Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

case.

the trust fund, subject, however, to the rules should succeed in maintaining their case upon of equity as applicable to the facts and circum- some ground independent of being substituted stances which may exist in any particular to the equity of the trustee who contracted the

Ex parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr. 110; krdebt to them. parte Richardson, 3 Madd. 138; Owen v. Dela. It is not necessary that the plaintiffs who inmere, L. R. 15 Eq. 134; Cutbush v. Cutbush, 1 stitute such a suit should first bave recovered Beav. 184; Thompson v. Andreus, 1 Myl. & K. judgment on their claim, or even that their 116; Buruell v. Manderille, 43 U. S. 2 Ilow. claim should be vet due. Whitmore v. Orbor560 (11 L. ed. 378]; Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. rulo, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 13; Story, Eq. 35, 47. 320, 330 (25 L. ed 955); Jones v. Walker, 103 And the usual way is for one creditor to sue U. S. 444 [26 L. ed. 404); Pitkin v. Pithin, 7 in behalf of all. Story, Eq. Pl. $ 99; Erberts Conn. 307; 2 Story, Eq. & 1400; Lewin, Tr. v. Wood, 3 Paige, 520; Hallett v. Halett, 2 Paige, 7th ed. 217.

15; Chapman v. Bankers & T. Pub. Co. 128 It is indeed contended on the part of the Mass. 478; Thompson v. Dunn, L. R. 5 Cb, 573. plaintiffs that their right to resort io the trust We can have no doubt, therefore, ibut the propery is a primary and originalright, wbicb demurrer to the bill should be overruled. The exisis independently of any right on the part demurrer was contained in the answer, and of the trustees to be indempified. Wylly v. tbcre appears to have been no formal order by Collins, 9 Ga. 223.

a single justice overruling it, but the case was The view, lowever, wbich has prevailed in referred to a master, who has made a report England, so far as the question has been dis- which was apparently designed to present all cussed, is ibat tbe creditors may reach the trust the material facts involved in the issues raised property when the trustees are entitled to be by tbe pleadings. No objections or exceptions indemnified therefrom, and tbat the creditors were taken to the report, and when ibe case reach it by being substituted for the trustces came on to be beard before a single justice, it and standing in their place. Re Johnson, L. was, upon the request of both parties, reserved R. 15 Ch. Div. 548; Douse v. Gorton, L. R. 40 for ibe determination of the full court, upon Ch. Div. 5:6; Lindley, Partn. 4th ed. 607,608. the pleadings and the master's report. The

It is wiih reference to this docirine that ibe more important questions which bave been ardefendants contend that the plaintiffs ought to gued upon the merits are two: (1) whether the offer in tbeir bill 10 make good 10 the trust riglits of tbe plaivtiffs are qualified by any equifund the losses and defaults occasioned by the ty which exists in favor of the trust estate acts of silus H. Pomeroy. But this ground is against Silas H. Pomeroy; (2) whether the untenable on the demurrer, because, assuming earlier creditors are entitled to have a priority for the present this doctrive to be correct and over the laler ones. taking the plaintiffs' case upon the lowest In reference to the first of these questions, ground, the bill sets out the right of the trus- there is nothing in the facts stated in the mastees to be indempitied against personal liability ter's report which shows that there is any eq. ipcurred in the proper execution of the trust, uily existing in favor of the trust estate against the existence of such liability to ibe plaintiffs Silas H. Pomeroy, so that we have no occasion and others and ibe equiiable right of the plain to consider the question whether, as a general tills and oibers to have enforced in their favor rule of equity, the rights of the plaintiffs would for the payment of their claims the rights of be qualitied ihereby in case it should be found the trustees for reimbursement and indemnity; that he was bimself subject to any such equity. and it asserts a right to bave their claims paid Mention has already been made of the proout of tbe trust property and estate in full, or vision in the will, ibai the trustees shall be enif such property and estate are insufficient, then titled to a fair and reasonable compensation to bave their claims paid io pro rota propor. for their services in administering the trust, tions; and prays that tbe trusiees be beld and and shall not be liable to any loss to the trust ordered to account for the triist property, and estate wbich does not involve bad faith on their that an account of the creditors may also be part. Assuming that the doctrine of the retaken and ibe equitable interest of Silas H. rent Englislı cases above ciled | Re Johnson and Pomeroy in the trust estate may be sold and Duwse v. Gorton) is applicable to the present disposed of, and the proceeds applied in pay case, we find nothing io show ibat Silas H. ment of the plaintiffs and others. There is no Pomeroy is indebted to the trust ostate, or that occasion for any distinct offer on the part of the he bas caused any loss to the same for which plaintiffs to make good any possible losses to be is responsible, under the terms of the will

. the trust estare, arising from bis misconduct, There has been no formal accounting, and the if any sucb there were, since ilicy would only material facts, briefly stated, upon which this succeed to such rights as be might be found to question depends are as follows: Until May, have. There is no surgestion in the bill of any 1881, the trustees carried op tbe business to misconduct or default on bis part, but if there geiher. While so carrying it on, disagreements were, and if the plaintiffs have no higher right arose, and the other two irusters bronelit a bill tban simply to siand in his place, the bill need in equity in the court, on the 111b of April, pot contain any such offer to make good losses 1885, against Si'as II. Pomeroy and the other in oriler to enuitle the plaintiffs to reach parties in interest, under the Sinute giving ju. whatever upon account may be found to remain risdiction in equity to regulate the execution of as a fund from wbich be would be entitled to trusts. be indemnified. The result of such an ac- On tbe 18th of May, 1885, an agreement was counting cannot be anticipated or a demurrer. made whereby Silas II. Ponieroy was to take If it should prove tinally that there was doth charge of the mills and property and carry on ing to wbicb be wus entitled, then the plain the business, and pay over to Turnbull, who tiifs would fail on the merits, unless they I was one of the other trustees, and whose firm was also a large creditor of the trustees, the net | benefit of the other trustees in raising the avails over and above the cost of manufacture $10,000. The master expressly finds that the of the goods manufactured and sold by bim, goods became a part of the trust property, and and be was also to give to the two other trus that they were suitable and necessary therefor. tecs an agreeinent with acceptable surely in. Whether the purchase was or was not in acdemnifying them against any liability, debt or cordance with the first decree, the second deobligation created by his arts, and also securing cree dealt with the question of any failure in the payment above provided for to Turubull. that respect, and it has been co:nplied with; so No restriction was put upon his power to con. tbat it is not now to be alleged against Pomeroy tract debts in carrying on the business. Such that he failed to comply with the terms of the agreement with surety was given, and Pomeroy first decree, in respect to the purchase of goods. took possession of the mills and property and There were certain other particulars in the proceeded with the manufacturing business decree of June 1, 1886, respecting wbich nothunrier the same name as before.

ing bas yet been done, namely, the indebtedOn the 1st of June, 1836, a decree was made dess of the trust estate to Turnbull & Co. bas in the suit in equity denying a motion for a re not been determined, and no mortgage to seceiver, and prescribing the manner in which cure the same bas been given. With reference Ponierny slould thereafterconduct the business. to these the first step 10 be taken was to delerHe was to proceed with the manufacture of mine the amount of indebtedness by reference the wool and raw material then on band and to a master, if the parties did not agree, and if turn o er tbe net avails of tbe goods to Turn- this bas not been done there is nothing to show bull & Co; his right to purchase new material that the omission has been through any fault was limited; after all the stock should be man. of Pomeroy. It was a matter between the ufactured be was to be at liberty to copiinue the three trustees on the one side, and Turubull & business as trustee under the will; as soon as he Co, on the other, Mr. Turnbull himselt being bad manufactured the material on hand and on both sides. the goods had been sold and the proceeds an: There has been no accounting, in wbich plied as above provi led, then the balance, if Pomeroy has been found to be in default. as in any, due to Turnbull & Co., was to be deter. the case of Re Johnson, before cited; and there mined by reference to a masier, if the parties is nowhere in the master's report any finding did not agree, and a morgage upon the trust that there has been any loss to the trust estate property was to be given 10 secure such bal- tbrough any fault of his; much less, that there ance, and thereupon thie two other trustees were has been any loss which involved bad faith on to be discharged as trustees; the business was his part. We are therefore unable to see that to be so conducted as to create no liability upon he is in any manner indebied to the trust estate, the two other trustees; and there were certain or that there is any equity existing against him other subordinate provisions. Pomeroy faileil to prevent bim from being indemnitied out of in ceriain parlirulars to conform to the above the trust estate for personal liabilities assumed decree, and on the 41b of June, 1887, a new by him in the conduct of the business. decree was entered, reciting ibat be bad dis- Nor do we see any good reason for giving to obeyed the order of the court in that be bad the first class of creditors, whose debts accrued failed to turn over to Turnbull & Co the net wl.ile the three trustees were carrying on the proceeds of the goods, and bad in'ermingled business, a priority over the latter creditors the material and goods, until their identity had / whose dehts accrued duriog the management been lost, and had used the proceeds for carry.j of Pomeroy. The business during the whole ing on the general business of manufacturing, time was the business contemplated in the will. and that he bad thus failed to apply $40,000: Tbere was no change of truslees. By an arand it was thereupon ordered that all the wool rangement among themselves, wbich was sancand raw material then on band should be de-lioned by the court, one of the trustees assumed voted and set ap:ırt 10 raise $10,000 to be ap- the direct management of the business, but plied as directed in the former decree. there was no separation of the property, no in

Tledecree furtber provided ibat ibe business ventory, no accounting and do withdrawal or of manufacturing should be continued, and discharge of any of the trustees. The 'rustees that additional necessary material might be who retired fruin the active management made pi rchased from time to time not exceeding an arrangement with ibeir associate which was $100,000, and added to add mixed with the then deemed sufficient for their protection. Block on band. From the proceels of such Pomeroy's failure in the first instance to conmanufacture after deducting the cost of such form to the directions of the first decree of the additional property, and expense, the sum of court was made good by wliat bedil under the $40.000 and interest was to be paiii 10 Turnbull second decree. The master finds that he in& Co., or to creditors of the three trustees. curred debts and liabilities for and on account There were ther provisions not necessary to be of the business for goods and materials used in stared here. The master finds that it was ad and made a part and parrel of the trust propmitted that ineprovisions above inentioned have erty, and such goods and materials were suitbeen substantially fullilled. The new decree able and necessary for the manufacturing busiin ibe particuinis above mentioner was a sub-ness as con lucied by him, and for payment of stitute for the former decree. If wide the first then the creditors relied on the credit of the decree was in force be exceeded wbilt was trust property, as well as on bis personal credit; ther«in prescribed in respect to the purchase of and these are the debis due to the plaintiffs and goods, that transgressiou was cured by the ap lose in whose behalf this suit is prosecu ed. propriation of the property so purebased under the trust is now ready to be closed. It is found the Dew decree. The goods so purchased went that these iwo classes of crediture prist; the first into the trusl properly and thus went for ile class to the amount of about $91,000, and the second class to the amount of about $51,000, mortgage or whether any mortgage would be besides a few others which are to be dealt with given. The decree contemplated a security to specially. They have all furnished materials be given in the future in ease it should be deand supplies to the trust property, and it may termined that there remained any indebtedness prove ibat ibe trust property pow remaining is 10 secure. But now the whole business is insufficient to pay them all in full. Why stopped and creditors must accept the situation should one class of creditors be preferred to as it is. The later creditors bave contributed another? There is nothing in the statules and to increase the trust property and it would not Dothing in the provisions of the will directly be equitable or just to appropriate the whole applicable to such a case. It is suggested that trust property to the payment of the earlier under the decree made in June, 1886, it was creditors in full, leaving the later creditors to contemplated that a mortgage upon the trust the chance of what might remoin. property should be given which would inure to The provision in the decree of June 1, 1886, the benefit of the tiist class of creditors. But that the business be so conducted in tbe future such mortgage was to be given while the con- as to create no liability upon the two plaintiffs cern was a going concern; it has never been as trustees, and that they should not be liable given, and the time has never come for it to be for any debt incurred by S. II. Pomeroy in given. There was first to be a determination doing ihe business, referred only to a direct li. of the amount due, by a reference to a master, ability on their part. It did not mean that and this has never been done. The business is creditors in the future should be postponed to pow no longer to be carried on under the trust themselves in case of a possible pecessity for but the trust is to be wound up, and in view of resorting 10 the dust property. It is not conthe question in controversy it is to be treated as tended that the creditors whose debts accrued if the trust properly were insufficient to pay the usder the management of Pomeroy have any debts in full. "Ordinarily, under the insoli ent direct claim upon the iwo other trustees. The laws, an agreement by a debtor to give to bis several claims specially reported upon by the creditor a mortgage in tbe future will not pro master may be allowed to be paid out of the tect the mortgage when given from being set' trust fund, either as expenses of the adminisaside as a preferepre. Copeland v. Barnes, 147 tration of the trust, or as the costs of parties Mass. 288, 390, 7 New Eng. Rep. 61, and cases properly brought before the court in a suit to tbere cited.

determine the duties of the truslees, no objecThe steps were pot scasopably taken to pro- tion being made by any party. Under the cure the mortgage, and it is now too late. New above decision, there is no need io classify them equities bave avisen. If tbe mortgage had ac- furiler. Abbott v. Bradstreet, 3 Allen, 587; 3 tually been given, crerlitors would have been Perry, Tr. & 910; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 41h Am. ed. bound to take notice of it. Under the decree, 1412. it was not certain whether there would be any Decree accordingly. balance of indebtedness to be secured by the

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS.

0.

Franklin FARREL et al..

tained counsel to oppose this petition and this

suit was brought to enjoin the pyment for TOWN OF DERBY et al.

sucb services from the funds of the Town.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. (58 Conn. 234.)

Messrs. V. Munger and John P. Kel.

logg, for plaintiffs, in support of the demurrer: 1. A town has power to employ counsel A town has no such implied right to its exto oppose before the General Assembly a peti- isting boundaries that it may defend them tion for the division of its territory.

against that legislative body which has given 2. The vote of the town is not neces- tbe town all the powers it possesses and even sary to authorize selectmen to employ counsel its existence itself. and incur expense to oppose a division of the

See Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Minot town by the General Assembly.

v. West Roabury, 112 Mass. 6; Coolidge v.

Broohline, 114 Mass. 592; Westbrook v. Deer. (Andrewr, Ch. J., dissents.)

ing, 63 Me. 231; Opinion of the Justicc8, 52 (December 30, 1889.)

Me. 598; Frankfort v. Winterport, 51 Me. 250.

The fact that notice must be given under

for New llaven County, upon bill, answer sented to the Legislature, and the fact that noand demurrer ibereto, of a suit to enjoin the tice was served upon the Town of Derby in payment by defendants of certain expenses in this case, gives this Town Do new rights, curred in opposing a petition to the General duties or powers. Assembly for a division of the Town of Derby. First Society of Waterbury v. Platt, 12 Conn. Judgment for defendants adrised.

181; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Ilartford, 16 Tbe plaintiff with oiliers presented a petition Conn, 149; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Cunn. 416. to the General Assembly asking for a division Mr. C. R. Ingersoll, with Messrs. of the Town of Derby and the incorporation Wooster, Williams & Gager, for defenda new town to he called the Town of Ansovia. ants, contra: The town agent and selecimen of Derby re. By law and immemorial usage, towns in Connecticut have the power to defend from their This paragraph of the answer is demurred. treasury their terriiorial integrity, even against to, in the first place, because it is not alleged, the General Assembly.

nor does it appear by said answer, what the • Swift, System of Conn. Laws. 116. several matters and measures were that were

In 1695 patents were issued by the general pending before said General Assembly." court for the “grants” of their territory. There are seven other causes of demurrer as

Stat. ed. 1808, p. 433; Symsbury Case, -igned, wbich may be summed up and exKirby, 447.

pressed in the language of the plainiills' brief, The powers of Connecticut towns are of the that the Town bas “no power to employ nature of chartered powers derived by "grant" counsel to oppose before the Ġeneral Assembly from the sovereign.

tbe granting of a petition, or the passage of a Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 139. resolution, dividing its territorial liniis."

Notice in cases for the division of towns was It will be noticed that the answer expressly regarded as essential to the jurisdiction by admits the precise ibing and all that the comlaivyers who were familiar with legal practice plaint alleges. The fact that it is included in before the Constitution.

"several matters and measures" cot nimed, Berlin v. New Britain, 9 Conn. 175; Syms can neither enlarge the scope of the complaint bury Case, supra; Granby V. Thurston, 23 por destroy the eifect of tbe admission. Conn. 416.

But if pecessary to specify the other "matThe proceeding is judicial in its character, ters and measures," we think they are suffiand the party in interest is entitled to bave an ciently specilied for all the purposes of the animpartial tribunal and the usual rights and wer. The complaint, in terms, only refers to privileges which attend judicial investigations. ibe matter of dividing the Town. While that

Cooley, Const. Lim. 562. See also Enfield may fairly include a division of the property, Toll Bridge Co. v. Connecticut River Co. 7 rebts, burdens, etc., yet tbey are not named. Cond. 49.

The answer brings upon the record the peti

tion and resolution, so that the court can see Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of iust what the Legislature was asked to do. In the court:

looking at the resolution we find that it pm. This is a complaint by certain residents braces several distinct matters and measures." and taxpayers of ihe Town of Derby, praying if they were wbat the answer referred to, and for an injunction restraining the defendants they probably were, the first cause of demurfrom paying the charges of counsel, and otber rer has no foundation in fact. expenses, incurred in defending against ibe We come then to the other causes of demur. peiition for the incorporation of the Town of res, which raise ibe main question: Has the Ansonia.

Town as such the right and power to employ The controversy arises mainly under the fifth counsel and expend money in proper ways, in paragraph of the complaint and the fourth opposing the granting of the petition and the paragraph of the answer. The former is as passage of the resoluiion! It will be observed follows:

ihat the question we are considering is not "The defendants have already wrongfully whether the Town has a right to resist the and illegally paid money from the reasury of sovereignty of the State in an attempt to change said Town, and threaten and intend to wrong. the territorial limits of the Town. Had the fully and illegally pay additional sums of State of its own motion, for reasons of public money from said treasury, to counsel and others policy, taken steps to change the boundaries of to oppose before said General Assembly the pro.ihe Town, or abolish it altogether, the case posed division of said Town, as hereinbefore presented would have been a very different state I, using in so doing money paid inio said one. But the attack was not made by the treasury by the plaiviiffs in common with State from motives of policy and in the interothers,

est of good government, but was made by cerThe paragraph of the answer referred to is tain parties who sought tbereby to promote as follows:

their own interests. The attack was not di“ The said Wheeler, as the agent of said rected alone against other individuals who difDerby, and the said W beeler, Gesner and Web- ferred from them, but against the Town as sler, as selecimen of said Derby, acting for well. The end sougbt involved not only a disand in the name and behalf of said Town of memberment of the Town in respect to terri. Derby, did retain and employ counsel to attend tory and population, but also a division of its to several matters and measures brought to and corporate property, a reduction of its grand pending before said General Assembly, affect- list, an apportionment of its debts, liabilities ing and concerning the interests of said Town, and burdens as to bighways, bridges, paupers and to do wbat could properly and legally be and the like. In respect to these matters the done by them to protect aud advance the in. Town and every taxpayer in the Town bad an terests of said Town, as the same should be interest; and they and everyone were duly cited affected as aforesaid, including within such to appear before the Legislature that they retainers and employment the opposition by might be heard. The proceeding was of an such counsel in the name and bebalf of said adversary nature, and the opposing parties Towu to the granting of said petition and the were brought before the supreme tribunal of passage of said resolution; and that they bave the State, that the matter might be adjusted. made a payment from the treasury of such Here, then, were all the elements of ordinary Town on account of such employment, and litigation-a court baving competent jurisdicintend to pay for all legitimate retainers, serv- tion, parties in interest and matiers in contro. ices and expenses of such counsel rendered or versy. Tbe Town then was not aptagonizing incurred under said employment."

the State, but was defending a cause against

its equal, and only its equal, before an impar- est? Every individual residing within its limtial tribunal.

its. How are they interested? Very much as Nor should this case be confounded with stockholders in other corporations are-in the those cases in which towns bave exercised prosperity and well being of the corporation powers wbich more properly pertain to the with which they are connected. Their interfunctions of the State or the general govern est pertains, not to their own private affairs, ment; such as Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, but io the affairs of the corporation. It is not in wbich it was held that the town had no several, but an interest in common. Now the power to appropriate money to defend the in. argument is that the organized community habitants and property of the town against a may not appear to protect the community in. foreign enemy, the bounty cases in this Slate, terest, but each individual in the community and the like.

may appear and defend such interest as be may Neitber is this case to be controlled by those bave, infinitesimal though it may be, in comcases in this State and elsewhere wbich bold mon with all the others. We confess our inthat towns bave no inherent or reserved pow. ability to appreciate the force of this louic. It ers of legislation, of wbich many of the cases eiiber is to be excluded it would seem more cited by the plaintiffs are examples.

patural to exclude the in lividual and admit On the other band we do not deem it neces- the corporation. It seems to us much more sary to decide whether towns in this State are reasonable that the organization, representing essen ially different in respect to their origin, the whole, should act for the benetii of all and powers and duties from towns in otber States. at the expense of all. We assume tbat lowns have only such powers But, as already remarked, the claim is not as are conferred by statule, expressly or by made in terms that the Town had no right to reasonable implication.

appear and defend.

It did in fact appear, Powers and duties carry with them corre-'anil, so far as we know, without objection. sponding obligations and rights. Public duties The matter bad been pending before the Legisimposed upon towns and the right to have and , lature two months when this suit was brougut. bold property are inseparable; and the right to During that time the matter had been heard or hold property begets the power to protect and partially heard, counsel for the Town appeardefend it. These simple and obviously correct ing and taking part, and presumptively with propositions will not be controverted.' Let us the knowledge of some of these plaintills, for make the application.

they were petitioners. In bringing the suit no Has the Towo power to pay its counsel? suggestion was made that the Town wrong.

That question will be substantially answered fully appeared; the sole ground of complaint is by the answer to another-Had the Town a that the expenses bave been, and are to be, riglit to appear? In tbe somewhat exhaustive wrongfully paid. Wbat reasons are there for brief of the plaintilfs we nowhere tind the ball this complaint? proposition in so many words, that the Town We start now with the proposition conceded, had no right to defeud. The right of the se- or established, that the Towo bad a rigbt to lectmen to defend without a voie of the Town apnear. Engrafted on that proposition is the is devied on the ground, as it is claimed, tbat claim that the Town bas du right to pay the the maller does not concern the Town, and expense. Tbat is the precise qestion. Of therefore that the selectmen, under section 64 wbat avail is the right to defend, if the Town of the General Statutes, which provides that is deprived of the power to exercise the right? they sball superintend the concerns of the Towns can only appear by agent or aitoruey. Town, bad no power to act. Granting the Agents and attorneys do not ordinarily appear premises, the conclusion follows. Another in such cases at their own expense. low are conclusion, that the Town itself bad no power, they lo be obtained without compensation? It would seem to be equally logical. But the argu may be said that individuals interested may meot implicdly admits that the Town might employ counsel. True, but wbat sense is there act. That admission destroys the premises; in imposing upon individuals burlens which for if the Town may act, it is because the Town properly belong to the Towv? Why cripple a is ivterested; if ivierested, it is one of the con town iv maintaining its rights, hy compelling cerns of the Town. If the Town fails to take it 10 depend upon voluntary contributions? action, it is the duly of the selectmen to take Let us examine this mat er a lilile niore in such action as they may deem advisable. detail. The first proposition is to make two

The right of self-defense is well nigb univer- I towns of one. That involves a division of the sa Towns are not exceptions to the rule. grand list. The Town is reduced, it may be, They bave a right to defend their existence, from a first class town in point of wealth and and to ask for 118 continuance, even when it population, to one of the third or fourth class. is proposed to deprive them of it by law. So It may be ihat every residcot of the remaining long as they exist, and must exist, with certain town would prefer that the former state of burdevs imposed upon tbem, certain duties things should continue. But his preferences from which they cannot escape, they have a are rendered practically unavailing by tbe in. clear right to defend their integrity. W ben it ability of the Town to bring the matier to the is proposed to change those burdens, by in- attention of the Legislature. Is this right? creasing or lessening them, with a correspond. True, each person may appear for himself. ing change in tbeir meads and facilities, their But an organized defense for and in bebalf of right to be beard must be upquestionable. the whole would be more effective and less er

That a town is interested in questions neces. pensive. sarily arising on the division of the town is Again; the division of a town makes nec hardly a debatable question. What is a town? essary the maintenance of two lown organizaA corporation. Who are the parties in inter- tions, with public buildings, instead of one

« AnteriorContinuar »