the vouchers withdrawn from the package
and destroyed before the genuine ones are
delivered to him, which he does not dis-
cover, he cannot charge the bank with the
loss if it was not negligent in paying the
checks. Morgan v. United States Mortg. &
T. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 741, 101 N. E. 871, 208
N. Y. 218.
(Annotated)
Insolvency.

Officer's liability on bond for loss of
money by failure of bank, see
Bonds.
Fraudulent sale by insolvent bank of
shares of its capital stock, see Cor-
porations, 11.

Estoppel of bank to deny statements
concerning deposit to credit of an-
other insolvent bank, see Estoppel,

2.

Set-off in case of, see Set-Off and Counterclaim, 2.

BIBLE.

Reading of, in public schools, see Constitutional Law, 19; Schools, 3.

BILL OF REVIEW.
See Review.

BILL OF SALE.

As violation of condition in insurance policy, see Insurance, 8, 9.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Recovery of money paid on forged draft against United States Treasury, see Assumpsit, 2.

Negotiability.

1. Uncertainty as to the rate of interest in a note, so as to render it non-negotiable, is not created by drawing with a pen a ring around the figures representing such 5. One who has deposited checks on ac- rate as inserted by a typewriter in a printed count in an insolvent bank is not prevented note blank, and placing a figure above it from having payment on them stopped and with a pen, where the statute provides that reclaiming them from the bank's receiver, where there is a conflict between the writby the fact that they have been forwarded ten and printed provisions in a contract, to a correspondent bank and credited to the the written ones must prevail, since the account of the insolvent one, if the corres-typewritten figures must be regarded as pondent makes no claim to them. Knaffl v. Knoxville Bkg. & T. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 402, 170 S. W. 476, 130 Tenn. 336.

BATHING RESORT.

(Annotated)

1. The ownership of premises is not essential to the liability of a person who operates or maintains a bath house where bathing suits are furnished for hire, at a seaside resort, for injuries due to his negligence in failing to maintain proper and safe life lines and life rafts for the protection of his patrons. McKinney v. Adams, L.R.A.1915D, 442, 66 So. 988, Fla.

-.

2. An action may be maintained against a person who operates or maintains a bath house where bathing suits are furnished for hire, at a seaside resort, for negligence in failing to maintain proper and safe life lines and rafts for the protection of his patrons, by a patron not guilty of contributory negligence who is injured as a proximate result of the negligence of such operator or his agents, where the statute makes it the duty of a person operating or maintaining such a bath house to maintain at all times proper and safe life lines and life rafts for the protection of bathers, and prescribes a fine or imprisonment or both for failure to comply with the duty. McKinney v. Adams, L.R.A.1915D, 442, 66 So. 988, Fla. (Annotated)

BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES.
Insurance by, see Insurance,

BETTING.

See Gaming.

BIAS.

Of juror, see Appeal and Error, 12.

water into a cellar on one side of the street | unless it is made bona fide, and unless, from a pond on the opposite side, because also, the plaintiff has not signified an inof the disturbance of the earth by the blasts. tention to regard the contract as at an end. McGinnis v. Marlborough-Hudson Gas Co. Corduan v. McCloud (N. J. Err. & App.), L.R.A.1915D, 1080, 108 N. E. 364, 220 Mass. L.R.A.1915D, 1190, 93 Atl. 724, N. J. (Annotated)

575.

BONA FIDE HOLDER.
Of note, see Bills and Notes, 4.

BONDS.

Recovery of unearned premium upon
bond of public officer, see Assump-
sit, 1.
Right of legislature to divert proceeds
of county bonds, see Counties.
By person engaging in messenger busi-
ness, see License, 1.
Contribution between sureties on bond
of public officer, see Principal and
Surety.
Set-off in action on official bond, see
Set-Off and Counterclaim, 1.

A town treasurer who, upon re-election to office, continues a deposit account of the town's money in a bank so insolvent that it cannot pay the amount, does not, although he is ignorant of the true conditions, account for it within the meaning of his official bond satisfying its obligation in case of such accounting, so as to relieve the surety from liability in case the account is lost because of the bank's insolvency. Yawger v. American Surety Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 481, 106 N. E. 64, 212 N. Y. 292.

BOOKS.

Right to inspect books of corporation, see Corporation, 7, 7a, 24.

BREACH.

BREAKING.

Sufficiency of, to constitute burglary, see Burglary.

BRIDGES.

a

The cost of the construction of bridges on the public highway across drainage ditch constructed by a drainage district must be borne by the county, and not by the drainage district, where the bridges are a public necessity and convenience, and where the estimated cost of such construction was deducted from the share levied upon the county as its portion of the cost of the improvement, on the theory that the county was damaged to the extent of such cost of construction, and no appeal was taken from such action. Wilkins v. Hillman, L.R.A.1915D, 249, 145 Pac. 1111,

Okla.

BROKERS.

1. A property owner cannot accept the benefits of a contract for sale negotiated by a broker finally compensated by him, although he acted originally for the purchaser without ratifying the statements as to the income of the property made by the broker to effect the sale. Whitney v. Bissell, L.R.A.1915D, 257, 146 Pac. 141, Or. -.

2. The agreement by a property owner to pay a broker a commission for selling the property, knowing that he was employed by the buyer, is a fraud upon the rights of

Of covenant, see Covenants and Con- the buyer, if the agreement was not assentditions, 3.

BREACH OF PROMISE.

Prematurity of action for, see Action or Suit, 1.

Oral promise to marry, see Contracts,
3.

Validity of contract of marriage, see
Contracts, 6.

Presumptions and burden of proof in
action for, see Evidence, 10.
Good faith of tender of performance
of promise as question for jury,
see Trial, 3.

1. A right of action for breach of promise of marriage is not affected by an attempted contract of settlement which is invalid because in restraint of marriage. McCoy v. Flynn, L.R.A.1915D, 1064, 151 N. W. 465, Iowa,

3. An offer on the part of the defendant to fulfil the promise of marriage after his refusal to do so, or a renewed offer in, his answer or in open court, is not a defense

ed to by him. Whitney v. Bissell, L.R.A. 1915D, 257, 146 Pac. 141,

BROTHER.

Or.

Right to appointment as administrator, see Executors and Administrators, la.

BUILDINGS.

Denial of equal protection of laws by
building regulations, see Constitu-
tional Law, 2.

Police power as to, see Constitutional
Law, 17.

Restrictions in covenants, see Covenants
and Conditions, 2.

Injunction to prevent destruction of,
under void municipal ordinance,
see Injunction, 4.

Lien on, see Mechanics' Liens.
Delegation of power as to, see Munici-
pal Corporations, 4.
Forbidding storage of inflammable sub-

stances in garage in certain loca-
tions, see Municipal Corporations,

11. Partial invalidity of ordinance establishing fire limits, see Municipal Corporations, 5.

Valley R. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 368, 105 N. E.
652, 211 N. Y. 369.
(Annotated)

3. A railroad company cannot avoid liability for injury to a passenger by the application of the emergency brake to avoid collision with a traveler on a highway crossing on the theory that it might assume that he would leave the track in time to escape injury, if he was manifestly unconscious of the approach of the train. Dorr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 368, 105 N. E. 652, 211 N. Y. 369.

4. A railroad company is liable for injury to a passenger by the sudden application of the emergency brake to avoid striking a traveler at a highway crossing if it was negligent in failing to warn him or to observe his danger in time to avoid the accident without resort to the emergency brake. Dorr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 368, 105 N. E. 652, 211 N. Y. 369. Leaving at destination.

5. A railroad company is not liable for carrying past his destination a passenger who knowingly boards a train not scheduled to stop there, although the gateman and brakeman made no objection to his boarding the train, if the conductor, upon ascertaining his destination, informed him that the train would not stop, and advised him to leave it at a suitable intermediate stopping place and wait for another train. Louis ville & N. R. Co. v. Gaddie, L.R.A.1915D, 705, 172 S. W. 514, 162 Ky. 205.

Limitation of liability.
Effect of Federal employer's liability
act to invalidate contract exempt-
ing carrier from liability for in-
jury to Pullman porter, see Mas-
ter and Servant, 1.

Negligence as question for jury, see
Trial, 4.

Question for jury as to fairness of con

tract limiting liability, see Trial, 6. 8. In order that a carrier may relieve itself from liability for loss of, or damage to, goods while in transit, it is necessary for it to show that the loss or damage arose solely from one or more of the excepted causes; it is not sufficient for it merely to show that the shipper was negligent, if the loss or damage would not have resulted except for the concurring fault of the carrier. Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Williams, L.R.A.1915D, 1077, 151 N. W. 419, 128 Minn. 514.

9. A common carrier is at common law an insurer of the goods shipped, and is responsible for all losses except those arising from certain excepted causes, one of which is improper packing by the shipper. Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Williams, L.R.A.1915D, 1077, 151 N. W. 419, 128 Minn. 514.

10. If improper packing in a shipment offered to a carrier is apparent to the carrier or his servants, he may refuse to receive the shipment, but if he receives it he assumes to carry the goods as they are, and the full common-law liability as carrier attaches. Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Williams, L.R.A.1915D, 1077, 151 N. W. 419, 128 Minn. 514.

11. Although a carrier has knowledge of (Annotated) | defective packing in goods shipped, yet, if it is not apparent to the ordinary observation of the carrier or his servants that the goods cannot be safely carried in the condition in which they are presented, the carrier should not be held to take the chances of injury from improper packing. Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Williams, L.R.A.1915D, 1077, 151 N. W. 419, (Annotated) 128 Minn. 514.

6. One who, when employed as a Pullman porter, agrees to protect the Pullman Company in its contracts by which it undertakes to indemnify railroad companies against liability for injuries to Pullman employees, deprives himself of the right to maintain an action against the railroad company for injuries received in the course of his employmentt. Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 510, 40 App. D. C.

169.

Baggage or property of passenger.

7. A passenger who does not claim his baggage at destination until forty-eight hours after its arrival cannot hold the car rier liable as insurer for loss of the baggage twenty-four hours before by burglary, although he failed to reach destination earlier because of inability to procure sleeping car accommodations, if he did not notify the carrier that he would not accompany the baggage. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Doyle,

L.R.A.1915D, 113, 145 Pac. 688, Colo.
Freight carriers.

Liability of carrier for injury by live
stock escaping from cars, see Ani-

mals.

Presumption and burden of proof as to negligence, see Evidence, 14, 15; Trial, 11.

12. An act of God, such as a severe blizzard and snowstorm, which will excuse a carrier from liability for loss, must not only be the proximate cause of the loss, but it must be the sole cause, and though the loss may have been caused by an act of God, yet, if the negligence of the defendant commingles with such act of God as an efficient, contributing, concurrent cause, and it appears from the evidence and the circumstances of the case that such injury would not have occurred except for such negligence, the company will be liable. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dreyfus, L.R.A. 1915D, 547, 141 Pac. 773, 42 Okla. 401.

13. Where property is injured or lost while in the hands of a common carrier, the shipper may sue the carrier upon the

latter's common-law liability, without re

gard to the existence of any special contract of shipment that may have been entered into limiting the carrier's liability, thus leaving it to the defendant to plead such contract by way of defense. McGrath v. Northern P. R. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 644, 141 N. W. 164, 121 Minn. 258.