holding of the court, rendered by Mr. Justice Bradley, tbat, so far as this tax was levied upon receipts comprehends an attractive analysis of the more properly appurtenant 10 interstate commerce, pertinent decisions upon this rule, with copious it was void, and that, so far as it was only up- references to many others. on commerce wholly within the State, it was It will be observed that we have heretofore valid.”
considered the argument submitted by respond
ents' proctors as if a portion of the cargo of internal commerce, but to inland navigation. The Katie was shipped to be transported wholly So much for the direct purpose of the Act. within the State. It is true, bowever, as we (3) If internal commerce is affected, it is incishall presently see, that all of it is properly to dentally, merely: and the purpose of the Legisbe regarded as interstate in its character. It is lature being legitimate, and warranted by the true, also, that The Katie was engaged, in the Constitution, it is wholly immaterial to the constrictest sense, in interstate and foreign com- sideration of its validity that somewhere it has merce, and that the Savannah River between a casual or contingent effect upon the domain Augusta and Savannah is, as clearly, as the of state legislation. (4) Even though the subMississipp between St. Louis and New Orleans, jects of this extended liability, or the territory & navigable river of the United States. We in which it is effective, are partially within the extract the following from the valuable and region of state control, yet, where ihey are sepelaborate brief of Mr. Robert Erwin, the proc- arable, and are partly under the national contor for libelant:
trol, the Act will be sustained by the courts “The State of Georgia is bounded on the cast | wherever the power of Congress extends, and by a line running from the sea, or the mouth as to all those objects to which it attaches; and of the River Savannah, along the stream there. this rule is easily applicable to the facts. (5) of, to tbe fork or confluence made by the Riv. As to the Savannah River, it is a public paviers Keowee and Tugalo. Code Ga. & 15. It gable stream. The voyages of The Katie and is proper to state, bowever, that there has been her cargo are interstate in character, and the much discussion as to whether the State of jurisdiction of Congress is undoubted. Georgia extends only to the thread of the stream It will be seen that the question presented as or to the Carolina shore. However that may to the constitutionality of the clause extending be, the second article adopted by the conven the benefit and privilege of limited responsibiltion of Beaufort, which settled the boundary ity to the owners of vessels engaged in navibetween Georgia and South Carolina, provided gating the inland public waters of the United that the pavigable portion of the Savannah River States has been heretofore considered solely should be benceforth equally free to the citi- with relation to the commercial power of Conzens of both States, and exempt from all duties, gress. But the commerce clause of the Coptolls, bindrance, interruption and molestation stitution is not the only title to the validity and whatsoever attempted to be enforced by one effectiveness of the enactments. It is equally State on the citizens of another. See Hotch-clear that the Amendment is warranted by par. kiss, Stat. Law Ga. 916. And as the stean. 1, § 2, art. 3, of the Constitution, which exboat Katie, on every trip, touched at landings tends the judicial power of the United States on both shores of the river,-that is, in Souil to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdicCarolina and in Georgia, -there can be notion. Since the demurrer was argued, the Sudoubt that she was engaged in interstate com- preme Court of the United States, in Butler v. merce."
Boston & S. Steamship Co. 130 U. S. 527-558 In New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Cincin-132 L. ed. 1017–1025), has settled with distinctnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. ness the following principles applicable to this 289-294, we find it announced that commerce discussion: The law of limited liability was between points in the same State, but which enacted by Congress as part of the Maritime passes through another State, is regarded and Law of the United States, and is co-extensive treated as interstate commerce. Mr. Commis in its operation with the whole territorial dosioner Morrison, stating the conclusion of the main of that law. (2) While the General Commission, on page 293, uses the language Maritime Law, with slight moditications, is following: “While passing through Missis. accepted as law in this country, it is subject, sippi, after passing from Louisiana, this com under the Constitution, to such modifications merce is interstate, and subject alone to inter- as Congress may see titio adopt. (3) The Limstate regulation. It is not subject at any place ited Liability Act applies to the case of a disbetween Shreveport and New Orleans to regu: aster happening within the technical limits of lation by both the State and the Congress. It a county in a State, and to a case in which the passes by continuous carriage from Louisiana liability itself arises from a law of the State. to and ibrough the State of Mississippi. It is The case resulted from the well-known disaster pot transportation wholly within one State.' to the City of Columbus near Gay Head, at the It is subject to regulation by the provision of western extremity of Martha's Vineyard; and the Act to Regulate Commerce, and Commis- it was insisted by respondents to the libel to sion bas jurisdiction to revise the rates, when limit liability, filed by the steamship company, the parties interested in them are before it." that the docirine bad no application to cases of
This report is strongly advisory, and the personal injury and death, and none in the statement quoted seems otherwise altogether technical limits of a county in a State, nor to justifiable. Then The Katie, was in all respects a cause of action created by state law. All of engaged in interstate commerce. See also these propositions were negatived by the court. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. 8. The case seems to have been argued with great 196 (29 L. ed. 15%]; The Daniel Ball, supra. care and elaboration; and the opinion, rendered
To summarize our conclusions upon this im- by Mr. Justice Bradley, is most valuable. The portant and interesting topic, we are of opinion learned justice declares that the purpose of the that the Act of June 19, 1836, is valid, in view Limited Liability Law is, we may observe, of the power of Congress to regulate commerce: not to affect internal commerce, but for the (1) Because the law, amended, excepted from encouragement of ship-building, and the emits operation ipland navigation only, and not ployment of ships in commerce. He refers to internal commerce, as insisted. (2) The Amend-ihe various attempts wbich bave been made to ment extended the operation of the law, not to narrow the operation of tbe Statute. He cites