mits the drawing of the check by Muse, pay able to Thomas Pickle or order, and claims that it was presented by the payee, and paid to him in person. It admits that the check bas never been indorsed by complainant, but insists that it never required the indorsement of such a check when presented for payment by the payee in person. The officers of the defendant Bank do not in their depositions pretend to any memory as to the payment of this check. They prove that it was the rule and custom of the Bank to require the indorsement of all checks drawn against it where the check is payable to the payee or order, when presented for payment by one other than the payee, but that, when presented by the payee in person, they do not require his indorsement; that the check in question bears the bank stamp of payment as of March 28, 1887, and has no indorsement; and that, in view of their custom or rule, they would not have paid such a check to anyone but complainant, unless indorsed by him. They further insist that the possession of such a check raises a presumption that it was paid to the payee named in the check. is that the holder of a bank check cannot sue the bank for refusing payment, in the absence of proof that it was accepted by the bank, or that it has done some other act equivalent to and implying acceptance. This has been the uniform view of this court. Planters Bank v. Merritt, 7 Heisk. 177; Planters Bank v. Keesee, Id., 200; Imboden v. Perrie, 13 Lea, 504. In the latter case the reasons for this doctrine are forcibly stated and the authorities collated by Judge Turney. We are unable to see any reason for disturbing the rule as heretofore declared by this court, especially as the decided weight of authority is in accord with our decision. National Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 152 [19 L. ed. 897]; First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 [24 L. ed. 229]; Carr v. Nat. Security Bank, 107 Mass. 45; Etna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82; Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 485; Saylor v. Bushong, 100 Pa. 23; Purcell v. Alle mong, 22 Gratt. 742; Bellamy v. Majoribanks, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 523. Has there been any acceptance by the defendant Bank of the check in question? It is The possession of an order by the person up- argued that the check, having been charged up on whom it is drawn is prima facie evidence to the account of the drawer, and returned to that the articles or money specified therein were him, is tantamount to an acceptance. The audelivered or paid according to the order. Kin-thorities are not agreed as to the effect of such caid v. Kincaid, 8 Humph. 17; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1647. This presumption is, however, rebutted by the positive and uncontradicted testimony of complainant that he in fact never did collect the check, or authorize anyone to collect it for him. We have considered all the circumstances relied on by the defendant as tending to support the presumption of payment to complainant in person, and are of opinion that the weight of proof is that the check has never been paid to complainant. The custom of the defendant Bank to pay such checks as the one now under consideration, to the payee, without his indorsement, is the occasion of this litigation. The contrary is the usage of commerce. Such a check, returned to the drawer when paid, and credited to his account, with the indorsement of the payee, would be a voucher for such payment in favor of the drawer against the payee. But, without such indorsement, it would not be evidence, as between drawer and payee, of such payment. 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1648. The almost universal custom of business is to make checks payable to the payee or order, for the purpose of making the check a voucher for the payment; so the indorsement by the payee would furnish the banker very high evidence of payment in accordance with the direction of the drawer. A check drawn in favor of a particular payee or order is payable only to the actual payee, or upon his genuine indorsement; and, if the bank mistake the identity of the payee, or pay upon a forged indorsement, it is not a payment in pursuance of its authority, and it will be responsible. Morgan v. State Bank, 11 N. Y. 404; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1618, 1663; First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 [24 L. ed. 229]. This brings us to the question as to whether complainant can recover upon this check as against the Bank. While the authorities are not agreed. yet the decided weight of opinion an act. The case of National Bank of the Republic v. Millard was the case of a payment made of a check upon a forged indorsement. It did not appear that the check had been charged to the drawer, and there was a judgment in favor of the Bank. Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering the opinion of the court, in speaking of the effect of such a charge, said: "It may be, if it could be shown that the Bank had charged the check on its books against the drawer, and settled with him on that basis, that the plaintiff could recover on the count for money had and received, on the ground that the rule ex æquo et bono would be applicable; as the bank, having assented to the order, and communicated its assent to the paymaster, would be considered as holding the money . . . for the plaintiff's use, and therefore under an implied promise to him to pay it on demand." 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 157 [19 L. ed. 899]. In the subsequent case of First Nat. Bank v. Whitman the very question arose, when the court, through Mr. Justice Hunt, held that such a charge, having been made through mistake, and upon the assumption that it had in fact paid the check to one authorized to collect it, would not authorize the presumption of an acceptance and promise to pay it again. 94 U. S. 347 [24 L. ed. 231]. Upon the question of commercial law, we should be generally inclined to follow any wellsettled line of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States when the question was in this State res integra. This question can hardly be regarded as one of "commercial law," in the ordinary sense of the phrase. It is rather a question as to weight and sufficiency of evidence tending to prove an acceptance. We agree that the holder of a check, for want of privity, cannot recover upon the check against the bank, unless he can show an acceptance. The question presented is as to the weight to be attached to certain acts done by the Bank, and the inference fairly to be drawn from these acts. Where a bank has negligently paid a check to an improper person, it would seem that, in good conscience, the true owner and payee ought not to be remitted to his action against a palpably insolvent drawer, for thereby he may lose his debt altogether. A legal principle, however, stands in the way, in that there is no privity between himself and the bank until the bank has assented to the order of the drawee requiring it to pay the holder of the check the sum of money named. The assent which is necessary before there is any contract relation between the holder of the check and the bank is what is meant by acceptance. This assent need not be by indorsement of "Good" across the check, or by any other particular words, either in writing or oral. The question of assent or acceptance is one of fact, and may be made out by any of the methods by which a fact is proven. it may result in the loss to complainant of his debt by remitting him to his action against his original debtor, whom he may be unable to coerce into payment. We think there is no inequity in holding the Bank to the inference that it has accepted this check, springing out of the fact that it has charged it up to the account of the drawer. This was clearly the view of Mr. Justice Davis, a great master in the law, as appears from his opinion in the Millard Case, supra. It has the support of the only other courts which have been called upon to pass upon this question,-the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Ohio. Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483; Saylor v. Bu shong, 100 Pa. 23; Dodge v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234. This brings us to the question as to whether the check was ever delivered to the complainant; for it is asserted that if there has been no delivery to him he has no such title to the instrument as will enable him to maintain a suit against the Bank. Whether this check was sent to complainant, and miscarried, and fell into the hands of a stranger, or whether it was left with the Bank to be credited to the complainant, who kept his account there, and by oversight this credit was not given, is all matter of conjecture. How this check ever reached the Bank we are unable, from the proof, to determine. All we can say is that we are satisfied that it never came into the hands of complainant. Someone undoubtedly received it from Muse. By suing the Bank upon this check, complainant may and does ratify the receipt of the check from Muse. It is as if it had been received by an agent for the use and benefit of the complainant. Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur,a subsequent ratification has a retrospective effect, and is equivalent to a prior command Broom, Legal Max. 676. says Mr. Broom, "of very wide application. No maxim,' remarks Mr. Justice Story, is better settled in reason and law than this maxim; . . . at all events, where it does not prejudice the rights of strangers.' Fleckner v. Bank of U. S. 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 363 [5 L. ed. 631]." So Mr. Daniel, in his very learned work upon Negotiable Instruments, lends the support of his name to the view we have taken, saying: Did the defendant Bank assent to the direc- "There is no doubt that, if the bank pays a tions of its customers to pay out of his funds check upon the forged indorsement of the on deposit the sum named in the check? If so, payee's or special indorser's name, the payee or to whom did it assent to pay this sum? The such indorser may recover back the amount, if answer is found by inspection of the check. If the check had been delivered to him, and the it assented to pay the check, it undertook and drawer may recover it back if he had not issued assumed to pay it to Thomas Pickle, or upon it." 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1663. his order. Now, the facts which are relied upon as making out such an assent to the direction of the drawee of this check as to bring complainant into privity with the Bank are that it received and retained the check, and that it has charged the check to the account of the drawer, and settled with him, deducting the amount of the check. Now, when a bank certifies a check as "Good," it is not only authorized, but good banking would require that such check should be then charged to the account of the drawer, as so much of his funds which they have obligated themselves to pay upon that check. Of course, if the check is never paid, or is returned, the drawer would be credited. The debiting of this check to the account of the drawer would then mean only one of two things, that the check has been paid as ordered, or that the fund is held subject to the demand of the payee. The bank must be taken to have assented to pay it as directed; that is, to the payee or his order. That it has assented to the payment of this check is, we think, to be inferred from the retention of the check when presented at its counter, and the subsequent charge of the check to the drawer. Upon this charge to the drawer we predicate its assent or acceptance. It had no right to charge it to the drawer, and to settle his account, unless it had either paid the check to the payee named in the check, or his order, or, having accepted the check, held the fund of the drawee subject to the demand of the payee. It has not paid the check. It must therefore be held to hold the amount of the check for the payee. It cannot escape this consequence by saying that what we have done in receiving the check, and in paying it, and in debiting to the account of the drawer, is all through mistake. That would be to suffer it to escape the consequences So, in another case it was said: of its own mistake, by pleading its own negli act done for another by a person not assuming geuce in answer to the natural inference from to act for himself, but for such other person, its reception and retention of this check, and though without any precedent authority whatits subsequent charge to the drawer might en-ever, becomes the act of the principal, if subable it to shelter itself behind the technical de- sequently ratified by him, is the known and fense of want of privity; but, on the other hand, well established rule of law. In that case the "This is a rule, As illustrative of the application of the rule, the author cites the case where the goods of A are wrongfully taken and sold. The owner may either bring trover against the wrong-doer or may elect to consider him as his agent, and adopt the sale, and bring an action for the price. Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211. "That an principal is barred by the act, whether it be for his detriment or his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same -extent as by, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority.' Wilson v. Tumman, 6 Man. & Gr. 242." Broom, Legal Max. 679. The Bank is not prejudiced by this subsequent ratification, for it dealt with the check as the property of the complainant, and undertook to pay to him or his order. The effect of this ratification is simply to make the check the property of the complainant. It does not ratify the collection of the check by one whose act in receiving it is subsequently ratified, and agency to receive a check payable to order implies no authority to indorse it in the name of the payee, or to collect it without such indorse ment. ground. Judge Davis, who had made the dictum in the former case, it is true was not present, having just before resigned, but the other judges who made the decision were present, and all concurred in it. The decision commands my most earnest approval; but there are additional reasons why I think it should be followed: First. It is the judgment of the highest court in the country on a general banking and commercial question, where the decisions should be treated as conclusive, as on such questions the Supreme Court of the United States follows no state construction. It is not "rather a question of the weight of evidence," as put by the majority, because we all agree that the check in the case before us was not paid to the payee, and, having determined that, we come to settle the question whether, upon this conceded condition of affairs, the payee can maintain suit against the Bank. Second. The decision should be folState, so far as our cases go, and we should in such case, on such question, make our decisions conform to that of the United States, and thereby have but one rule applicable to our citizens. As it is, when our decisions conflict, ours, of course, can only be good as to a part of the litigation which may arise in the State, for, as to any litigants who may be carried into the federal courts by nonresidence and otherwise, the federal rule will be applied. So it will be in all cases where the national banks go into the hands of receivers, and have their affairs wound up in the federal courts, and in every case in which, by virtue of the situation of parties, or manner in which the question is involved, the federal courts have jurisdiction. Many reasons could be added, but they will suggest themselves. These are sufficient to indicate them, and outline the ground of dissent. In the case of Dodge v. Nat. Exchange Bank, a certificate of indebtedness by the government to Dodge was remitted by mail to the pay-lowed because it is an original question in this master for a check. The mail was robbed, and the certificate presented by the thief to the paymaster, and a check demanded. The latter, without requiring proof of the identity of the holder of the certificate, paid a check payable to Dodge or order, and took up the certificate. The indorsement of Dodge was forged, and the check paid. Subsequently Dodge sued the bank, and recovered, the court holding that he might ratify the taking of the check for the certificate, and sue upon it as an accepted check. 20 Ohio St. 234. See, to same effect, Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 N. Y. 207. The decree of the chancellor is reversed, and judgment for complainant against the Bank for the amount of the check, and interest from date of filing of bill, and all the cost of the cause. Snodgrass, J., dissenting: Disagreeing with the majority upon the merits of the question decided, and strongly opposed to the policy of refusing to follow the Supreme Court of the United States on this important banking and commercial question, I am constrained to express briefly my dissent. The exact question before us, as shown in the majority opinion, was decided adversely to it in First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 [24 L. ed. 229], in 1877, by the Supreme Court of the United States, without dissent by any member of the court. In that court, in the Millard Case, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 152 [19 L. ed. 897], Judge Davis had doubtfully intimated that the bank might be liable to the payee of a check which it had improperly paid off to an unauthorized holder and charged to account of drawer, not, as the majority holds here, because such payment to an unauthorized holder is an acceptance and implied promise to pay the real owner or payee,-for this doctrine he repudiated, but because of the charge to the drawer the bank might be liable to the payee for money had and received to his use. But this whole matter was the doubtfully expressed inference of argument, and was not even an affirmative dictum, which, least of all things, is entitled to serious consideration. Afterwards, when the exact question arose, with the Millard Case before it, cited in argument and referred to in the opinion, the court, on full consideration, unanimously held the bank not liable to suit on any Caldwell., J., joins in this dissent. E. W. COLE et al., Appts., v. Joe HAND. (....Tenn.....) One employed by a corporation on a monthly salary, who is part of the time on the road selling goods, making collections, etc., as a druminer, and the rest of the time working in a store shipping and receiving goods, moving and handling stock, etc., or making sales and collecting bills in the city, is a "clerk" within the meaning of the General Incorporation Act of 1875, § 11, making stockholders individually liable for moneys due laborers, servants, clerks and operatives" in case the corporation becomes insolvent. (January 21, 1890.) PPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover, under 11 of the Act of 1875, from the stockholders of an insolvent corporation, the salary due an alleged clerk. Affirmed. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. Gaines & Slemons, for appellants: The remedy against the stockholder must be strictly construed, because of the nonliability | ture, has a broad significance, and embraces all of stockholders at common law. Woods v. Wicks, 7 Lea, 45 A book-keeper who worked by the year, and often acted as manager, is not a laborer, servant or operative, nor does he come within that category. Taylor, Corp. §§ 732, 734, note 2, citing Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213; Jones v. Avery, 50 Mich. 326. persons of whatever rank or position who are in the employ and subject to the direction and control of another in any department of labor or business. Indeed, it may in most cases be said to be synonymous with "employé." Wood, Mast. and S. p. 2. There is no middle ground between restricting the operation of the Statute to day laborers and applying it to all persons employed in the A traveling salesman is not a "laborer" with service of the company who have not a differIn the meaning of a provision that stockhold-ent, proper and distinct appellation, such as ers shall be individually liable for labor performed for the corporation. Peck v. Miller, 39 Mich. 594. A corporation aggregate cannot be an employé of another corporation within the mean ing of a statute which makes the stockholders liable for debts due and owing laborers, servants, operatives and employés. Dukes v. Love, 97 Ind. 341. A president of a corporation is not a laborer. England v. Daniel F. Beatty Organ & Piano Co. 3 Cent. Rep. 494, 41 N. J. Eq. 470. As to who is a drummer, seeRobbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist. 13 Lea, 306; Singleton v. Fritsch, 4 Lea, 96, cited in State v. Miller, 93 N. C. 511, 53 Am. Rep. 469, and in Er parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 478, 38 Am. Rep. 336. It may be stated as a general rule that only those who perform menial or manual labor are within the class contemplated in the Statute. officers and agents of the company. Conantv. Van Schaick, 24 Barb. 98; Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 643; Short v. Medberry, 29 Hun, 40; Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 590; Harris v. Norvell, 1 Abb. N. C. 127; Williamson v. Wadsworth, 49 Barb. 298. Folkes, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action at law to recover of the defendants individually the wages claimed to be due plaintiff by the Nashville Plow Company, an insolvent manufacturing corporation chartered under section 11 of the General Incorporation Act of 1875. Under the case as made in the record, the only question presented is whether the plaintiff, who was a traveling salesman or drummer in the employ of the company, can claim the benefit of said Act, as being one of the persons in favor of whom the Legislature has given an individual right of recourse over upon the stockholders. Section 11 of said Act provides for the creation of mining, quarrying and manufacturing com Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213; Cook, Stock and Stockholders, § 215, p. 205, note 3; Adams v. Goodrich, 55 Ga. 233; Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50, 32 Am. Rep. 262; Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340, 31 Am. Rep. 503; Brock-panies, and contains this clause: "The stockway v. Innes, 39 Mich. 47, 33 Am. Rep. 348; Pennsylvania & D. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. 168, 24 Am. Rep. 189. Words in the Constitution or Statute, which have a technical meaning, are supposed to be used in that sense; but if not, then in their ordinary sense or common acceptation. In Adams v. Goodrich, supra, a laborer was held to be one who performs manual labor. See also Heebner v. Chave, 5 Pa. 115; Pennsyltania & D. R. Co. v. Leuffer, supra; Aikin v. Wasson, 24 N. Y. 482; Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 640; Stryker v. Cassidy, supra; Ericsson v. Brown, 38 Barb. 390. The labor Hand did was the incident, and not the principal, of his services. Hence he cannot recover. Cook, Stock and Stockholders, p. 229; Coffin ▼. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 643. Chief Justice Shaw defines the word "operative" thus: "Probably the primary thought which the legislators had in mind was the wages due men and women, working in manufactories, who receive their pay usually weekly or monthly.' Thayer v. Mann, 2 Cush. 371. Mr. Percy D. Maddin, for appellee: It is the laborers, servants and clerks who have no voice in the management of the company, who have nothing to do with its financial or business policy, who cannot say what contracts shall and what shall not be made, it is these who are under the direction and control of the superior officers and agents of the company that are protected The word "servant," in our legal nomencla holders are jointly and severally liable, individually, at all times, for all moneys due and owing to the laborers, servants, clerks and operatives of the company, in case the corporation becomes insolvent.' " The proof shows that for a salary of $100 per month, payable as wanted, the plaintiff had been on the road for about twenty-three weeks, and at the factory fourteen or fifteen weeks, during the time of his employment, being out and in alternately, and for varying periods as directed and required by the company; that while on the road be sold goods by sample or photograph, made collections, settled claims and generally did any and every thing which is understood to be within the duties of a drummer working on a salary, subject to the direction and control of the general manager of the company. When not on the road, he worked in the store, shipping and receiving goods, moving and handling stock, etc. He also made sales in the city, and collected bills, when so instructed. There is due him salary for five and four-fifths months, during which time he was on the road and at the factory, about half each. Does this character of employment and service bring him within the benefit of the clause of the Act above quoted? While there is no doubt of the power of the Legislature to impose this increased liability upon the stockholder, when it is done in the Act creating the corporation, yet, being in derogation of the common law, such statutes, so far as concerns such liabili y, are to be strictly construed. They are a wide departure from established rules, and, though founded upon considerations of public policy and gen- | principles of construction that are to govern us, eral convenience, are not to be extended beyond the plain intent of the words of the Statute, as said by Mr. Cook in his work on Stock and Stockholders, § 214. Again, this author says, in speaking of the statutory liability of stock-be, if we were at liberty to accept the term in holders for debts of the corporation due its servants or laborers: "There has been difficulty in determining what persons are to be classed as 'servants;' but the courts are not inclined to give a broad application to the word." § 215. It must also be borne in mind that while the Legislature has in such Acts manifested a purpose to guard and protect the wages of a cer tain class, it does not follow that the class should be extended by any liberality of construction, so as to include persons not named. The court should be slow to enlarge the class by any latitudinous construction, not only up on the consideration above stated, but for the further reason that the Legislature is not to be presumed to place unnecessary burdens upon the corporations of its creation. They serve a most valuable purpose in developing and building up the resources of the State. By means of the aggregation of capital, they are able to accomplish great and much-to-be-desired benefits to the public, which individual means and effort would be unable to achieve. With these general principles to direct us, we are to ascertain, as each case arises, what employé is or is not within the language of the Act. In arriving at a satisfactory conclusion, we find but little aid and comfort from the adjudged cases from the courts of other States, the same language receiving very different construction at the hands of different courts, of equally high authority, as a citation of some of them will show. The following persons have been held not to fall within the terms "servant" or "laborer: " the secretary of a manufacturing company (Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N. Y. 640); a civil engineer (Pennsylvania & D. R. Co. v. Leuffer, 81 Pa. 168); a consulting engineer (Ericsson v. Brown, 38 Barb. 390); an assistant engineer (Brockway v. Innes, 39 Mich. 47); an overseer on a plantation (Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340); a book-keeper and general manager. Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213. These cases seem to rest upon the idea that the terms named have reference only to per sons who perform menial or manual labor, or, rather, to persons whose chief employment is to perform such labor, and not to embrace the bigher class named in the authorities just cited, although each of the persons named did perform more or less of manual labor, as incidents to their employments. On the other hand, a master n echanic or machinist employed by the year was held to be embraced under a statute protecting clerks or laborers. Sleeper v. Good win, 67 Wis. 590. But without further naming the cases, we refer the crious to note 1 10 § 215, Cook, Stock and Stockholders, where a number of caves are to be found. The Statute under consideration, as we have seen, uses the words "laborers, servants, clerks, operatives." We do not deem it necessary to define the terms "laborer" or ". operative," as it may be said to be clear, under the that they do not include the traveling salesman on a salary of $100 per month. Whether he would be embraced under the term "servants," it would be difficult to say. He would its broadest sense, as defined by Mr. Wood in his work on Master and Servant, viz.: "The word 'servant' in our legal nomenclature has a broad significance, and embraces all persons of whatever rank or position, who are in the employ, and subject to the direction or control, of another, in any department of labor or business. Indeed, it may, in most cases, be said to be synonymous with 'employé.'"' 1. That it is, however, not used in that sense in the Statute, is shown by the fact that other terms are used, which would be altogether unnecessary and idle, if it were meant to be synonymous with "employé." We would have no room for the words "laborer, clerk" or "operative." Webster defines "clerk," as "an assistant in a shop or store who sells goods, keeps accounts,' etc. Bouvier says he is a person in the employ of a merchant, who attends to any part of his business, while the merchant himself superintends the whole; or a person employed in an office to keep accounts or records. Rapalje says: "In business law, an assistant employed to aid in any business, mercantile or otherwise, subject to the advice aud direction of his employer." Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 219. That "clerk" embraces and includes "salesman," seems beyond all doubt. If the term includes the salesman who remains in the shop or store, we can see no reason why it does not include the salesman on the road under like terms of employment. Each makes sales, collects accounts, handles goods and acts under the instruction of the employer. 66 It is worthy of note that the Act of 1875, chap. 142, "To Provide for the Organization of Corporations," creates an individual liability upon the stockholders to employés in different companies in different language, and some of the corporations created are left without any provision at all on the subject. Thus sec ion 12 ("colon compress and warehouse" companies) has be same provision that we have been considering for mining and manufac uring, viz.: Laborers, servants, clerks and operatives.' Section 18 (hotel companies), The terms are laborers, servants and clerks." Fection 21 'as to printing and publishing companies), the language is: Journeymen for wages due, and all other servants and employés." Section 22 (as to transfer and omnibus companies), “To servants and agents.' Section 24 (steamboat and packe companies), "To hands, and other employés"-while there is no provision at all on the subject as to railway, turnpike, telegraph, insurance or street railway companies, building associations, pawnbrokers, levees, banks or immigration and real-estate companies. Whatever may have been the purpose of the Legislature in making these distinctions, they do not materially help us to a decision of the case in hand, and we have referred to it merely as a matter of interest in connection with the subject of statutory liability of stockholders, so far as concerns employés. |