Altnow v. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186, 44 Am. Rep. 191, 14 N. W. 877; Dosdall v. Olmsted County, 30 Minn. 96, 44 Am. Rep. 185, 14 N. W. 458; Grube v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228; Bank v. Brainerd School Dist. 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814; Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 18 L.R.A. 151, 53 N. W. 763; Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289, 53 Am. Rep. 31, 23 N. W. 220; Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn, 278, 64 N. W. 812; Miller v. Minneapolis, 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 183; Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 698, 115 N. W. 643, 14 Ann. Cas. 673; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332. The establishment and maintenance of parks, commons, and squares are public or governmental, and not proprietary, func tions. Browne v. Bowdoinham, 71 Me. 144; Corbin v. Dale, 57 Mo. 297; Mayo v. Wood, 50 Cal. 171; Clark v. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567. Higginson v. The Treasurer (Higginson v. Slattery), 212 Mass. 583, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 215, 99 N. E. 523. The notice served upon the city council was insufficient to found an action. Terryll v. Faribault, 84 Minn. 341, 87 N. W. 917; Bausher v. St. Paul, 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. W. 745, 4 Am, Neg. Rep. 407; Doyle v. Duluth, 74 Minn. 157, 76 N. W. 1023; Nicol v. St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. W. 375; McKeague v. Green Bay, 106 Wis. 577, 82 N. W. 708. Messrs. Healy & La Du, for respon dents: The city is exercising corporate powers, and not governmental functions. Reed v. Anoka, 85 Minn. 294, 88 N. W. 981. Where a municipality is given the exclusive control of its streets, it is required to exercise reasonable care to keep them in a safe condition, and is liable to anyone who is injured as a result of the want of such Park uses are public uses in the strictest care. sense. Rossmiller v. State, 114 Wis. 169, 58 L.R.A. 93, 91 Am. St. Rep. 910, 89 N. W. 839; State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, L.R.A. 148 N. W. 617, 1095; Watson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 46 Minn. 321, 48 N. W. 1129; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Whitham, 155 Ill. 514, 28 L.R.A. 612, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 40 N. E. 1014; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Marble, 112 Mich. 4, 70 N. W. 319; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Warrum, 42 Ind. App. 179, 82 N. E. 934, 84 N. E. 356; Todd v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 19 Ohio St. 514; Louisville, St. L. & T. R. Co. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401, 49 Am. St. Rep. 303, 29 S. W. 14; 13 Cyc. 439; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431, 8 L. ed. 452; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119, Gil. 75; Poudler v. Minneapolis, 103 Minn. 479, 115 N. W. 274; Cole v. Minnesota Loan & T. Co. 17 N. D. 409, 117 N. W. 354, 17 Ann. Cas. 304. The maintenance of Loring park is a public and governmental function, in the exercise of which the city is not liable for the negligence of its employees. Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485; Veale v. Boston, 135 Mass. 187; Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578, 3 L.R.A. 257, 12 Am. St. Rep. 601, 20 N. E. 329; McKay v. Reading, 184 Mass. 140, 68 N. E. 43; Holleran v. Boston, 176 Mass. 75, 57 N. E. 220; Clark v. Waltham, 128 Mass. 567; Steele v. Boston, 128 Mass. 583; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 51 Atl. 1042; Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156, 40 Am. St. Rep. 895, 35 Pac. 605; Park Comrs. v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S. W. 948; Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 419, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 523, 78 Atl. 196; Re Certain Land, 119 Fed. 453; St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297, Gil. 205, 74 Am. Dec. 753; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308, Gil. 284; Cleveland v. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279, Gil. 255; Moore v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 300, Gil. 258; O'Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65; Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 50 Am. Rep. 564, 19 N. W. 730; Grant v. Stillwater, 35 Minn. 242, 28 N. W. 660; Nichols v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 494, 47 N. W. 168; Blyhl v. Waterville, 57 Minn. 115, 47 Am. St. Rep. 596, 58 N. W. 817; McDowell v. Preston, 104 Minn. 263, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 190, 116 N. W. 470; Estelle v. Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243, 6 N. W. 775; Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 53 Am. Rep. 23, 22 N. W. 444; Kleopfert v. Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. W. 908, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 381; Schigley v. Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 689, 118 N. W. 259, 16 Ann. Cas. 169; Weber v. Harrisburg, 216 Pa. 117, 64 Atl. 905; McDonald v. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 308, 83 Am. St. Rep. 428, 84 N. W. 1022, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 318; Burridge v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 557, 42 L.R.A. 684, 72 Am. St. Rep. 582, 76 N. W. 84; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 51 Atl. 1042; Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 147, 114 Am. St. Rep. 158, 82 Pac. 590, 7 Ann. Cas. 1042, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 94; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109, 26 Atl. 304; Townley v. Huntington, 68 W. Va. 574, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 118, 70 S. E. 368, 3 N. C. C. A. 835. The notice served upon the city was sufficient. Kandelin v. Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 124 N. W. 449; Terryll v. Faribault, 84 Minn. 341, 87 N. W. 917; Kelly v. Minneapolis, 77 Minn. 76, 79 N. W. 653; Nicol v. St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. W. 375: Harder v. Minne- | 68 N. W. 458; Schigley v. Waseca, 106 Minn. apolis, 40 Minn. 446, 42 N. W. 350; Larkin v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 311, 127 N. W. 1129; Wornecka v. St. Paul, 118 Minn. 207, 136 N. W. 561. Taylor, C., filed the following opinion: Under and pursuant to chapter 281 of the Special Laws of 1883, and the acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, the board of park commissioners of the city of Minneapolis has established, improved, and maintains a system of parks and park ways for the use of the inhabitants of that city. Among the parks so established and maintained is a tract of about 36 acres, now known as Loring park, located in the midst of a thickly settled portion of the city. Running through this park in various directions are numerous gravel and cement walks and footpaths, but no carriage ways. These walks and paths are in constant use as thoroughfares by people passing from one part of the city to another. On April 30, 1913, employees of the park board raked together a large quantity of leaves and other rubbish, and burned it at the intersection of two or more of these walks. When they quit work at night they left the ashes and unburned rubbish lying upon the walk. In the evening of the same day, Aloysius J. Ackeret, a child less than two years of age, while proceeding along the walk with his mother, stumbled and fell into this pile of ashes, and burned his hands upon the coals and heated refuse underneath the ashes to such an extent that his right hand is permanently crippled. Casper A. Ackeret, the father of the child, brought two actions for damages, one on behalf of the child and the other on his own behalf, and recovered a verdict in both. In the action brought by the father in his own behalf, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was denied. Judgment was entered, and defendant appealed therefrom. In the action brought on behalf of the child, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. This motion was also denied, and defendant appealed from the order denying it. The two cases were argued together and submitted upon one brief. The important question presented is whether the city is liable in damages for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions in the walks or pathways in its public parks. 1. In establishing, maintaining, and caring for streets, highways, and public parks, a municipality acts in its governmental, and not in its proprietary, capacity. St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 63 Minn. 330, 34 L.R.A. 184, 63 N. W. 267, 65 N. W. 649, 94, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 689, 118 N. W. 259, 16 Ann. Cas. 169; International Falls v. Minnesota, D. & W. R. Co. 117 Minn. 14, 134 N. W. 302; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 51 Atl. 1042; Hartford v. Maslen, 76 Conn. 599, 57 Atl. 740; Higginson v. The Treasurer (Higginson v. Slattery) 212 Mass. 583, 42 L.R.A.(N.S.) 215, 99 N. E. 523; Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash: 156, 40 Am. St. Rep. 895, 35 Pac. 605; Park Comrs. v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S. W. 948; Bisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 523, 78 Atl. 196. From the earliest times it has been the recognized rule that a municipality is not liable in damages for negligence in performing its governmental functions unless such liability had been imposed by statute. This rule has been recognized and applied many times by this court. Dosdall v. Olmsted County, 30 Minn. 96, 44 Am. Rep. 185, 14 N. W. 458; Altnow v. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186, 44 Am. Rep. 191, 14 N. W. 877; Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289, 53 Am. Rep. 31, 23 N. W. 220; Grube v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228; Bank v. Brainerd School Dist. 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814; Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 18 L.R.A. 151, 53 N. W. 763; Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N. W. 812; Miller v. Minneapolis, 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 183; Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 698, 115 N. W. 643, 14 Ann. Cas. 673; Brantman v. Canby, 119 Minn. 396, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 862, 138 N. W. 671. But by what is termed in Lane v. Minnesota State Agri. Soc. 62 Minn. 175, 29 L.R.A. 708, 64 N. W. 382, as an "illogical exception to this rule," it has become firmly established in this state, and in most of the Middle and Western states, that a city is liable for injuries resulting from defects or dangerous conditions in its streets. 2 Dunnell's Dig. § 6814; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 420. The reasons assigned for making a distinction between such cases and those governed by the general rule are various, and not very satisfactory. The reason most generally assigned is that such municipalities, having been given the exclusive control over their streets with ample power to provide funds to care for and maintain them, are chargeable with the duty to keep them safe for travel, and that it follows by implication therefrom that they are liable for failure to perform such duty. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 420; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308, Gil. 284; Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 53 Am. Rep. 23, 22 N. W. 444; Blyhl v. Waterville, 57 Minn. 115, 47 Am. St. Rep. 596, 58 N. W. 817; Peterson v. Cokato, 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W. 615, 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 576; Schigley v. Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 689, 118 N. W. 259, 16. Ann. of pedestrians, and hold that the city is Cas. 169. But it is difficult to see why the same reasoning would not also impose liability upon cities for negligence in performing many of their other governmental functions. It would certainly apply with equal force to the case now under consideration, for the city is given as plenary power in respect to its parks as in respect to its streets. In Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 18 L.R.A. 151, 53 N. W. 763, it is suggested that the distinction can best be sustained upon considerations of public policy and the doctrine of stare decisis. The exception, whether logical or otherwise, is now too firmly established to be questioned, and our present concern is to determine whether the case at bar is controlled by the exception or by the general rule. On examining the grounds upon which liability is imposed for defects in streets, we find that the same grounds exist for imposing liability for defects in the walks and pathways in question. These walks and pathways were used not merely for purposes of pleasure and recreation, but as thoroughfares for passing from one part of the city to another. They differed from other walks provided by the city for the use of pedestrians only in the fact that they were within the limits of a park. We find no substantial distinction between such walks and those located along the public streets. When we turn to the decided cases, we find a diversity of opinion. The New England states, as well as some others, do not recognize the exception to the general rule which we have been considering, and hold that a city is not liable for defects in its streets unless such liability is expressly imposed by statute, and, of course, also hold that it is not liable for defects in the paths and ways traversing its parks. Most of the cases cited by defendant are from states where such is the rule, and lack cogency in states which have adopted a different rule. Some courts, however, hold that a city is liable for negligence in respect to its streets, but is not liable for negligence in respect to its parks. Park Comrs. v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S. W. 948; Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156, 40 Am. St. Rep. 895, 35 Pac. 605. Other courts hold that it is also liable for negligence in respect to its parks. Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 147, 114 Am. St. Rep. 158, 82 Pac. 590, 7 Ann. Cas. 1042, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 94; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109, 26 Atl. 304; Weber v. Harrisburg, 216 Pa. 117, 64 Atl. 905; Silverman v. New York (Sup.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 59. We find no sufficient ground for making a distinction between the walks and pathways in question and the ordinary sidewalks provided by the city for the use liable for dangerous conditions therein caused by its own employees. See Kleopfert v. Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. W. 908, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 381. 2. The statute requires every person who claims damages from a city for injuries sustained by reason of defective streets, or through the negligence of city employees, to cause a written notice to be presented to its governing body stating the time, place, and circumstances of the injury, and the amount of compensation demanded. A notice was duly served stating the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in question; that the child was the infant son of Casper A. Ackeret, and that damages were claimed in the sum of $10,000. The notice was signed by the attorney for Casper A. Ackeret. Defendant contends that this notice is fatally defective in this: That the accident gave rise to two claims for damages,-one in favor of the father and one in favor of the child, and that the notice states only one claim, and does not specify whether that is the claim of the child or of the father, and further contends that in any event the notice cannot serve as a basis for both actions. The purpose of the notice is to give the municipal officers information which will enable them to ascertain and investigate the facts while the evidence is available, and to determine whether a liability exists, and, if so, the nature and extent of such liability. While the essential requirements of the statute must be complied with, it has been determined that a claimant is not barred from maintaining his action because his notice was informal, or not technically accurate, if the information required by the statute could, in substance, be ascertained therefrom. Kelly v. Minneapolis, 77 Minn. 76, 79 N. W. 653; Nicol v. St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. W. 375; Terryll v. Faribault, 81 Minn. 519, 84 N. W. 458; Terryll v. Faribault, 84 Minn. 341, 87 N. W. 917; Kandelin v. Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 124 N. W. 449; Larkin v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 311, 127 N. W. 1129; Wornecka v. St. Paul, 118 Minn. 207, 136 N. W. 561. The notice in question gave the officials full and accurate information as to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. It also informed them that the one injured was the infant son of the one giving the notice, and that damages were claimed in the sum of $10.000. If the facts stated in the notice were true, the law gave the father the right to bring two actions, one in his own behalf and one in behalf of his child. It is true that the notice did not state whether he made the claim in his own behalf, or in behalf of the child, or in behalf of both, and, if in behalf of both, that it did not apportion the damages between them. The natural inference would be that he was insisting upon all the rights given by the law. We think that all the essential facts were set forth, and that no prejudice resulted to defendant from the failure of the father to state specifically that he claimed damages both individually and as the statutory representative of his child, or from his failure to apportion the damages between the two claims. The purpose of the notice was fully accomplished, and we hold that it was not so defective as to bar either right of action. contrary. Where he in fact performs this duty, we think he may maintain an action to recover for loss of the services of his minor child. If in fact he did not perform such duty, a different question would be presented, which is neither involved nor determined herein. It follows that the order in one case and the judgment in the other are affirmed. Petition for rehearing denied. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. Respt., v. CATHERINE E. SCHULTZE et al. 3. In the action brought in his own behalf, the father sought to recover for the TAX LIEN COMPANY OF NEW YORK, expenses which he had incurred in providing medical and surgical treatment for the child, and also for the partial loss of services which will result from the child's crippled condition. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that two causes of action were improperly united, and that there was a defect of parties plaintiff. The demurrer was overruled, and defendant an swered. The same questions were again raised by objections interposed to the answer, and were again ruled against defendant. Defendant's contention is that the claim for loss of services vested in the father and mother jointly and that they must bring a joint action in order to recover therefor. This contention is based upon comparatively recent statutes. Section 7146, Gen. Stat. 1913, among other things provides: "Where husband and wife are living together, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all necessary household articles and supplies furnished to and used by the family." Section 7442, Gen. Stat. 1913, states: "The father and mother are the natural guardians of their minor children, and, being themselves competent to transact their own business and not otherwise unsuitable, they are equally entitled to their custody and the care of their education. If either dies or is disqualified to act, the guardianship devolves upon the other." Defendant insists that both parents are equally liable for the support of their children, and are equally entitled to the custody of them, and that it follows as a consequence that they are jointly entitled to the benefit of the services of the children, and must bring a joint action to recover for the loss of such services. This contention is correct to some extent, but we think it was neither the purpose nor the effect of these statutes to make any material change in the duty imposed upon the husband and father to support and maintain the family. Other late statutes making his failure to do so a criminal offense point strongly to the WESLEY E. BARKER, Appt. (213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751.) Tax sale cutting off easements. right to withdraw from bid. 2. A purchaser at tax sale is not bound to comply with his bid if the property is subject to easements of light, air, and access which materially affect its value. amended by chapter 490 of the Laws of Mr. Edward Miehling, for appellant: 1908 and chapter 65 of the Laws of 1911), The foreclosure of a tax lien and the sale to foreclose a tax lien upon premises de- of premises pursuant to § 1035 of the scribed in the judgment as follows: Greater New York charter do not extin"Borough of the Bronx. New description, guish private easements of light, air, and section 9. Block 2277, lot 50. Location, access of adjoining owners over the land East 132d street, between Willis avenue and Brown place; assessed to unknown owner; on the land and tax map, city of New York, borough of Bronx." Upon the sale pursuant to the judgment, the appellant, Wesley E. Barker, bid the sum of $5,000 therefor, and the property was struck off to him. He signed the terms of sale and paid $500 on account thereof. He subsequently refused to complete his purchase, for the alleged reason that the premises are affected by easements of light, air, and access in favor of adjoining owners, which are not cut off by the foreclosure of the tax lien, and which said liens were in no way referred to by the terms of sale. The plaintiff, so far as appears from the record, does not deny that there were ease ments of light, air, and access in favor of adjoining owners, but alleges that all of the adjoining owners were made parties defendant in the action to foreclose the tax lien, and that some of them appeared in the action, and others defaulted after being duly served with process, and that the judgment in the action provides: "That each and all of the defendants in the action who have been served with a summons, and all persons claiming under them or any of them after the filing of the notice of pendency of action, be and they are hereby forever barred and foreclosed of all right, claim, lien, title, interest, easement, and equity of redemption in the premises affected by the said transfer of tax lien, and each and every part thereof." sold. Jackson v. Smith, 153 App. Div. 724, 138 N. Y. Supp. 654; Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co. 73 Misc. 61, 130 N. Y. Supp. 740, 149 App. Div. 936, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1126, affirmed in 210 N. Y. 561, 104 N. E. 1127. Mr. August Weymann, for respondent: If there were easements affecting the tax lot sold to the purchaser in favor of abutting owners or encumbrancers, they were effectually cut off by the judgment of foreclosure and sale. Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 427; Blakeley v. Calder, 15 N. Y. 617; 1 Black, Judgm. p. 245; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529; Wiltsie, Mortg. Foreclosure, § 565. The judgment of foreclosure and sale herein is binding not only as to questions actually litigated, but as to all questions which might have been litigated in the action. Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 436; Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 351; Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 127, 37 L.R.A. 805, 56 Am. St. Rep. 607, 45 N. E. 367; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 41, 19 Am. St. Rep. 470, 25 N. E. 292; Goebel v. Iffla, 111 N Y. 170, 18 N. E. 649; Re Laudy, 161 N. Y. 434, 55 N. E. 914; Bloomer v. Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168. The purchaser has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot question the validity of the judgment. St. Rep. 688, 50 N. E. 55; Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co. 73 Misc. 61, 130 N. Y. Supp. 740, 149 App. Div. 936, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1126; Paddell v. New York, 50 Misc. 422, 100 N. Y. Supp. 581, affirmed in 187 N. Y. Archer v. Archer, 155 N. Y. 415, 63 Am. The motions were made at the special term and were heard together, one by the plaintiff to compel the appellant Barker to complete his purchase, and one by the appellant Barker to be relieved from his pur-552, 80 N. E. 1114, 211 U. S. 446, 53 L. ed. chase. erty subject to a right of way in favor of adjoining property does not acquire such property free from the easement, especially where the owner of the dominant tenement is not made a party to the proceeding. Blenis v. Utica Knitting Co. 73 Misc. 61, 130 N. Y. Supp. 740, affirmed in 149 App. Div. 936, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1126, which is affirmed in 210 N. Y. 561, 104 N. E. 1127. Motion for reargument denied, 210 N. Y. 614, 104 N. E. 1127. Contrary to the rule announced in TAX LIEN Co. v. SCHULTZE, and the other New York cases above cited, it is held in Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927, that a sale of land for taxes terminated a right of way granted by the owner prior to 275, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, 15 Ann. Cas. the tax foreclosure proceedings, under a statute giving a tax lien priority, and requiring it to be fully paid and satisfied before any recognizance, mortgage, judgment, debt, obligation, or responsibility to or with which such real estate may become charged or liable, where the owner of the easement did not have the land segregated and obtain a pro tanto reduction of the tax, as authorized by statute. The grant of the easement had been made within the period covered by the delinquent taxes for which the sale was afterwards had, but no point is made of this fact. The decision rests upon the principle that the tax is a paramount lien, and its foreclosure cuts off all charges upon the real estate. W. A. E. |