In Miller v. Oelwein, 155 Iowa, 706, 136 N. W. 1045, it was declared that "the enrolled bills duly signed and deposited with the secretary of state constitute the ultimate proof of their regular enactment, and behind them it is impossible for any court to go for the purpose of ascertaining what the law is." take from the act as published, but ap-state without objection thereto within peared in the original bill. The court, upon thirty days, and the court held that it did examination of the enrolled bill, found this not become a law. not to be so, and added: "This enrolled bill, thus filed and preserved in the secretary's office, is the authenticated copy of the real bill which the general assembly passed, and is the ultimate proof of the true expression of the legislative will, as this court have before held. Clare v. State, 5 Iowa, 510. And that for the obvious reason that it is the bill which received the Duncombe v. Prindle, supra, and Collins signatures of the officers of both branches of v. Laucier, 45 Iowa, 702, were cited, and althe legislature, after a committee appointed so Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Taggart, 141 for that purpose had compared it with the Ind. 281, 60 L.R.A. 671, 40 N. E. 1051. law as passed, and reported it a correct But later on this was added: The "mere copy of the same. Behind this it is im- failure of the journals to show compliance possible for any court to go for the purpose with the requirements as to the method of ascertaining what the law is. There is of enacting a law will not be conclusive that no other bill, original or a copy, to which such requirements were not complied with" the signatures of the president of the senate-citing Leavenworth County v. Higginand speaker of the house of representatives botham, 17 Kan. 62. are affixed, or to which is appended the approval by the governor. And when counsel speak of some other original bill than this, in which the township 90 was embraced, we confess we are at a loss to conceive what they mean. Are we to suppose that the enrolling clerk, and the committee appointed to examine and report upon the accuracy of his work, have all been guilty of laches or corruption, especially in the absence of any competent proof to that effect?" Though not involved in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N. W. 738, the court in the course of its opinion observed that "inasmuch as a bill, before it becomes a law, must be signed by the presiding officers of the two houses and by the governor, as will be assumed, we may, for the purposes of this case, concede, when it has been enrolled and so signed and deposited in the office of the secretary of state, it is the ultimate and conclusive evidence of the contents of the bill which passed the general assembly, and that it cannot be contradicted by the journals, because there is no constitutional provisions requiring that it shall be entered on the journals." And further on at page 563, of 60 Iowa, it was said: "For fear we may be misunderstood, we will repeat that, when a bill or joint resolution is required to be signed by the presiding officers and the governor, and it is so signed, it will be conceded that such bill or resolution constitutes the ultimate and conclusive evidence of the contents thereof." In Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa, 702, 25 N. W. 887, the bill was presented to the governor for his approval during the last three days of the session of the general assembly, and he did not sign it and merely deposited it in the office of the secretary of In the recent case of Conly v. Dilley, 153 Iowa, 677, 133 N. W. 730, the contention was that the two houses did not adopt the same bill, in that in passing the house it included two amendments omitted by the senate, and, among other things, the court observed that "in the first place, it is extremely doubtful if the courts can properly go behind the enrolled bill to scrutinize the details of its legislative history for grounds upon which to hold it invalid. Clare v. State and Duncombe v. Prindle, supra; 36 Cyc. 971. It may be held that if the record affirmatively disclosed the adoption of an amendment which does not appear in the enrolled bill, or that such bill did not receive a constitutional majority of either house, or other vital defect of that nature, the court would not be bound to accept the enrolment and publication of an alleged statute as a finality; but we are here asked to go very much farther than the suggested case, and to presume that the house did adopt certain amendments of which there is not the slightest record, except of the fact that they were recommended by a committee. The fact that the journal does not show what was done with these amendments may afford good ground to criticize the manner of keeping the record; but we know of no rule of law or reason by which we can presume they were adopted by the house." It will be noted that the point under consideration was not involved in any of those cases, but it was covered by what was said in Duncombe v. Prindle, supra, and that decision is generally cited in opinions holding that the enrolled bill in office of the secretary of state, when properly attested. is conclusive evidence of its enactment, and, even though what was said in other deci Aside from entering the yeas and nays on the journal on final passage, no record except the enrolled bill duly authenticated is exacted by the fundamental law, and as the legislature is a co-ordinate branch of the government, in no sense inferior to the other branches, and equally bound by oath of obedience to the Constitution, we perceive no reason for not regarding its final record as embodied in such enrolled bill, authenticated as required by § 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, as absolute a verity as the judgment of a court. Of course, a judgment may be attacked, but not collaterally, and that is the only way an enrolled bill may be assailed. sions be dicta, these indicate the trend of exacted in the passage of a bill also required thought of those concurring therein. More- to be preserved? The Constitution noover, upon an examination of the conflicting where requires the bill to be made of record. authorities, we are inclined to the opinion | that this construction has the better reason for its support. There is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between other parties. Regardless of the good faith of a person or officer relying on the enrolled bill in the office of the secretary of state, this would afford no protection from the consequence of his acts if it should turn out that the journals or other evidence disclosed fatal defects in its passage. One believing that he were complying with the Each of the three departments of our law might be unwittingly committing a government is equal, and each should be crime, or an officer paying out money in responsible to the people whom it represupposed obedience to a statute might dis-sents. The legislature enacts laws, and is cover too late that the enactment he under-commanded by the Constitution to enact took to obey had not been adopted in the them in a certain way. The executive manner prescribed by the Constitution, ac- enforces the laws, and by the Constitution cording to record of clerks, though the it is made his duty to take certain steps legislators were proceeding under solemn looking toward such enforcement in the oath of obedience to the fundamental law. manner prescribed therein upon the hapIt seems quite enough that the average citi-pening of certain contingencies. The judizen must take notice of the contents of the cial department is charged with the duty enrolled bill when duly authorized, sub- of interpreting the laws, adjudging rights sequent to July 4th after passage, without also putting upon him the burden of ascertaining the condition of the journal of the respective houses bearing thereon, and determining for himself the effect of any irregularity therein tending to invalidate the bill. Courts could not rely upon the pub-more impropriety in the legislature seeking lished session laws, but would be required to go behind the final record of a court to to look beyond these to the journals of the determine whether it had obeyed some prohouse and senate, and often to any printed vision of the Constitution in making such bills or amendments which might be found record, than there would be in the courts after the adjournment of the general as seeking to go behind the final record made sembly. Otherwise, after relying on the by the legislative department. Where the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, executive is charged with taking certain authenticated as exacted by the Constitu- things upon contingencies happening, and is tion, for years, it might be ascertained from given no power to act except upon such the journals that an act theretofore en- contingency, if he determined that the conforced had never become a law. The incon- tingency exists and acts in pursuance therevenience of such a rule and the consequent of, the courts will not inquire into the fact confusion are a strong argument against its as to whether he decided correctly in deadoption. What is the design of exacting termining the existence of the contingency. the signing of the enrolled bills by the pre- Indeed, to preserve the harmony of our siding officers of the two houses and the form of government, these mandatory pro approval of the governor, and that they be visions must be considered as addressed to deposited with the secretary of state? Is the department which is called upon to perit not that these are the final records of the form them, and neither of the other departacts of the legislature for the information ments will be permitted in any manner to and guidance of other departments of gov-coerce that department into obedience thereernment? If so, why should they not be to. Those courts which uphold the inquiry accorded the respect usually accorded sol- as to whether the legislature has observed emn records? If merely steps in the en- the mandatory provisions of the Constiactment of laws, why are not other matters tution necessarily assume that it is safer and obligations thereunder. Such being the respective duties of the several departments, it would seem that, when certified to have been performed as required by the Constitution, this should be conclusive on the other departments, and there would seem no to intrust the enforcement of these to the Constitution itself. If it may, then, for the judicial department than the legislature, same reason it may go beyond the journal, and that the judicial department is the when that is impeached; and so the validity only one in which sufficient integrity ex- of legislation may be made to depend upon ists to insure observance of the provisions the memory of witnesses, and no man can, of the Constitution. Such an attitude in fact, know the law, which he is bound seems intolerable, and not to be endured. to obey. Such consequences would be a It is sometimes said that the courts assume large price to pay for immunity from the superiority over the legislature in deter- | possible abuse of authority by the high effimining that an act violates a provision of cers who are, as we think, charged with the the Constitution. This is not so, however, duty of certifying to the public the fact for they merely undertake to determine that a statute has been enacted by compewhether an act of the general assembly is tent houses. Human governments must rein conflict with the Constitution, and, if it pose confidence in officers. It may be is, the statute necessarily must yield, for abused, and there may be no remedy. Nor that the Constitution has a sanction great- is there any great force in the argument er than can be given by the action of any which seems to be regarded as of weight by department of state. some American courts, that some important provisions of the Constitution would be a dead letter if inquiry may not be made by the court beyond the rolls. This argument overlooks the fact that legislators are sworn to support the Constitution, or else it assumes that they will wilfully violate that It is neither modest nor just for "Upon principle then, in view of the division into departments under our form of government, each of equal authority, one department cannot rightfully go behind the final record certified to it or to the public from either of the other departments. And the judicial department is no more justi- oath. fied in going behind the final act of the leg-judges thus to impeach the integrity of anislature to see if it has obeyed every man- other department of government, and to datory provision of the Constitution than claim that the judiciary only will be faithis the legislature to go back of the final ful to its obligations." record made by the courts to see whether or not they have complied with all the constitutional requirements." State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 23 L.R.A. 340, 34 Pac. 201. What was said in Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514, 95 Am. Dec. 710, is especially pertinent: "It is argued that, if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each house may, by the aid of corrupt presiding officers, impose laws upon the state in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must, of necessity, be confided to officers, who, being human, may violate the trusts reposed in them. This, perhaps, cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond others, nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments, and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep the legislative journal. It ascertains the statute law by looking at its authentication, and then its function is merely to expound and administer it. It cannot, we think, look beyond that authentication, because of the It is also to be observed that the manner of keeping the journal, by either the house or senate, is not prescribed in the Constitution. Nor does it require that the acts finally passed shall be preserved in any form or place other than as enrolled bills authenticated as exacted therein and deposited with the secretary of state. In State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, supra, the court, in reverting to this matter, said: "The enrolled acts are prepared with some care, and, under the rules of our legislature, and of every legislative body of which we have any knowledge, some committee is charged with the responsibility of seeing that such enrolled bills are compared with the one which actualy passed the legislature before they are presented to the presiding officer for signature. There is therefore some protection thrown around these enrolled acts, and it would be a difficult matter for anyone through carelessness or fraud to prevent the will of the legislature, as expressed in the bill actually passed, being embodied in the enrolment thereof. But, if the doctrine be once established that the fact that such bill had passed can be negatived by the journal, there would be very little to prevent a bill which had been properly passed being defeated by the carelessness or fraud of the journal clerk or some employee under him. Under the practice prevailing in the legislature of this state, and in most of the other states, there is very little assurance that the journal will fully and ac ernment which has as its basis the equal authority of the three departments into which it is divided." curately show the proceedings of the body for which it is kept. The practice in nearly all such bodies is to have the journal read, if read at all, from loose slips of paper, made In Pacific R. Co. v. The Governor, 23 up partly in writing and partly by pasted Mo. 353, 66 Am. Dec. 673, in considering slips, and, after being thus read, ordered this subject, the court, speaking through approved. It is also a fact of which every- Scott, J., said: "If the legislature exceed one has knowledge that often upon such its powers in the enactment of a law, the reading there is such inattention on the courts, being sworn to support the Constipart of the members of the legislature that tution, must judge that law by the standgross errors might pass unnoticed. The ard of the Constitution, and declare its vajournal as thus read and approved from lidity. But the question whether a law on loose slips of paper is then passed to the its face violates the Constitution is very dif journal clerk, and by him, or under his di- ferent from that growing out of the nonrection, transcribed into a book, and the compliance with the forms required to be slips then carelessly preserved or entirely observed in its enactment. In the one case, destroyed. The transcription of these min- a power is exercised, not delegated, or which utes, without any further action on the part is prohibited, and the question of the validof the legislature, or of any person but the ity of the law is determined from the lanone who makes it, except superficial exami- guage of it. In the other, the law is not, in nation by the journal clerk, and possibly by its terms, contrary to the Constitution; on the presiding officer, becomes the formal its face it is regular, but resort is had to journal. It follows that the chances of mis-something behind the law itself in order to take are very great, and for fraud upon the ascertain whether the general assembly, in part of the copyist even greater. The Con-making the law, was governed by the rules stitution requires that there should be a majority of the body recorded as voting in favor of a bill upon its final passage. Upon such passage the bill in fact receives one or two more than such constitutional majority, and is duly passed; but if by carelessness or fraud the copyist should change one or two of the names of those voting, from the affirmative to the negative, the will of the legislature, regularly expressed, would be defeated. And the same result might follow if in copying he should omit a Not only would such results follow in the cases specified, but in many cther ways the least error in making up or transcribing the journal might result in the defeat of the will of the legislature. Unless the method of keeping journals should at once be revolutionized, and so much attention be paid to them that they will be made to absolutely represent all the doings of the body to such an extent as to very much prolong the sessions of the legislature, the sanctity of legislative enactments will be entirely dependent upon the carefulness and good faith of some copyist employed by the legislature at a few dollars a day. Much less evil will grow out of a course of decision which will give the people to understand that the legislative is a department of the government of as high authority as the judicial, and that with the mandatory provisions directed to it, the other depart ments of the government have no concern. When this is once well understood, the people will see to it that such mandatory provisions are complied with by the legis lature, or, if they do not, the blame must rest upon themselves or the system of gov name. prescribed for its action by the Constitu- The required to be seen whether there is anything in our Constitution or laws requiring or authorizing a departure from the common-law rule. When we once depart from principle, we stop? Do not the circumstances of this case open to our vision a vista of absurdities into which we shall stumble if we attempt to explore forbidden fields for evidence of a vague, shadowy, and unsatisfactory character upon which to overthrow the enrolled statutes of the land? In this case, the enrolment, the record of the statute, exists, and we are satisfied that we should not look beyond it, certainly not beyond the record aided by the journals, and looking at both, we must hold the entire act to be a valid law." evidence in the last resort that the laws were constitutionally passed, would not some method have been adopted by which greater care would have been exacted in entering the proceedings of the two houses?-from a sound rule of law,-where shall Would the task of making them have been intrusted to a single clerk, with a power in the houses to dispense with their reading, even should there be a rule requiring them to be read,—a matter, however, about which | the Constitution and laws are silent? In that country from which we borrow so many of our ideas respecting government and laws, and whose common law and early statutes constitute the substratum of all our systems of jurisprudence, the statute roll is the only and exclusive evidence of what the statute law is, so long as it is in existence. Then it is maintained that, if the journal were every way full and perfect, yet it hath no power to satisfy, destroy, or weaken the act, which, being a high record. must be tried only by itself,-teste meipso. So it appears that by the common law the statute roll was the absolute and conclusive proof of a statute. This record could not be contradicted. It implied absolute verity. There was no plea by which the existence of a statute could be put in issue. Under this state of the law our Constitution was adopted." In Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, 89 Am. Dec. 93, will be found a review of the authorities up to that time; the court concluding that "the result of authorities in England and in the other states clearly is that at common law, whenever a general statute is misrecited, or its existence denied, the question is to be tried and determined by the court as a question of law; that is to say, the court is bound to take notice of it, and inform itself the best way it can; that there is no plea by which its existence can be put in issue and tried as a question of fact; that, if the enrolment of the statute is in existence, the enrolment itself is the record, which is conclusive as to what the statute is, and cannot be impeached, destroyed, or weakened by the journals of Parliament or any other less authentic or less satisfactory memorials; and that there has been no departure from the principles of common law in this respect in the United States, except in instances where a departure has been grounded on, or taken in pursuance of, some express constitutional or statutory provision requiring some relax ation of the rule, in order that full effect might be given to such provisions; and in such instances the rule has been relaxed by judges with great caution and hesitation, and the departure has never been extended beyond an inspection of the journals of both branches of the legislature. It remains This decision was followed in Yolo County v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 265, 84 Am. St. Rep. 41, 64 Pac. 403, though its author, since a judge of the United States circuit court, afterwards seems to have raised some doubt as to its correctness in San Mateo County v. Southern P. R. Co. (C. C.) 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 722. The question was exhaustively considered in State ex rel. Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. J. L. 29, where, among other things, the court said [in 10 Nev. 182, 21 Am. Rep. 721]: "For whoever engages in any transaction the validity or construction of which depends upon statutory provisions, whoever holds or acquires any sort of property or right, the title or enjoyment of which may be affected by the operation of any law, is bound to take notice, at his peril, what the law is. And it is not enough for him to know what the law is after a court of last resort has made an investigation and determined what part of the statute roll is to stand and what part to fall, but he must know in advance of litigation, and govern his conduct accordingly. If there is any record or document outside of the statute roll to which a court will resort for the purpose of testing the validity of an enrolled law, he must not overlook it. If a court will hear oral testimony to impeach the record, he must be able to conjecture in advance what the testimony will be, and what weight will be allowed to it. Considering the exigency of this rule, it is easy to perceive of what extreme importance it is that there should be some high, authentic, and unquestionable record to which not only courts and public officers, but private citizens, may resort, and by a simple inspection determine for themselves with infallible certainty what are the statutes of the state, and what are their terms. Considerations such as these had led to the firm establishment in England, at a date anterior to American independence, of the maxims that matters of public |