servations: "The real matters which the rela- | Statute. In the case in hand the plaintiff says he has a title, though not of record, and not required to be made matter of record, which is superior to and cuts out the deed of trust; and he brings that title forward, and pleads it, relying upon the Statute of Limitations, which concerns real actions only, and bases his right upon that The real issue which he tenders is the same that he would make in an action of ejectment brought by the purchaser at a trus tee's sale, and surely this court would have jurisdiction of an appeal in such a case. We must look to the pleadings in this case to see what the real issues proposed to be made are, and in doing this we cannot escape the conclusion that the case is one involving the title to real estate. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. All concur except Barclay, J., who dissents. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (2d Div.). Charles COUDERT et al., Admrs., etc., of| Edmond Fougera, Deceased, Respts., v. Isidor COHN et al., Appts. (....N. Y.....) Where tenants enter under a lease for a stated term of more than one year, which is void by reason of the absence of written authority to the owner's agent making the same, and pay rent, they become tenants from year to year, and the time for the commencement and termination of the respective terms will correspond in each year with the date of entry; and if they hold over after tenancy until the end of the succeeding term with the possible exception that they may quit at the the close of any term, they cannot terminate the day fixed in the lease for the termination of the tenancy should such day be reached. (January 14, 1890.) Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180; Doe v. Terry, 4 Ad. & El. 274. Bradley, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The action was brought to recover rent of premises described in a written lease made by the agent of the plaintiffs' intestate to the defendants in January, 1884, for the term of two years and five months, commencing on the 1st day of March, 1884, and ending on the 1st day of August, 1886, at the yearly rent of $3,000, payable, in equal monthly payments, on the last business day of each month. The authority of the agent to make the lease not being in writing, it was void. 2 Rev. Stat. p. 131, § 6. The defendants went into possession on the 1st of March, 1884, and continued to occupy and pay rent up to August, 1885, when they left the premises, and sought to surrender the possession up to the plaintiffs' intestate, who APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of declined to accept it. He recovered for the the General Term of the Supreme Court, Second Department, affirming a judgment of the Kings Circuit entered upon a verdict directed for plaintiffs in an action to recover rent alleged to be due and unpaid. Affirmed. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Messrs. Simpson & Werner, for appellants: The yearly term expired on August 1, 1885, and, the defendants having quitted, they were not further liable. Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 7th Am. ed. 114; People v. Rickert, 8 Cow. 231; Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 209. The defendants were only liable for the time they actually occupied, which is coincident with the expiration of the term, to wit, August 1. 1885; and consequently there can be no recovery here. Thomas v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118; Prial v. Entwistle, 10 Daly, 398; Smith v. Genet, 2 N. Y. City Ct. Rep. 88; Fougera v. Cohn, 2 N. Y. City Ct. Rep. 253. Messrs. Carpenter & Roderick, for respondents: The defendants are liable for the rent sued for. Having entered into possession under the void lease, a yearly tenancy was created, and, having held over after the expiration of the first year, they are liable for at least another year's rent. amount of rent at the rate mentioned in the lease from the 1st of August to the 1st of March following. While the cases are not entirely in harmony on the subject, the doctrine now in this State is such that the defendants, on going into possession of the premises and paying rent, became, by reason of the invalidity of the demise, tenants from year to year, and in such case the continuance of occupancy into the second year rendered them chargeable with the rent until its close. They could then only terminate their tenancy at the end of the current year. Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180; Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205. The question presented is, When did the rental year arising out of such relation commence and terminate? It is contended by the defendants' counsel that inasmuch as the end of the term designated by the terms of the lease was the 1st of August, 1886, that was the time when the yearly tenancy, in contemplation of law, terminated, and therefore the surrender was properly made on the 1st of August, 1885. It is urged that this view is in harmony with the recognized principle that, although the lease was invalid, the agreement contained in it regulated the terms of the tenancy in all respects except as to the duration of the term, and Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471, is cited. There a farm was, in January, 1790, let by a parol lease, void by the Statute of Frauds, for seven years, the ly to that time, he must be considered a tenant from year to year with reference to the time of the original entry. lessee to enter upon the land when the former the effect that, although the tenancy was from tenant left, on Lady Day, and into the house year to year, the tenant might without notice on the 25th of May following, and was to quit have quit at the expiration of the period conat Candlemas. He entered accordingly, and templated in the agreement, but, having repaid rent. A notice was served upon the ten-mained in possession and paid rent subsequentant, September 22, 1792, to quit on Lady Day. In ejectment brought against him, it was claimed on the part of the lessee that his holding was from Candlemas, and therefore the notice was ineffectual to terminate the tenancy. Lord Kenyon, in deciding the case, said and held that "it was agreed that the defendant should quit at Candlemas; and though the agreement is void as to the number of years for which the defendant was to hold, if the lessor choose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven years, he can only put an end to it at Candlemas." The same principle, in respect to holding over a term, was announced in Doe v. Dobell, 1 Ad. & El. N. S. 806, where it was said that "in all cases the current year refers to the time of entry, unless the parties stipulate to the contrary." The doctrine of the English cases seems to be that a party entering under a lease, void by the Statute of Frauds, for a term, as expressed in it, of more than one year, and paying rent, That case has in several instances been cited is treated as a tenant from year to year from by the courts of this State upon the question the time of his entry, subject only to the right of the force remaining in the terms of the agree to terminate the tenancy without notice at the ment embraced in a void lease. And in Schuy-end of the specified term; and to that extent, ler v. Leggett, 2 Cow. 663, it was remarked by Chief Justice Savage, in citing it, that such an agreement "must regulate the terms on which the tenancy subsists in other respects, as the rent, the time of the year when the tenant must quit," etc. And the citation was repeated to the same effect by the chief justice in People v. Rickert, 8 Cow. 230. The question here did not arise in either of those two cases, nor can they be treated as authority that the time for termination of a tenancy from year to year, in any year other than that of the designated expiration of term, is governed by such designation in a void lease for more than one year rather than by the time of entry. The effect sought to be given in the present case to the case of Doe v. Bell is not supported by English authority. In Berrey v. Lindley, 3 Man. & G. 498, the tenant entered into possession of premises under an agreement void by the Statute of Frauds, by the terms of which he was to hold five years and a half from Michaelmas. Several years after his entry, and after expiration of the period mentioned in the agreement, the lessee gave notice to his landlord to terminate the tenancy at Michaelmas. It was there contended on the part of the latter, and Doe v. Bell was cited in support of the proposition, that the time designated in the agreement for the termination of the tenancy governed in that respect. But the court decided otherwise, and held that the notice was effectual to terminate the ten ancy. The views of the court there were to and for that purpose only, the terms of the agreement, in such case, regulate the time_to quit. This right is held to be reciprocal. Doe v. Stratton, 4 Bing. 446. That proposition is not without sensible reason for its support. The lease for more than one year, unless made in the manner provided by the Statute, cannot be effectual to vest the term in the lessee; yet in other respects the rights of the parties may be determined by its terms, so far as they are consistent with its failure to create any estate or interest in the land, or any duration of term for occupancy by the lessee; and that principle is properly applicable to such leases. Porter v. Bleiler, 17 Barb. 154; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 184; Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205, 209. This view does not aid the defendants. They became tenants from year to year as from the time of their entry; and although, by virtue of the terms of the agreement in that respect in the lease, they may have been at liberty to quit on the 1st of August, 1886, if they had remained until then, such time in that or the year previous could not be treated as the end of any year of the tenancy. The defendants having entered upon the second year from the time of the original entry, it was not within their power to terminate their relation or liability as tenants until the end of the then current year, which did not terminate until the 1st of March was reached. The conclusion, from these views, necessarily follows that the judgment should be affirmed. All concur, except Brown, J., not sitting. See also 18 L. R. A. 278; 32 L. R. A. 643. the City of New York affirming a judgment | about May 28, 1885, Dougherty conveyed the of the Special Term in favor of plaintiff in an action to have certain taxes adjudged void, and to enjoin the collection of the same: Reversed. Statement by Earl, J.: This action was brought for the purpose of baving certain taxes which were imposed upon real estate in the City of New York in and for the year 1882 adjudged void and canceled, and to restrain the collection thereof. The case was tried at a special term of the New York Superior Court, and the trial justice found the following facts: That on or about December 22, 1881, James J. Dougherty entered into a written contract with the New York Life Insurance Company for the purchase of premises known as "No. 304 East Seventy-Eighth Street," New York City, upon which was a four-story building, with basement. That on or about January 17, 1882, for a valuable consideration, the insurance company, by deed, conveyed the premises to Dougherty, who took the property in 'his own name, individually, but purchased the same on behalf of and with moneys belonging to the Church of St. Monica, a religious society of the Roman Catholic Church, of which he then was pastor. That it is a common custom for priests of the Roman Catholic Church to take deeds of property in their own names, and this custom was known to the archbishop at the time of the purchase, and the purchase was made with the archbishop's knowledge and authority. That prior to January, 1882, and ever since, the building was and has been used exclusively for school purposes, under the management of Dougherty, as pastor of the Church of St. Monica. That the school was presided over by the Sisters of Charity. That all female children of St. Monica's parish between the ages of five and sixteen years were admitted to the school, which was known as "St. Monica's Female Parochial School," and that all branches of commonschool education were taught there. That the basement and several floors of the building, during the period aforesaid, were used as follows: The basement was the class-room for primary children; the first floor, the classroom for larger children; the second floor was used for the chapel; the third floor, for a lecture-room, and the fourth floor, for the residences of the Sisters of Charity, with the exception of three rooms used for storage. That the City of New York, through its proper officers, assessed the premises for taxation, in and for the year 1882, in the sum of $7,000, and there after imposed a tax upon the premises for that year, based upon the assessed valuation, amount ing to $157.50. That in the year 1885 the Church of St. Monica was incorporated as a religious body, under the provisions of chapter 45, Laws 1863, and amendments. That, on or premises to the plaintiff, the incorporated Church of St. Monica. That the parochial school is not incorporated, but belongs to the plaintiff. And he found as conclusions of law that the tax of $157.50 imposed upon the property for the year 1882 was void because at the time of the imposition thereof the property was exempt from taxation for the reason that the building was a "school-house," within the meaning of the Statute exempting schoolhouses from taxation, and was exclusively used for the purposes of a school, and was exclusively the property of a religious society; and he gave judgment for the plaintiff as prayed for. Earl, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Among the property exempted from taxation in the Revised Statutes is the following: "Every building erected for the use of a college, incorporated academy or other seminary of learning; every building for public worship; every school-house, court-house and jail; and the several lots whereon such buildings are situated, and the furniture belonging to each of them." Rev. Stat. pt. 1, chap. 13, title 1, § 4, subd. 3. Under this provision it has been held that no seminary of learning is exempt from taxation, unless it is incorporated, and that no school-house is exempt, unless it belongs to the public common-school system of the State. Cregaray v. New York, 13 N. Y. 220; People v. Brooklyn Board of Assessors, 32 Hun, 457, affirmed in this court, 97 N. Y. 648; Col ored Orphans Ben. Asso. v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581, 6 Cent. Rep. 796. If, therefore, the exemption here claimed depended upon the Revised Statutes, it is clear that it would have to be denied. There has been, however, further legislation. In 1852 (chapter 282) the Act "Defining the Exemptions from Taxation on Public Building in the City of New York' was passed, the first section of which is as follows: "The exemption from taxation of every building for public worship, and every school-house or other seminary of learning, under the provisions of subd. 3, § 4, title 1, chap. 13, of pt. 1 of the Revised Statutes, or amendments thereof, shall not apply to any such building or premises in the City of New York, unless the same shall be exclusively used for such purposes, and exclusively the property of a religious society, or of the New York Public School Society." And this provision was subsequently embodied in the Consolidation Act relating to the City of New York, except the last phrase, above italicised. Laws 1882, chap. 410, § 827. There is 'building erected for the use of a college, incorpo- | v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. rated academy or seminary of learning, does not embrace a building used and occupied for a private boarding-school. Chegaray v. New York, 13 N. Y. 220, State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497; St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. 451. An exemption of all houses of religious worship will not exempt portions of the building leased for business purposes. Prop'rs of S. C. Meeting-House 611; Old South Society v. Boston, 127 Mass. 378; Chapel of the Good Shepherd v. Boston, 120 Mass. 212; Baltimore Appeal Tax Court v. Grand Lodge A. F. & A. Masons, 50 Md. 421; Fort Des Moines Lodge, I. O. O. F., v. Polk Co. 56 Iowa, 34; Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa, 275; Cook v. Hutchins, 48 Iowa, 706; Frederick Co. v. Sisters of Charity of St. Joseph, 48 Md. 34. some dispute whether, at the time this assessment was imposed, the Act of 1852, or the provision in the Act of 1882, was in force; and it is now immaterial to determine the matter. The provision above quoted is not happily worded, and its precise scope and meaning are not entirely clear; and its language has given some trouble to those who have had to deal with it. Colored Orphans Ben. Asso. v. New York, 38 Hun, 593. that was an unincorporated society, and not, we think, such a society as the law-makers meant to include in the words "religious society," used in the Act of 1852. They evidently had in mind religious societies incorporated under the Act of 1813, entitled an Act "to Provide for the Incorporation of Religious Societies," or under some one of the other nu merous Acts for the same purpose. The words "religious society," when used in the laws of this State, as they frequently are, generally have reference to an incorporated religious society. It cannot be supposed that it was the legislative intention that any number of persons could come together for some religious purpose, and set up a school, and then claim the exemption. In using the words "religious society," it is most probable that the law-makers had in mind some legal entity capable, as such, of taking and holding property, and popularly known as a "religious society. It was apparently the purpose of the Act of 1852 to limit and confine in the City of New York the exemptions contained in the Revised Statutes, and not to extend them; and hence the qualifying words, "exclusively used for such purposes, and exclusively the property of a religious society," were added. But, without undertaking to give a precise construction to these qualifying words, we think this, at least, is clear: that before a school-house can be exempted it must belong to the public-school system of the city, or be "exclusively the prop- We are therefore of opinion that upon the erty of a religious society." We have there- facts found the plaintiff was not entitled to the fore only to determine whether this school-relief claimed, and that the judgment should be house belonged to a religious society. We will reversed; and as there is no probability that assume that it belonged to the society at the the facts can be changed, the complaint should time called the "Church of St. Monica," al- be dismissed, with costs. though the legal title was held either by the All concur. insurance company or Father Dougherty. But | TEXAS SUPREME COURT. G. KRUEGER, Appt., V. John KRUEGER. (......Tex.......) 1. When a debt is barred the new promise relied on must acknowledge the justness of the claim, and express a willingness to pay it. 2. A letter saying: "I have done my best to raise some money, but I cannot do it now... But some money we will send you, but not all, because we must live first,"-does not constitute a clear, unequivocal and unconditional acknowledgment of the justness of the demand, nor express a willingness to pay suflicient to remove the bar of the Statute. (January 21, 1890.) Court of Fayette County, and alleged in his petition that the defendant resided in Hamilton County, Texas, and that on the 1st day of January, 1880, the defendant executed and deliv ered to him his promissory note set out in the petition, as follows: $2,061. Round Top, January 1, 1880. We the undersigned, or either one of us, promise to pay to the order of John Krueger, in the Town of Round Top, Fayette Co., Texas, the sum of two thousand and sixty-one dollars, American coin, with interest from date at the rate of ten per cent per annum, interest payable annually, for value received. It is further provided that we are to pay any and all expenses, including attorney's fees, should the collection of the note be made by an attorney. G. Krueger. It was further alleged that the defendant, in APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the District Court for Fayette County in his indebtedness on the 10th day of August, a letter written by him to plaintiff in regard to favor of plaintiff in an action upon a promis-1887, admitted the justness of the debt, and sory note which was alleged to have been taken out of the operation of the Statute of Limita- promised to pay it. The letter is as follows: tions by a new promise. Reversed. Hamilton, 10th August, 1887. Dear Father: I have done my best to raise some money, but I cannot do it now, because the little money which I had yet, I bought wheat for, which was cheap still. I bought it at 68 cents yet, and then hauled 40 miles; and corn for feed I must also buy, because that is very slim here, as rain was wanted. Cotton, too, don't look the best. But some money we will send you, but not all, because we must live first, and that in Brenham we must pay too: that was a hard lick for us. Dear father, you sent me a note that I don't sign. I will pay you some every year, but whenever I can, but I sign no more papers, for I think it is just as good without, because we all know how we stand; but you must be satisfied with what you get every year, for I will do whatever I can. G. Krueger. An acknowledgment which will take a debt out of the bar of the Statute of Limitations must be clear and unequivocal, and neither qualified by conditions nor limitations. McDonald v. Grey, 29 Tex. 83; Dickinson v. Lott, Id. 173; Madox v. Humphries, 24 Tex. 196; Smith v. Fly, Id. 353. The defendant pleaded his privilege of being sued in the county of his residence, and claimed that, while the original note was payable in Fayette County, it was barred, and the suit was Considered in the light of these authorities, on the alleged admission and promise contained we think it too clear for argument that the letin defendant's letter of August 10, 1887, which ter relied on by plaintiff to take the barred note did not stipulate for payment in Fayette Coun-out of the operation of the Statute of Limitaty. The defendant interposed the same de- tions is not sufficient for that purpose. It does fense by special exception, and also especially not contain a clear, unequivocal and uncondiexcepted on the ground that the note set out in tional acknowledgment of the justness of plainthe petition was barred by the four-years' Stat-tiff's demand, nor does it contain an expression ute of Limitations, and that, "the letter sued on as a new promise does not show any promise to pay any certain sum of money, nor does it show any acknowledgment of the justness of any demand of plaintiff against defendant." The plea and exceptions were overruled, and the trial, without a jury, resulted in judgment for plaintiff for principal, interest and attorney's fees, according to the terms of the note. of a willingness to pay. We think it settled by the authorities, supra, that the acknowledg ment, to relieve the claim from the operation of the Statute of Limitations, must contain an unqualified admission of a just, subsisting indebtedness, and express a willingness to pay it. If the expression of a willingness to pay is coupled with conditions, it devolves upon the plaintiff to prove that the named conditions have taken place. Leigh v. Linthecum, 30 Tex. 103. Under proper assignment of error, it is contended that the court erred in holding that defendant's letter to plaintiff was sufficient to We think the court below erred in its contake the barred note out of the Statute of Lim-struction of the letter from defendant to plainitations; and this is the only question we think tiff, and are of the opinion that its judgment it necessary to consider. It is conceded that should be reversed, and the cause dismissed. the original debt was barred. When a debt is barred, the new promise relied on must acknowledge the justness of the claim, and express a willingness to pay it. Coles v. Kelsey 2 Tex. 555. Stayton, Ch. J.: Report of commission of appeals examined, opinion adopted, judgment reversed, and cause dismissed. 1. Books made up by the receiver of taxes containing a statement of tax sales, and by him handed over to the city treasurer, are public records within the meaning of Pub. Acts 1889, No. 205, giving all persons the right to examine them for any lawful purpose. 2. An abstract maker cannot be de prived of the right to inspect public records given by Pub. Acts 1889, No. 205, because he uses the records to prepare abstracts of title for other persons for a compensation. (December 28, 1889.) PETITION for a writ of mandamus to com pel respondent to permit relator to inspect the public records in the custody of respondent as city treasurer. Granted, The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry A. Chaney, for relator: Relator has a right to inspect and copy from the city treasurer's official records; and this right is enforcible by mandamus. Lum v. McCarty, 39 N. J. L. 287; People v. Richards, 99 N. Y. 620; Hanson v. Eichstaedt, The Legislature has full power to open the records to the public, and no mere official perquisite can stand against its action. Silver v. People, 45 Ill. 225. Courts have nothing to do with any mere questions of policy in the enactment of statutes. People, 44 Mich. 280; Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Mich. Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 335; Reithmiller v. 431. That the right of inspection existed at common law, see Rer v. Shelley, 3 T. R. 141; Rex v. Allgood, T T. R. 746; Herbert v. Ashburner, 1 Wils. 297; Bacon, Abr. title Evidence (F) 306. The abstract maker's standing in the law is now such that he is held to a responsibility in damages for the accuracy of the information which he furnishes. Smith v. Holmes, 54 Mich. 104. Mr. John W. McGrath, for respondent: There is no common-law right to make copies or abstracts of public records for specu. lative purposes, as for the compilation of a set of abstract books for selling abstracts of titles, nor is such a right given by Act 54 of 1875. Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 534; Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 51 Mich. 145. Morse, J., delivered the opinion of the 69 Wis. 538; State v. Rachac, 37 Minn. 372; Boy-court: lan v. Warren, 39 Kan. 301, 7 Am. St. Rep. 551. The relator asks for the writ of mandamus |