v, Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. 87 Miss. 679, 40 So. 263. Actions against receivers cannot be brought without prior leave having been secured from the court administering the Tex. Civ. App. property without any compensation what- Morse v. Tackaberry, 134 S. W. 273; Kerr, Receivers, 2d ed. pp. 196 et seq.; J. I. Case Plow Works v. $1 Fed. 529; Buckhannon & N. R. Co. v. Finks, 26 C. C. A. 46, 52 U. S. App. 253, Davis, 68 C. C. A. 345, 135 Fed. 707; Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 59 Fed. 523; Central Trust Co. v. Wheeling & L. E. R. Co. 189 Fed. 82; Comer v. Felton, 10 C. C. A. 28, 22 U. S. App. 313, 61 Fed. 731; Harmon v. Best, 174 Ind. 323, 91 N. E. 19; High, Receivers, 4th ed. p. 541, § 395a; Galveston, H. & H. R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. The Railroad Commission has no authority to add anything to § 5545 of the Code, or to extend the provisions of that statute so as to make it cover things which the language of the statute itself does not cover. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. State, 137 Ala. 439, 34 So. 401; Page v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 129 Ala. 232, 29 So. 676; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. ed. 37; State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic Coast v. Pennefather; Line R. Co. 51 Fla. 578,,40 So. 875; States.. W. 951; Smith v. St. Louis & S. F. R. any lay denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, were violated by an act of the legislature requiring railroads to make such physical connections, etc., as ordered by the Corporation Commission, and making it the duty of such Commission to investigate all complaints in reference to physical connections, and require railroads to establish and maintain union depots; nor by an order of the Commission, in pursuance of the power conferred upon it, requiring three railroads to unite in operating a union station at a specified point, where it appeared that the railroad company objecting to the validity of such order was incorporated under the laws of the state prior to the passage of the act. And this was held to be true although the railroad had acquired a right of way in the town, and certain citizens had agreed to give it a bonus of $10,000 to build a station on a site other than that designated for the location of the union station, and it had purchased the site so agreed upon, and although the order would compel the abandonment of its right of way and station grounds, and the running of the road through two elevators, and the grading of an additional roadbed, and necessitate a curve in its track so acute as to cause a delay in handling trains, all at a cost of not less than $50,000, which it appeared, however, would be partly compensated for by the fact that the expense of the company in maintaining its part of the union depot would be less than that of maintaining an independent depot. It was held that such act and the order in pursuance thereof were just and reasonable and valid, either as an exercise of the police power, or as a reasonable exercise of the reserve power of the legislature to amend or repeal the corporation's charter. Effect of difficulty of acquiring new site. It is no objection to the enforcement of an order of the Railroad Commission re - 126 quiring the establishment and maintenance of a union station by three railroads, to be located on the old site of the station of one of them, that the company owning the location refuses to sell any interest in its location to the other companies, since they have the right to acquire such interest as they need by condemnation proceedings, under Rev. Stat. 1911. art. 6504, although that act does not specifically mention union stations, since its provisions apply to all depots permitted or required by law. State v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. 165 S. W. 491. Necessity that exact location be fixed. In Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. State, Tex. Civ. App. 167 S. W. 192, an order of the Railroad Commission, acting under articles 6695 and 6696, of the Revised Statutes of 1911, directing the erection of a union depot "to be located so as to best serve the purpose for which it is intended," was upheld as against the objection that it was too vague and indefinite to be complied with, in that it did not designate the location of the depot, and failed to state the character of the building required, the court remarking that the Commission under the statute had a right to determine for itself the location and character of the building, but that it was permissible for it to leave these matters of detail to the railroads. Requiring change of line, delay in schedule, etc. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 191 Fed. 757, an order requiring the entrance of all complainant's passenger trains into a union passenger depot was held unreasonable and violative of the interstate commerce clause, and as taking property for public use without compensation, upon facts stated in a complaint in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the order, and admitted by the demurrer, that Co. 151 Mo. 391, 48 L.R.A. 368, 52 S. W. for the transaction of its business and the 378. Section 5545 of the Code of Alabama is not applicable to receivers operating railroad property. accommodation of the traveling public in a city where the local revenues were small, to unite in the construction of a passenger station to be used jointly, but it would be in violation of the United States constitutional provision against deprivation of property without due process of law. United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 44 L. ed. 780, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; United States v. Sheldon, 2 Wheat. 119, 4 L. ed. 199; Grooms v. Hannon, 59 Ala. 510; Ex Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Caroparte Charles, 106 Ala. 203, 18 So. 73; lina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. Jarratt v. McCabe, 75 Ala. 325; Southwest-ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. ern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Rowe, 125 Ala. 491, 28 So. 484; Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. McCants, 120 Ala. 616, 25 So. 8; Scott v. Field, 75 Ala. 419; Greek-American Produce Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 4 Ala. App. 377; National Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Cheatham, 137 Ala. 395, 34 So. 383. Not only would it be arbitrary and unreasonable to compel the defendants, or either of them, having adequate facilities the complainant operated a railroad over intervening states; that it had a passenger station in the city of Mobile, and operated through that city more passenger trains than the other three roads combined; that it was under contract to transport the mails; that much the greater number of passengers on its trains were through passengers, and there was little exchange of passengers between complainant and the other roads entering the city, due to the fact that the other roads terminated there; that the change would require it to diverge from its main line about 2,800 feet; that its trains would be required to operate over the lines of another company around curves, necessitating a delay of over 30 or 40 minutes, or it would be required, at an expense of $50,000, to build a track across the yards of another railroad, which would result in rendering the schedule uncertain. In Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co. 109 Mass. 103, it was held no objection to an act directing several railroads to construct a union station that it required the railroads to extend their tracks, and to exercise the right of eminent domain, and incur additional expense. Matters open to objection by railroads. A railroad which is merely ordered to enter and use a union station after it is erected by another road cannot, in an action to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission's order, avail itself of an objection that a part of a street is included in the location selected, since this is a matter between the company ordered to construct the station and the public. Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749. Neither can a railroad complain that a statute is unconstitutional on the ground that it authorizes the Railroad Commission to require a joint ownership of union depots, where the Commission's order affecting it merely instructs it, together with 398. de Graffenried, J. delivered the opinion of the court: We quote the following propositions which, in our opinion, exert a controlling influence upon the questions presented by this record: A. "Whenever the validity of an act is challenged upon the ground that it is other companies, jointly or severally, to proceed to acquire a certain site for a union station, and, in the event of a failure to agree upon the purchase and erection of the station within a stated time, directing one of the roads, other than the complainant, to acquire the site and erect a station, and ordering the complainant company to enter and use such station on terms agreed upon between it and the constructing road, and in the event of their failure to reach an agreement, upon terms prescribed by the Commission, since the only thing imperative upon the complainant under the order is that it enter the station when one is completed. Ibid. The court in this case, however, stated that they did not mean to hold that the Commission could not compel a joint construction and ownership of a union depot, but merely held that it was not necessary for them to determine the point. Ibid. Miscellaneous. Where an act directed four named railroads to unite in a union station, it was held unnecessary to give lessees or assignees of such roads, or others whose interests were merely subordinate, notice of the hearings by the Commission concerning the location of the station. Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co. supra. In North Carolina ex rel. Corporation Commission v. Seaboard Air Line & S. R. Co. 161 N. C. 270, 76 S. E. 554, in view of the statute governing appeals from the Corporation Commission, and providing that they should be tried under the same rules as are prescribed for the trial of other civil cases, it was held that on an appeal from a finding requiring the erection of a union depot, neither the plaintiff's nor the defendants were confined to the testimony submitted to the Commission, but that any, competent evidence was admissible. J. T. W. 1 unconstitutional, the objector assumes the | Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 30 L.R.A. burden of showing tha it is an exercise (N.S.) 499, 52 So. 941. of authority not legislative in its nature, or that it is inconsistent with some other provision of the Constitution. In cases of doubtful construction, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of thet." State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So. 543; Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 499, 52 So. 941; Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749; Nos. 291, 292, and 293, October term, 1912, being the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shep ard, Simpson v. Kennedy, and Simpson v. Shillaber) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, present term. 1. In this case the Railroad Commission made an order requiring the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, and the Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company, and S. L. Schoonmaker and H. M. Atkinson, receivers of said Atlanta, Birmingham, & Atlantic Railroad Company, to procure sufficient grounds within a certain specified territory in the city of Bessemer for a union passenger station for said railroads, and upon such ground to erect, within a given period, for the use of said roads, at said city, a union passenger station. The order was made on February 5, 1912, and required said parties to "proceed to the procurement of sufficient grounds within the boundaries above set out, and proceed with the con B. "Constitutions were made for practical purposes, and not for the exercise of critical gymnastics; they should be construction of an adequate passenger station strued so as to carry out the intention of the lawmakers, which should be reasonable rather than absurd." State ex rel. Covington v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 So. 679; State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So. 543. thereon, to be used jointly by the above set out railroad companies, and that work on the construction of said building shall commence within ninety (90) days, and shall [be completed within six (6) months." The above order of the Railroad CommisC. "All laws are carried into execution sion was made pursuant to § 5545 of the by means of officers appointed for that pur- Code of 1907, which is as follows: "Any pose; some with more, others with less, but two or more railroads which enter any city all must be clothed with power suflicient or town may be required, when practicable, for the effectual execution of the law to be or when the necessities of the case in the enforced." Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, judgment of the Railroad Commission de70 Ga. 694; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, mands it, to have and maintain one common 128 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 377, 9 Sup. Ct. or union passenger station for the security, Rep. 47; Railroad Commission v. Alabama | accommodation, and convenience of the Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749; | traveling public, and to unite in the joint State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So.undertaking and expense of erecting, con543; Spraggins v. State, 183 Ala. 663, 63 So. 83. D. The appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not dissolve the corporation. Cook, Corp. 6th ed. § 871; Green v. Walkill Nat. Bank, 7 Hun, 63. structing, and maintaining such union passenger station commensurate with the business and revenue of such railroad companies or corporations, on such terms, regulations, provisions, and conditions as the Railroad Commission may prescribe; and any com E. When a board is created for the pur-pany failing to comply with the orders of pose of carrying a law into execution, all legal intendments are with the orders of the Railroad Commission shall be liable to a penalty of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, for every six months in default, to be recovered by the state." Under the above provision of the Code we presume that the Railroad Commission, before making the above order, informed itself as to the necessities of the situation, and we accept the order as tantamount to such board, and such orders will be upheld unless their invalidity is shown by those who complain of such orders. The legal presumption is that such orders are reasonable; that they were made upon proper evidence; and that they are valid. It is only when such orders were unauthorized by the law, or were made by such board without or in excess of legal authority, orniently located union passenger station in were unreasonable, that they are void. Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749; Spraggins v. State, 183 Ala. 663, 63 So. 83; State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So. 543; a declaration that the reasonable necessities of the traveling public demand a conve the city of Bessemer, to be used by the named railroad companies for the reception and discharge of their passengers at that point, and that the building of such station will not amount to an unreasonable burden upon the railroad companies, taking into consideration the volume of their passenger business at that point and the cost, to the railroads, of such union passenger station. In other words, we accept, in the present state of the record, the making of the order by the Railroad Commission as a finding by the Railroad Commission that the situation at Bessemer is such as to justify the making of the order. See above subdivision E of this opinion, and the authorities there cited. 2. It is argued by the railroad companies that the above order is void because it does not appear from the order or the petition for mandamus that the companies have it within their power to comply with the order, in that it does not appear that they own or can obtain at reasonable figures sufficient land within the prescribed limits upon which to build the union passenger station. Unless the contrary is clearly shown, we will presume not only that the place prescribed is suitable, but that sufficient ground can be obtained, either by private purchase, or by condemnation proceedings, at reasonable figures, for such station. Through the power of eminent domain which the law has conferred upon the railroad companies, they possess all the power which is necessary to acquire the needed lands at their fair value; and, under the present state of the record, we must presume that the Railroad Commission has placed no unreasonable burden upon the railroad companies in so far as the acquisition of the needed ground for the station is concerned. See above subdivision E of this opinion, and authorities cited. 3. It is also contended by the railroad companies that "the order of the Railroad Commission is void in that the order of the Railroad Commission requires each railroad company to abandon presently occupied depot facilities in the city of Bessemer, and to build, in conjunction with others, a union depot, whereas the act authorizing the Railroad Commission to require the construction of a union depot does not authorize the Commission to compel the abandonment of depot and depot facilities already erected and in use." This argument was, of course, applicable to the facts presented by the record in Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749, but in that case this court held that it is competent, when the reasonable necessities of the public require it, and the needed improvement will not place an unreasonable burden upon the railroads, for the Railroad Commission to order two or more railroads maintaining separate passenger stations in the same city or town to unite in one pas senger station. Conditions which a few years ago were amply sufficient to meet the public needs are now found to be altogether inadequate, and in this day, when quick transportation is a necessity, the public demands better and more convenient passenger stations than were formerly needed, and the statute which we have above quoted was passed to meet this new necessity of the public. It is out of respect to the reasonable public needs, and the power of the state to require those who serve the public to meet such reasonable needs, that statutes similar to the one now under consideration have in other states been held to be violative of no principle of constitutional law. Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co. 109 Mass. 103; North Carolina Corp. Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 139 N. C. 126, 51 S. E. 793; Industrial Siding Case, 140 N. C. 239, 52 S. E. 941; Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 142 N. C. 392, 55 S. E. 292; Griffin v. Southern R. Co. 150 N. C. 312, 64 S. E. 16. 4. Authorized as we are, in this state of the record, to presume that the Railroad Commission, when it made the order complained of, had by personal investigation on the part of its members, and by other proper evidence, arrived at the just conclusion that the city of Bessemer has reached that stage in its growth and development when the public travel to and from that city renders the location and maintenance of a union passenger station at that point a not unreasonable burden upon the named railroads, and that the passenger stations of said railroads at said city are so located, with reference to each other that the necessities of the traveling public require that said railroads shall receive and discharge their passengers at the same point, the Railroad Commission, under the authority conferred upon it by the laws of this state, certainly had the authority to order said railroads to unite in one passenger station at said city. Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. supra. It is not the policy of the state to place the safety and convenience of the traveling public solely within the arbitrary control of those who manage railroad companies, nor is it the policy of the state to place the manner in which railroads shall conduct themselves, in the conduct of their business, in the uncontrolled discretion or judgment of the Railroad Commission. When, however, the Railroad Commission makes an order which is within the purview of the powers which the legislature has conferred upon the Commission, when this body of men selected, presumably, for its intelligence and fitness, and charged by the law with the performance of its duties, makes an order in furtherance of the laws of the state which it is required to administer with equal justice to all interests, then, unless there is something on the face of the record, or evidence aliunde the record, showing the illegality or the unreasonableness or injustice of the order, the order will be upheld. See subdivision E of this opinion, and authorities there cited. Under the opinion of this court in Railroad Commission v. Alabama Northern R. Co. supra, there is therefore but one question going to the validity of the order of the Commission, in the instant case, on constitutional grounds, left for our consideration, and that is whether so much of said § 5545 of the Code of 1907 as authorizes the Railroad Commission to require two or more railroads to jointly purchase or condemn lands for a union depot and to jointly erect a union depot thereon is within the power of the legislature. charges has been called in question, and the answer made to it in those cases is equally pertinent here. Indeed, it is impossible for the state to exercise this power of regulation without interfering to some extent with the power of a railway to contract either with its customers or connecting lines. The power is one which was said, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77, to have been customarily exercised in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, for the regulation of ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, and innkeepers; and the whole object of this class of legislation is to curtail the power to contract by limiting the exactions of those engaged in these occupations, and providing that the rendition of such services shall not raise an implied promise to pay more than a certain fixed sum. This legislation may be justified by the fact that these various occupations are necessarily to a certain extent monopolistic in their nature, and that in dealing with customers the parties do not stand upon an equality; the latter being practically compelled to submit to such terms as the former may choose to exact, unless the state shall, acting in the interest of the public, elect to interfere and prescribe a maximum of charges." The above opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States was delivered in a case which was appealed from the supreme court of Minnesota, and in this same case the supreme court of Minnesota said: "If the state is to have any voice, therefore, in the The question as to whether the Railroad Commission can compel two or more railroads to jointly purchase or condemn lands needed for a union depot, and to construct thereon a union passenger station, was left, in the above case, an open one; but in that case there is an intimation that the court was inclined to the opinion that the Commission possessed such power, and that this court would probably so hold when the question was properly presented. In that case this court said: "We do not mean to hold, however, that any part of said § 5545 is unconstitutional, or that the Commission cannot compel a joint construction and ownership of a union depot," and cited, in that connection, the case of State ex rel. Rail-establishment of reasonable rates, it must road & W. Commission v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 80 Minn. 191, 89 Am. St. Rep. 514, 83 N. W. 60; s. c., 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. While the Supreme Court of the United States did not, in the above case, in terms determine this question, the entire argument of the court in that case, in support of the conclusions to which it actually arrived, is strongly persuasive that the court was of the opinion that the states possess the power which, in this case, the Railroad Commission has seen fit to exercise. In that case the court said: "It is insisted that it is beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to compel companies to enter into involuntary, unreasonable, and unprofitable contracts with other companies at the instance of third parties, or to fix terms and conditions upon which such contracts shall be performed. This argument in its various applications is one which has been addressed to and considered by this court in nearly every case in which the power of the state to regulate railway have a voice in some degree and some manner in the business of the carrier. Where a single carrier is being dealt with, this can be accomplished by determining what the operating expenses ought reasonably to be; the reasonable value of the capital invested; what return, under all the circumstances of the case, would be fair; and then, by adjusting the rate, an economical management is secured. But in a case like the one at bar, where each may plead its inability to make the necessary agreement with the other, the state must have the power to arbitrate between them, and, within proper limitations, compel the acceptance of its award.' If the state is powerless to decide as between carriers, we have, as said by counsel for the Commission, the following absurdity, namely: (a) The state may regulate rates; (b) the rate must be reasonable; (c) it must afford the carrier compensation over and above operating expenses; (d) the method of operating and consequent expenses is beyond the state control.' But this question has heretofore |