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cised in disregard of its rules, or which may State does not require the administrator to take greatly extend, modify or limit their common an oath. It was so held in Deringer v. Deringer, law powers and privileges. The measure of 5 Houst. 416. So, 100, in Lincoln Sav. Bank v. the legislative power in ibis regard is limited Ewing, 12 Lea, 602, where it was urged that a only by circumstantial provisions. Ordinarily, corporation was incapable of taking to itself a in ibe creation of corporations, the common- mortgage or trust conveyance, it was beld that law incidents and powers are implied, unless a corporation may take and bold as a trustee or otherwise provided or restrained by the law of mortgagee, and execute a trust in which it has its corporate existence. But, in determining an interest, within the scope of its business; the nature and extent of the powers and capac- and a failure or inability to comply with the ities conferred on a corporation, and the mode provisions of the Code by taking the required of their exercise, the law of its creation, wheth- oath would not affect the validity of the deed, er a charter or a statute, must be consulted; or the title vested. for it has no power, except as thus given, either As it is pot questioned that the business in expressly or as incidental to the exercise of the which the defendant is engaged is a lawful ocpowers granted. It is provided by our Statute cupation, and that the articles of incorporation ibal a corporation may engage in any lawful are suflicient to copfer the power on the de enterprise, business pursuit or occupation fendant to act as an attorney in fact in further. (Code, $ 3217); so that, unless corporations are ance of its legitimate objects, there is nothing affected with some disability, when the articles to prevent it from doing the acts essential to of incorporation are sufficient for the purpose, carry on its business, and comply with the there is no lawful occupation or business in terms of its agreement, unless it is incapable of which it may not engage in this State exactly performing such acts from some cause inberas individuals.

ent in itself. By its articles of incorporation, the defend. A corporation, like a natural person, bas a ant corporation is expressly authorized and right to conduct its legitimate business by all empowered “to act as the general or special the means necessary to effect such object. agent, or attorney in fact, for any public or Within its prescribed range, it can do whatever private corporation or person in the manage- a natural person mutatis mutandis could do. nent and control of real estate or other prop- Wharton, Ag. $ 57. erty, its purchase, sale or conveyance,” etc. In Barry v. Merchants Exch. Co. 1 Sandf. No question is made but what the defendant, Ch. 280, it is said: “Every corporation, as by its articles of incorporation, bas conferred such, has the capacity to take and grant prop upon it the power to do the act as to which erty, and 10 contract obligations, in the same lbere is claimed to be an alleged failure; but mavner as an individual. . . . And every such the contention is that a corporation, from the corporation has power to make all contracts Dature of the organization, as an artiticial body. which are necessary and usual in the course of necessitated to act through agents, is incapable the business it transacts, as means to enable it. of executing a deed as an attorney in fact. to effect such object, unless expressly prohibitThis argument is based on the assumption that ed by law.” Having the power conferred up there are some things, from the inberent nature on it to act as an attorney in fact, is it not enof the case, that a corporation is incapable of dowed with all the faculties or capacities es doing, and seeks its illustrations in the common sential to execute it, and carry out the business law, as that a corporation cannot be an admin projects of its creation? Why may not a cor. istrator or executor because its duties are of a poration act as an agent for an individual or personal nature, and cannot be delegated; or another corporation? As the owner of real cannot take an oath, wben so required by law, property, it can by its authorized agents exebefore proceeding to execute some duty or cute a conveyance, or it may authorize an

But this argument overlooks the fact other, by power of attorney in writing, to conthat a corporation may be empowered to do by vey such property for it; why, then, may it not statute wbat it was incapable of doing under act as the agent or attorney in fact of anoiher iis common-law powers; ard, when thus cre for a like purpose, when it is so authorized, ated, its powers, capacities and modes of exer- and to ibus act is one of the chief powers concisiog them depend upon the Statute. Nor is ferred to effect the object of its creation, and the disability, in such cases, of a character to carry on the business in which it is engaged?" which cannot be obviated by statute; for, as “Within the scope of its corporate powers,” Mr. Morawetz says, "there are numerous in- says Mr. Mechem, "unless there are express stances in which corporations have been ex- provisions in its charter or constating instrupressly empowered by statutes to administer ments to the contrary, a corporation may act estates.” i Mora wetz, Priv. Corp. $ 357. as agent, either for an individual, a pari nership

The reason wby a corporation was unable to or other corporation. Many of ibe great corperform the oflice of executor or administrator, porations of the country are organized for this as stated by Blackstone, was that it could not express purpose, under statuies or charters take an oaih for the due execution of the oflice. conferring and defining their powers, and the 1 Bl. Com. 477.

methods of executing them; but even in other But, to enable a corporation to act as execu- cases, authority so to act might be implied as tor or administrator, the Statute may dispense auxiliary to their main purpose.” Mechem, Ag. with the oath, or provide that some one of its S 64. officers may take it, or the law of the State It is clear, then, that a corporation may act may not require any oath for the due execu- as the agent of anotber; and, if so, it must be tion of the oflice; and in such case,

no endued with the culties or instrumentalities other impediment intervenes, a corporation to perform the office it is authorized to undermay act as administrator when the law of the take, and carry out the purposes of its creation.


When a corporation engages in a legitimate, Brace, 51 Md. 508; Am. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, business, and is authorized by its incorporation Acknowledgment, Corporations. to do the things necessary to carry on such In fact, within the same principle of reasonbusiness, it is an express grant of power to en- ing, it may be said that a corporation cannot able it to effect that object. If it is to be ex- make a deed of its own property; but we know cluded from doing such things because, from it can, and that the act of its officers in so dothe nature of its organization, it cannot act ing is the act of the corporation. personally, but only through agents, there When a corporation is made the agent of anwould be little left in the domain of business it other to sell and convey property, it acts could do. As was said by the court in Hopkins through the same instrumentalities as when v. Gallatin Turnp.Co., 4 Humph. 412: “The acting for itself; and the relation between it common-law rule with regard to patural per- and its instrumentalities are as one being orarsons, that an agent, to bind bis principal by tificial person in the performance of its engagedeed, must be empowered by deed himself, ment, and involves no delegation of powers. cannot, in the nature of things, be applied to So that, when a corporation is invested with a corporations aggregate. These beings, of mere power of attorney to sell and convey real proplegal existence, and their beard, as such, are, erly, the person conferring the power knows literally speaking, incapable of a personal act. tbat the corporation cannot act personally in They direct or assent by vote; but their most the matter, but that in performing the engageimmediate mode of action must be by agents.” ment it will act through its agents, who for Being a creation of the law,—an artificial per- that purpose are its faculties, and whose acts son, -it can only act by agents, who are its in the discharge of that duty are the acts of limbs, or ivstrumentalities to effect the purpose the corporation, and as such must be considered for which it was organized, and to act for it, to be included in the artificial person, as intheir act being the act of the corporation, ex strumentalities authorized by him to do the act actly as the act of an individual is his act. As conferred upon it by bis power of attorney. such, upon the principle of the objection raised, In this view, the argument that the corporation it could not make an acknowledgment in per. cannot do such act, under the power of attorson, but it may by its officers; and in such ney, without a delegation of authority to its cases its officer asfixing the seal is the party agents, and that the grantor of the power bas executing the deed, within the meaning of the given no such power of substitution, cannot be Statute requiring deeds tc be acknowledged by sustained. the or. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U. S. 711 There was no error, and the judgment must (24 L. ed. 544); Frostburg Mut. Bldg. Asso. v. I be affirmed.


Appie M. PRENTISS et al., Appts.,

Hugh S. PAISLEY et al.

(....Fla.....) •1. A bill of review, for error of law appar

ent upon the record, will lie, although the decree *Head notes by RANEY, Ch. J.

sought to be reviewed is a final decree, consequent upon a decree pro confesso, for failure of

the defendant to plead. 2. Where the bill does not justify the

final decree following the decree pro confesso, a bill of review for error apparent upon the record is a proper remedy for relief in the court rendering such decree, and an appeal the remedy through the appellate court.

NOTE.-Wife's capacity to contract.

Under the Civil Code As to the wife's disability to contract, see notes Under Civ. Code, a married woman may enter to Speier v. Opfer (Mich.) 2 L. R. A. 345; Roop v. into any agreement or transaction respecting her Real Estate Invest. Co. (Pa.) 7 L. R. A. 211; Cook property which she might if unmarried. She may v. Walling (Ind.) 2 L. R. A. 769.

mortgage or convey it by deed of trust to secure The existence of the wife is merged in that of the the debts of her husband, and, having done so, bis husband, and a contract binding herself personally, creditors may enforce their claims against it in the or subjecting her to a judginent in personam, is same manner and to the same extent that they void. Spencer v. Parsons, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 769.

could if it were his property, and not her Burkle A married woman cannot be sued at law in an

v. Levy, 70 Cal. 250. action er contractu, except where such suit is authorized by express legislative enactment, Davis

District of Columbia. v. Carroll (Md.) 18 Atl. Rep. 965.

The common-law disability has not been removed A contract which could not bave been enforced in the District of Columbia (Ritch v. Hyatt, 3 Macagainst a married woman if living caunot be en-Arth. 536); but a married woman may contract to forced against her estate. Ibid.

repair her house, or to put it into rentable condiWhere coverture is pleaded to a contract it is tion. Harmon v. Garland, 1 Mackey, 1. proper, in the reply, to show that the contract is one

Florida. a married woman bas power to make. Arnold v.

Though the wife may conduct a mercantile busiEngleman, 1 West. Rep. 483, 103 Ind. 512.

ness in Florida, and the husband may act as agent Lale decisions from various state courts: for her in that business, yet she cannot make a conCalifornia.

tract berself or by bim as agent on which she will A married woman, in California, is incapable of be personally liable. McQuaid v.

24 Fla. contracting a personal obligation except in cases | 509. provided by statute. Norton v. Meader, 4 Sawy. 604. Tb determine whether the credit was given to

See also 31 L. R. A. 597.


8. A married woman is by the common 7. The marital relation does not of itself law incapable of making a contract

disqualify a husband from acting as the agent of that will bind her personally, either in law or

his wife with reference to her separate estate. equity; and for this reason there cannot, in the 8. The person in whom the legal title absence of legislation changing the common law, to property is vested in trust for a marbe a judgment or decree against her personally for ried woman is a necessary party to a bill seeking the recovery of money, as distinguished from a to charge the property with the payment of decree charging her separate equitable estate, or mocey paid to her. other property, with the payment of money, No exception to this rule is created by the existence of

(January 13, 1890.) a marriage contract between husband and wife giving her the right to control and manage her PPEAL by plaintiffs from an order of the separate estate and property the same as if she had remained unmarried.

a bill for review of proceedings in wbich a per 4. A married woman is personally lia- sonal decree was entered against a married

ble for her civil torts, including such frauds as woman, and refusing to enjoin the sale of her do not grow out of, or are not directly connected separate property for the enforcement of such with, or a part of, a contract which she has under-decree. Reversed. taken to make.

Hugh S. Paisley filed a bill against T. D. C. 5. Wherever coverture avoids a con. Prentiss and Annie M. Prentiss bis wife, alleg. tract which a wife has attempted to make, it like ing misrepresentation and fraud on the part of wise bars a personal recovery against the wife on defendants in selling to plaintiff certain land althe ground of the fraud connected there with; and leged to contain orange trees, but which in fact the bar cannot be overcome by suing her in an bad no such trees on it and was of very little

action ex delicto. 6. It is error to decree a recovery of of sale, a cancellation of the bood for title, a

value. He prayed a rescission of the contract money of or against a married woman personally, in a suit in equity instituted to set aside a delivery up of the notes given for the purcontract for the sale of land on the ground of chase money and a judgment against defendfraud, and to recover the amount of a cash pay- ants for the amount of the purchase money ment made thereon by the complainant. already paid.

him or to her, it should be shown that the fact was But she may render herself liable for things known to the vendor, or that between him and the bought by her for family use. Ibid. husband there was a clear and distinct understand- Yet she is not liable upon a contract for the board ing that the credit was given to her; else the hus- of herself and husband. Ibid. band will be liable. Ibid.

She cannot make a valid contract for the erecGeorgia.

tion of a building upon the joint property of herA married woman is not liable on her note given self and husbard, but can contract only with referfor money borrowed to pay the premium due by Crowe (Mich.) 41 N. W. Rep. 876.

ence to her sole or separate property. Curtis v, the husband upon a policy of insurance on his life, where it is not shown that the policy was for her made on behalf of her sole property. Mutual Ben.

A contract in writing to bind her must have been benefit alone. Jones v. Bradwell (Ga.) 10 S. E. L. Ing. Co. v. Wayne Co. Sav. Bank, 12 West. Rep. Rep. 745.

535, 68 Micb. 116. Minois.

The statutes do not authorize a wife to become As to the power of the wife, under the Enabling personally liable on an executory promise except Laws of Illinois, to engage in trade, etc., see Re concerning her separate estate. Kentoo Ins. Co. v. Kinkead, 3 Biss. 405; Farwell v. Kinkhead, 1 Am. L. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564; Reed v. Buys, 44 Mich. 80; Rec. 323.

Edwards v. McEnhill, 51 Mich. 160; Harvey v. GalIndiana.

loway, 48 Mich. 52; Richards v. Proper, 44 Mich. A married woman may execute a promissory 96; Wilson v. Coolidge, 42 Mich. 112; Gantz v. Toles, note for property purchased by her. Lane v. 40 Mich. 725. Schlemmer, 12 West. Rep. 924, 114 Ind. 296.


The capacity of married women to be bound and A note given by a married woman, not for neces- estopped by their conduct is incident to their ensaries for herself or family, and for which credit larged power to deal with others, under Minnesota was not given her, is void. Stevens,v. Deering (Ky.) statutes. Dobbin v. Cordiner (Minn.) 4 L. R. A. 333. OS. W. Rep. 292. Maryland.

Mississippi. A bond executed by a feme covert alone, without The statutes in Mississippi in relation to married the joinder of her husband, is void, and no action women have not relieved a wife from common-law can be maintained upon it, either during coverture disabilities to make contracts. Canal Bank v. Paror afterwards. Harris v. Dodge (Md.) 19 Atl. Rep. tee, 99 U. S. 325 (25 L. ed. 390). 697.

With certain exceptions a married woman canMassachusetts.

not bind herself by any covenant, nor can she be A married woman who indorses blank promissory bound by the covenants of her trustee in a deed of notes, at her husband's request, for him to fill up separation; nor can sbe, in consideration of such and use, which afterwards and in her absence he separation, convey or release to ber husband her fills up and negotiates for value at a bank, is liable claims on his estate. Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 to the bank as indorser, under the Massachusetts Miss. 125. statutes, which give her the unrestricted right to In Mississippi, unless a married woman has a sepcontract except with her husband. Binuey v. Globe arate estate, she is subject, as to her contracts, to Nat. Bank (Mass.) 6 L. R. A. 379.

the disability of coverture. Canal Bank v. Partee, Michigan.

supra. A married woman cannot make an executory A personal judgment against a married woman, contract that is not directly connected with her es- in an action against her on her promissory note, is tate. Howe v. North, 13 West. Rep. 919, 69 Mich. 272. a nullity under the laws of Mississippi. lbid.

A decree pro confesso was rendered against Dixon, 51 Miss. 593; Wallace v. Rippon, 2 Bay, defendants granting the relief prayed for and 112; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 262. directing execution to issue for the collection Her property is not liable on a general edof the money judgment, which decree was gagement, except where a case is made out for afterwards enrolled.

a court of equity to charge her separate estate, Subsequently defendants filed a bill of review as for improvements on the same. against Paisley and the sheriff to set aside so Spearman v. Ward, 6 Cent. Rep. 147, 114 much of the judgment as bound Mrs. Prentiss Pa. 634. and to enjoy the sale of her separate estate The only relief given in equity on a married which had been levied on to satisfy the judg- woman's contract to convey is to enforce a rement.

funding of the purchase inoney where she has The bill was dismissed, the injunction re- received it. fused and defendants appealed.

Goss v. Furman, 21 Fla. 411. Further facts appear in the opinion.

The judgment against her is not a personal Messrs. Miller & Spencer, for appellants: one purely, but one to be satisfied out of her

A creditor suing a married woman must, in separate estate; and the record should show his bill in equity or declaration at law, aver this, otherwise the judgment is void, and may that she is a married woman, that she bas a be so treated wherever it is met. separate estate and that the debt is a charge on Offutt v. Dangler, 5 Cent. Rep.430, 5 Mackey, it or ought to be paid out of it.

313; Canal Bank v. Partee, 99 U. S. 325 (25 Choppin v. Harmon, 46 Miss. 307; Canal L. ed. 390); Rodemeyer v. Rodman, 5 Iowa, 427; Bank v. Partee, 99 U, S. 334 (25 L. ed. 394). Leris v. Perkins, 36 N. J. L. 133; McGlaugh.

There can be no personal judgment against lin v. O'Rourke, 12 Iowa, 461; Cary v. Dizor, her at law, and no personal decree in chan- | 51 Miss. 593; Mallett v. Parham, 52 Miss. 921. cery; it must be one which reaches her property When a bill seeks to affect the separate only.

property of the wife through her personally, Reeves, Baron and Feme, 171; Bank of it should be dismissed; her trustees must be Louisiana v. Williams, 46 Miss. 629; Cary v. I made parties,


Ohio. Under the Revised Statutes of Missouri a married The jus disponendi which attaches in Ohio to woman may act as seme sole as to her separate prop- the estate of a married woman is largely regulated erty, and may make contracts for purchase of per- by statute. Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147. sonal property with her separate means. Dailey The ground upon which a court of equity charges v. Singer Mfg. Co. 4 West. Rep. 503, 88 Mo. 301; Ros- her separate estate for ber general engagements enheim v. Hartsock, 7 West. Rep. 114, 90 Mo. 357; is not because her contracts have any validity but Miller v. Brown, 47 Mo. 504.

because the circumstances are such that equity The restriction by Mo. Rev. Stat., 8 689, on the decrees it to be just that they should be paid out of power of a married woman to covenant in a joint her estate. Ibid. deed with her husband of her statutory estate, does Her separate property is not liable for her gennot apply to her covenants in a conveyance of her eral engagements in the absence of a contract valid separate estate in equity. Barlow v. Delaney, 40 in law to bind the same. Rice v. Columbus, T. & Fed. Rep. 97.

T. R, Co. 32 Ohio St. 380.
New Jersey.

Except so far as capacity has been given to her Under the New Jersey Revision, a wife may con- by statute to bind herself by her contracts, they tract to sell her real estate; and specific perform are void. Payne v. Thompson, 3 West. Rep. 153, 44 ance thereof will be decreed after her husband's Ohio St. 192. death, against one purchasing with knowledge

She may charge her separate estate at least to the thereof. Union Brick & Tile Mfg. Co. v. Lorillard, extent that such liability may be incurred for its 12 Cent. Rep. 82, 44 N. J. Eq. 1.

benefit. Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371; Patrick

v. Littell, 36 Ohio St. 79. New York,

Pennsylvania. In New York, a married woman may carry on business and may make contracts in the prosecu

The wife has only such power over her personal tion of such business. United States v. Garling- property as is conferred by statute. Hinkle v. Lanhouse, 11 Int. Rev. Rec. 11. See Voorhees v. Bone

dis (Pa.) 25 W. N. C. 218. steel, 83 U, S. 16 Wall. 16 (21 L. ed. 268).

All contracts made by the wife concerning her In the course of her separate business she can separate estate, other than for labor and materials make negotiable paper, which will be governed by for improving the same, are subject to her disabile the law-merchant. Noel v. Ki ney, 8 Cent. Rep.

ities as a feme covert, except where a case is made 60, 106 N. Y. 74.

out for the court to charge her separate estata Her contracts may be either express or implied, Spearman v. Ward, 6 Cent. Rep. 147, 114 Pa. 634. and may be made either personally or by agent.

Under Pa. Act of Feb. 29, 1872, a married woman and when within the statute they will charge her

can make a valid judgment note for a sewing-ma

Baker v. Singer separate estate. Dickerson v. Rogers, 114 N. Y. 405. chine purchased for her own use.

As to all contracts relating to her separate estate, Mfg. Co. 13 Cent. Rep. 477, 122 Pa. 363. a married woman stands at law, under the Married

Under the Pennsylvania Act of June 3, 1887 (Pub. Woman's Acts, on the same footing as if unmarried. Laws, 332) known as the Married Person's Property Noel v. Kinney, supra; Overseers of Poor of Parker Act, a married woman may confess judgment, or City v. Overseers of Poor of Du Bois Borough (Pa.) bind herself or her estate by contract, for three 8 Cent. Rep. 207; Frecking v, Robland, 53 N. Y. 422; purposes, viz.: where she engages in trade or busiBodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93.

ness; in the management of her separate estate;

and for necessaries; but she cannot bind her estate North Carolina

generally as a feme sole. Real Estate Invest. Co. r. As to the power of a wife, in North Carolina, to Roop (Pa.) 7 L. R. A. 211. make contracts which will charge her separate es- A married woman cannot enter into a valid agree tate, see Matthews v. Murchison, 17 Fed. Rep. 760. ment with a third person, without the consent of

Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418; 1 Daniell, Ch.Pr.186. The bill of review, considered as one for Mr. S. D. McConnell, for appellees: crror of law apparent upon the face of the rec

Equity will charge the separate property of ord, is maintainable. The term “record,” as the wife with tbe repayment of money advanced used in connection with such bills, means the to ber at ber instance and for her benefit or on pleadings and decree in the cause as to which account of her estate.

the complaint is made. Whiting v. Bank of U. Pentz v. Simonson, 13 N. J. Eq. 232; Norton S. 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 6 (10 L. ed. 33); Shelton v. v. Turrill, 2 P. Wms. 144; Greatley v. Noble, 3 Van Kleeck, 106 U. S. 532 (27 L. ed. 269). Madd. 79; Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3 Madd. 387. Looking at the Paisley decree, complained

The marital relation does not disqualify the of, we perceive one of its features to be a perhusband from becoming the agent of his wife. sonal recovery against Mrs. Prentiss, and the Tresch v. Wirtz, 34 N. J. Eq. 124.

pleading or bill shows the claim to be for a Equity will charge the separate estate of a money demand growing out of a contract, the married woman with the value of property sum recovered being the amount of a cash delivered to her as a consideration of a con- payment alleged to have been made on a contract for the sale of her separate property and tract for the sale of land, in wbich the comfor money expended by vendee by reason of plainant charges he has been defrauded. contract of sale.

A married woman is by the common law inPierson v. Lum, 25 N. J. Eq. 390.

capable of making a contract that will bivd ber The estate of a married woman is chargeable personally, either in law or equity; and for this with its augmentation by another through her reason there can be no personal judgment or procurement or knowledge and consent. decree of recovery against her. G088 v. Hur

Thrasher v. Doig, 18 Fla. 809; Staley v. Ham- man, 21 Fla. 406; Randall v. Bourguardez, 23 ilton, 19 Fla. 275.

Fla. 264; Dollner v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86; 1 Bishop,

Married Women, § 601; Pilcher v. Smith, 2 Raney, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the Head, 208; McQuaid v. Fontane, 24 Fla. 509; court:

Choppin v. Harmon, 46 Miss. 304; Bank of This is an appeal from an order denying an Louisiana v. Williams, Id. 618; Cary v. Dixon, injunction and dismissiog a bill of review. 51 Miss. 593; Mallett v. Parham, 52 Miss. 921;

her husband, transferring to such third person a So the improvement of land, or the management sum of money in consideration of his obligating of personal property, may be conducted through himself to pay her an annuity out of such sum the agency of ber husband. Noel v. Kinney, 8 during her natural life; and if she does so it will be Cent. Rep. 58, 106 N. Y. 74; Rowe v. Smith, 45 N. Y. presumed that such tbird person knew that she was 230. acting ultra vires. Hinkle v. Landis (Pa.) 25 W.N. Where a husband, under a power of attorney C. 218.

from his wife to convey her real estate, conveyed

the real estate to a third party, who reconveyed to South Carolina.

the husband on the same day, and he conveyed to Under the South Carolina law, a married woman the defendant, the transaction is void, being in fact cannot execute a valid contract of suretyship. a conveyance to himself by an agent authorized to Harris v. McCastan (S. C.) 10 S. E. Rep. 104.

sell land. A subsequent grantee of the wife may A note given by a married woman for money maintain ejectment against the husband's grantee. borrowed for her own use is valid, under S. C. Gen. McKay y. Williams, 12 West. Rep. 38, 67 Mich. 547. Stat., 8 2037. Howard v. Kitchens (S. C.) 10 S. E. Where a husband, both before and after mar. Rep. 224.

riage, was the agent for his wife, and collected the And a note given by her for money expended on interest on a pote sued on, for four years before account of her child at her request is invalid. Ibid. the defendant acquired it by an assignment from

him, a previous note having thus been negotiated Wisconsin.

with the defendant with the wife's knowledge; and In Wisconsin, married women have not been the proceeds of the note were used in paying family vested by statute with general power to bind them- expenses,-a finding against the wife, as to the husselves or their separate estates, by the ordinary band's agency, will not be disturbed. Mead v. contract of indorsement of a note. Avery v. Spalding, supra. Doane, 1 Biss. 64.

In an action to recover for labor done and ma

terials furnished on a wife's house, where it apHusband als agent of wife.

peared she was aware of the work at the time it The mere relation of husband and wife creates was being done, the agency was sufficiently made no agency in the husband to bind her by his repre-out to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Kelly v. sentations or to create an estoppel against her. Kearns, 10 Cent. Rep. 244, 107 N. Y. 633. Henry v. Sneed (Mo.) 12 S. W. Rep. 663; Wilcox v. But the knowledge, consent and approval of a Todd, 64 Mo. 388; Hall v. Callahan, 66 Mo. 316. wife, that improvements should be made to a house

A married woman may manage her separate es- owned by the wife, does not of itself constitute the tate either in person or by an agent, and can con- husband, under whose direction it was done, her stitute her husband her agent for that purpose, agent in fact. Ziegler v. Galvin, 45 Hun, 44. whose acts in purchasing articles for the use of ber That the wife resided on premises with her hus separate estate are binding upon her. Brown v. band subsequently to their being bired by him is Thomson (S. C.) 10 8. E. Rep. 95.

no evidence of her husband's authority to hire as The husband may be the agent of the wife, though her agent. Sandford v. Pollock, 7 Cent. Rep. 821, the agency must be clearly established. Mead v. 105 N. Y. 450. Spalaing, 12 West. Rep. 408, 94 Mo. 43; Eystra v. Where a husband by an agreement with his wife, Capelle, 61 Mo. 580; Rodgers v. Pike Co. Bank, 69 not recorded and not known to a creditor, carries Mo. 562; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596; Baum v. on business for himself upon his wife's plantation, Mullen, 47 N. Y. 577; Treman v. Allen, 15 Hun, 4; I she is responsible, as an undisclosed principal, for Abbey y. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343; Paine v. Farr, 118 those items of account only which were all for the Mass. 77; Ross v. Baldwin, 65 Miss. 570.

use and benefit of the business transacted with her

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