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prior or remote cause and the injury, a cause." Eberhardt v. Glasgow Mut. Teleph. distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient Asso. 91 Kan. 763, 765, 139 Pac. 416, 417. cause of the injury.” Missouri P. R. Co. "Where the intervening cause is set in v. Columbia, 65 Kan. 390, syl. || 1, 2, 58 operation by the original negligence, such L.R.A. 399, 69 Pac. 338.

negligence is still the proximate cause, and “The intervening cause which will relieve where the circumstances are such that the of liability for an injury is an independent injurious consequences might have been cause which intervenes between the original foreseen as likely to result from the first wrongful act or omission and the injury, negligent act or omission, the act of the turns aside the natural sequence of events, third person will not excuse the first wrongand produces a result which would not doer.

If the act of the third person, otherwise have followed, and which could which is the immediate cause of the injury, not have been reasonably anticipated.” is such as, in the exercise of reasonable Winona v. Botzet, supra.

diligence, would not be anticipated, and the “The mere fact that another cause inter-third person is not under the control of the vened between defendants' negligence and one guilty of the first act or omission, the conplaintiff's injury is not enough to relieve the nection is broken, and the first act or former from liability if the intervening act omission is not the proximate cause of the was of such nature that its happening was injury.” Seith v. Commonwealth Electric to have been apprehended. Stated other- | Co. 241 Ill. 252, 260, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 978, wise, the intervening cause will not relieve 132 Am. St. Rep. 204, 89 N. E. 425, 428. the original negligence of its actionable “The primary cause may be the proximate quality if the occurrence of the former cause of a disaster, though it may operate might have been anticipated.” Fishburn v. through successive instruments, Burlington & N. W. R. Co. 127 Iowa, 483, article at the end of a chain may be moved 490, 103 N. W. 481, 484.

by a force applied to the other end; that If a carrier be guilty of negligence not force being the proximate cause of the in itself harmful, but wrongful only be movement. The question always is: cause of injurious consequences which may Was there an unbroken connection between follow, and a new cause intervene between the wrongful act and the injury, a continusuch negligence and the injury complained ous operation? Did the facts constitute a of, which new cause is not a consequence continuous succession of events, so linked of the original negligence, which reasonable together as to make a natural whole, or prudence on the part of the original wrong. was there some new and independent cause doer could not have anticipated, and but for intervening between the wrong and the inwhich the injury could not have happened, jury?” Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kelthe new cause is the proximate cause, and logg, 94 U. S. 469, 474, 24 L. ed. 256, 259. the original negligence is disregarded, as The injury to the plaintiff was related to not affecting the final result." Rodgers the negligence of the defendant. That inv. Missouri P. R. Co. 75 Kan. 222, 223, 10 jury did follow, in regular order, the sevL.R.A.(N.S.) 658, 121 Am. St. Rep. 416, 88 eral successive events flowing from that Pac. 885, 12 Ann. Cas. 441.

negligence. There was an unbroken connec“The question of proximate cause is one tion between that negligence and the injury frequently so near the borderline as to to the plaintiff, unless the attack by the cause much perplexity, but, generally speak cow or the acts of her drivers broke that ing, it may be said in this state that the connection or succession of events. It can proximate is the producing cause; not the hardly be said that these acts of cow or one supplying the condition, but the one drivers were causes independent of the orig. producing the injury. The one supplying

inal acts of negligence. The driving of the the condition may be so intrinsically care

cow by the defendant's employees was made less as to amount practically to a continu necessary by the wreck. It was the duty of ing invitation, so to speak, for a direct cattle. The producing cause, the one with

the defendant to gather up the liberated cause to join in producing a disastrous re out which the injury would not have ocsult. But to be such it must present a curred, was the negligence of the defendant. condition of danger so manifest that the one That negligence made it necessary to emresponsible must be held to have been negli ploy the drivers. They were not acting gent in furnishing the means for a probable independent of the defendant. Their eminjury. But a condition which could not ployment was to have been anticipated. reasonably be expected to endanger, and They were under the control of the defendwhich, but for some independent cause ant. The cow had no intelligence. She without which the injury would not have could not produce a cause of injury for occurred, would not have endangered, does which some person might be liable. The not ordinarily amount to a proximate' acts of the cow cannot be said to have been

a cause of the injury to the plaintiff, in the class to which it belongs, and if such tervening between the negligence of the propensities are of a nature to cause injury, defendant and that injury, so as to relieve he must anticipate and guard against them.” the company from liability for its negli- ; p. 189. gence. The drivers may have been negli. “What is the proximate cause of an ingent in handling the cow, but that is not jury is ordinarily a question for the jury.” alleged, and cannot be considered. If they Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 were negligent, and had been separate and U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256. independent agencies, the defendant prob- See also Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. ably would not be liable.

Parry, 67 Kan. 515, 73 Pac. 105; Home Oil If O'Connell had been the owner of the & Gas Co. v. Dabney, 79 Kan. 820, 101 cow, would he be liable for the injury done? | Pac. 488, He learned that the cow was vicious when “When the facts are established, whether she charged him on three separate occa- the negligent acts complained of are the sions before injuring the plaintiff. O'Con-proximate cause of the injury is a question nell then had notice of the cow's vicious of law to be determined by the court." disposition. It was then his duty to see Consolidated Electric Light & P. Co. v. that she did no injury to anyone. He was Koepp, 64 Kan. 735, 736, 68 Pac. 608, 609, then bound to use a degree of diligence that 11 Am. Neg. Rep. 404. would prevent injury. It finally became See also Dewald v. Kansas City, Ft. S. necessary to rope this cow. That is prob. & G. R. Co. 44 Kan. 586, 24 Pac. 1101, 3 ably what ought to have been done before Am. Neg. Cas. 447; Eberhardt v. Glasgow she injured the plaintiff. The cow was in Mut. Teleph. Asso. 91 Kan. 763, 767, 139 the streets of a city. She was almost sure Pac. 416. to hurt some person, unless her freedom "In a case where it is either admitted, or of movement was absolutely restrained. A from the facts as found established, that jury would have been warranted in finding two distinct, successive causes, unrelated O'Connell guilty of negligence in handling in their operation, conjoined to produce the cow, and therefore liable for the dam- a given injury, the question of remote and age done by reason of that negligence. The proximate cause becomes one of law for the owner of a domestic animal known by him decision of the court, and not of fact for to be vicious must see that it does no the determination of the jury, and the deinjury. 3 Enc. L. & P. 966; 1 R. C. L. 1088, termination of this question of law by the 1089; 2 Cyc. 368, 369.

jury is not binding or conclusive on the In Clowdis v. Fresno Flume & Irrig. Co. court.” Missouri P. R. Co. v. Columbia, 65 118 Cal. 315, 62 Am. St. Rep. 238, 50 Pac. Kan. 390, syl. s 3, 58 L.R.A. 399, 69 Pac. 373, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 326, the owner of 338. a bull was held liable for injuries inflicted It must be noted that in all the cases while the bull was being driven from one quoted from, the question of proximate place to another, a vicious disposition being and intervening causes depends on their refirst developed on the trip, the injury be lation to or independence of each other. ing done after the bull had attacked several Whether or not the question of proximate persons.

cause should have been submitted to the The jury found that the cattle were what jury is unimportant, if we have reached a is known as wild, dangerous Texas cattle. correct conclusion concerning the liability By the negligence causing the wreck they of the defendant, on the facts as shown by were released in a city. It is only reason- its abstract. The question was submitted able to expect this kind of cattle turned to the jury, and the jury, in its general loose in a city to do damage, not only to verdict, found against the defendant, and property, but to persons as well. The fact the court approved the verdict. that one of them did hurt an old lady, with not unmindful of the answer to question out any additional cause therefor, shows

17. That answer is that the direct and imthat injury ought to have been expected as mediate cause of the cow's running over the & result of these cattle roaming on the streets of Harper. It is generally known plaintiff was her vicious disposition. But that wild, dangerous Texas cattle will at- that vicious disposition was not the proxitack men on foot. When these cattle were mate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. released, it ought to have been anticipated That was an unintelligent dangerous force that they would attack pedestrians whom that had been loosed by the defendant's they might meet.

negligence. In Hammond v. Melton, 42 Ill. App. 186, The defendant cites 29 Cyc. 419, 426, to 1 Am. Neg. Cas. 274, we find this: “The the effect that it owed no duty to the plainowner of a domestic animal is bound to tiff. There was no contractual relation take notice of the general propensities of' between the parties, but the defendant did

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owe to the plaintiff the duty of not injuring / ugly and run against a person on the highher by any agency it might set in motion. way, could it be said that the injury was

We have given this case careful consid- the natural and probable consequence of eration, and are unable to say that the the defective fence, and that it was a rejudgment should be interfered with, and it sult that the owner should have foreseen? is therefore affirmed.

To my mind the injury to the plaintiff was

not the natural or probable consequence of Burch, Mason, and Dawson, JJ., con- the collision. It was no more than a re

mote possibility that a cow so liberated

would, while being chased by a horse about Johnston, Ch. J., dissenting:

four hours later, run against and injure I am unable to concur in the judgment a person, and for such remote consequences of affirmance. The evidence sufficiently there is no liability. There was another shows that the collision and resulting liber-efficient and proximate cause of the injury, ation of the cattle from the car were due bus whether the defendant was responsible to the negligence of the railway company, for that cause has never been submitted to and for any injury that can be said to be or determined by the jury. the proximate result of that negligence, the I am therefore of the opinion that the company is responsible. The injury, how-judgment should be reversed. ever, was not inflicted when the cattle were liberated from the car, nor did it occur Porter and West, JJ., concur in the foreuntil a long time after the accident by going dissent. which the cattle were released. In the fourhour period which elapsed between the time of the accident and the injury of the plaintiff, the cow had strayed away a con- KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS. siderable distance and had even been lying down. O'Connell, who had a riding horse,

T. F. BRANNON, Appt., was asked by the agent of the company to drive this cow and other cattle to the stock COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. yards, and if, through his negligence in driving the cow, an injury was inflicted,

(162 Ky. 350, 172 S. W. 703.) the company may be held liable. The neg

Evidence bias of jury affidavit of ligence charged, and upon which the verdict

juror. rests, is the improper switching of the

1. Upon the question whether or not a trains which resulted in the collision. The juror was so biased against accused as to collision, in my opinion, cannot be regarded justify setting aside a verdict against him, as the producing or proximate cause of the his affidavit to the effect that he used his injury. A party is not liable for every con- influence to reduce the punishment fixed by sequence, near and remote, which may pos- the jury is admissible. sibly result from negligence. It is only Appeal refusal to set aside verdict. those which are the natural and probable

2. No abuse of discretion which will reconsequences of the negligent act, and quire a reversal on appeal in refusing to

set aside a verdict for bias of a juror is which should have been foreseen. The cow was run along the highway by O'Con- Note. Misconduct toward witness as nell, and he says that when she got warmed

contempt of court, up she became mad.

She was

a whitefaced western cow, but plaintiff's witnesses

For misconduct towards jurors as consaid that any cow is likely to show such a tempt, see note to Poindexter v. State, 46

L.R.A.(N.S.) 517. disposition when she is so chased, and in that respect she acted like an ordinary an offense to leave the jurisdiction, see note

As to procuring one having knowledge of The fact that she became excited and to Com. v. Berry, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 976. ugly under such treatment is not the proximate result of the failure to turn the

Arrest. switch, and, judged by common experience

It is contempt to procure the arrest upon and observation, the likelihood that anyone civil process of a material witness for one would be struck by the cow while she was of the parties to a pending action, while he being driven was not within reasonable is in attendance at a hearing therein before anticipation, and is not the natural and a referee. State v. Buck, 62 N. H. 670.


So, in Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138, 49 Am. probable consequence of the collision. owner of a cow allowed her to escape causing the plaintiff's arrest and imprison

Rep. 598, an action to recover damages for because of an insufficient fence, and

ment at a time when he was privileged from neighbor, in driving her home, should run arrest, as he was returning home from a her and excite her, and she should become place where he had been attending court as

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shown by the fact that the court acts upon punish for contempt is not adequate to ina statement in his aflidavit that he used his fict a suitable punishment for a criminal influence to reduce the punishment fixed by contempt may submit the matter to the dethe jury, in preference to affidavits by termination of a jury. friends of the accused that the juror told

Same them that accused should be given the limit.

ignorance of subpæna.

5. That one who assaults a prospective Contempt criminal assault on wit- witness against him does not know that he

has been subpenaed is immaterial to the 3. It is a criminal contempt for one under question of his liability for contempt. several indictments, in one of which the jury

Same punishment is out but eventually returns a verdict of

6. A fine of $1,000 and six months' im. guilty, with another yet to be tried, to commit a battery on a witness who testified flict upon one who commits a battery upon

prisonment in jail is not excessive to inagainst him in the pending case and is to be called in a subsequent one, for the pur case, to intimidate him from giving evidence

one who testified against him in a criminal pose of punishing him for the testimony in another case yet to be tried in which he given and intimidating him for the future. is a prospective witness. Same submission to jury. 4. A court whose power summarily to

(January 27, 1915.) a witness, the court said: “It is clear that restricting the power of the United States a person ordering an arrest of a witness court to inflict summary punishment for may be punished for contempt of court for contempt to certain specified cases, among interference with its business."

which is such misbehavior, for one, in the And similarly, it is contempt of court for jury room of the court, which is temporaran attorney to cause a writ of attachment ily used for a witness room, and which is for an absent witness to be issued improper- | located within less than 7 feet of the court ly and wrongfully, before the witness is in room, to approach a witness and improperly default under the subpoena which was served attempt to deter him from testifying for upon him. Butler v. People, 2 Colo. 295. the government in a pending action; or to

approach a witness in the hallway of the Assault.

court building, immediately adjoining the See BRANNON v. Com., which seems to be court room, and offer him money not to the only reported case upon the question testify against the defendant in the action. of assault on a witness as contempt of Re Savin, 131 U. S. 267, 33 L. ed. 150, 9

Sup. Ct. Rep. 699. court.

And it is a direct contempt committed in Bribery.

the presence of the court, for one to ap

proach a witness in the main corridor of the It is contempt of court to endeavor by building, near the court room, while he is bribery to induce a witness to suppress evi- in attendance for the purpose of testifydence which it is his duty to give. Re ing in a criminal case on the calendar of the Hooley, 79 L. T. N. S. 306, 6 Manson, 44. court and about to be called, and to ask him

So, it is a contempt of court to induce, to go to a neighboring saloon and have a persuade, and procure, by the payment of drink, and then to invite him to take a money, one known to be a material and im- ride, and to tell him that the case in which portant witness for the United States in a he has been subpænaed has been continued, pending prosecution, who, it is known, will and to give him money and procure him not be subpænaed by the government, to avoid to be present in court at the time when the the service of any subpæna upon him, and case has been set for trial. People v. Jackto conceal and hide himself, and absent him- son, 178 Ill. App. 121. self from the court, preventing the United Likewise, it is contempt committed in the States from using him as a witness upon presence of the court, or so near thereto as the trial of the cause. Re Brule, 71 Fed. to interfere with its procedure, to attempt, 943.

in the hall of the courthouse, or just outAnd it is a contempt of court for a direc- side and near the courthouse, pending the tor of a company to offer money to a bank- trial of a criminal case, to bribe a witness rupt to induce him to say nothing, at his in attendance upon the court in the case, to public examination, about certain transac- modify his testimony and swear falsely tions between them, which, while capable of therein. Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457, satisfactory explanation, were liable to mis- 87 Am. St. Rep. 971, 64 Pac. 1056. construction and might injure the company. And bribery of a material witness in a Re Hooley, supra.

pending criminal cause is misbehavior so And in White v. White,

N. J. Eq.

near the court as to obstruct the adminis62 Atl. 430, the plaintiff and others were tration of justice, within the meaning of ad judged guilty of contempt of court for the statute limiting the power of the Fed. attempting to bribe and otherwise procure eral courts to punish summarily for cona witness to suppress testimony unfavorable tempt, notwithstanding the bribery took to the plaintiff.

place at the residence of the witness, # of It is also “misbehavior in the presence of a mile away from the court building. Re the court," within the meaning of a statute | Brule, supra.


PPEAL by defendant from a judgment Messrs. James Garnett, Attorney Gen

of the Circuit Court for Bourbon eral, and Robert T. Caldwell, Assistant County, convicting him of criminal contempt Attorney General, for the Commonwealth: of court. Affirmed.

The verdict is not excessive. The facts are stated in the opinion.

French v. Com. 30 Ky. L. Rep. 98, 97 Messrs. Denis Dundon and John J.

S. W. 427.
Williams, for appellant:
The acts proved did not constitute con-

Contempt of court was committed. tempt of court.

Melton v. Com. 160 Ky. 642, L.R.A. 1915B, 2 Roberson, Crim. Law & Proc. § 649; 689, 170 S. W. 37; Criminal Code of PracNewport v. Newport Light Co. 92 Ky. 449, tice, § 273; State v. Tugwell, 19 Wash. 17 S. W. 435; Wages v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 238, 43 L.R.A. 717, 52 Pac. 1056; Re Chad925; French v. Com. 30 Ky. L. Rep. 98, 97 wick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071; FishS. W. 427; Gordon v. Com. 141 Ky. 461, 133 back v. State, 131 Ind. 304, 30 N. E. 1088; S. W. 206.

Bloom v. People, 23 Colo. 416, 48 Pac. 519; Messrs. Hazelrigg & Hazelrigg also for Ex parte Turner, 3 Mont. D. & De G. 523; appellant.

Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130. And in United States v. Carroll, 147 Fed. , and also recognized to appear at the trial 947, although it was held that the evidence of an indictment, from appearing and givwas too unsatisfactory upon which to find ing evidence. McCarthy v. State, 89 Tenn. the accused guilty, beyond a reasonable 543, 15 S. W. 736. doubt, of an alleged attempt to influence a And in Partridge v. Partridge, Tothill, witness, the court said that “any direct 40, it appears that a man was committed attempt on the part of any person to bribe for terrifying a witness who was to be exor persuade a witness to testify contrary amined at a commission. to the truth in a cause pending and then on And see also Re Savin, supra, under trial,

where made so near the “Bribery;” French v. Com. infra, under “Incourt as is designated by the witnesses for ducing to disregard summons, subpæna, or the government, being not to exceed three recognizance;' and Ricketts v. State, infra, blocks away, constitutes, in legal contem- under “Subornation of perjury." plation, a direct contempt; that is to say, it constitutes misbehavior so near to the Inducing witness to evade service of sumcourt as to obstruct the administration of

mons or subpæna. justice.” And see also State v. Moore, and French is pending in court, and a summons requir

Where an indictment has been found and v. Com. infra, under “Inducing to disregarding the attendance as a witness in the case, summons, subpæna, or recognizance."

at an approaching term of the court, of

one whose name is indorsed on the indictIntimidation.

ment as a witness, has been issued and is in It is contempt of court to endeavor to in the hands of the sheriff to be served on him, timidate a witness in a pending action. it is contempt of court for one who knows Bromilow v. Phillips, 40 Week. Rep. 220;

these facts, for the purpose of preventing Shaw v. Shaw, 2 Swabey & T. 517, 31 L. J. the service of the summons, to remove the Prob. N. S. 35, 6 L. T. N. S. 477, 8 Jur: witness to a remote part of the county, N. S. 141; Re Herencia, 1 Porto Rico Fed. away from his ordinary place of residence,

and advise and direct him thus to avoid Rep. 207.

the service of the summons. Haskett v. Thus, it is a contempt of court for a party to a pending suit, who was in court State, 51 Ind. 176.

And under a statute providing that every when witnesses who had been sworn in the case were charged by the court not to talk court of record shall have power to punish to anybody, or permit anybody to talk to suit noticed for trial therein, while going

for unlawfully detaining any witness in a them, or in their presence, about the case, and knew of this charge and order, to talk to, remaining at, or returning from, the to the witnesses, either directly or indirect court, it is a contempt of court to counsel ly, with the expectation that they will hear the parties to a pending action, who has not

and induce a material witness for one of his remarks, the only effect, and only expect: vet been subpænaed to appear, to depart ed effect, of which could be that this would from the jurisdiction of the court, to avoid serve to intimidate the witnesses. Re Her the service of a subpæna. Montgomery v. encia, supra.

And it is contempt of court for a party Palmer, 100 Mich. 436, 59 N. W. 148. to a pending suit to attempt, by any com Inducing witness to disregard summons, munication, to intimidate a prospective witness for the other party in giving his evi

subpæna, or recognizance. dence. Shaw v. Shaw, supra.

It is contempt of court for one, with the Likewise, it is contempt of court to pre- intent to hinder and obstruct the adminisvent, by intimidation, a witness residing tration of justice in a court, by giving or in another state, who has been summoned offering money or bribes, or by threats of

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