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IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS-INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, ETC.

L.R.A.1915D, 847, 174 S. W. 384, Mo. | INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, AND COMPLAINT.

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Wife's liabilities.

2. A married woman who personally applies to a tradesman for the purchase of groceries, stating that she wishes to open an account in her own name, and directs the tradesman to charge the goods to her, is personally liable therefor, where, in pursuance of this arrangement, the goods are delivered at her home and charged to her, notwithstanding the legal obligation of the

First objecting to sufficiency of indictment for arson on appeal, see Appeal and Error, 15.

Of woman transported in violation of white slave act for conspiracy to violate laws of United States, see Criminal Law, 1.

1. An indictment of a physician for manslaughter under a statute defining manslaughter in the second degree as homicide committed without design to effect death,

husband to support his wife and the fact that the groceries are such as would be a proper support to be provided by the hus-by any act, procurement, or culpable negligence" not constituting a higher crime, band for the family. Bell v. Rosingnol, need not allege knowledge on the defendant's L.R.A.1915D, 1184, S4 S. E. 542, Ga. part of probability of consequences from the (Annotated) act or omission charged; nor is it necessary to charge his duty in the premises, or set up a specific standard of duties, nor to allege "culpable" or any other degree of negligence eo nomine, nor set out defendant's acts in any other than general terms and as ultimate facts. State v. Lester, L.R.A. 1915D, 201, 149 N. W. 297, 127 Minn. 282.

Conveyances to third persons.
3. Failure to name the wife in a con-
tract apparently made by the husband alone,
to convey their joint property, does not, if
the instrument is properly executed by her,
prevent its binding her interest. Agar v.
Streeter, L.R.A.1915D, 196, 150 N. W. 160,
(Annotated)

Mich.

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ner Dry Goods Co. L.R.A.1915D, 524, 151 N.
W. 724, Mich.
(Annotated)
6. A man cannot, because of his curtesy
initiate, sue, without joining his wife in
the action, to recover possession of her real
estate, and to recover damages for timber
cut therefrom, and rents and profits, where
she has conveyed the property without his
joining in the conveyance. Bryant v. Free-
man, L.R.A.1915D, 996, 173 S. W. 863, 131
Tenn. 87.
(Annotated)

IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS.
See Constitutional Law, 20.

INCOMPETENT PERSONS.

Presumption and burden of proof, as to sanity, see Evidence, 8, 9.

As to married women, see Husband

and Wife.

Negligence toward, see Trial, 5.

INDEBTEDNESS.

2. The failure of a complaint under a statute making the use of a false weight, measure, balance, or measuring device a misdemeanor, to negative a proviso in the statute that a slight variation from the stated weight, measure, or quantity for individual packages is permissible, provided

the variation is as often above as below the

weight, measure, or quantity stated, does
not render the complaint defective. State
v. Belle Springs Creamery Co. L.R.A.1915D,
515, 111 Pac. 474, 83 Kan. 389.
3. A count in an indictment for vio-
lation of a statute against the use of false
weights and measures, which charges that
the accused did unlawfully "expose for
sale and sell and deliver" certain goods in
violation of the statute, is not bad for du
plicity. State v. Belle Springs Creamery
Co. L.R.A.1915D, 515, 111 Pac. 474, 83 Kan.

389.

4. A count of an indictment under a statute providing punishment for one who, in attempting to effect a robbery, puts the life of the custodian of the property in jeopardy by the use of deadly weapon, is not duplicitous in charging an attempt to commit robbery and the putting of the life of the custodian of the property in jeopardy of the attempt. by the use of a deadly weapon in the course Price v. United States, L.R.A.1915D, 1070, 218 Fed. 149, 131 C. C. A. 1.

5. A complaint in an action for the violation of a statute prescribing the weight Of city or town, see Municipal Corpo- for a "print or package" of butter, which rations, 13, 14.

INDEFINITENESS.

Of indictment, see Indictment, etc., 5. Of demand for autopsy by insurance company, see Insurance, 18.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.

charges the accused with having sold a "print and package" of butter, is not indefinite and uncertain on the theory that it does not inform the accused whether it was a print or package, where the legislature used the words "print" and "package" synonymously. State V. Belle Springs Creamery Co. L.R.A.1915D, 515, 111 Pac.

Who are, see Master and Servant, 10. 474, 83 Kan. 389.

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8.

INSURANCE.
Parol evidence to show misdescription
of land in insurance policy, see
Evidence, 23.

Sufficiency of proof in action on policy
against loss by theft, see Evidence,

47.

Sufficiency of evidence in insurance actions, see Evidence, 47.

Right and manner of doing business.

1. A contract by an individual engaged burial in consideration of payment of interin the undertaking business, to furnish according to age and service to be rendered, est during life on notes of varying amounts is within the operation of the statute governing the transaction of insurance business. Renschler v. State ex rel. Hogan, L.R.A. 1915D, 501, 107 N. E. 758, · Ohio St.

2. The fact that a life insurance company collected money to meet its obligations by so-called annual dues, instead of by premiums, does not conclusively make it a mutual association or a fraternal benefit association, and not an old line life insurL.R.A.1915D, 130, 137 Pac. 793, 91 Kan. 220. ance company. Filley v. Illinois L. Ins. Co. Constitution, rules, and by-laws.

contract between a fraternal beneficiary as3. Under a provision in an insurance

sociation and its members that the insured 1. While equity will not ordinarily en- shall be bound by the laws of the order then join a criminal prosecution, yet, where re- in force or thereafter enacted, a provision peated prosecutions are threatened under a that if the insured commits suicide, sane or void municipal ordinance, and the effect of insane, within two years, the association such prosecutions would tend to injure or should be liable for only one fifth the destroy the property of the person so pros- amount of the benefit certificate, may be ecuted, or deprive him of the legitimate changed so as to render the suicide provision enjoyment of his property, equity will enter-effective for a period of five years, and such tain a suit to inquire into the validity of the ordinance, and enjoin its enforcement. Carey v. Atlanta, L.R.A.1915D, 684, 84 S. E. 456, Ga.

2. Ordinarily a court will not enjoin the prosecution of a criminal proceeding, but the remedy of injunction may be employed to protect personal and property rights, although it may operate incidentally to restrain a prosecution under an invalid ordinance. Brown v. Nichols, L.R.A.1915D, 327, 145 Pac. 561, 93 Kan. 737.

3. Admission that Greek letter fraterni

ties are moral agents will not sustain an injunction against trustees of a state institution to prevent their exclusion therefrom, if their existence is prohibited by statute. University of Mississippi v. Waugh, L.R.A.1915D, 588, 62 So. 827, 105 Miss. 623.

4. Injunction lies to prevent the destruction of buildings under a void municipal ordinance. Hays v. Poplar Bluff, L.R.A. 1915D, 595, 173 S. W. 676, Mo.

INSOLVENCY.

Of bank, see Banks, 5.

INSPECTION.

provision so changed is binding upon a
member who commits suicide while sane,
and upon those claiming under his benefit
certificate. Ledy v. National Council of K.
& L. of S. L.R.A.1915D, 1095, 151 N. W.
905, 129 Minn. 137.
(Annotated)
Reformation.

Reformation of policy and enforcement
thereof in one action, see Action
or Suit, 3.

4. It is not necessary for an insured to

on

bring a suit in equity to reform a policy
containing a misdescription of land
which crops insured against hail are grow-
ing, where such misdescription is due solely
to the error of the agent of the insurance
company in preparing the application for
such insurance, but the insured may, by
setting forth the facts relating to the mis-
take in his complaint, bring an action at
law thereon in the first instance. French v.
State Farmers' Hail Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D,
766, 151 N. W. 7, 29 N. D. 426.
Cancelation; paid-up policy.

5. A provision in a life insurance policy that should the insured reach a certain age and so desire he could then surrender such

Of books of corporation, see Corpo- policy and receive back his payments with

rations, 7, 7a, 24.

INSTRUCTIONS.

In general, see Trial, 9-13.

interest is a condition subsequent not impairing the vested interest of the beneficiary unless and until the insured reaches the designated age and chooses to surrender the

policy. Filley V. Illinois L. Ins. L.R.A.1915D, 130, 137 Pac. 793, 91

220.

Construction of policy generally.

Co. | mobile from one garage, where it was inKan. sured, to another, is not such an immaterial breach of warranty that the policy will not be avoided thereby. Lummus v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 239, 83 S. E. 688, 167 N. C. 654.

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6. A policy of insurance on a farm barn will be held, in the absence of express language to the contrary, to cover it during 14. The use by a farmer of a gasolene the ordinary uses to which it is put, such engine in his barn as part of an outfit for as the annual threshing of the grain gath-threshing his grain is not within the operaered into it in the customary way. Bouchard v. Dirigo Mut. F. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 187, 92 Atl. 899, Me.

representations;

condi

7. If an accident insurance policy is so drawn as to require interpretation, and to be fairly susceptible of two different constructions, the one will be adopted that is most favorable to the insured. Union Accident Co. v. Willis, L.R.A.1915D, 358, 145 Pac. 812, Okla. -. Warranties; tions. 8. A bill of sale of chattels to secure money advanced to pay the purchase price is not a violation of a condition in an insurance policy on the property that it shall be void if the interest of the insured is other than unconditional and sole ownership. Petello v. Teutonia F. Ins. Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 812, 93 Atl. 137, 89 Conn. 175.

(Annotated)

9. A bill of sale of chattels to secure money advanced to pay for them is not, although recorded, within the operation of a provision in an insurance policy rendering it void if the property becomes encumbered by a chattel mortgage. Petello v. Teutonia F. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 812, 93 Atl. 137, 89 Conn. 175.

10. The inclusion in a deed of trust of personal property, of an automobile insured by a policy providing that it shall become void if the property becomes encumbered, will not prevent recovery on the policy if the deed of trust is only temporary, and is satisfied and canceled before the loss, and is not material to the risk, or fraudulent. Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 344, 84 S. E. 274, C.

N.

11. The mere temporary use in an insured barn of a gasolene engine to thresh grain is not within a provision in the policy making it void if the situation or circumstances affecting the risk shall be so altered as to cause an increase of the risk. Bouchard v. Dirigo Mut. F. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 187, 92 Atl. 899, Me. (Annotated)

12. A policy on an automobile to be kept in a specified private garage with the privilege of operating the car and housing it temporarily in other places while en route or being cleaned or repaired, which has been suspended by the permanent removal of the car to another state, is not restored by temporarily placing the car in a repair shop without returning it to the place specified in the policy, so as to render the insurer liable for its destruction while in such shop. Lummus v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 239, 83 S. E. 688, 167 N. C. (Annotated) 13. The permanent removal of an auto

654.

tion of a provision in a policy of insurance on the property making it void if burning fluids are kept or used by the insured on the premises. Bouchard v. Dirigo Mut. F. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 187, 92 Atl. 899, Me.

15. A policy insuring for a single premium specified sums on the dwellings on a farm and its barns, sheds, furniture, products, equipment on the premises, and live stock anywhere in certain specified counties, is divisible, and the insurance on the personalty is not avoided by breach of warranty as to condition of chimneys on the dwellings and the placing of an encumbrance on the realty without authority, except so far as it is contained in the buildings as to which the risk is increased. Benham v. Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 736, 131 N. W. 87, 165 Mich. 406.

16. Where a policy of accident insurance gives to the insurer the right, in case of death, to an autopsy by a medical adviser, and the policy holder suffers death claimed to be accidental, his widow, who is sole beneficiary, is the proper person upon whom to make a demand for an autopsy. Johnson v. Bankers' Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 1199, 151 N. W. 413, 129 Minn. 18.

17. It is not necessary that a demand for an autopsy to which an accident insurance company is entitled under the terms of its policy in case of death of the insured be made upon the proper person in person, so long as it is communicated to him. Johnson v. Bankers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 1199, 151 N. W. 413, 129 Minn. 18.

18. A demand for an autopsy under the terms of an accident insurance policy, to be effective, must be made within a reasonable time after death, and at a reasonable time and upon a proper occasion, and when made upon the widow of the insured between his death and burial, the language should leave nothing to intendment, but should be free from doubt and ambiguity. Johnson v. Bankers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 1199, 151 N. W. 413, 129 Minn. 18. (Annotated)

19. A demand for an autopsy as provided in an accident insurance policy was not made at a reasonable time or upon a proper occasion, and its refusal does not defeat the right of action under the policy, where the demand was made by the claim auditor of the company about three hours before the time set for the funeral of the insured, and when friends were beginning to arrive from a distance and the body was being prepared for burial, and when the demand was a present demand calling for

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20. Error of an insurance agent in making out an application, notwithstanding the facts are truthfully stated to him by the applicant for insurance, is chargeable to the insurer, and not to the insured. French v. State Farmers' Hail Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 766, 151 N. W. 7, 29 N. D. 426.

21. Failure to give notice of claim within the time stipulated in the policy is waived, where, in response to the notice, the company denies liability wholly on another ground. Johnson v. Bankers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 1199, 151 N. W. 413,

129 Minn. 18.

Risks and causes of loss, injury, or death.

Presumption as to cause of death of insured, see Evidence, 12.

22. A policy of insurance which provides that indemnity shall not be payable for injuries, fatal or otherwise, intentionally inflicted upon the insured by himself or some other person, does not exclude a recovery where the insured dies from a fracture of the skull caused by a fall on a hard pavement, the result of a blow in the face struck by the fist of another, where the blow, but not the fatal result, was intentionally inflicted. Union Accident Co. v. Willis, L.R.A.1915D, 358, 145 Pac. 812, Okla. -.

23. One insured against accident as "proprietor" of a trucking business, "no manual labor," does not, by undertaking to operate an elevator after working hours when the regular operator has gone home, in order to unload some trucks engaged in moving his business from one location to another, bring himself, as matter of law, within a clause in the policy making the amount recoverable in case of injury while insured is doing any act or thing pertaining to any more hazardous occupation such portion of the face of the policy as could be purchased by the premium paid at the rate fixed for such occupaton, although the occupation of elevator operator is classed as more hazardous than the proprietorship of such business, but the question of the casual or habitual character of the act is for the jury. Gotfredson v. German Commercial Acci. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 312, 218 Fed. 582, C. C. A. (Annotated)

Extent of injury or loss.

24. A policy providing compensation for accidental loss of hand by removal at or above the wrist covers an accident requir

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ing the removal of all the bones of the fingers at the wrist, leaving only flesh enough to protect the bones remaining and the thumb in a stiffened and useless condition. Moore v. Etna L. Ins. Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 264, 146 Pac. 151, Or. -. (Annotated)

Interest in proceeds.

25. The rights of a beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy become vested upon the issuance of the policy, and can thereafter during the life of the beneficiary be defeated only as provided by the terms of the policy. Filley v. Illinois L. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 130, 137 Pac. 793, 91 Kan. 220.

26. Whether a policy of life insurance or a benefit policy issued to one for the benefit of another vests a present interest in the beneficiary depends, not upon the name or nature of the company, but on the terms of the policy, the existing statutes, and the by-laws, if any, by which such company and its policy holders are bound; and when such policy is issued to a member for the benefit of a proper beneficiary, then, in the absence of some statute, by-law, or contract to the contrary, the beneficiary thereby becomes vested with an interest which cannot be destroyed at the wi" of the insured. Filley v. Illinois L. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 130, 137 Pac. 793, 91 Kan.

220.

27. The benefit accruing from a policy of life insurance in an old line company, upon the life of a married man payable upon his death to his wife, naming her, is payable to the surviving beneficiary named, although she may have several years thereafter secured a divorce from her husband and he was thereafter married to another, who sustained the relation of wife to him at the time of his death, where the insured continued to pay all sums required by the terms of the policy after the divorce and remarriage up to his death with no attempt to change the policy or the beneficiary, and where there is nothing to indicate that the insured at the time the policy was taken out contemplated a divorce from his then wife, or that he was contemplating any protection to anyone who might thereafter become his wife and maintain that relation at the uncertain time of his death. Filley v. Illinois L. Ins. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 130, 137 Pac. 793, 91 Kan. 220. (Annotated)

INTENT.

Presumption and burden of proof as to, see Evidence, 10.

Evidence as to, generally, see Evidence, 33.

Question for jury as to, see Trial, 3. INTENTIONAL INJURY.

To insured, see Insurance, 22.
INTEREST.

Effect of uncertainty as to rate of
interest on negotiability of note,
see Bills and Notes, 1.
Usurious interest, see Usury.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.

davit was not filed within the time speci

Consideration of, on appeal, see Appeal fied by statute. Dibbert v. Metropolitan

and Error, 8.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Prohibition and regulation.

Equal protection and privileges as to,
see Constitutional Law, 6.
Due process in, see Constitutional Law,
15.

Title of statute, see Statutes, 5.

1. A statute making it unlawful to keep, store, or possess any intoxicating liquors in any place other than a private residence will not be limited to a keeping for sale, where other provisions relate to a keeping for such purpose. Com. v. Smith, L.R.A.1915D, 172, 173 S. W. 340, Ky. Unlawful sales; offenses and proceedings.

Invest. Co. L.R.A.1915D, 305, 147 N. W. 3, 158 Wis. 69.

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Search of premises for intoxicating 229. liquors, see Appeal and Error, 13. 2. One having possession of intoxicating liquor to be delivered to carriers for shipment to other states upon receipt of the price is within the operation of a statute providing for punishment of one who has such liquors in possession for purpose of sale. Frogg v. Com. L.R.A.1915D, 330, 173 S. W. 383, Ky.

IRRIGATION.

2. The usurious character of a debt secured by a mortgage which had been foreclosed and sale held cannot be raised in an action by the mortgagors to quiet title against a subsequent mortgagee who, withthe prior mortgagees, who had purchased out knowledge of the usury, redeemed from at their foreclosure sale, and received a sheriff's deed to the premises. Heitsch v Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. L.R.A.

Liability of irrigation company for fail- 1915D, 349, 150 N. W. 457, 29 N. D. 94.

ure to deliver water to stockholder, see Corporations, 13. Damages for injury to crop by failure to furnish water for, see Damages,

6.

Who may maintain action for negligent failure to maintain irrigation ditch, see Parties, 2.

Jurisdiction of Railway Commission over question of ownership of irrigation canal, see Public Service Commissions, 1.

Use of water for, generally, see Waters,

2, 3.

Regulation of rates of irrigation company, see Waters, 4-6.

JERK.

Injury to passenger by, see Carriers, 2-4.

JOINDER.

Of causes of action, see Action or Suit, 3.

Of parties plaintiff, see Parties, 8.

JOINT DEPOSIT.

In bank, see Banks, 2.

JOLT.

Injury to passenger by, see Carriers, 2-4.

JUDGES.

There is no error in one of several judges of a trial court having co-ordinate jurisdiction calling in another judge to try a case after an affidavit of prejudice had been filed against himself, although the affi

Foreign judgments.

(Annotated)

the estate of the decedent who died domi3. A decree in one state distributing ciled in another state, and discharging the which had been presented against the estate administrator after finding that all claims had been paid, is not conclusive that all existing claims were presented so that,

under the full faith and credit clause of the

Federal Constitution, claims for inheritance taxes upon the estate so distributed cannot be allowed against the executor by the courts of testator's domicil, where, under the law of the former state, inheritance taxes are not expenses of administration or charges upon the general estate, although the administrator is permitted to retain sufficient funds to pay the local inheritance tax. People v. Union Trust Co. L.R.A. 1915D, 450, 99 N. E. 377, 255 Ill. 168. Relief against.

As to new trial, see New Trial.

4. The remedy of one against whom a judgment has been entered by a justice of the peace without service of summons is by motion before the justice to set aside the judgment. S. Lowman & Co. v. Ballard, L.R.A.1915D, 427, 84 S. E. 21, - N. C.

JUDICIAL EXAMINATION.
Of statute, see Statutes, 3, 4.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See Evidence, 1-3.

JUDICIAL SALE.

Sale of decedent's land for debts, see Executors and Administrators, 810.

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