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State, nor any just appreciation of the rights | vious there is no fair analogy between civil of a citizen, entitle him to be released. He and criminal cases in this respect, and a dif. may be held to answer for the crime be has ferent rule applies. committed. This question is fully considered It follows from these views that the order of in State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587. But it is ob- | the Circuit Court must be affirmed.



Herman WEBER, Respt.,

Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli.

gence, in stepping from a rapidly moving train KANSAS CITY CABLE R. CO., Appt.

in front of another, approaching at the same

rate of speed, from the opposite direction. (.... Mo.....)

Leslie v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co, 3 West.

Rep. 824, 88 Mo. 50; Nelson v. Atlantic & P, R. 1. Running grip cars at a rate of speed pro- | Co. 68 Mo. 596. hibited by ordinance is negligence per se.

An unavoidable inference of contributory 2. The fact that a door in the side of a grip negligence arises out of plaintiff's evidence. car is open is no invitation to a passenger to pass

Thompson, Trials, $ 1680; Milburn v. Kansas through it for the purpose of jumping off the car while the train is running at full speed.

City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 86 Mo. 104; Buesch

ing v. St. Louis Gaslight Co. 73 Mo. 229. 3. A passenger who alights from a grip

The proximate cause of the injury was plaincar running at full speed and is instantly struck he could have seen if he had looked for it, is guilty 636; Puri v. St. Louis. K. C. & N. R. Co. 72 by a car, running in the other direction, which tiff's leaping in front of an approaching car.

Henze v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. 71 Mo. of contributory negligence which will prevent any recovery for his injuries.

Mo. 171; Straus v. K'an8118 City, St. J. & C. B. 4. A demurrer to plaintiff's evidence is R. Co. 75 Mo. 191: Leduke v. St. Louis, I. M. &

not waived by defendant by putting in his evi- 8. R. Co. 4 Mo. App. 485; Henry v. St. Louis, dence where he asks the direction of a verdict K. C. & N. R. Co. 76 Mo. 293; McCann v. Sirth against the plaintiff at the close of all the evi. Are. R. (0, 117 N. Y. 505. dence.

There was no evidence that the proximate On Petition for Rehearing.

cause of the injury was the rate of speed at

which the trains ran. 6. An exception to a refusal to give re

Ashbrook v. Frederick Ave. R. Co. 18 Mo. quested instructions taken in the following form: “And said instructions (naming them), as App. 290; Harlan v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. asked, the court refused, to which refusal of the 18 Mo. App. 483; Leduke v. St. Louis, I. M. & instructions thus asked the defendant by its 9. R. CO. supra; Holman v. Chicago, R. I. & P. counsel then and there excepted at the time," - R. Co. 62 Mo. 562; Fletcher v. Atlantic & P. R. will not be treated as a general exception to the Co. 64 Mo. 484; Wallace v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. refused instructions as a whole, but it will en R. Co. 74 Mo. 59 1; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. y. titled the party to have each refused instruction Notzki, 66 I11. 455; Kelley v. Hannibal & St. J. considered in the appellate court.

R. Co. 75 No. 133. (January 27, 1890.)

Unless the employés on the west-bound train

saw plaintiff or could have seen bim in time to A PEPE Aichy defendant fromca indement of stog

, mertrainhainbill cannot recover: the Circuit Court for Clay County favor

v. & St. J. R. Co. 75 Mo. of plaintiff in an action to recover damages for 475; Zimmerman v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 71 personal injuries alleged to have resulted from Mo. 476. defendant's negligence. Reversed.

Mr. Wash Adams, for respondent: The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Weber was not bound to look and listen for Messrs. Johnson & Lucas, for appellant: I an approaching rain.

NOTE.-Street railroads; cable line.

Jance corresponding to the responsibility placed unA street railway company is bound to exercise on him. Potts v. Chicago City R.Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 610. the greatest care and foresight, in the construction Pulling down curtains to keep rain out of a car is and operation of a cable live, to provide for the pot negligence on the part of the conductor, alsafety of passengers. Watson v. St. Paul City R. though it prevents the view of sides of the street. Co. (Minn.) Nov. 18, 1889.

Ibid, It is the duty of those in charge of a grip cable- Stepping on the track of a street railroad, whethcar running on the streets of a populous city to be er of horse railroad or grip cable-road, without first on the lookout, and to take all reasonable meas. stopping to see whether a car is approaching, is not ures to avoid injuries to persons who may be on as matter of law, without regard to circumstances, the streets; and this duty is not discharged as a negligence. The character of such action is a ques. matter of law by ringing the bell and seeing that tion for the jury. See note to Chicago City R. Co. the track before the car is clear, without looking v. Robinson (III.) 4 L. R. A. 128. to the right or the left. Winters v. Kansas City Contributory negligence bars a recovery. See Cable R. Co. (Mo.) 6 L. R. A, 536.

notes to Erickson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (Minn.) 5 A gripman on a cable car is required to use ordi. L. R. A. 787; Watkinds v. Southern Pac. Co. (Or.) 4 nary care to prevent collision with wagons driven L. R. A. 239. in the street. Pope v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. Passenger alighting from moving train presump(Mo.) Jan. 27, 1890.

tively negligent. See note to New York, P. & N. R. Law demands of the gripman in a cable car a vigi- | Co. v. Coulbourn (Md.) I L. R. A. 541. 7 L. R. A.

Langan v. St. Louis, 1. M. & 8. R. Co. 72 | The bones were broken, but amputation was Mo. 392; Brassell v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. not peressary. He is a cripple for life. He Co. 84 N. Y. 241.

stepped off at or within a few feet of the east Notwithstanding the concurrent negligence crossing; . He says the train going west was so of plaintiff a recovery is not precluded if de- close to bim wben be got off that be could not fendant failed to discover plaintiff's danger see it. The whistle attached to the cord was througb its own recklessness and want of com- in the grip car, and was out of order, so that it pliance with municipal ordinances.

gave no signal. The plaintiff's seat in the car Dunkman v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 10 was within six or eight feet of the gripman, West. Rep. 396, 95 Mo. 232.

and the plaintiff did not notify the conductor In view of the fact that it was customary for or gripman where he desired io leave be car. persons 10 get off moving cars at crossings, and He had been in the babit of going back and that the street crossings were the places estab. forth, to and from bis work, by way of the delished by defendant for ingress and egress, fendant's road, and was familiar with the runwheiber it was negligerce for the trains to pass ning of the cars. There were eight Trains on crossings at an unlawful rate of speed was for tbe road, and each made ten or twelve daily the jury to determine.

trips. These trains were running at the rate William8 v. Kansas City, 8. & M. R. Co. 96 of a fraction over seven miles per hour, in vioMo. 231.

lation of a city ordinance which limits the rate A passenger when taking or leaving a rail- of speed 10 six miles per hour. road car at a station bas ibe right to assume The evidence tends to show that it was the that the company will not expose him to un- custom to riug tbe bells on both trains when necessary danger.

and wherever they passed. The gripn:an of Bra88 ll v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 84 the train on whicli planuutti took possunt insula N. Y. 241.

fied in positive terms that the bells on both

trains were ringing at and before paintiff Black, J., delivered the opinion of the stepped off; but the plain iff testitied, in ancouit:

swer to the question whether le beard any The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $13,200, bells: "I don't remember of one on the car I and, on the suggestion of the trial court, re was on. I never beard ibe bell on the apmitted a part, and accepted a judgment for proaching car.”. Another witness for the plain$10,000, 10 reverse which the defendant ap- uff, being asked if be was accuciomed to hear pealed. The defendant, at the close of the signals, said: “Yes, sir. On that occasion I plaintiff's evidence, submitted a demurrer 10 cannot say wbether I noticed any." ibe evidence, and asked a like instruction at The defendant offered evidence to the effect the close of all of the evidence, both of whicb that there were notices in the cars warning per. were refused. These ivstructions present the sons not to get off while the cars were in mo question whether the court should bave taken tion. The defendant offered over evidence; the case from the jury. The facts disclosed but, as it does not aid the plaintiff's case, it by the plaintiff's evidence are, in substance, neerl not be recited. these: "The defendanı's road ruus east and The defendant, in running its trains at a rate west through the City of Ronsas. The cars of spied proviwilid by uruwe, ... unny ut rup east on the soulli, and west on the norib, negligence per se. kiim v. Union R. & Tran track; and when the trains pass there is a sit Co. 90 Mo. 314, 7 West. Rep. 144. space of vot moje iban cigbucen inches between Besides that, there is some evidence, though the cars. The cars going east stopped ouly at it is very weak, to the effect that the gripman the east, and those going west at the west, on the west-bound laiu did not, as was the sidewalk crossings; and ibeo only when per custom, ring the bell if his car when passing sons desired to get on or off. The plaintiff', a lhe east-bound train, upon which lainiiff was young man about twenty years old, boarded an a passenger. We shall assume, for all present east-bound Train, composed of a coach and purposes, that this bell was not rung. It is argrip car, intending to go to Ilolmes Street. He gued for the defendant but the speed of the tock a seat on the roth side of the grip car, irain bad po direct agency in causing the in. pear ibe rear end. Besides end doors, this car jury, but we cannot yielil a consent to the had two side doors al the rear end, -one open proposition. There was sufficieni evidence of ing out on the north, and the other on the negligence on the part of the deleudant. The south, side. These doors were open, and there important que:tion is whether the case should was no cale or other contrivance to prevent have been taken fr: m the jury because of conpersons from going out on ibe porth side. tributory negligence on tbe p:iri of live plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that when he reached Ilolmes Wbile carriers of passengers are lield to a Sireet be pulled a cord, ubich was attached 10 very bigb degree of care, ilue is a correspondan air-wbistle, I wice; that he bcard vo signal, ing obligation on ibe part of the passenger to and the cars did not stop; that be was looking act with prudence; and, if his negligent act out of the side windows of the car, and ibien contributes to bringing about the injury, he leaned over ard looked out of the front-end cannot recover. Ordinarily, as has been said car door, and did not see any train coming by this court on several occ:sions, contributory from the cast on the nosib Track; ibat beiben vegligence is a question of fact, for the jury; got up, went to the rear end of the car, and but the power and the duty of the court to ditben stepped out of the north door, and, just rert a verdict in proper cases cannot be qnesas he got upon i be ground, a train going west, lioned. As has been said, if it appears, withon the norılı irack love him and knocked bim out any conflict of evidence, fromile plaintiff's down. His legs were brown under the wheels owp case, or from the cross-examination of his of the cars upon which be had been riding. I witnesses, that he was guilty of negligence

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proximately contributing to produce the injury | attempt to get off, then the act is contributory it would be the duty of the court to take the negligence, and will bar a recovery. 2 Am. & case from the jury. Buesching v. St. Louis Eng. Cyclop. Law, 763. Gaslight Co. 73 Mo. 219.

Again it is argued that the plaintiff was not A demurrer to the evidence must be sus bound to look out for the approaching car, betaileu wuere an unavoidable inference of con- cause, being a passenger, he had a right to astributory negligence arises out of the plain iff's sume that defendant would do potbing to put owu evidence, or out of other evidence wbich bim in danger when alighting, and in that restands undisputed in the case. 2 Thompson, spect he stood on a different fooling from a Trials, § 1680.

foutman crossing the track; and in support of But where the undisputed facts relied on to this we are cited to Chicago City R. Co. v. Robestablish contributory negligence are such as inson, 127 III. 9. 4 L. R. A. 126. In that case may, in the judgment of sensible mer, lead to a boy six years old alighted from standing grip different conclusions as to whether they estab-cars, on wbich he bad been a passenger, and lisb want of care, the question of negligence on was run over and killed when going over the the part of the plaintiff should be submitted to sidewalk crossiog at or near where he got off.

Pirtuv. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.88 It was held that the fact that he did not stop Mo. 306, 8 West. Rep. 297.

and look to see whether a train was approachumili unucunty lies, not in the rule, but ing was not, as a matter of law, and without in its application; and here we may dispose of any regard to the surrounding circumstances, some preliminary questions. Much reliance is, negligence, but the question of bis negligence by the plaintiff, placed upon the fact that the was one for the jury. If a failure to look for north door was open, and without a gate or an approaching cable train iu that case was evi. other guard to prevent persons from getting off dence of negligence, tben for much stronger on the north track. Though it was warm reasons is the failure of the plaintif in this case weatber, the fact that the door was left open to look for an approaching train evidence of and unguarded might be regarded as an invi- negligence. Persons getting on and off of tation to alight from that side when the car these cars are, while so doing, entitled to the was employed in receiving and discharging protection due to passengers. The defendant passengers. But it was certainly no invitation is in duty bound to stop its cars, and let them for anyone to jump off wben the car was run- remain at rest long enough for persons to get ning at full speed. The very fact that the cars on and alight with safety; and the servants in did not stop or cherk up was a warning to the charge of an approaching train are in duty passengers pot to get off.

bound to govern their conduct accordingly. In McGee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92 Mo. 218, But there is nothing in tbis case to show that 10 West. Rep. 282, the brakeman announced defendaut was required to stop its trains at the station, and he and tbe conductor went out, crossings when no one desired to get on or off. taking their lights with them; and in the mean The train upon whicb plaintiff was a passenger time the train stopped at a dangerous place. being in full motion, the servants on the apThese facts, it was beld, could be construed in proaching train would not suspect that be, or no other light than a direction for the passen- anyone else, would be in the act of getting off. gers to alight. The facts of that case are un. We do not see that the plaintiff stands on any like the facts in the case at bar, as will be better footing thau he would if he bad jumped readily seen. The fact tbat the door was open | off at a place other than a crossing. We bave cannot and ought not to be construed as any pot said, nor do we now say that the act of invitation to alight wbile the train was at full alighting when the car was ip full motion, speed.

taken by itself, or the failure of the plaintiff to 11 was, in substance, said iu Doss v. Missmiri, look for approaching cars when be reached the K. & T. R. Co., 59 Mo. 27, that to jump from car door, taken by itself, or any other single a car propelled by steam, while in rupid mo- circumstance in the case, would be, as a matter tion, might be regarded as mere recklessness; of law, negligence. The undisputed evidence but to step from a car at a platform wbile the must be taken as a whole, and the conclusion motion of the car is slight may or may not be must be drawn from the circumstances as a degligence, and the question is one for the jury: whole. We are not at liberty to consider them These observations bave been quoted or cited singly, and thus divide the case up into parcels. with approval in subsequent cases. Kelley v. It cannot be, and we believe it is not, ciaimed, Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 70 Mo. 604; Nelson that tbe failure of the whistle to give an alarm V. Atlantic & P. R. CO. 68 Mo. 593; Leslie v. afforded an excuse for leaving the car while in Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 88 Mo. 52, 3 West. full motion. Rep. 824.

Now, it is clear that the plaintiff was in posTo jump from a horse car while in rapid session of his faculties, and was accustomed to motion is not negligence per se. Wyatt v. Cit- these cars, and must have known that they izen: R. Co. 55 Mo. 487. In that case there was passed every few minutes. He left bis seat evidence tending to show that the conductor without signifying any desire to get off to the ordered the boy to get off.

brakeman, wbo was in close proximity to him, Whether a party jumping or stepping from a and without any reason to believe the cars moving car is guilty of degligence must, it is would come to a balt. When at the door of manifest, depend upon other circumstances the car he could have seen the approaching than the speed of the cars; and these circum- irain by casting an eye east, for be then bad stances are so variant that general rules only an unobstructed view; but that be did not do can be stated. If the rate of speed is so bigb, so is clear. Under these circumstances, he and the place of descent so obviously perilous, stepped off while the cars were running at full that a person of ordinary prudence would not speed, and was struck by the approaching cars

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as soon as be landed on the ground. With the al exception to the refused instructions as a other evidence resolved in favor of the plain whole, and if any one instruction was properly tiff, and guided by what a prudent person refused, the exception must fail. would ordinarily do under such circumstances, Authorities are cited from other States wbich it seems to us there can be but one conclusion, favor the position taken by the respondent, and that is that the plaintiff was very negligent, but such is not, and never has been, the rule of to express the result in mild terms. The con- practice in this State. Under our Code of clusion of negligence is a necessary and un- Civil Procedure either party may, after the avoidable result. One cannot thus voluntarily close of the evidence, move the court to give place life and limb in peril, and claim to be instructions, which are usually prepared by free from fault. But for the plaintiff's Degli counsel, and must be in writing; and the pracgence, be would not bave been injured. The tice is to number them, as was done in the court sbould have sustained the demurrer to present case. The refused instructions must the evidence.

be set out in tbe bill of exceptions, and a formThe point made that the defendant waived ula often used for saving the exceptions is, the demurrer to the evidence by putting in its “Which instructions the court refused, to own evidence is not well taken. The demurrer which refusal of the instructions thus prayed was not only interposed at the close of the plain the defendant by his counsel then and there tiff's evidence, but a like request was made at excepted at the time." Whittlesey, Pr. 482. the close of all the evidence. The defendant, Such an exception entitles the party to bave by putting in its evidence, took the chance of each refused instruction considered in this aiding the plaintiff's case; but it was not there court. Whatever may be the ruling of other by deprived of the right to ask the court to di- courts, we must follow the rule which has rect a verdict on all of the evidence. We see beretofore prevailed in this court, and we see no reason for remanding this cause, and the no reason to depart from it if we were at libjudgment is simply reversed.

erty to do so. This form of saving exceptions All concur.

is quite as well understood as if the objector Barclay, J., concurs in reversing the judg- had said he excepted to the action of the court ment, but is of the opinion that this cause in refusing to give said instructions, and each should be remanded,

of them. There is notbing in Harrison v.

Bartlett, 51 Mo. 170, or St. Joseph v. Ensuorth, A motion for rehearing was subsequently 65 Mo. 628, which conflicts with what has filed and on March 22, 1890, the following been said in this case. opinion was delivered:

One of the grounds assigned for a new trial

was “because the court erred in refusing to Per Curiam:

give instructions Nos. 10 to 22 inclusive, asked So far as the merits of this case are con- by the defendant." This was sufficient. cerned, we deem it unnecessary to add any- Again, counsel for the respondent are in thing to the opinion beretofore filed. A com- error in supposing that defendant waived its plaint is made that the court did not give full objection to the action of the court, in overconsideration to the point made in the respond- ruling the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, by ent's brief that exceptions were not properly putting in its own evidence. When such a saved by appellant to the action of the circuit demurrer is made and overruled, and the decourt in refusing certain instructions, among fendant puts in its evidence, this court in rewhich was one to the effect that, upon the viewing the ruling will do so in the light of all pleadings and evidence, the plaintiff could not of the evidence. *If, upon all the evidence, no recover. This instruction is pumbered 10, and matter by whom or when offered, there is a is one of thirteen asked by the defendant, but case to go to the jury, we do not reverse, refused by the court. In respect of these re- though the demurrer to the plaintil's evidence fused instructions the bill of exceptions says: should bave been given as the case stood when “And said instructions Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, it was interposed. With these qualifications, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, as asked, the the demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence will be court refused, to which refusal of the instruc- considered bere, though the defendant should tions tbus asked the defendant by its counsel offer evidence after it is overruled. McPher. then and there excepted at the time." The son v. St. Louis, I. M. & 8. R. Co. 97 Mo. 254. argument is that there is here but a gener- The motion for rehearing is overruled.


Jobp L. DOUGLASS, Appt.,

laws which are printed and issued in a book in 0.

which bis name appears as secretary. MERCHANTS INSURANCE CO., of New 2. A by-law of a corporation providing York, Respt.

for the removal of officers by the board of direc

tors at pleasure constitutes part of the contract (118 N. Y. 484.)

of employment of a secretary at a designated

yearly salary, with no special agreement as to 1. The secretary of a corporation is the time of service. chargeable with knowledge of its by

(February 25, 1890.) NOTE.-Remedies of servant wrongfully discharged. See note to Keedy v. Long (Md.) 5 L. R. A. 760.

the General Term of the Supreme Court, The LR A.


See also 29 L. R. A. 100.

First Department, affirming a judgment of the terminated capriciously nor without just cause
New York Circuit dismissing the complaint in of honest dissatisfaction.
an action brought to recover damages for the Brooklyn v. Brooklyn R. Co. 47 N. Y. 479. See
alleged breach of a contract to pay plaintiff also Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230.
for the rendition of personal services. Affirmed. Mr. Francis Lynde Stetson, for respon-

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. dent:
Mr. William W. Badger, for appellant: A continuance in the employment, with the
No lawful discharge of plaintiff was showd consent of the defendants, after the expiration

upon the 19th day of January, 1885, at the of the current year, was equivalent to a new regular meeting for that month," as the 19th biring upon the same terms. could not be “the second Monday” of the Vail v. Jerscy L. F. Mfg. Co. 32 Barb, 564month, as required for the alleged "regular 567; Huntingdon v. Claffin, 38 N. Y. 182. meeting" by article 18 of the by-laws.

Tbe by-law in question being in force when As plaintiff was paid only to February 1, plaintiff's original contract was made, and ever he was plainly entitled, at least, to the Febru- since, and being necessarily within his knowlary salary, as damages.

edge, formed part of his contract for the year Moody v. Leverich, 4 Daly, 401-409; Ioward 1885. V. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; Everson v. Powers, 89 Hunter v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. 26 La. Ann. 13. N. Y. 527; Perry v. Dickerson, 7 Abb. N. C. The by-law in question, forming part of 470–474, affirmed in 85 N. Y. 350; Goodman v. plaintiff's contract for 1885, accomplished its Pocock, 15 Ad. & El. N. 8. 576.

clear purpose, and reserved to the defendant a The saving grace of common sense and the right to discbarge the plaintiff at any time. ordinary obligations of common honesty re- Wood, Mast. and S. 274; Smith v. Buffalo quire that a faithful servant after twenty-eight Street R. 35 Hun, 201; Tyler v. Ames, 6 Laps. years of continuous service at “a yearly sal. 280; Spring v. Ansonia Clock Co. 24 Hun, 175. ary," should not be summarily and arbitrarily dismissed without cause and without any no- Bradley, J., delivered the opinion of the tice or pay.

court: 1 Mora wetz, Priv. Corp. $ 544; Story, Ag. The plaintiff on or about the 1st day of Janu§ 466; Wood, Mast, and S. & 127, and cases ary, 1857, went into the service of the defendcited.

ant as secretary, at the yearly salary of $1,500; The just and fair application and intention bis salary, from time to time changed, was on of the by-law is that it might be applied at the the 1st of January, 1884, increased to $4.500 a end of any year. A yearly salary "during the year. He continued as such secretary in the pleasure of the boarư” means that.

service of the defendant at that appual salary Martino v. Commerce F. Ins. Co. 15 Jones & until January 19, 1885, when he was, by the 8. 521; King v. Steiren, 44 Pa. 104; McDaniel board of directors of the defendant, removed v. Parks, 19 Ark. 671; Walworth v. Pool, 9 Ark. from the office of secretary. He, baving been 394; Fouler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Webster v. paid up to February 1, brought tbis action to reWade, 19 Cal. 291.

cover as damages a sum equal to the salary for Otherwise the by law is a nullity under the the residue, or eleven months, of the then curConstitution, as "impairing the obligation of rent year. This claim is made for the alleged reathe contract.”

son that he was in the defendant's service from Laws 1849, chap. 308, § 12; Ang. & A. Corp. year to year, and that the defendant could not, ES 333, 426, and cases cited. See also Soldiers' without liability to bim for damages, discharge Orphans Ilome v. Shaffer, 63 III. 243–245. him from its service until the end of any year

A corporation loses its general power of re- upon wbich he had entered in sucb service. moval, contained in its charter, if it make a When a party enters into service of another special contract.

at a stipulated annual compensation or salary, William8 v. Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177; Costz. and continues beyond a year, the presumption gan v. Mohawk & H. R. Co. 2 Denio, 609, 613. is that he does so on the same terms. Hunt.

Corporations seeking to enforce by-laws ingdon v. Claffin, 38 N. Y. 182; Vail v. Jersey must show their power to pass such by-laws, Little Falls Mfg. Co. 32 Barb. 564; Ranck v. and bring themselves by proof within that Albright, 36 Pa. 367; Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. power, and must act at regular meetings or Co. 106 Mass. 56. prove notice given of the meetings and also There is no evidence that the original biring prove express assent to them by tbeir employés. was for a year, other than in the fact that the

1 Parsons, Cont. p. 475, and cases there cited plaintiff's salary was annual. The plaintiff, of assent; i Mora wetz, Priv. Corp. $ 532; Peo- for bis evidence in that respect, relied solely ple v. Albany & S. R. Co. 55 Barb. 345; 1 Wat- upon the admission in the defendant's answer. erman, Corp. SS 49, 64; Dunham v. Rochester, By the answer it is alleged that a by-law of 5 Cow. 462; Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L. the defendant, known to the plaintiff, was part 223.

of the contract of employment under wbich he A contract for services for a yearly salary, went into and continued in its service. This if continued into succeeding years without by-law was adopted and went into effect in further words, is thereby renewed by the year. 1850, and provided that “the president, vice

Hunting lon v. Claffin, 38 N. Y. 182; Vail v. president, secretary, surveyor and clerks shall Jersey Little Falls Mjg. Co. 32 Barb. 564; Tat- respectively hold ibeir offices during the pleasterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co. 106 Mass. 56; Davis ure of the board of directors, and until the apv. Marshall, 6 Hurlst. & N. 916, as to yearly pointment of successor either permanent or contracts for wages payable moothly.

pro tem., and no officer or clerk' shall be re. The case is analogous to a coniract to the moved without a concurrence of a majority of satisfaction of defendants, which cannot be the whole board of directors." A new edition

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