rant or validity. (5) They assert that the provision of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," has relation merely to the law of the forum, and gives no authority to Congress to regulate the property rights and liabilities of parties litigant therein. Moreover, even though it be conceded, they say. that the admiralty clause confers upon Congress the power to legislate as to all topics which are properly within the admiralty jurisdiction, nevertheless the Act of June 19, 1886, is broader even than that extensive domain, for it applies to all inland waters, while the admiralty jurisdiction is limited to those waters which, by themselves, or their connections with others, form a continuous channel for commerce among the States or with foreign countries,-citing The Daniel Ball and The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, supra; Allen v. Newberry, 62 U. S. 21 How. 244 [16 L. ed. 110]; The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 569 [18 L. ed. 455]; The Belfast, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 624 [19 L. ed. 266]; The St. Lawrence, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 527 [17 L. ed. 183]. 219 [20 L. ed. 375]. (3) While respondents | ments are otherwise without constitutional warconcede the power of Congress to provide, by inspection, license regulations, etc., for the safety of vessels engaged in internal traffic, they insist there is a distinction between inspection and other laws intended to control the character of machinery, equipment and the like in vessels plying upon the navigable waters of the United States, and laws intended to enlarge or to limit the contract rights and liabilities of persons concerned with the same vessels; that the legislation, for the one purpose, may be warranted by the commerce clause of the Constitution, while for the purpose of affecting the rights of persons contracting with vessels engaged exclusively in the internal traffic of a State the enactments of Congress are nugatory, -citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 [19 L. ed. 999]; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 631 27 L. ed. 1057]; Hatch v. Wallamet Iron Bridge Co. 6 Fed. Rep. 329; Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. James, 20 Fed. Rep. 903; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co. 123 U. S. 295 [31 L. ed. 151]. (4) They further insist that the legislation em bodied in the Act of March 3, 1851, and in sections 4283-4289 of the Revised Statutes, was construed by the Supreme Court of the United Proctors for respondents instance rivers and States, and by other federal courts, to be au- inland waters in the States which are not inthorized by the commerce clause of the Consti- cluded in the navigable waters of the United tution, citing Moore v. Am. Transp. Co. 65 U. States; and they cite Veazie v. Moor, 55 U. S. S. 24 How. 37 [16 L. ed. 680]; Lord v. Goodall 14 How. 568 [14 L. ed. 545]; The Montello, 78 Steamship Co. 102 U. S. 541 [26 L. ed. 224]; The U. S. 11 Wall. 411 [20 L. ed. 191]; Sands v. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443 Manistee River Imp. Co. supra. By all of this [13 L. ed. 1058]; The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. reasoning they reach with great apparent con274; The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. 819; The War fidence the conclusion that the Act of June 19, Eagle, 6 Biss. 366. They argue that the enact-1886, has no foundation upon the admiralty themselves and is within the provisions of the Stat- | stituted until after a party has obtained satisfaction ute. Ibid. A vessel employed in navigation upon the Hudson River, and not elsewhere, is not within the class excepted by the provisions of § 4289. The Tug Sears, 8 Fed. Rep. 365. It is only vessels engaged in what is known ordinarily as maritime commerce which are subject to the provisions of the Act; hence, the owners of a small steam pleasure yacht engaged in navigating the Detroit River are not entitled to the benefit of the Limited Liability Act. The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. $13, 8 Fed. Rep. 367. Proceedings for claim of benefit of Act. Limited liability may be claimed (1) merely by way of defense to an action; or (2) by surrendering the ship or paying her value into court; the latter method is necessary only when the owner desires to bring all the creditors claiming damage into concourse for distribution. Thommessen v. Whitwill, 118 U. S. 520 (30 L. ed. 156). Ship owners are entitled to the benefit of the Statute, though no action has been begun against them. The John Bramall, 10 Ben. 495. Where the owners may invoke the provisions of the statute, the court cannot know without appropriate proceeding the value of the offending vessel and the pending freight. The Maria and Elizabeth, 11 Fed. Rep. 520, 12 Fed. Rep. 627. Where on a libel for collision the vessel has been decreed liable for damages, the owner cannot on a petition for a limitation of liability retry the question of liability, that being res judicata. Ibid. of his demand, are ineffectual as to him, and a return of the money should not be compelled. The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239 (26 L. ed. 351). If any such proceedings are begun after the suit brought, they must be in the same district court as that in which the suit is pending. The Alpena, 10 Biss. 436; Re The Luckenback, 26 Fed. Rep. 870. Costs may be imposed upon the owners for delaying for an unreasonable period to institute proceedings for a limitation of liability. Re The Garden City, 27 Fed. Rep. 234; Miller v. O'Brien, 35 Fed. Rep. 779. Jurisdiction in proceedings for limitation of liability. The words "in any court" refer to a competent federal court, and not to a state court. Re Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 6 Ben. 124. In a cause of a limitation of liability, which proceeding is sui generis, partaking of the nature of a suit in personam, and not a proceeding in rem, possession of the vessel or her proceeds is not essential to the jurisdiction. Re The City of Norwich, 6 Ben. 330; The Mendota, 14 Fed. Rep. 358. The "appropriate proceedings" must be proceedings in personam where the parties to be affected are to be duly brought before the court, and such proceedings are not within the jurisdiction of an admiralty court. Place v. The City of Norwich, 1 Ben. 89. The rule of limited liability embraces all damages done by a vessel without the privity of the owner, whether consummated on land or water; and this being a maritime rule or regulation, courts of admiralty have authority to enforce it, and to enforce claims on the fund representing the value of the vessel. Re Goodrich Transp. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 718. A district court cannot take jurisdiction in adProceedings for a limitation of liability, if not in- miralty of a petition for a limitation of liability The institution of proceedings under the Statute, followed by a decree, is a bar to an action elsewhere for damages. Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344. clause, and none upon the commerce clause, of | of respondents' proctors: "It seems to us clear the Constitution, and must therefore be wholly disregarded, and, as a consequence, that the libel must be dismissed. It is not difficult, it would seem, for the observing mind, trained in the philosophy and history of our law, to appreciate the interesting considerations of legal thought suggested by the pending inquiry and the gigantic magnitude of the values which its ultimate adjudication may affect. Should the propositions of the respondents be deemed finally controlling, this would afford the twenty-first instance when an Act of Congress was decisively adjudged unconstitutional. When it is considered that this record of legislative conscientiousness and judicial conservatism embraces a period of ninety-nine years, the inchoate and formative period of a vast and novel experiment in the science of government, the exciting exigencies of foreign wars, the corroding inflammation of civil strife, the expansion of three millions of primitive people, employed mainly in the simple and unproductive occupations of frontiersmen, to sixty millions whose ventures in the production of national weaith are as diverse in character as they are intrepid in enterprise and affluent in results; when, also, the mighty volume of decided cases, involving the application or interpretation of the Constitution, is considered, it must be granted that the national legislation is with substantial uniformity stable and valid, and that the occasions when it may be held by the courts invalid are rarely afforded. It is equally obvious that the courts will decline to adjudge a statute to be in conflict with the Constitution, unless the reasons therefor are of that convincing and imperative character which at once clear the mind of doubt and constrain the inevitable decision. The attempted impeachment of the fourth section of the Act of June 19, 1886, extending the privilege of limited responsibility to "all vessels used on lakes or rivers, or in inland navigation, including canal-boats, barges and lighters," is evolved mainly from this premise that section 4 of the Act (save in the use of the words 'sea-going vessels') directly collides with the Constitution, and that its expressed purpose was to do the very thing which Congress is prevented from doing. The law, as it stood, excepted from the operation the owners of vessels engaged in internal commerce. The design of the Act of 1886 was so to change the excepting clause as to apply the law to such owners and commerce. Take the law as it was in connection with this fourth section, and it will then appear that the purpose was to do an unconstitutional thing; that is to say, the very legislation proposed was unconstitutional if our contention be correct as to the power of Congress." In this connection it may be well to state that elsewhere in the copious and valuable brief from which the quotation is taken an important axiom of constitutional interpretation is frankly set forth, viz., "that a court ought not to declare a law unconstitutional unless the fatal infirmity is made clearly to appear, — to appear beyond any reasonable doubt. With this cardinal rule in mind, let us attempt to ascertain if there is not at least a reasonable doubt as to the existence of error or misapprehension in the propositions of the proctor, above set forth. Is it true that Congress has 'expressed the purpose" by this Amendment to take control of the internal commerce of the States? 1. Did the law, before the Amendment, except from its operation the owners of vessels engaged in internal commerce? 2. Does the Amendment assailed apply the law to such owners and commerce? 3. Is it true that the "purpose of Congress was to do an unconstitutional thing?" It does not appear that the Law of Limited Liability before the 19th of June, 1886, excepted from its operation the owners of vessels engaged in internal commerce. The language of the exception was applicable to the owners of craft of certain description plying upon certain waters. It is wholly silent as to the character or kind of commerce for which to their jurisdiction of the main subject. Re Goodrich Transp. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 713. where it would not have had cognizance in ad-, miralty originally of the cause of action involved, as where suit was brought by a sufferer from a fire The fact that a claimant against a vessel has reset out on land by a passing vessel. Ex parte Phe- covered in a state court less than her stipulated nix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 (30 L. ed. 274); The Ply-value does not oust the jurisdiction of the district mouth, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 20 (18 L. ed. 125). See, however, The Mary Lord, 31 Fed. Rep. 416; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 104 (20 L. ed. 585; Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co. 109 U. S. 578 (27 L. ed. 1038); Elwell v. Geibel, 83 Fed. Rep. 71; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378. Proceedings to limit the liability of ship owners may be instituted in a district where a fund or claim equitably representing the lost vessel is in litigation, though the petitioners reside in another district. Re Leonard, 14 Fed. Rep. 53. court of proceedings to limit her liability where his original claim was greater than its value. Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. Rep. 727. See further, as to the jurisdiction of the district court, Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 (30 L. ed. 274). Injunction to restrain prosecution in state courts. Injunction may issue to restrain the prosecution of suits in a state court. The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112. The district court may, notwithstanding Rev. Stat., § 720, restrain parties who have commenced action in the state court from proceeding further therein. Re Long Island N. S. P. & F. Transp. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599; The Oceanus, 6 Ben. 258; but see Hill Mfg. Co. v. Providence & N. Y. Steamship Co. 113 In The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239 (26 L. ed. 351), the supreme court promulgated a rule that a petition for the limitation of liability shall be filed in the circuit court, if a suit as to the vessel is there pending, and though the ship owner on the trial as to the cause of the collision contest all liability what-Mass. 495, 502. ever. The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239 (26 L. ed. 351). And though the ship has been surrendered to the underwriters. The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468 (30 L. ed. 134). Admiralty courts have jurisdiction to enforce such claims on the fund as auxiliary and incidental The making of the 55th Admiralty Rule, restraining, on application by the owners, the further pros ecution of all suits against them, was within the power of the supreme court, notwithstanding Rev. Stat., § 720. Re Providence & N.Y. Steamship Co. 6 Ben. 124. the vessels or the water routes were utilized. | Legislature to encroach upon the conceded This is plainly apparent from the language of the proviso before the amendment was adopted: "This Act shall not apply to the owner or own ers of any canal-boat, barge or lighter, or to any vessels of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation." It should not be difficult to understand that this is widely variant from the proposition of respondents. The excepting clause, if their construction had been adopted, would probably have read: "This Act shall not apply to the owners of any vessel, etc., used in purely internal commerce. rights of the States as to internal commerce. It may be, and is, no doubt, true that much of this legislation does incidentally affect rights growing out of internal commerce. That, however, is a necessary result, flowing from the variety and extent of the influence, exerted by every Act of Congress of general operation, howsoever undoubted its constitutionality. An illustration of this may be found in the laws relating to internal taxation. Who may say these do not affect internal commerce? And yet the power of Congress is conceded. In the amplitude and variety of the occupations and enterprises of our countrymen many results flow from congressional action, which, if designed as a result of direct legislation, would be held unwarranted. It is enough to say of a law that its purpose, object and main results are legitimate, and the law of limited responsibility has been often so adjudged. Norrich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 109-128 [20 L. ed. 585–593]. The Act of March 3, 1851, was entitled "An Act to Limit the Liability of Ship Owners, and for Other Purposes." Its provisions applicable to the questions at bar, embodied in §§ 42834289, Rev. Stat., are as follows: "The liability of the owner of any vessel for any embezzlement, loss or destruction, by any person, of any property, goods or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel; or for any loss, damage or injury by collision, or for any act, matter or thing lost, damage or forfeiture done, occasioned or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending." 4283, Rev. Stat: "The provisions of [this title] [the seven preceding sections], relating to the limitation of the liability of the owners of vessels, shall not apply to the owners of any canal-boat, barge or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation." § 4289, Rev. Stat. There is, or may be, a vast distinction in the lading or contracts of a vessel used in inland navigation, and one used for internal commerce. A vessel may be used for internal commerce and never traverse inland waters, or may ply the waters of a lake embosomed in the central territory of a State, and be wholly engaged in interstate commerce. Then it is not true that the law, before the Amendment, excepted from its operation the owners of vessels engaged in internal commerce, but simply those whose vessels were used in rivers or inland navigation. Again, does the Amendment to the Limited Responsibility Law, assailed by the respondents, apply to the "owners of vessels engaged in internal commerce?" In the opinion of the court, very clearly not. It has no syllable with reference to internal commerce. It shall apply also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers, or in inland navigation, including canal-boats, barges and lighters." Congress, in the Amendment as in the excepting clause of the Act of 1851, supra, dealt entirely with classes of vessels navigating inland waters and lakes, and gave no attention to cargoes or shipping contracts. It did not deal with commerce, but with shipping. As we have before seen, there is no essential identity of topic in a vessel and the character of the commerce in which it is engaged. By a parity of reasoning it follows that Congress has not, by this extension of the limited-responsibility privilege, expressed the purpose to take control of internal The legislation upon this subject, next succommerce, nor, so far as it has been made to ceeding the Act of 1851, is found in the Act of appear, was it its purpose to do an unconstitu- June 26, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 53). This, it is tional thing. These conclusions seem to be important to observe, is entitled "An Act to clearly inferable from the plain and unambigu- Remove Certain Burdens on the American ous words of the clauses which constituted the Merchant Marine, and Encourage the Ameriold law and the remedial statute, which, as we can Foreign Carrying Trade, and for other will presently see, is but an encouragement to Purposes." The eighteenth section of this important classes of shipping in which the | Act is as follows: "That the individual liawealth of the country is largely invested. But bility of a ship owner shall be limited to the if the language of the sections quoted was proportion of any or all debts and liabilities equivocal, there would even then be no diffi-that his individual share of the vessel bears to culty in tracing to its constitutional source the current of this legislation, which has revived the drooping but vital growth of the country's maritime interests. It is well to remember that it is an elementary principle of construction, not only that the scope of a legislative enactment may be modified by the purpose expressed in the title, but that the intention of the Legislature is often gathered from a view of the whole, and every part, of continuous legislation on the same general topic. 1 Kent, Com. 461, 462. Upon consideration of the several enactments on the subject of limiting responsibility of the owners of shipping, it is not possible to discover any purpose of the national the whole, and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel, on account of the same, shall not exceed the value of such vessel and freight pending: provided, that this provision shall not affect the liability of any owner incurred previous to the passage of this Act, nor prevent any claimant from joining all the owners in one action, nor shall the same apply to wages due to persons employed by said ship owners." " We thus perceive that the title indicates what the body of the Act makes clear, viz., that it was intended to encourage, and therefore to foster, the American merchant marine and the American foreign carrying trade. Its chief modification of the existing law was an | the conclusion was reached that it was a navenlargement of the privileges of exemption. igable stream, and the court adds: "And by It will be readily observed that it was the con- its junction with the lake it forms a continued sistent legislative purpose to broaden the priv- highway for commerce, both with other States ileges of the owners of American craft upon and with foreign countries, and is thus brought the high seas. The enactments, it seems, were under the direct control of Congress." found advantageous also, as they were followed very soon afterwards by the Act of June 19, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 79), which is entitled "An Act to Abolish Certain Fees for Official Services to American Vessels, and to Amend the Laws Relating to Shipping Commissioners, Seamen and Owners of Vessels, and for Other Purposes." The fourth section of this Act extends previous enactments relating to limitations of liability to "all sea-going vessels," and here the respondents insist the National Legislature exhausted its jurisdiction. But it was not deemed enough to accord these privileges to sea-going vessels. A vast and rapidly augmenting fleet of American shipping, embracing every type of vessel, from the clumsy sailing craft of the last century to the latest achievements in naval architecture, whose twin screws and triple expansion engines drive them with incredible swiftness over the teeming waters of the Great Lakes, were wisely esteemed by Congress to merit the aid and en couragement of the legislation which had been so effective with sea-going shipping. Nor was this all. It had been found that the vital necessity for cheap transportation for the natural and manufactured productions of the country, often denied in greater or less measure by railway combinations, had been accomplished by a return to the slower but cheaper methods of water carriage. Rivers, canals and inland lakes, by themselves or their connections, in many instances afford the most important channels for the ebbing and flowing tide of interstate and foreign commerce. In the case of The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 [19 L. ed. 999], where the recovery of a penalty under the Act of Congress for failure to obtain a license to transport merchandise and passengers upon the bays, lakes, rivers or other navigable waters of the United States was resisted upon the ground that the steamer navigating the Grand River, in the State of Michigan, was not engaged in interstate commerce, and for this reason it was insisted Congress had no control over her, the supreme court make very pertinent declarations. They decided that the Grand River was a navigable stream. They hold that rivers "are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are, or may be, conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water, and they constitute navigable waters of the United States, within the meaning of the Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form, in their ordinary condition, by themselves, or by uniting with other wa ters, a continuous highway, over which commerce is, or may be, carried on with other States or foreign countries, in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water." 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 563 [19 L. ed. 1001]. This test was applied to Grand River, and The court continues: "That power [i. e. the power to regulate commerce] authorizes all appropriate legislation for the protection or advancement of either interstate or foreign commerce, and, for that purpose, such legislation as will insure the convenient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the United States, whether that legislation consists in requiring the removal of obstructions to their use, in prescribing the form and size of the vessels employed upon them, or in subjecting the vessels to inspection and license, in order to insure their proper construction and equipment. "The power to regulate commerce,' this court said in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 724 [18 L. ed. 99] 'comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress." But it is contended that the steamer Daniel Ball was only engaged in the internal commerce of the State of Michigan, and was not, therefore, required to be inspected or licensed, even if it be conceded that Grand River is a navigable water of the United States; and this brings us to the consideration of the second question presented. There is undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject to the control of the States. The power delegated to Congress is limited to commerce among the several States,' with foreign nations and with the Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily excludes from federal control all commerce not thus designated, and of course that commerce which is carried on entirely within the limits of a State, and does not extend to or affect other States. In this case it is admitted that the steamer was engaged in shipping and transporting down Grand River goods destined and marked for other States than Michigan, and in receiving and transporting up the river goods brought within the State from without its limits; but inasmuch as her agency in the transportation was entirely within the limits of the State, and she did not run in connection with, or in continuation of, any line of vessels or railway leading to other States, it is contended that she was engaged entirely in domestic commerce. But this conclusion does not follow. So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods brought from without the limits of Michigan, and destined to places within that State, she was engaged in commerce between the States; and, however limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as it went, subject to the legislation of Congress. She was employed as an instrument of that commerce; for, whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. The fa that several different and independent agencicare employed in transporting the commodity, LAWTON V. COMER. 63 some acting entirely in one State, and some foreign country, and no opinion is intended to acting through two or more States, does in no be intimated as to jurisdiction in such a case." respect affect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency acts in December, 1870, in the case of The Montello, The case was decided in January, 1884. In that transportation, it is subject to the regula- a proceeding to recover a penalty under a stattion of Congress. It is said that, if the posi-ute operative upon the "bays, lakes, rivers or tion here asserted be sustained, there is no such other navigable waters of the United States," thing as the domestic trade of a State; that Congress may take the entire control of the the stream "can only be deemed a navigable -Mr. Justice Field, for the court, declares that commerce of the country, and extend its regu- water of the United States when it forms by lations to the railroads within a State on which itself, or by its connection with other waters, grain or fruit is transported to a distant market. such a highway. We answer that the present case relates to justice continues, "If, however," the learned transportation on the navigable waters of the highway for commerce with other States or "the river is not of itself a United States, and we are not called upon to foreign countries, or does not form such a highexpress an opinion upon the power of Congress way by its connection with other waters, and is over interstate commerce when carried on by only navigable between different places within land transportation. And we answer, further, the State, then it is not a navigable water of that we are unable to draw any clear and dis- the United States, but only a navigable water tinct line between the authority of Congress to of the State, and the Acts of Congress . . . regulate an agency employed in commerce be- the enrollment and license of vessels have no aptween the States when that agency extends plication. Those Acts only require such enfor through two or more States, and when it is rollment and license for vessels employed upon confined in its action entirely within the limits the navigable waters of the United States.' of a single State. If its authority does not extend to an agency in such commerce when that agency is confined within the limits of a State, its entire authority over interstate commerce may be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary line at one end of a State, and leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the federal jurisdiction would be entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a dead letter." See also The Montello, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 411 [20 L. ed. 191], 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 430 [22 L. ed. 391]; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629 [27 L. ed. 1056]. struction of a penal statute, and its application It will be observed that this was the conunder the admiralty power. But, for the regu lation of interstate commerce, as we shall presently see, Congress has enacted legislation with reference to the commerce upon water routes, whether they form, by connection with other waters or with railways, a highway for continuous carriage or shipment of passengers or property. The power of Congress for this purpose is, we believe, generally conceded. If, therefore, the navigable waters of a State wholly within the State, and with no exterior mon control, management or arrangement," in water connection, are yet utilized under "comconnection with railroads, for carriage,"-in other words, for interstate commerce,-for the purposes of such commerce,"continuous they would become public waters of the United States, and subject to congressional control under the commerce clause (par. 3, § 8, art. 1) of the Constitution, if not under the admiralty clause. See Act of February 4, 1887, entitled L. 379; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 1 "An Act to Regulate Commerce," 24 Stat. at Inters. Com. Rep. 411, 32 Fed. Rep. 9. In the case last cited the waterway upon which the collision occurred was actually the property of the State of Illinois, and was wholly artificial, and was wholly within its territorial boundaries. The court says, through Mr. Justice Blatchford: "Within the principles laid down by this court in the cases of The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 557 [19 L. ed. 999], and The Montello, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 430 [22 L. ed. 391], which extended the salutary views of admiralty jurisdiction applied in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12 How. 443 [13 L. ed. 1058]; The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 555 [18 L. ed. 451]; and The of the Act of June 19, 1886, are so broad that But if it be true, as contended, that the terms Eagle, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 15 [19 L. ed. 365], we they affect the navigable waters of a State uphave no doubt of the jurisdiction of the dis-on which there are vessels wholly engaged in trict court in this case.' situated as this canal is, used for the purposes nullity for that reason? From the fact that the "Navigable water, internal commerce, must the Act be held a for which it is used, a highway for commerce indefatigable proctors for respondents have between ports and places in different States, referred to the Kissimee, in Florida, and the carried on by vessels such as those in question Jordan, in Utah, to illustrate their argument, here, is public water of the United States." and lakes are very rare. it is perhaps fairly inferable that such streams that the commerce which they convey is comIt is probable, also, paratively unimportant. Now, is it not the duty of the court to sustain the Act under consideration if it appears that its application to States, and to the great body of commerce, is the navigable inland waters of the United valid and appropriate, even though it may af fect, upon occasion, commerce wholly within a State? Concede that its language is susceptible of the meaning suggested by the respondents, it is nevertheless clearly warranted, and It is true that this case considers and decides a question of admiralty jurisdiction; but the canal, although wholly artificial, and wholly within the body of the State, is declared public water, for the reason that it is a conduit for interstate commerce. ion, Mr. Justice Blatchford observes: "This In concluding the opincase does not raise the question whether the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court extends to waters wholly within the body of a State, and from which vessels cannot so pass as to carry on commerce between places in such State and places in another State or in a |