« AnteriorContinuar »
act of the defendant, producing a result for 28 R. I. 186, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 740, 66 Atl. which reason, and, as we believe, the weight 202; Armour & Co. v. Kollmeyer, 16 L.R.A. of authority, holds it responsible.
(N.S.) 1110, 88 C. C. A. 242, 161 Fed. 78; Human emotions and other mental states St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Murdock, naturally have a powerful influence upon 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249, 116 S. W. 139; Arhuman action and are factors which cannot thur v. Henry, 157 N. C. 438, 73 S. E. 211; be left out of the account. They must be Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 reckoned as part of the necessary sequence So. 927. A valuable note on the subject of intermediate causes. It is a basic princi- appears in 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49, appended to ple that, if the cause set in motion by the Huston v. Freemansburg, originally reported defendant operates continuously and direct. in 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl, 1022, although the ly upon another agency which, as a neces- case itself indicates an opinion opposed to sary consequence, affects a still different that here expressed. force by which injury is inflicted, the author It has been decided in some instances of the initial cause is responsible for the that if one, in the commission of an unfinal result. The difficulty lies in the ap- lawful act, excites in the mind of another plication of this fundamental doctrine. The a reasonable apprehension of personal danauthorities are apparently in hopeless con- ger, and in the endeavor of the latter to flict on this question, but it is believed escape his own act is the immediate cause that proper discrimination will reconcile of his death, the former is criminally rethem in this manner. If, under all the cir- sponsible as for homicide. Cox v. People, cumstances, in the exercise of ordinary care, 80 N. Y. 500; Adams v. People, 109 Ill. 444, a person can discern that his act will nat. 50 Am. Rep. 617, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 351; urally and probably result in harm of some Norman v. United States, 20 App. D. C. kind to another, but not necessarily fore- 494; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. Such seen as to the exact form of injury, the cases clearly recognize the induced fright former is liable in damages for the ensuing as one of the train of causes set in operacasualty. On the contrary, if no harmful tion by the defendant and culminating in result can reasonably be expected, or if the homicidal crime. The analogy holds there is no natural connection between the good in civil cases where the wrong comact of the defendant and the injury alleged, plained of is inaugurated by a negligent act no action will lie.
of the defendant, and continues naturally In this case, considering that a large through various concomitant and succeedblast was set off within 150 feet of the ing causes, including fright of the plaintiff, plaintiff's house from the overhanging hill to the injury in question. If criminal liaside, the jury was authorized to find that bility can be imputed in one case, civil acthe defendant could have foreseen that countability certainly attaches in the other. some sort of injury was liable to happen The defendant contends that the trial to the inmates of that house, so that it court erred in its instruction to the jury, would be liable for such hurt in whatever excepted to by the defendant, in assuming. form it occurred, however extended the con- in spite of the general issue, that the plaincatenation of causes between its initial act tiff had received an actual injury. In statand the resulting injury. On this branch of ing the case to the jury on the first cause the case, Mr. Chief Justice Winslow, in of action the court said: “The issues for Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 24 L.R.A. you to determine on that first cause of ac(N.S.) 1159, 123 N. W. 625, tersely says: tion are: (1) Was the defendant negligent “The principle here decided is that when in exploding the blast complained of? (2) physical injury flows directly from extreme Was the injury complained of by plaintiff fright or shock, caused by the ordinary caused by such an explosion, and, if so negligence of one who owes the duty of caused, was it the natural and proximate care to the injured person, such fright or result of such explosion ? (3) Was the shock is a link in the chain of proximate plaintiff guilty of any negligent or wrong. causation as efficient as physical impact ful act which contributed to and helped from which like results flow."
cause the injury?” The following citations justify the con- Whether the injury happened at all is clusion here set down: Gulf, C. & S. F. R. thus omitted from the calculation. This Co. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 47 L.R.A. 325, assumption of hurt seems to have 77 Am. St. Rep. 856, 54 S. W. 944, 7 Am. through the whole charge. A single excerpt Neg. Rep. 359; Kimberly v. Howland, 143 on that subject is sufficient. Referring to N. C. 398, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 545, 55 S. E. 778; the assessment of damages, the court said: Pankopf v. Hinkley, supra; Chesapeake & “In considering that question you are to 0. R. Co. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 45 L.R.A. take into consideration the pain and suffer(N.S.) 433, 152 S. W. 976; Hendrix v. ing the plaintiff Mrs. Salmi has endured Texas & P. R. Co. 40 Tex. Civ. App. 291,' and will endure as the natural result of 89 S. W. 461; Simone v. Rhode Island Co. the injury she received. You are also to
take into consideration the impairment of | for aggravation of a previous trauma, the health
through the injuries she re-judgment is reversed, and a new trial orceived for such time as
her health dered. has been impaired and will be impaired by reason of her injury, which impairment of Moore, Ch. J., and McBride and Ben. health has prevented her from attending son, JJ., concur. to or performing her usual and ordinary work, and also her pain and suffering which naturally results from the physical impact a consequence of the injury received.
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDI
CIAL COURT. In thus assuming that the plaintiff had received an injury, the court was in error.
CHARLES E. KOONTZ Yarnberg v. Watson, 13 Or. 11, 4 Pac. 296; Kelley v. Highfield, 15 Or. 277, 14 Pac. 744; BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMSalomon v. Cress, 22 Or. 177, 29 Pac.
PANY 439; Owens v. Snell, 29 Or. 483, 44 Pac. 827;
and Savage v. Savage, 36 Or. 268, 59 Pac. 461; NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, & HARTWest v. McDonald, 67 Or. 551, 136 Pac. 650. FORD RAILROAD COMPANY, Trustee.
Again, it was urged by the defendant that the plaintiff was afflicted with rupture
(220 Mass. 285, 107 N. E. 973.) prior to the June explosion, and there was evidence proper to be submitted to the jury
Judgment nonresident absence of on that subject. Apropos of this, the de
service. fendant requested the court to charge the
1. No judgment can be entered against a jury in substance that, not having pleaded foreign corporation which has appeared spethe same, the plaintiff could not recover cially for the purpose of pleading in abatefor aggravation of a rupture existing prior ment, or moving that the action be disto the first explosion; but the court re- missed, if no personal service of process is fused to so instruct. This is error within shown. the doctrine of Maynard v. Oregon R. & Garnishment - cars of a foreign corNav. Co. 46 Or. 15, 68 L.R.A. 477, 78 Pac. poration. 983; Dorn v. Clarke-Woodward Drug Co.
2. Cars of a foreign railroad company en65 Or. 516, 133 Pac. 351; Boatright v. Port- gaged in interstate commerce are not subland R. Light & P. Co. 68 Or. 26, 135 Pac. ject to garnishment when in possession of
a local company also engaged in interstate 771.
commerce, under an agreement by which the We think there was no material error in local company might transport to destinaallowing the plaintiff's witnesses to describe tion loaded cars coming into its possession, the condition of her premises as to the de- and employ the cars in its business for a posit of débris thereon when they were per diem compensation, where it would be there soon after the occurrence complained practically impossible for the local comof, especially as there was other testimony pany to carry on its business independently
of the arrangement. tending to show that the state of the property was the same as at the time of explosion. It was helpful in determining the
(February 26, 1915.) force of the blast and its effectiveness in Note. - Attachment or garnishment of frightening the plaintiff into the faint she
foreign railroad car. describes. It was erroneous to allow testimony concerning an alleged promise of This note is supplementary to the earlier the defendant's local manager to the plain- notes on the same subject appended to Wall tiff's husband that no blasting would occur
v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 64 L.R.A. 501, and while the latter was away from home. The Seibels v. Northern C. R. Co. 16 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1026. action is not predicated upon a breach of
Cars owned by a foreign railway company contract, but is one of pure tort, and hence which have temporarily come into the state the testimony should be confined to the in the course of interstate transportation, issues set out in the pleadings. On the through the agency of other carriers, are main question presented it was proper to subject to attachment under the state laws, hold that fright should be reckoned as one despite the provisions of the interstate of the causes in the succession leading to commerce act and of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258, the injury; but, for the error of assuming Comp. Stat. 1913, § 10058, securing conthe existence of hernia caused by the de: land, c. c. & st. L. R. Co. 217 U. S. 157,
tinuity of transportation. Davis v. Clevefendant, the admission of testimony about 54 L. ed. 708, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 823, 30 Sup. the manager's promise and the refusal to Ct. Rep. 463, 18 Ann. Cas. 907. instruct the jury against assessing damages And a foreign railroad company having a
folk County for determination by the ed. 1211, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Barrow S. S. Supreme Judicial Court of an action brought Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 101, 42 L. ed. 964, to recover damages for personal injuries 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. sustained by plaintiff while in defendant's Plaintiff's act in attaching by trustee employ, in which a motion by defendant process the defendant's cars in the custody for dismissal was allowed, and a motion by and possession of the trustee, within the the trustee to be discharged was denied. territorial jurisdiction of the superior court, Order of dismissal affirmed. Motion to be had no tendency to regulate interstate comdischarged granted.
merce, although indeed it might be indiThe facts are stated in the opinion. rectly affected thereby. Mr. Charles Toye, for plaintiff :
Rosenbush v. Bernheimer, 211 Mass. 146, If defendant desired to contradict the 97 N. E. 984, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1317; Davis officer's return, it should not have waived v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 217 U. its answer in abatement, and it then would S. 157, 54 L. ed. 708, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 823, have been entitled, as a matter of right, to 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463, 18 Ann. Cas. 907. have the facts in dispute found by the Mr. Frederick Foster, for defendant: jury, since a jury trial was claimed in the Service upon defendant was insufficient. case, and not waived.
Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Asso. O’Laughlin v. Bird, 128 Mass. 600; Oliver 215 Mass. 341, 102 N, E. 316; Lowrie v. Ditson Co. v. Testa, 216 Mass. 123, 103 N. Castle, 198 Mass. 82, 83 N. E. 1118; Kimtraffic contract with a local company can- | pired. The court said:
"One of the quesnot defeat an attachment of its cars within tions involved in this case was passed on by the state, because of the rights of the local this court in the case of Southern Flour & company under the contract, where the lat. Grain Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 127 Ga. 626, ter is not made a party to the proceeding. 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 853, 119 Am. St. Rep. 356, De Rochemont v. New York C. & H. R. R. 56 S. E. 742, 9 Ann. Cas. 437. We have Co. 75 N. H. 158, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 529, 71 been requested to review and overrule this Atl. 868.
decision. However, we think the ruling Attaching a car of a foreign railroad com- there made is correct, and will not disturb pany when found idle within the state, un it. We do not think the levy of an attachder a statute permitting it in order to ment against a nonresident railroad comenable local creditors to collect their debts, pany on one of its freight cars standing is not an unlawful interference with inter- empty and idle on the spur track of a railstate commerce. Ibid.
road in this state is invalid, and a sale Nor is it invalid under the Federal statute thereof cannot be enjoined on the ground giving railroad companies authority to that such levy and sale are an interference carry property on its way to other states, with interstate commerce or the duties of a and to contract with roads of other states, common carrier to the public, or
on the so as to form continuous lines of transporta ground that a part of the property of tion. Ibid.
a nonresident railroad corporation serving A state statute permitting the attachment the public as a common carrier cannot be of idle cars of foreign railroad companies is sold under attachment to pay its debts, but not invalid as tending to promote the evils the collection of the debt should be made by at which the interstate commerce act of the sequestration of the earnings of such Congress is aimed, nor as directly or in nonresident corporation, or on any other directly tending to defeat any of the pur. ferred to in the case cited supra. See also poses which Congress had in view when the ground referred to in the briefs of the counstatute was enacted. Ibid.
sel for the plaintiff. See the authorities reAnd where an attachment sued out by a Atlanta v. Grant, 57 Ga. 340; Drake, Atcreditor of a nonresident railroad company tachm. 7th ed. § 252a, p. 253; Kneeland, was levied upon one of its freight cars | Attachm. $ 321, p. 237. The fact that the standing idle and empty upon the spur | plaintiff held the car under the contract retrack of another railroad company, which ferred to would not make the levy of the atunder a contract with such foreign owner tachment on it illegal. If the plaintiff was was in possession of such car, with a right a hirer of the property in question, the to use, load, and send it beyond the limits judgment of the court granting the injuncof the state, and an order was obtained to tion, provided the plaintiff gave bond to sell the car after ten days' notice, it was return the car as provided for in the order, held in Southern R. Co. v. Brown, 131 Ga. was one of which the plaintiff cannot com245, 62 S. E. 177, upon the hearing of an plain in this case. Civil Code 1895, § 2913. application for injunction by the company An attachment can be levied on property of having such possession to prevent the sale a debtor, though hired to another before the of the car, that it was not error to grant attachment is issued. There is nothing in such injunction conditioned upon its giving Civ. Code 1895, 8 2913, preventing an atbond in a named sum to return the car to tachment from being levied on such propthe proper officers of the court after its erty, and we know of no other statute havright to use the car under the contract ex- ing such effect.”.
ball v. Sweet, 168 Mass. 105, 46 N. E. 409; , ton, 174 Mass. 208, 75 Am. St. Rep. 296, Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 205 U. S. 54 N. E. 538; Drake, Attachm. 3d ed. 452; 530, 51 L. ed. 916, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Cox v. Central Vermont R. Co. supra; Ros. Atty. Gen. ex rel. Corporation Comr. v. enbush v. Bernheimer, 211 Mass. 146, 97 Electric Storage Battery Co. 188 Mass. 239, N. E. 984, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1317; Johnson 74 N. E. 467, 3 Ann. Cas. 631.
v. Union P. R. Co. 145 Fed. 249, 29 R. I. There was no effectual attachment of de- 80, 132 Am. St. Rep. 799, 69 Atl. 298; Wall fendant's property.
v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 52 W. Va. 485, 64 Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Edwards L.R.A. 501, 94 Am. St. Rep. 948, 44 S. E. v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works, 168 294; Connery v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. Co. Mass. 564, 38 L.R.A. 791, 47 N. E. 502; 92 Minn. 20, 64 L.R.A. 624, 104 Am. St. Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217; Nye Rep. 659, 99 N. W. 365, 2 Ann. Cas. 347; v. Liscombe, 21 Pick. 263; Cox v. Central Michigan C. R. Co. v. Chicago & M. L. S. Vermont R. Co. 187 Mass. 596, 73 N. E R. Co. 1 Ill. App. 399; Southern Flour & 885; Staniels v. Raymond, 4 Cush. 314. Grain Co. v. Northern P, R. Co. 127 Ga.
The attachment was void under restric- 626, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 853, 119 Am. St. Rep. tions in the statutes upon the right to at- 356, 56 S. E. 742, 9 Ann. Cas. 437. tach freight cars.
The attachment would be an interfer. Cox v. Central Vermont R. Co. 187 Mass. ence with interstate commerce. 596, 73 N. E. 885.
Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 An unreasonable burden was imposed on U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. the trustee.
823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Dubuque & Van Camp Hardware & Iron Co. v. Plimp. S. C. R. Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584, 22
But in Pullman Co. v. Linke, 203 Fed., gress, the instrumentalities of interstate 1017, where a foreign sleeping car en route commerce transportation are, for the time from a city within the state to one with being, ‘immune from judicial process,' and out the state, while waiting at a junction are ‘put apart in a kind of civil sanctuary,' with its passengers, both intra and inter being, under such circumstances, exempt state, aboard to be picked up by a through from attachment and, of course, from executrain and taken to its destination, was at. tion as well, by reason of the provisions of tached under a state writ and forcibly held such acts for continuity of transportation by the sheriff, compelling the passengers to and avoidance of transshipment of freight disembark and accept other accommodations, and passengers. Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. it was held that, under $ 1 of the interstate & St. L. R. Co. 217 U. S. 176, 54 L. ed. 719, commerce act as amended June 29, 1906, 34 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 823, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468, Stat. at L. 584, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563, 18 Ann. Cas. 907. A sleeping car company, providing that the term "common carrier” it is true, by furnishing sleeping cars under as used in the act shall include sleeping a contract with a railroad company to be car companies, the car, at the time of the used by the traveling public, does not thereattachment, was an instrumentality of inter- by assume or acquire the status of a comstate commerce, and was not subject to at- mon carrier of goods or passengers, tachment under a state writ, which would unless declared to be such by some constidirectly interfere with its operation in tutional or statutory provisions. It merely such capacity. The court said: “That the furnishes accommodations to the passengers statute under which the seizure was made is of another company, and performs only an a valid state law, enacted to enable credi. auxiliary function in their transportation; tors to collect their debts, and for no other but it is nevertheless engaged in a public or ulterior purpose, and evinces no conscious calling.
Section 1 of the interstate purpose to regulate directly or indirectly commerce act as amended June 29, 1906, 34 interstate commerce, is not controverted; Stat. at L. 584, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563, nor is it claimed, nor can it be successfully provides that the term “common carrier' as asserted, that the acts of Congress relating used in that act shall include sleeping car to interstate commerce were intended to companies. By virtue of this statutory proabrogate the attachment laws of the state. vision, the plaintiff's status at the time of Within their proper sphere, the Federal the seizure of the car was in legal conacts are paramount; but beyond that, the templation the same as that of an interstate law, whose purpose is wholesome, is state carrier. The car, moreover, was an operative as against all that come within instrumentality of commerce, and was when its provisions. Davis v. Cleveland, C. C. & seized actually employed as such in interstate St. L. R. Co. supra. In that case the warn- | transportation. It is asserted by the plaining is sounded that interference with inter- tiff and denied by the defendants that, in state commerce by the enforcement of at- view of the facts disclosed, the acts of Contachment laws of a state must not be exag- gress, and the commerce clause of the nagerated. But when there is incompatibility tional Constitution, the car in question at between the obligations an interstate car- the time of its seizure was 'immune from rier has to its creditors and the obligations | judicial process. The views of the state it has to the public, either from the nature i courts, when required to decide upon the liaof its services or under the acts of Con- | bility of cars to judicial process when in
L. ed. 173; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas, \ 94 Am. St. Rep. 948, 44 S. E. 294; Connery 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co. 92 Minn. 20, 190; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 64 L.R.A. 624, 104 Am. St. Rep. 659, 99 N. 6 L. ed. 678; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 W. 365, 2 Ann. Cas. 347; Michigan C. R. Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Wabash, St. L. Co. v. Chicago & M. L. S. R. Co. 1 Ill. App. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 399; George D. Shore & Bro. v. Baltimore L. ed. 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 7 Sup. & O. R. Co. 76 S. C. 472, 57 S. E. 526, 11 Ct. Rep. 4; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Ann. Cas. 909; Pullman Co. v. Linke, 203 Murphey, 196 U. S. 194, 49 L. ed. 444, 25 Fed. 1017. Sup. Ct. Rep. 218, 2 Ann. Cas. 514; Cleve- Mr. John L. Hall, for the trustee: land, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 The attachment of the cars was void. U. S. 514, 44 L. ed. 868, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. Cox. v. Central Vermont R. Co. 187 Mass. 722; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 596, 73 N. E. 885; Hall v. Carney, 140 Mass. 122 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1 Inters. Com. 131, 3 N. E. 14. Rep. 306, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1126; Union P. R. The court will not require the trustee to Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343, 23 L. ed. 428; Re suffer pecuniary loss by reason of the atLennon, 166 U. S. 548, 41 L. ed. 1110, 17 tachment. Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. Coffee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. 34 Fed. 155 Mass. 21, 28 N. E. 1128; Bowers v. 481; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Penn- Connecticut River R. Co. 162 Mass. 312, 38 sylvania Co. 19 L.R.A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. N. E. 508; Foster v. New York, N. H. & Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Wall v. Norfolk & H. R. Co. 187 Mass. 21, 72 N. E. 331; Ladd W. R. Co. 52 W. Va. 485, 64 L.R.A, 501,' v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 193 Mass. given attitudes and employed in interstate Washington city, and being in the course commerce, have been discordant, as noted of transportation to another state, it had in the Davis Case. No attempt will be made ceased to be governed exclusively by the to review the cases there cited, or others of domestic law, and had begun to be and was a kindred character which diligent counsel governed and protected by the national law have pressed upon the court, or those in of commercial regulation.
The imwhich the courts have passed upon the right pounding of the car delayed (briefly though to levy upon instrumentalities employed in it was) the transportation of all the pasthe transportation of the United States mail sengers both in the car and on the train (Harmon v. Moore, 59 Me. 428; Parker v. to which it was to be attached, and, in disPorter, 6 La. 169), and which are claimed regard of their rights and the policy of Conto be analogous to the case at bar. The gress favoring continuous lines and continusituation of the car involved in the present ous carriage (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258, Comp. case was unlike not only that of any car Stat. 1913, $ 10058), enforced the transshipwhose seizure was under consideration in ment of interstate passengers. The transany of the cases cited, but also that of the portation of passengers from one state to instrumentalities employed in the carriage another is in its nature national, is comof the United States mails whose, attachmerce between the states, is beyond the ment provoked the rule announced in the reach of state legislation, and admits of and Harmon and the Parker Cases, respectively requires uniformity of regulation through The car was not empty or idle, or waiting Congress, affecting alike all the states. for return shipment, or unnecessarily de
The attachment levied on plaintiff's layed in the course of business, or in process car directly stopped, though temporarily, of loading or unloading, or awaiting the the delivery, and required the transshipment commencement of a journey or the next trip. of interstate passengers. It not merely inIt had already entered upon a lengthy and cidentally and indirectly affected interstate continuous journey, bearing interstate pas-commerce, but bore upon it so directly as to sengers who were in nowise connected with amount to its regulation. The state law, or concerned in the controversy between Gil- though enacted in the exercise of powers not lett and the plaintiff, and who had acquired controverted, may not be so used as to proby purchase from the railroad company and duce such a result, and the attachment must the plaintiff for the whole of their respective therefore be held invalid.
If the journeys the valuable contractual rights of writ of attachment is susceptible of the aptransportation and sleeping car accommoda- plication made of it by the defendants, lititions on that particular car.
The gants may at their pleasure cause the transswitching of it from one train to another shipment of interstate freight and paswas an essential part of its journey, and sengers with its incident delay, and thereby while being so switched it was still in use produce great inconvenience, discomfort, and in interstate commerce. The temporary sus- hardship, and necessarily interfere directly pension of its movements was but an inci- with the freedom of, interstate commerce, dent in, and did not take it out of, the continuous and rapid transportation, and course of its transportation, or impart to the conduct of carriers in the management it a local character only.
Having and disposition of their interstate business. started with its load of human freight on But this may not be done." W. W. A. its ultimate passage from Columbus to