the years above set forth. of lien to which one may enforce the equita- Sidney Arthur, | came parties and asserted a lien on tract No. 1 superior to all other liens except that of the Western & Southern Life Insurance Company. Thereafter appellant, Loretta B. Gibson, became a party to the action, and filed a petition alleging substantially the facts above set out. She further alleged that all the mortgages above referred to were in full force and effect at the time the taxes became delinquent and were paid by her, and that by reason of her payment of the taxes the mortgagees were benefited in that the owners of the buildings were enabled to pay interest on the the town, or to answer for his official default. It is only available to the public and for the public, and subject to the restraints and safeguards which public use and attendant public responsibility afford. . . No case has come to our attention where a collector who had extinguished all public interest in the taxes by full payment and satisfaction was afterwards permitted, unrestrained by the right of abatement or the general safeguards arising from public interest and superintendence, to pursue the delinquent taxpayers by means of the remedies incident to his former office, including the right of arrest and commitment. No man should be permitted to employ for his own personal benefits those drastic remedies devised solely and justified only to meet sovereign necessity; nor should any man be permitted to serve the most arbitrary proc So, in Repass v. Moore, 98 Va. 377, 36 S. E. 474, it was held that the plaintiff, who as county treasurer had paid taxes owing by the defendant, was not entitled to be subrogated to the lien of the county and state therefor. The court said that in this case the treasurer, without previous request or subsequent promise of indemnity, and with no assignment of the tax lien, if it were capable of assignment, voluntarily paid the tax which he now sought to recover, into the county and state treasuries; that there was no such duty imposed upon him, but that it was his voluntary act in derogation of the duty imposed upon him by law; and he was therefore not within the broadest and most comprehensive definition of the right of subrogation; but that it would not undertake to say that a case might not arise in which the right of subrogation would be enforced for the protection of a collector of taxes. And in Page v. Claggett, 71 N. H. 85, 51 Atl. 686, it was held that an agreement between a tax collector and a town, whereby the former for a sum of money guaranteed the town against loss on account of unpaid taxes, and the latter agreed that the tax warrants should continue in force until all the taxes were collected, was unauthorized and void. Regarding the assignability of the tax warrants, it was said: "Governmental necessity for prompt and efficient means of obtaining money to meet the public expense has brought into use, for the collection of taxes, instrumentalities which, applied in enforcement of ordinary obligations, would violate the most sacred rights of person and property. .. The propriety and legality of these summary and drastic measures when employed in the prescribed way for the public benefit, and under the restraints and safeguards which responsibility to the public imposes and provides, are unquestioned. But a tax warrant, with its peculiar attributes, is inseparable from the public for whose sovereign need it exists. It cannot be assigned with the taxes to whosoever will pay them, nor can it be employed by the collector to reimburse himself for taxes he has been compelled to pay for others, whether in fulfil ment of a special contract of guaranty with ess known to the law in his own behalf. The fact that after a certain time taxes are subject to extraordinary rate of interest should not be countenanced. It would enfurnishes a peculiar reason why such policy to official neglect, and open wide the door courage official speculation, offer a premium to oppression and abuse." It was held also in Page v. Claggett, supra, that the authority to collect on the tax warrants as the assignee of the town was not given the collector by a statute providing that his powers should continue until all the taxes in his list were collected, the court regarding the taxes within the meaning of the statute, when as "collected," paid by the collector to the town. To permit tax warrants and the remedies for the collection of taxes to be assigned would afford such opportunity for abuse and oppression that legislative authorization should not be found except upon clear enactment to that effect. Ibid. And it was held in Page v. Claggett, supra, that a taxpayer whose taxes the collector had advanced to the town, pursuant to the agreement, was subject to arrest for nonpayment thereof, as the payments by the collector were inoperative, the tax still remained due, and the warrants were enforceable by the collector for the town's benefit. In White v. State, 51 Ga. 252, it was held that a tax collector who had settled with the state and county for taxes uncollected by that payment was made by appellant. Appellant asked that she be subrogated to the liens of the city, county, and state for the taxes so paid by her, and that her liens be adjudged superior to all other liens or encumbrances on the two parcels of land. A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and the petition dismissed. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. mortgage liens, which the mortgagees county clerk noted on his books the fact would not otherwise have received. It was further alleged in her petition that the liens for said taxes were not to be canceled, but that the delinquent tax collector and the county clerk were to make such entries on their books as would show that such tax bills had been paid by and assigned to the plaintiff, in order that the lien for the same might remain unimpaired. The delinquent tax collector indorsed on the city tax bills the fact that payment was received of appellant, and that the bills, including interest and penalties, were assigned to her. The him was not entitled to the immunity from judicial interference allowed by statute to the state in the collection of taxes. Although subrogation to the rights of the public of one voluntarily advancing money to pay the tax on property in which he had and claimed no interest has been generally denied, there are several cases in which, under special statutes, the right of subrogation has been upheld. Thus, in Hart v. Tiernan, 59 Conn. 521, 21 Atl. 1007, it was held that under the statutes applicable to the case requiring a tax collector to pay over all taxes, whether collected or not, within one year after they became due, and providing that if any taxes remained unpaid to the collector after settlement, he might maintain an action in his own name and recover the same, a tax collector who had accounted for uncollected taxes of the defendant succeeded to the rights and remedies of the public as to the tax liens, and might maintain an action in his own name to foreclose the same, and this, too, without an assignment of the liens. See also Cole v. Rice, 74 Conn. 680, 51 Atl. 1083, recognizing the right of a tax collector in that state to succeed to all the rights under a tax lien that can be asserted by the municipality. And subrogation of a county treasurer to the right of the state and county was said in Schaum v. Showers, 49 Ind. 285, to arise under the Indiana statute providing that whenever any county treasurer or collector shall have charged himself with and accounted for a tax that shall not have been paid to him, such tax shall be deemed as due to him personally, whether in or out of office, and may be collected by him in the same way as other taxes due and unpaid are collected. It was held, however, in this case, that a treasurer who had advanced money for taxes was not entitled to a lien on the property prior to that of mortgagees, by virtue of a statute providing that if he on a settlement stands charged with taxes remaining unpaid, and does not receive a credit therefor, he may collect the tax for his own use, at any time within a year after settlement, by distress and sale or by an action of debt in his own name. Under the Indiana statute an assignee of a county treasurer who had accounted for Briefly stated, appellant's contention is that, as she paid the taxes at the instance of the owners of the property, and with the distinct agreement that she was to be taxes uncollected was held in State ex rel. Riley v. Taggart, 148 Ind. 431, 47 N. E. 831, not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to place the taxes on tax duplicate for collection for her benefit, where no excuse was offered for not attempting to collect the tax out of the personal property within a year, and nearly twenty years had elapsed since the payment by the treasurer, during which, it was insisted, the real estate had passed to innocent parties. The court said it was true that if the taxes were still due the state, the lien would continue in its favor until they were paid, but that the assignee of the treasurer had no such right. The general rule was laid down in Title Guarantee & T. Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1308, 89 N. E. 1082, 1085, 17 Ann. Cas. 1131, on facts not within the scope of the note, that there is nothing in the nature of a lien for taxes or assessments, or in the fact that such lien exists in favor of a sovereign taxing power, to prevent the application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation when justice demands it. That a purchaser of land of a corporation on foreclosure, who, before the sale is approved or he has complied with his bid, voluntarily pays a claim for taxes, without knowledge of any dispute as to its validity, and is denied credit therefor when completing his purchase, may be subrogated to the claim for such part of the taxes as the property was clearly subject to, see Walters v. Charleston Mills, 48 L.R.A. 503, 40 C. C. A. 108, 99 Fed. 825. In Thomas v. Hammer, 13 Lea, 620, it was held that a tax collector who had accounted for taxes on land sold by him therefor, and bid in for the county, the sale not being recognized as valid, was entitled to be subrogated to the lien of the state and county for the tax. Under a provision of the Municipal Code that assessments may be recovered or the lien enforced in the name of the corporation, an assignee from a municipality of a claim for a sewer assessment cannot sue upon it in his own name, although the Code expressly authorizes the assignment of such claims. Scully v. Ackmeyer, 2 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. 296. R. E. H. subrogated to the rights of the taxing au- | Inerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa, 410. Therefore, thorities, she is not a volunteer, and is in the absence of statutory authority, the therefore entitled to a lien on the property taxing officers upon whom these broad powunder and by virtue of the general doctrine ers are conferred have no authority to asof subrogation, applicable to cases where a sign tax claims and vest in the assignee third party, by agreement with the owner, the power to enforce their collection. This discharges a lien or encumbrance on the disposes of appellant's case in so far as she owner's land. 27 Cyc. 468. In this state we relies on the assignment by the delinquent have no statute authorizing assignment of tax collector. Counsel for appellant insist tax claims by the taxing authorities, and that appellant is not a volunteer because subrogating a stranger who pays taxes of the special agreement. It must be reunder an agreement with the owner that he membered, however, that a tax is not a debt will be so subrogated to the lien of the in the ordinary sense of the word, and is taxing authority. The only statutes which not therefore subject to the control of the we have on the subject provide that a lien parties. As neither the state nor any of holder, or the occupant or tenant of land, its municipalities may assign their tax or the bailee or person in possession of claims, we are unable to see upon what personal property, may pay the tax which theory or sound public policy it can be held the owner ought to pay, and recover from that the owner of property can, in effect, the owner, and give him. a lien on the prop- make such an assignment by procuring a erty taxed to secure the payment thereof. stranger in interest to pay the taxes under Kentucky Statutes, §§ 4032, 4033. We also an agreement that he will be entitled to subhave a statute providing that the purchaser rogation. If this were the rule, the effect of property at an invalid tax sale shall would be the same as if the taxing authorhave a lien on the property for the amount ity themselves had made the assignment. of taxes and costs paid by him, and for In our review of the authorities bearing which the property is liable. Section 4036. on the question, we have been unable to Aside from the authority contained in these find any well-considered case holding that statutes, it is also generally held that a a stranger who has no interest to protect person who has an interest in property, and is entitled to subrogation where he paid who, in order to protect that interest, is the taxes under a mere agreement with the compelled to pay the taxes thereon, is en- owner that he was to be subrogated. In titled to subrogation. This rule is applied every case we have been able to find, subin favor of mortgagor and mortgagee, ven- rogation is applied under the authority of dor and vendee, grantor and grantee, ten- particular statutes, or on the ground that ants for life, tenants in common, lessor the payment was made to protect some and lessee, executors, etc. Cooley, Tax. property right. We are not therefore dispp. 812-824. Then, too, in some jurisdic-posed to hold that all the machinery for coltions subrogation is allowed where payment is made under a mistake as to ownership (Kemp v. Cossart, 47 Ark. 62, 14 S. W. 465; Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555, 2 N. W. 395; Ingersoll v. Jeffords, 55 Miss. 37; Schaefer v. Causey, 8 Mo. App. 142), though this doctrine is denied by the Federal Supreme Court (Iowa Homestead County v. Valley R. Co. [Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co.] 17 Wall. 153, 21 L. ed. 622). In the case before us appellant had no interest whatever in the property. She did not pay the taxes under a mistake that she owned the property. She paid the taxes at the instance and request of the owner, and under an agreement that she was to be subrogated to the lien of the city, county, and state. As before stated, there is no statute in this state conferring on tax collecting officers the power to assign tax claims. The state and its various subdivisions are given broad powers in matters of taxation. These powers are conferred on state and municipal officers to be exercised by them, and not to be delegated to others. Mc lecting taxes may be turned over to an entire stranger in interest under and by virtue of a mere agreement made with the owner of the property. In our opinion, sound public policy forbids it. Powers intended to be exercised by public officers would be conferred on private individuals. Not only so, but mortgagees and other lien holders would be frequently placed at a great disadvantage. They might go on for years in the belief that the taxes had been regularly paid by the owner, only to find that they had been paid by a stranger who was asserting a lien on the land in an amount sufficient practically to destroy the value of their security. There is no merit in the contention that mortgagees would not be prejudiced. If the taxes were paid by the owner, the lien would be discharged. If paid by a stranger, the lien would continue in force. If not paid by the owner, and the law did not permit a stranger in title to pay them, the mortgagees could take prompt steps to protect their interests. While not a volunteer in the ordinary sense of that word, ap pellant was a volunteer in its legal sense, for subrogation to the lien of the taxing authorities upon the payment of the taxes was not authorized by any statute, nor was it necessary to protect any interest which she had in the property. We, therefore, conclude that, in the absence of a statute authorizing subrogation, a mere stranger who has no interest in the property to protect, but who pays the taxes thereon merely under an agreement with the owner that he should be subrogated to the lien of the taxing authorities, is not subrogated to such lien as against persons having valid liens on the property. Judgment affirmed. The general rule seems to be that one who boards a train not scheduled to stop at his destination may be required to leave the train at the first regular stopping place prior thereto, if there be one; if the first regular stop is beyond his destination, he must pay fare to such place, and on refusal the train may be stopped and he must get off or suffer ejection. As subsequently shown, there is some conflict as to the rights and duty of the passenger when he has been misdirected by an employee. That a rule that certain trains only shall stop at certain stations is a reasonable rule which a railroad company has the right to prescribe in the absence of statutory regulation or prohibition has been held in Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carmichael, 90 Ala. 19, 9 L.R.A. 388, 8 So. 87; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, Ala. 66 So. 669; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Ark. 74, 14 S. W. 468, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 136; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 58 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Hancock v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 434, 85 S. W. 210; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miles, 100 Ky. 84, 37 S. W. 486; Duling v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 66 Md. 120, 6 Atl. 592; Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 77 Mo. 663; Sira v. Wabash R. Co. 115 Mo. 127, 37 Am. St. Rep. 386, 21 S. W. 905; Hutchinson v. Southern R. Co. 140 N. C. 123, knowingly boards a train not scheduled to stop there, although the gateman and brakeman made no objection to his boarding the train, if the conductor, upon ascertaining train would not stop, and advised him to his destination, informed him that the leave it at a suitable intermediate stopping place and wait for another train. (January 19, 1915.) PPEAL by defendant from a judgment A of the Circuit Court for Knox County in plaintiff's favor in an action brought to recover damages for defendant's alleged breach of duty in refusing to stop one of its trains at plaintiff's destination and permit him to alight therefrom. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Black, Black, & Owens, with Mr. Benjamin D. Warfield, for appellant: Defendant was not liable for carrying plaintiff past his destination. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miles, 100 Ky. 84, 37 S. W. 486; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Warfield, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 352, 98 S. W. 313; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cruse, 123 Ky. 463, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 299, 96 S. W. 821, 13 Ann. Cas. 593; Hancock v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 434, 85 S. W. 210; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Raine, 130 Ky. 454, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 753, 132 Am. 52 S. E. 253, 6 Ann. Cas. 22; Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 82 S. C. 478, 64 S. E. 418; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 S. W. 362, 4 Ann. Cas. 770; Texas & P. R. Co. v. White, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (Willson) 451, 17 S. W. 419; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bell, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 412, 87 S. W. 730; Albin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 95 S. W. 589; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ludlam, 6 C. C. A. 454, 13 U. S. App. 540, 57 Fed. 481. And it seems also to be a well-settled rule that it is the duty of a person about to take passage on a train to inquire when and how he can go or stop according to regulations, and if he makes a mistake which is not induced by the agents of the railroad company, he has no remedy against the company for the consequences. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Rosenberry, 45 Ark. 256, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 122; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carmichael, 90 Ala. 19, 9 L.R.A. 388, 8 So. 87; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, · Ala. - 66 So. 669; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nuzum, 50 Ind. 144, 19 Am. Rep. 703; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Hatton, 60 Ind. 12; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608, 5 Am. St. Rep. 780, 17 Pac. 54; Usher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 71 Kan. 375, 80 Pac. 956; Flood v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 80 S. W. 184; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miles, 100 Ky. 84, 37 S. W. 486; Duling v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 66 dict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000. The railroad company appeals. St. Rep. 400, 113 S. W. 495; Cincinnati, him to alight therefrom. There was a verN. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rose, Ky. 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 681, 115 S. W. 830; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Summers, 133 Ky. 684, 118 S. W. 926; Cook v. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. 160 S. W. 123. Mr. B. B. Golden for appellee. Plaintiff testified that he is now the president of the People's Bank at Pineville, and resides in that city, but that in January, 1912, he lived in a brick building about 250 yards from the depot at Ely's, a station in Knox county on defendant's line of rail Hannah, J., delivered the opinion of the road; that on January 17, 1912, he purcourt: J. P. Gaddie sued the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in the Knox circuit court to recover damages resulting from an alleged breach of its duty as a common carrier of passengers in refusing to stop one of its fast passenger trains at the place of plaintiff's destination and permitting Md. 120, 6 Atl. 592; Haskins v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 4 Ohio L. J. 951; Noble v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Okla. 534, 46 Pac. 483; Caldwell v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 467; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 82 S. C. 478, 64 S. E. 418; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 S. W. 362, 4 Ann. Cas. 770; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bell, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 412, 87 S. W. 730; Albin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 43 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 95 S. W. 589; Plott v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 63 Wis. 511, 23 N. W. 412; Schiffler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 96 Wis. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 35, 71 N. W. 97, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 121; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ludlam, 6 C. C. A. 454, 13 U. S. App. 540, 57 Fed. 481. So, an instruction that recovery may be had for failure to stop the train at a passenger's destination notwithstanding a regulation that such train shall not stop at such place, if a passenger boards it without knowing that it would not stop there, and is accepted as a passenger without protest, is erroneous where it ignores the duty of the passenger to exercise ordinary care to ascertain whether the train which was boarded was the proper train. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Campbell, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 35, 69 S. W. 451. But in Delmonte v. Southern P. Co. 2 Cal. App. 211, 83 Pac. 269, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 81, in affirming a judgment for ejection of a passenger who boarded a through train in reliance on its custom to stop at an intermediate station, it was held proper to instruct the jury to the effect that while it is the duty of a passenger before he takes a train to ascertain whether it will stop at his destination, yet he may depend on custom or wait until he gets express notice from some source of a change. And where, under the regulations of a railroad company, a freight train carries passengers to a certain station whenever there is necessity for handling freight at that station, and it is the custom, when no passengers are to be taken, to lock the caboose or to announce before leaving that no stop will be made there, one who has traveled on that train before has a right to chased from the defendant's ticket agent at Frankfort a ticket which entitled him to be transported to Elys, via Louisville; and that he left for home that afternoon. At Louisville he changed trains, boarding the next train out of Louisville for Corbin, arriving at Corbin about midnight. There it was again necessary to change trains, assume that such stop will be made, unless notified otherwise in the customary manner, and so is not bound to make special and independent inquiry. Wieland V. Southern P. Co. 1 Cal. App. 343, 82 Pac. 226. Liability for refusal to stop through train at passenger's destination. A railroad company which establishes reasonable rules and regulations for the running of its trains, incurs no liability because of failure to stop all its trains at every station, especially where there is no evidence that ample facilities and accommodations are not afforded to all who may desire to reach a particular station at which the train does not stop. Kyle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 105 C. C. A. 151, 182 Fed. 613. And especially has a railroad company the right to run through trains, where it is using the tracks of another company, and under a traffic arrangement it is bound not to do a local business. Flood v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 80 S. W. 184. So, in the absence of a special contract to that effect, a passenger has no right to require a train to stop at a particular station where, according to the regulations of the company, it is not scheduled to stop, and does not ordinarily stop. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cameron, 14 C. C. A. 358, 32 U. S. App. 67, 66 Fed. 709. Therefore where one boards a train, knowing before hand that it will not stop at his destination, he cannot recover damages for being carried past such destination. Texas & P. R. Co. v. White, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (Willson) 451, 17 S. W. 419. And one who, through his own fault or mistake, gets on a train which does not stop at his destination, cannot recover damages for refusal of the conductor to stop the train at such place, contrary to the regulations. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540. And where one boards a through train without making any effort to ascertain |