We do not find in the evidence proof of the knowledge of the defendant Verner of the transfer of the building from one lot of land to the other, by which he may be charged with constructive notice of the lien of the mortgage, nor actual notice of a fraud that was intended, which appears to have been satisfactory to the court below. It appears that Verner lived in Philadelphia up to February 15th, when he moved to Camden, and opened a grocery store ahout two squares from Muench's place of business, and after that time went there frequently. He kept bar for him from May to August. Muench testifies that the house was removed about the 3d or 4th of February, and thinks they started in January. This was before Verner came to Camden. Verner says he did not know that the house had been moved from another lot until after he had bought it. This evidence, if believed, shows that he neither saw nor knew that the house was moved from the mortgaged premises, and there was not a fraudulent knowledge or collusion in the purchase. Without proof of such collusion, the testimony of two witnesses that Muench told them he removed the dwellinghouse so that, if the sheriff come on him, he would have a house anyhow," is not competent to show that Verner had knowledge of a fraudulent purpose, and participated in it. If said, it was spoken between other parties in his absence. Faulkner v. Whitaker, 15 N. J. L. 438. The payment of the consideration by Verner to Muench is testified to by them, and by Muench's wife, who says she saw money paid, without knowing the amount. The purchase price, they say, was $1,300, paid in different sums, at several times,-$400 on February 15th, $300 July 30th, $500 on August 1st, and $100 in wages due Verner. The first money was brought from Philadelphia, obtained by selling out a grocery store there, and cash on hand. The second and third payments were, as Verner says, borrowed from his brother. The first sum was $400, loaned to assist Muench in building. Afterwards, he says, when he asked for it, he was told that he (Muench) had no money, and he offered to sell the house and lot. He did not want it, but, with the advice and help of his brother, he bought it to save losing the money he had loaned. Although this money was all paid before August 3d, when the deed was dated, it was not a pre-existing debt, without parting with anything of value at the time of conveyance, depriving the defendant Verner of the character of a bona fide purchaser for value, as was argued by connsel; but all, excepting the first two items, were parts of a present consideration, appropriated, when made, to its payment, and sufficient to constitute the defendant Verner a bona fide purchaser in equity. Mingus v. Condit, 23 N. J. Eq. 313; De Witt v. Van Sickle, 29 N. J. Eq. 209; Basset v. Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 82. The small profit derived from the grocery store conducted by his wife while he attended bar for Muench, and before that time; the fact that Muench collected rent of the tenant, after the alleged sale, as Verner's agent; and the failure to produce the brother who was said to have loaned the money to complete the pur chase,-cast suspicion on the consideration; but as the proof now stands, with the positive evidence of three witnesses to sustain it, and nothing more than these circumstances to overcome it, we do not feel warranted in saying that this payment was not made. Muench swears positively that he received these sums of money, and applied them to making the improvements for the summer garden. Assuming that the appellant, Verner, bought the house, and paid for it a valuable consideration, without knowledge of its removal, as appears by the direct proof, and that Muench sold it, as he testifies, to raise money to pay for the hall building, and the improvements he was making, the important question is presented whether the complainant is in a position to obtain the relief he asks here for the injury he has sustained. Can a court of equity return to the wasted property the building that has been wrongfully removed, and sold to a bona fide purchaser, after being affixed to other land not included in the mortgage? The subject of legal and equitable relief, where such removals are made, is considered by Mr. Jones in his book on Mortgages (§ 143, 144, 453, 684), with abstracts from cases and numerous citations in the notes. It is a question on which the authorities are divided, and depends for its solution on the effect given to a mortgage of lands. It seems that where the mortgage is regarded as a conveyance of the legal title to the property, giving the mortgagee the right of possession, his legal ownership, and actual or constructive possession, give him the right to follow and recover the property severed. The principle applied is that property severed from the realty, so as to become a chattel, belongs to the legal owner of the land; but where the mortgage is regarded merely as a lien for security, and the mortgagor has the right of possession until ejectment or foreclosure, there the mortgagee has merely the right to restrain the removal of the property by injunction, to protect his lien, or, after the removal, only a right to recover damages for the wrongful diminution of his security. The case of Hamlin v. Parsons, 12 Minn. 108 (Gil. 59), comes nearer to the conclusion reached by the decree in this case than any other to which my attention has been called. There the mortgagor moved a dwelling on an adjoining lot belonging to his wife, without the knowledge of the mortgagee, but with the knowledge of the wife; and it was held that the lien on the dwelling-house remained, and the mortgagee might sell the lot of land covered by the mortgage, and afterwards the house, to satisfy his mortgage. But in Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568, where a petition was filed in equity to subject to the lien created by the mortgage a number of cottage buildings which had been removed to other land, and affixed, it was held that when the buildings were severed from the mortgaged premises, and had become part of another freehold, the lien upon them was gone. In Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. 559, the materials of a dwelling-house or mortgaged land were used in the construction of a house upon another lot of land. It was said the right of property vested in the grantee of that land, and the mortgagee could not maintain trover against the purchaser, either for the new house, or the old materials used in its construction. In Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, millstones were severed from the mill, and sold by the mortgagor. It was held that the title passed to the purchaser, and there was no power to seize them after they had been severed and carried away. In Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433, where a house subject to a mortgage was floated off by a flood into the street, and was bought while in that position, it was said that the severance affected the right of lien; that a building on land was subject to the lien of the mortgage whether there at the time of the mortgage or built there afterwards, but, when severed, the lien was lost. If the contrary were the law, everything affixed to mortgaged lands might, when severed and sold to a bona fide purchaser, be followed and reclaimed. Clark v. Reyburn, 1 Kan. 281; Kimball v. Darling, 32 Wis. 684; Van Peltv. McGraw. 4 N. Y. 110; Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 232; Lane v. Hitchcock, 14 Johns. 213; Hutchins v. King, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 53 [17 L. ed. 544]; Gore v. Jenness, 19 Me. 53; Gooding v. Shea, 103 Mass. 360; Byron v. Chapin, 113 Mass. 308; Wilson v. Maltby, 59 N. Y. 126, and many other cases,--might be cited as illustrating the differences of opinion, and the principles applied, in determining the rights of parties when fixtures are severed and sold from mortgaged lands. A distinction is made in Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42, where it is said that a mortgagor may sell, in the usual way, lumber, fire-wood, coal, ore or grain growing on the land, until the mortgagee stops him by eject ment or estrepement; for these things are usually intended for consumption and sale, and the sale of them is the usual way of raising the money to pay the mortgage. But in the case of a factory or other building it is from the use of it as it is, and not by its consumption or its sale by piecemeal, that all its profits are to be derived. condition, but as a security for debt, the legal estate being considered as subsisting only for that purpose. This is elsewhere called the equitable and the American doctrine, by which the mortgagor has a right to lease, sell and in every respect deal with the mortgaged premises as owner so long as he is permitted to remain in possession, and so long as it is understood and held that any person taking under him takes subject to all the rights of the mortgagee. 4 Kent, Com. 157. There is no difficulty in applying this rule while fixtures remain attached to the realty; and so long as the mortgagor continues in possession, or when the property severed passes into the possession of a person in collusion with him to defeat the lien and security of the mortgagee, whether upon or off the mortgaged premises, it would seem that the rights of the mortgagee would be unaffected. But when the property is severed, and sold to an innocent purchaser, the lien in equity is gone, and the remedy of the mortgagee is an action at law against the mortgagor, and those who act with him, to impair or defeat the security of the mortgage. The case of Kircher v. Schalk, 39 N. J. L. 335, holds that a mortgagee of real estate, whose debt is due, but who has not entered into possession, cannot maintain replevin for a steam-engine affixed to the realty subject to the mortgage, which the mortgagor or his assigns had severed from the realty, and removed from the premises, because the mortgagee cannot, with propriety, insist upon being legally entitled to a remedy, the enforcement of which pertains to the general legal ownership of the land. But in Jackson v. Turrell, 39 N. J. L. 329, it was decided that a mortgagee may maintain an action on the case against the mortgagor or his assigns for an injury to the security resulting from the removal of fixtures, or other waste, by the defendant. Notice, without fraud, was said to be sufficient to charge the purchaser with liability. It is not necessary in this case to determine whether a court of law will enforce this remedy against a bona fide purchaser without actual notice, or the exact form of remedy that may be then used; but in a court of equity the right of such purchaser is equal to the equity of a mortgagee who has not such title to the article severed that he can maintain an action for the recovery, in specie, of the fixtures removed. It is a maxim that where there is equal equity the law must prevail. It is upon this account that a. court of equity constantly refuses to interfere, either for relief or discovery, against a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate for a valuable consideration, without notice of the adversetitle, if he chooses to avail himself of the defense at the proper time, and in the proper mode. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 64c. It is manifest that this cannot be reconciled with cases cited above, as furnishing a rule applicable to all fixtures, but that any general rule must be based on the right of property. If the mortgagee have the legal ownership and right of possession, he may follow things severed and removed from the mortgaged lands without his consent wherever he can find them. If he holds title under the mortgage only as security for his lien, then the remedies appointed for preserving the security, and compensating for any loss sustained by its diminution, are such only as the mortgagee may use. The theory in the latter case is that, as to innocent third parties, the mortgagor is the owner of the property, and may sever and sell until restrained by injunction, or ejected by entry, or barred by foreclosure. In any view taken of the respective rights of mortgagor and mortgagee, the latter may have the security of The conclusion given in 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. his lien protected by injunction. Brady v.743, on this matter is that, wherever one or Waldron, 2 Johns. Ch. 148; Emmons v. Hinderer, 24 N. J. Eq. 39. In our State the title of the mortgagee to lands under his mortgage has been defined by this court in Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. L. 496 -503, where it is said that the mortgage is regarded, not as a common-law conveyance on the other of the parties has a legal estate over which a court of law can exercise jurisdiction, then, in an equity suit between them, as a general rule the defense of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration will avail as against the plaintiff, whether he has a legal or an equitable estate. In either case the court of equity simply withholds its hand, and remits the party | weight of the evidence as presented, the decree to a court of law. In the review of cases will be reversed, and modified so that the land which appear to conflict with the conclusion described in the mortgage, with the building in this case, cited from the English courts, it and improvements thereon, as they exist at the must be borne in mind that there the mort- time of filing the bill, shall be sold to satisfy gagee has the legal title to the mortgaged land, the mortgage; and, as to the injury sustained and the right of possession. by the removal of the building formerly on the land, the mortgagor will be remitted to his remedy at law. Decree reversed unanimously. Having found that the appellant, Verner, is a bona fide purchaser of the building in controversy affixed to his land, according to the PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, ex rel. v. NEW YORK, LAKE ERIE & WESTERN (......Pa.......) 1. A corporation violating the Organic Law forfeits its franchise, but does not thereby become subject to the escheat or confiscation of its property. 2. A foreign corporation owning all the stock of a domestic corporation, where the statutes allow its stock to be held by other corporations, does not thereby "acquire or hold" the real estate of the domestic corporation so as to violate the Act of April 26, 1855, against acquiring or holding real estate "directly in the corporate name, or by or through any trustee or other device whatsoever unless specially authorized" under penalty of escheat. 3. The penalty of escheat is removed as to land in the possession of owners having the right to hold the same, although the Act imposing it is not repealed in terms, when before any inquisition is taken the land has been conveyed to such owners, and a statute has declared that the land should be held by them "indefeasibly as to any right of escheat" in the Commonwealth. (Sterrett and Clark, JJ., dissent.) (March 3, 1890.) | pose of enabling it to hold lands in this State which it could not otherwise lawfully hold, and that such holding of the lands by it was a violation and evasion of the laws of Pennsylvania, and prayed that such lands might be escheated to the Commonwealth. It appeared at the trial that the shares of stock of the Company holding title to the lands were distributed as follows: of the whole number of 5,000 shares 4,194 shares stood in the name of the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company, 800 in the name of trustees of the Erie Company and the remainder in the names of persons who were directors of the Coal & Railroad Company, and who were also officers of the Erie Company, and who were alleged to hold the stock merely for the purpose of qualifying them to hold the offi ces of directors of the Company. Further facts appear in the opinion. Messrs. William S. Kirkpatrick, AttyGen., John F. Sanderson, Dep. Attu-Gen., and Silas W. Pettit, John R. Read, George A. Jenks and William P. Jenks, for plaintiff in error: A corporation cannot become a stockholder in another corporation unless by power specifically granted by its charter or necessarily implied in it, especially if it be for the purpose of controlling or affecting the management of the other corporation, and a fortiori, if for the purpose of thereby engaging in a business ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas for other than and additional to that for which it Elk County to review a judgment in favor of defendants in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to escheat to the Commonwealth certain lands in Elk County. Affirmed. The New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company is a corporation of the State of New York doing the business of a common -carrier in Pennsylvania. is incorporated. Green's Brice, Ultra Vires, 91, note b; Ernest v. Nicholls, 6 H. L. Cas. 401; Sumner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M. 105; Mechanics & W. M. Mut. Sav. Bank & Bldg. Asso. v. Meriden Agency Co. 24 Conn. 159; Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Hazlehurst v. Savannah, G. & N. A. R. Co. 43 Ga. 13; Salomons v. Laing, 14 Jur. 279; Franklin Bank v. Com The information set out that during the years 1873 and 1874 that corporation acquired cer-mercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 354. tain lands for mining purposes and took the title in the name of trustees. That it acquired, without authority, all the capital stock of the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company, a domestic corporation. That the Erie Com pany procured the transfer of the title to said lands by the trustees to the Mining Company for its benefit. That subsequently the title be came vested in the New York, Lake Erie & Western Coal & Railroad Company, a domestic corporation, the capital stock of which was held by the Erie Company and the Mining Company. That the Erie Company procured the capital stock of the other two corporations for the pur-thorize. If the title was defeasible when taken by the trustees for the Erie Company, it has remained so ever since, and no subsequent conveyances of the title-more especially merely colorable transfers, as were those in this casewill validate it, or bar the right of the Commonwealth to escheat the land. Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & R. 313; Goundie v. Northampton Water Co. 7 Pa. 233; Rubeck v. Gardner, 7 Watts, 455. A Legislature cannot ratify or confirm that which at the time of such attempted ratification or confirmation it could not originally au Messrs. John G. Hall and George W. Biddle for defendants in error. Paxson, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court: Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 137; Grenada Co. ▼. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261 (28 L. ed. 704); Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172 (30 L. ed. 911). Although corporations of one State may by comity enter and do business within the borders of another State, yet the license to do so is purely gratuitous, and depends solely upon the permission expressly or impliedly granted by such other State; and wherever a State sufficiently indicates that it refuses or withdraws such permission, the right wholly ceases, "without reference to the injustice, the prej-dence and admitted by the parties, do not difudice or the wrong that is alleged to exist" in such refusal or withdrawal. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535 (24 L. ed. 148); Bank of Augusta v. Earl, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 592 (10 L. ed. 298); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U. S. 18 How. 404 (15 L. ed. 451); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 168 (19 L. ed. 357); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 410 (19 L. ed. 972); Green's Brice, Ultra Vires, p. 4, note a; Com. v. Gloucester Ferry Co. 98 Pa. 105; Runyan v. Coster, 89 U. S. 14 Pet. 122 (10 L. ed. 382). The rights and powers of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, organized in April, 1887, do not in any way relate back to the rights and powers of the Erie Railway Company, as they existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1874. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 (28 L. ed. 937); St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465 (28 L. ed. 1055); Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Miler, 114 U. S. 176 (29 L. ed. 121); Dow v. Beidelman, 49 Ark. 325; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680 (31 L. ed. 841). This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto filed by the Attorney-General, the object of which was to escheat to the Commonwealth certain lands in Elk County, alleged to be held by or for the defendant Railroad Company. The facts as disclosed by the evi fer essentially from those in Com. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., reported in 114 Pa. 340. This is really a branch of the same proceeding, but for lands lying in a different county. The present case has been twice argued-a re-argument having been ordered of our own motionand has received careful consideration. This was due to the gravity of the questions involved and the amount in controversy. It was alleged in the first place by the Com. monwealth that the Railroad Company had violated section 5 of article 17 of the Constitution of this State. The said section is as follows: "No incorporated company doing the business of a common carrier shall directly or indirectly prosecute or engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transportation over its works; nor shall such company directly or indirectly engage in any other business than that of common carriers, or hold or acquire lands, freehold or leasehold, directly or indi rectly, except such as may be necessary for carrying on its business; but any mining or manufacturing company may carry the products of its mines and manufactories on its railroad or canal not exceeding fifty miles in length." It will be noticed that this clause in the Constitution affixes no penalty for its violation. It is conceded that for a violation of the Or Such open and flagrant violation of the fundamental law of the State cannot be excused, or its consequences evaded, by the transparent device of using the name and stock of the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company, or that of the New York, Lake Erie & Wes-ganic Law, a Pennsylvania corporation or a tern Coal & Railroad Company. A thing which is within the intention of the makers of the Statute is as much within the Statute as if it were within the letter; and such construction ought to be put upon it as does not suffer it to be eluded. Bacon, Abr. Statute, 1, § 5-10; Heydon's Case, 3 Coke, 7; Magdalen College Case, 11 Coke, 73; People v. Utica Ins. Co. 15 Johns. 381; Com. v. Clark, 7 Watts & S. 127; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 2 (6 L. ed. 24); Manley v. State, 7 Md. 135; Leonard v. Com. 112 Pa. 607; Chester Co. v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647. For many purposes, and when necessary to attain the justice of the case, courts will always consider the interest of the shareholder as an interest in the property of the corporation. Seaman v. Enterprise F. & M. Ins. Co. 21 Fed. Rep. 778; Warren v. Davenport Ins. Co. 31 Iowa, 464; Com. v. Standard Oil Co. 101 Pa. 119; Coleman v. San Rafael Turnp. Road Co. 49 Cal. 517. If such holding is prohibited by the Constitution, the lands are escheatable in this proceeding. Com. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 114 Pa. 340. See Atty-Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. 6 Jur. N. S. 1006. foreign corporation having or exercising corporate franchises within this Commonwealth would forfeit such franchises. This, however, would not involve an escheat or confiscation of its property. For present purposes we must regard this constitutional provision as out of the case. The question here is whether the real estate in controversy is liable to escheat. This is not a proceeding to forfeit the Company's franchises but to escheat its lands. It must rest, if it can be sustained at all, upon the Act of April 26, 1855 (Pub. Laws, 329), the fifth section of which provides that "no corporation shall hereafter acquire or hold any real estate within this Commonwealth, directly in the corporate name, or by or through any trustee, or other device whatsoever, unless specially authorized to hold such property by the laws of this Commonwealth." This is the prohibition of the Act. The penalty for its violation is contained in section It is as follows: 9. "That all property hereafter acquired and held by persons, corporations or associations forbidden by this Act, and all such bereafter acquired and held beyond the limit prescribed as aforesaid by this Act, shall escheat to this Commonwealth, and upon the same being adjudged to have escheated under proceedings in court by quo warranto in all respects as is provided by law in the case of the usurpation of any corporate franchises, the same shall be taken in possession and disposed of, "etc. It was not alleged that the defendant Railroad Company held the title to any of the lands in controversy either in its corporate name, or by or through a trustee. The contention of the Commonwealth was that the title thereto was held by the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company, defendant; that all of the stock of said last-named Company was held by the said Railroad Company, and that the placing of the title in the former Company was a mere "device" to enable the Railroad Company to hold lands indirectly which it was forbidden by the Act of 1855 to hold directly, or by or through a trustee. Whether it was such device" was the question we directed to be sub mitted to the jury, when the other branch of the case was here, reported in 114 Pa. 340. | the corporation controls the land held by it. In this sense, and to this extent, the Act of 1869 enabled railroad companies to control real estate, the title to which they were forbidden to hold directly or indirectly by the Act of 1855. It must not be forgotten, however, that controlling real estate, by means of the ownership of a majority of the stock of such corporation is a very different matter from holding the title to such real estate. The one is legalized by the Act of 1869; the other is forbidden by the Act of 1855. It appears by the evidence that the Railroad Company purchased the charter of the Mining Company and retained all of the stock thereof, except the number of shares requisite to qualify the directors. It is admitted that the whole interest in the stock of the Mining Company was owned and controlled by the Railroad Company. It was contended that this was not aiding the Mining Company, but was a mere scheme or "device" to hold lands in violation of law. This was the view taken of it by our brother Sterrett in the former opinion of this court, and in that case it was directed that the question whether it was a "device" to evade the Act of 1855 should be submitted to a jury. That case was not heard before a full bench; those who heard it were not unanimous; it involved a question of grave importance, and a majority of those who heard the argument were in favor of taking the verdict of a jury upon the facts. It is not denied that the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company is a Pennsylvania cor poration, and authorized by its charter to hold these or similar lands, and to carry on the business of mining, milling, smelting and refining gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and other ores, coal and other minerals. Nor was it denied that under the Act of April 15, 1869 (Pub. Laws, 32), the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company had the right to purchase and hold all or any portion of the stock of the Northwestern Mining & Exchange Company. The said Act expressly declares: "It shall and may be lawful for railroad and canal companies to aid corporations authorized by law to develop the coal, iron, lumber o other material interests of this Common-lands was in the Northwestern Mining & Exwealth by the purchase of their capital stock or bonds or either of them, or by the guaranty of or agreement to purchase the principal or interest, or either, of such bonds.' As the question is now presented here, and as it was presented below, there are no disputed facts. It is conceded that at the time these proceedings were commenced the title to the change Company; that the said Company was expressly authorized by law to hold them; that the stock of said last named corporation is held or controlled by the Railroad Company, which The object of this legislation is obvious. It Company is in terms authorized by the Act of was to authorize railroad and canal companies 1869 to hold it; that the stock so held is personal to employ their capital and credit to aid in the property, and that the Railroad Company does development of the mineral resources of the not hold the title to said real estate, or to any Commonwealth. Such development, as every- portion of it, either in its own name, or by or one knows, is in many instances beyond the through a trustee. With the facts upon the reach of individual enterprise. It was easy record undisputed, we cannot evade the reenough to form corporations with all the req-sponsibility of this case by throwing it upon a uisite powers for this purpose. It was a very jury. With the facts admitted, it is the duty different thing to find capitalists to take their of this court to pass upon their legal effect, stocks or bonds. Hence it was that the Legis- and the verdict of a jury could not aid us. lature gave to railroad and canal companies Moveover, if we submit this question to a jury, the power to purchase both stocks and bonds we would have no rule whatever. Different of such companies. Nor was any limitation juries in different counties might find conflictplaced upon this power. They might buy a ing verdicts, in which case we would have the portion or all of the stock. It probably never strange result that in one county the transaction occurred to the legislative mind that while the would be held to be legal, while in an adjoinpurchase of a portion of the stock of a mining ing county it would be held to be illegal. We company would be aiding such corporation to were informed upon the argument, and have develop the mineral resources of the State, the no doubt of its truth, that a vast amount of purchase of a majority of the whole of the real estate in this Commonwealth is held by stock of such company might be held to be a corporations similar to the Northwestern Min"device" to evade the Act of 1855. However ing & Exchange Company, and chartered by that may be, the Act of 1869 was evidently the State for the purpose, inter alia, of holding intended to legalize, and perhaps encourage, the title to such property; that the stock of railroad and canal companies to invest in this said companies is largely held by railroad corspecies of mining companies. It involved, porations, in pursuance of the Act of 1869, necessarily, the control of such companies by and that the said real estate is in whole or in the corporations making such investments to part controlled by the latter class of corporathe extent of the stock held by them. Ations by means of their stock. If in all such majority of the stock controls the corporation; cases the question of whether the holding of |